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ABSTRACT
The Louisiana State Board of Health was the first
institution of its kind in the United States.

No other

state preceded Louisiana in establishing a permanent
organization for the promotion of public health.

During

the early years of its history, however, the State Board
of Health was engaged in a continuous battle for its very
life.

Those who opposed it were influential and artic

ulate.
The foremost public health issue in New Orleans during
the nineteenth century was the value of maritime quaran
tine.

When the Louisiana Board of Health came into ex

istence in 1

future depended to a great extent

upon whether it could prevent another yellow fever epi
demic from descending upon New Orleans and surrounding
communities.

The great epidemic of 1B53 was the major

factor leading to the creation of the State Board.

The

act which set up this institution also provided a state
quarantine.

The Board was to administer the quarantine.

No one could be certain whether the quarantine actually
averted yellow fever epidemics, but those opposed to it
could point out that millions of dollars in trade were
being lost to New Orleans because presumably infected

iv

vessels were required, to stop at Mississippi Quarantine
Station, some seventy miles below the Crescent City.
These ships were required to undergo inspection, cleans
ing, and disinfection at their own expense.
Although the continued existence of the State Board
of Health depended tc a great extent upon the success of
the quarantine, the Board was also charged with main
taining a sanitation program in New Orleans.

Its success

in promoting sanitary reform was not particularly great
until after the Civil War, however.

Beginning in 1S66

the Board introduced new measures which gradually, over
came the Crescent Ci ty ’s uneviable reputation for filth.
A new complication was added to the quarantine
controversy in 1$79 by the establishment of the National
Board of Health.

The National Board, which, like the

Louisiana Board, was seeking to prevent the importation
of yellow fever and other diseases believed to be con
tagious, needed the cooperation of state and local boards.
The Louisiana Board, jealous of its supposed prerogatives,
refused to comply with the most important requests of the
federal agency.

In this struggle state health authori

ties were eventually victorious.

The Louisiana State

Board of Health was determined to carry on its fight
against imported pestilence without assistance or inter
ference from- the outside.
This study is based largely upon primary sources.

v

Very little secondary material pertaining to the develop
ment of the State Board of Health during the nineteenth
century exists.

Contemporary newspapers, medical jour

nals, and medical periodicals, as well as the official
reports of the State Board itself have provided the
greatest amount of information utilized.

CHAPTER I
YELLOW FEVER PERPLEXES NE’
.V ORLEANS
Louisiana was the first state to establish a board of
health.

Local boards of health had been created by port

cities on the Eastern seacoast as early as the eighteenth
century,'*' but not until Louisiana took action in 1$55 was
there a state agency for the promotion of public health.
The Louisiana State Board of Health remained a unique or2
ganization until after the Civil War.
The establishment
of the Board was the result of a popular clamor for quar
antine protection against the importation of the dreaded
yellow fever.

Although its primary purpose was to function

as a quarantine agency, the Board did not find smooth sail
ing since the enforcement of a rigid quarantine was opposed
by a formidable majority of the mercantile and shipping
interests as well as oy most of the medical men in the state.

■^Baltimore organized a board of health in 1793;
Philadelphia followed in 1796.
Boston established a similar
organization in 1799 with Paul Revere as its chairman.
It
is possible that Petersburg, Virginia had a municipal board
of health earlier than any of those cities, but the records
have been lost.
Wilson G. Smillie, Public Health: Its
Promise for the Future (New York, 1955), p. 77.
^Massachusetts owns the distinction of having
created the second state board of health in 1B69.
Ibid.,
p. 317.

1

2
Over and above the basic question of the validity of quar
antine measures, the Louisiana State Board of Health found
itself repeatedly involved in disputes with other health
boards over the matter of jurisdiction in enforcing quaran
tine laws.

This unfortunate situation resulted primarily

from the quandary in which the medical profession, as well
as the general public, found itself regarding the cause of
yellow fever epidemics.

The Board was to have a stormy

history until this riddle was satisfactorily resolved.
The exact hearth area of yellow fever has never been
ascertained with finality, although the prevalent belief is
that the disease originated on the west coast of Africa and
3
was brought to the W e st er n.Hemisphere by slave ships.
During the seventeenth century a number of pestilential sick
nesses having some of the characteristics of Yellow Jack were
recorded in. the American colonies,

but in all probability,
li
the initial appearance of real "black vomit" in this country
5

occurred at Boston in 1693.

Cotton JViather noted in his Diary:

■^John Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America (Baton
Rouge, 1953), p. 139.
This study accords with the findings
of Henry Rose Carter, the foremost authority on the early
history of yellow fever.
See Henry Rose Carter, Yellow
Fever, An Epidemiological and Historical Study of Its
Place of~Origin, Laura A. Carter and Wade H. Frost, eds.
(Baltimore, 1931).
^Yellow fever was often called "black vomit" because
a principal symptom of the disease was the vomiting by the
afflicted of blood that had been partly digested in the
stomach and was therefore dark brown or black in color.
5
Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, p. 141.

"In the Month of July a most pestilential Feaver, was brought
among us, by the Fleet coming into our Harbour from the WestIndie s. ”

The disease, continued Mather, had "very direful

Symptoms,

of turning Yellow, vomiting and bleeding every way
£
and so Dying."
Within a few years Philadelphia and Charles
ton were scourged by severe outbreaks.

During the eighteenth

century the coastal cities of the entire Atlantic seaboard
were subject to an alarming number of invasions of epidemic
yellow' fever.
Fortunately,

Louisiana escaped the yellow pestilence

throughout the French period and during most of the Spanish
period of her history.

The precise date of the introduction

of this scourge into New Orleans has remained the subject of
some doubt.

George Augustin records several years: 1769,

1791, 1793, 1794, and 1795, any one of which may have wit
nessed the first cases of Yellow Jack in the Crescent City.
Augustin then states that the "first authentic invasion of
7

New Orleans" occurred in 1796.

John Duffy, after carefully

weighing the very fragmentary evidence that yelloiw fever
had been present in Louisiana before this date, agrees that
"there is no conclusive proof of its existence prior to

^ Diary of Cotton Mather, 1661-1706, Massachusetts
Historical Society Colle"ctions, Seventh Series (Boston,
1911), VII, 166-67.
^George Augustin,
Orleans, 1909), p. 66S.

History of Yellow Fever

(New

1796."^

During the succeeding century New Orleans, and to

a lesser extent the rural areas of Louisiana, were plagued
almost perennially by this mysterious disease which approached
without warning and took the lives of many thousands in the
lower Mississippi Valley.
Until the latter half of the nineteenth century the
state of Louisiana made no concerted effort to provide for
o
the accurate collection of vital statistics and other perti
nent public health data.

This fact makes an evaluation of

the extent and the impact of the numerous epidemics exceed
ingly difficult;
hopeless one.

outside of New Orleans the problem is a

Hence the history of the prevalence of yellow

fever in Louisiana throughout most of the century is restrict
ed primarily to the repercussions felt in the s tate’s metrop
olis,

Luckily for medical historians,

several remarkably

able physicians were numbered among the residents of the
Crescent City during the ante bellum period.

Not only were

these men usually successful in the practice of their chosen
profession, but they, in many instances, found time to do an
amazing amount of writing.

Among all these medical men the

foremost topic of the time was the perplexing enigma— yellow
fever.

^John Duffy, ed., The Rudolph Matas History of Medi
cine in Louisiana (Baton Rouge"j 1958), I, 206-207.
CiteH
hereinafter as Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana.
^Records of births, deaths,

and marriages

5
The epidemiologists were certainly justified in the-in
tense concern they manifested in yellow fever.

As the decades

of the nineteenth century passed into history, it became
evident to all except the most confirmed wishful thinkers
that Yellov.r Jack was not to be easily conquered,

and that

Louisiana would continue to experience periodic assaults until
the cause of the pestilence was finally determined.

J. D. B.

DeBow, in attempting to publicize the salubrity of New Orleans,
offered to his readers the feeble consolation that in nine of
the twenty-four summers between 1822 and 1845 only scattered
cases had been detected, and during one summer the dreaded
malady had been totally a b s e n t . D u f f y has found that de
spite brief respites from the worst attacks, yellow fever
invasions remained a constant problem in New Orleans between
1804 and i860 and demonstrated no tendency to subside.

At

times it seemed as though the city had been struck by a tidal
wave of death.

In addition to these visitations of yellow

fever, residents of the Crescent City underwent two great
onslaughts of Asiatic cholera during the pre-Civil War years.
The 1332-33 incursion took the lives of well over five thou
sand, and during the eight-year period between 1343 and 1355

■^J. D. B. DeBow, ed, pie Commercial Review of the
South and West (New Orleans, 1846), II, 73.
Cited hereinafter
as DeBowT s Review.
Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, Vol. 1, pp.
345-72 and Vol. 2, manuscript in progress.

nearly ninety-five hundred New Orleanians succumbed.

Other

sections of lower Louisiana as well as numerous river local
ities were also ravaged by the oriental assailant.
fever, however,

Yellow

attacked the state with terrifying regularity,

focusing attention immovably upon Africa’s contribution to
Louisiana’s infirmity rather than As i a’s.
Through persistent efforts by a number of physicians,
most notably Carlos Finlay and Walter Reed, the cause of
epidemic yellow fever was discovered early in the twentieth
century.

Several nineteenth century physicians had noted un

usually large numbers of mosquitoes during years when Yellow
Jack prevailed, but the difficulty was in finding the vital
connection.

In 1SS2 an article appeared in the New Orleans

Medical and Surgical Journal written by Dr. Carlos Finlay of
Havana propounding the revolutionary theory that the mosquito
was the carrier of yellow fever.
discoveries was not immediate,

13

Acceptance of Finlay’s

but within the next two decades

his findings were corroborated, and the riddle was solved-the Aedes aegypti mosquito was the vector of yellow fever.
Before the truth was established, however, many Louisianians,
both physicians and laymen, acknowledged their adherence to

Joseph Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs
Orleans, IB 9 0 ), Vol. 3, Part I, p. cccvi.

(New

Carlos Finlay, "The Mosquito Hypothetically Con
sidered as an Agent in the Transmission of the Yellow Fever
Poison,” New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n, s. f

ix (la&L-sn,T r a i n s . ------------------ ----------------

a number of other theories quite at variance with what
proved to be the real cause of the frequent epidemics.
Most nineteenth century writers can be classified into
one of three schools of thought with regard to their theories
of yellow fever transmission.

First, there were the conta-

gionists who believed that the disease was transferred from
person-to-person.

A splinter group of contagionists insisted

that the yellow pestilence could not be transmitted by per
sonal contact,

but was disseminated by fomites

peculiarly capable of absorbing, retaining,
infection).

(substances

and transmitting

Many of the contagionists believed that yellow

fever could be transmitted in both of these ways.

Vital to

this theory was the assumption that the contagion was import
ed from sane foreign source.

A second group, opposed to the

contagionists, were the non-contagionists.

The non-contagion-

ists can be subdivided into various categories, but in gen
eral they claimed that Yellow Jack was a disease of local
origin and prevailed at certain times because of the presence
of "miasma” or of an "epidemic constitution" of the atmos
phere.^

Between these two bitterly antagonistic factions

were those who alleged that yellow fever was contagious only
under certain conditions, and those who maintained that it
was imported in certain instances while arising spontaneously

■^These terms will be discussed in some detail in
the following paragraph.

in others.'
The first decade of American independence saw still
another concept as to the cause of disease gain support
among physicians in this country.

Those who adhered to

this creed contended that all illness was simply a conse
quence of ’’bad air. ”

The environment was contaminated by

miasmata (the plural of miasma), imaginary, invisible gases
which supposedly arose from stagnant water and decaying plant
and animal matter.

The great popularizers in the United

States of this theory were Noah Webster and Dr. Benjamin
Rush.

For nearly a century it was to remain the predominant

etiological dogma among American doctors.

16

Some theorists chose to combine the miasma credo with
the ancient concept that there w»as at times an epidemic con
stitution of the atmosphere.

Hippocrates had emphasized

meteorological variations and seasonal characteristics as
factors in promoting epidemics.

A particular state of the

atmosphere had a tendency to produce certain diseases.

This

theory survived the Middle Ages and was elaborated upon in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by such eminent men
as the French physician Guillaume de Baillou (153^-1616) and

IS

The terms ’’contagious” and ”infectious” were elu
sive ones during the nineteenth century.
They were often
used interchangeably.
Some writers did differentiate the
terms, contending that a contagious disease could be trans
mitted only by personal contact, whereas an infectious
disease was capable of being transmitted not only by per
sonal contact, but also by air, water, and fomites.
■^Snillie,

Public Health, pp. 9-11.

the English clinician,

Thomas Sydenham (1624-1639).

Sydenham

not only coined the term epidemic constitution, but he also
has been credited with being the first man to detect the
mysterious presence of miasma.

These notions persisted until

comparatively recent times and played a major role in en
couraging sanitary reforms during the nineteenth century.
Miasma, thought reformers, was an enemy which could be and
17
should be vigorously assailed.
Two of ante bellum New Orleans1 most distinguished
physicians,

Edward H. Barton and Erasmus D. Fenner, wrote

extensively in defense of the epidemic constitution as the
causation for disease.
sanitary reformers,

Both men were prolific writers, ardent

and noted yellow fever etiologists.

Barton, professor of materia medica, therapeutics,

and hygiene

at the Medical College of Louisiana, made himself one of the
c i t y ’s most controversial figures by his argumentiveness, his
presumption,

and his fearlessness in promoting measures he

believed conducive to public health.

Barton was especially

zealous in his advocacy of keeping accurate meteorological
charts.

In his account of the yellow fever epidemic which

prevailed in New Orleans in 1333 Barton commenced with a
discussion of thermometric and barometric readings, contending
that such climatic factors tended to produce,
an "epidemic constitution of the atmosphere."

17
’George Rosen,
1933), pp. 103-105.

in his words,
He then

A History of Public Health (New York.

10
considered other causative factors, notably the filth in the
lg
streets.
More than twenty years later, in an address de
livered to the Louisiana State Medical Society, Barton
stated:

f,I suppose I shall be deemed an enthusiast when 1

express my belief, that when all the meteorological elements
that influence man shall have become well understood, that
the prevalence of each of the great classes of maladies will
be known to the accurate meteorological observer.

• « .”19

Barton repeatedly defended his position in writing.
1356 he stated:

In

TTThe character of a fever will, in a great

measure, depend upon the degree of temperature and humidity,
the amount of filth, and the susceptibility of those exposed."

20

His thesis is further clarified by this excerpt

from an 1365 speech:

"Filth is the electric spark which

fires the other elements.

Typhus, smallpox, yellow fever,

measles, and many other diseases, as well as all intermittents,

21

may be, in my opinion, generated, without foreign

1a
Edward H. Barton, Account of the Epidemic Yellow
Fever, which prevailed in New Orleans during the Autumn of
1333 (Philadelphia, 133417 pp. 3-7.
^ % e w Orleans Medical Nev/s and Hospital Gazette,
II {1355-55)7 352:
20
Edward H. Barton, "Report on the Meteorology,
Mortality, and Sanitary Condition of New Orleans, for the
Years 1354 and 1355j1’ Transactions of the American Medical
Association, IX (1356), 729*

21

Types of malarial fever*

11
importation."

22

But above all, Barton was a reformer.

Early in 1B49 he delivered a warning that unless New Orleans
were cleared and drained, a proper sewerage system adopted,
the streets paved, the gutters cleansed regularly, as well
as some other laudatory improvements, "a large mortality will
inevitably ensue, together with such an occasional epidemic,
with its devastating horrors, as will cast a lasting stigma
on the salubrity of the place, and retard its permanent ad
vancement to a prosperous and stable condition."

Should his

recommendations be honored, Barton confidently predicted
that his city would become the healthiest in the country.

23

Dr. Erasmus D. Fenner, during his long career as writer,
instructor, and practitioner, was co-editor of both the New
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal and the New Orleans
Medical News and Hospital Gazette, the cityTs outstanding
ante bellum medical periodicals, and was the editor and
founder of the short-lived, but valuable, Southern Medical
Reports.

He served on the faculty of the Medical College

of Louisiana, and was instrumental in establishing the New
Orleans School of Medicine.

As a student of yellow fever,

Fenner agreed with Barton that a knowledge of meteorological

^^Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, LV (1$46),
729.
23Edward H. Barton, Vital Dynamics of New Orleans;
£ Report to the American Medical Association, M a y , 1#49
TPhilad elphia, 1^49)> P» 19.

12
variations was basic to the understanding of all disease.
The first chapter of each of his Southern Medical Reports
was devoted to a study of climatic conditions in New Orleans.
Fenner had great faith in sanitary reform, believing that
yellow fever could be completely eliminated from the Crescent
City if proper measures were t a k e n . ^

It was his conviction

that the practice of quarantine in Louisiana had to be thor
oughly discredited in order that essential undertakings,

jl.

_e., sanitary measures, would become the center of attention.
Careful observers, he maintained, were of the opinion that
yellow fever originated in New Orleans and was not conta25
gious. '

Fenner probably ranks as the foremost figure

among the Crescent City’s non-contagionist faction.
Among others classified as non-contagionists was the
noted New Orleans sanitary leader, Dr. J. C. Simonds.
Simonds* work, which included valuable statistical studies,
will be discussed in chapter two.

In concluding this

account of the non-contagionists, the following somewhat
ungrammatical statement from Dr. William B. Wood, a Centreville, Louisiana physician, summarizes well their viewpoint:
I believe the poison that gives rise to
yellow fever, to exist in the atmosphere.
Is

2% e w Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette,
II. (1S55-55T7 500-501.
2^e . D. Fenner, "The Yellow Fever Quarantine at
New Orleans," Transactions of the American Medical Asso
ciation, II (1849), 625.

13
generated under peculiar circumstances,
requiring the influence of certain degrees
of heat and moisture, added to animal
vegetable decomposition.
That this power,
when generated, is of local origin, and
confined to circumscribed districts of
country, or portions of our country, and
all who enter within the infected circle,
and breathe tpe air, are liable to take
the disease.2°
The contagionists, rejecting the miasma thesis and
seeing no great importance in meteorology,

favored a mari

time quarantine as the best means of protecting the Crescent
City from epidemic disease.

Within the medical profession

of pre-Civil War New Orleans, however, the quarantine fac
tion was not strong.

Only a small minority of physicians

were contagionists, and very few others among the city’s
influential citizens manifested any anxiety to carry on
an experiment that might prove injurious to the prosperity
of their city.

Usually it was physicians from localities

farther upstream, less concerned about the commercial activ
ities of the Mississippi's great entrepot, who urged that
quarantine regulations be enacted against vessels coming
from infected ports.

These men believed correctly that

Yellow Jack had often been brought into New Orleans on
board ships from the West Indies, and that the entire
Mississippi Valley was thereby made subject to pestilence.
The history of maritime quarantine goes back to the

2^William B. Wood, T,A Report of the Yellow Fever,
at Centreville, in 1$55>M New Orleans Medical News and
Hospital Gazette, II (Id55-5^), 493*

14
fourteenth century.

27

'

The term quarantine is derived from

the word quarantenaria, a period of forty days which a ship
supposedly impregnated with contagious disease, or suspected
of having sailed from an infected port, was forbidden interosi

course with its destination.

The first quarantine adopted

in North America was evidently that which Governor John
V/inthrop of the Massachusetts Bay colony directed against
29
Barbados in 1647.
Various forms of quarantine continued
to be utilized throughout the colonial e r a , ^

Immediately

after the American Revolution the new states assumed re
sponsibility for the health of their citizens by enacting
legislation providing for snip q u a r a n t i n e . H o w e v e r ,

the

concluding decade of the eighteenth century brought several
vicious assaults of yellow fever to the Atlantic seaboard,
and a question arose as to the efficiency of state quarantine
laws.32

^ R o s e n points out that Venice inaugurated the
practice in 134&. Rosen, History of Public Health, p. 6S.
28lbld . , p. 69; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever,
p. 6.
^ El izabeth C. Tandy, "Local Quarantine and Inoc
ulation for Smallpox in the American Colonies (1620-1775),"
American Journal of Public Health, XIII (1923)* 203.
3i3Smillie, Public Health, pp. 64-67.
33,Ibid., p. 71.
3^1791* 1793, 1794, and 1795 were years of especially
severe epidemics.
Joseph Jones, Outline of the History,
Theory, and Practice of Quarantine (New Orleans, 18$3)»
pp. 9-10.

In 1796 the Fourth Congress of the United States,
meeting in Philadelphia (one of the cities hardest hit by
yellow fever} considerea the advisability of granting the
federal government the exclusive duty of establishing and
maintaining quarantine.

Representative Samuel Smith of

Maryland proposed a resolution authorizing the President to
impose quarantine against foreign vessels whenever, in his
opinion, it was necessary.

The House Committee on Commerce

and Manufactures considered the resolution and reported a
bill empowering the President to provide for quarantine
stations in American ports as well as giving him authority
to proclaim quarantines at his discretion.

Serious opposi

tion was voiced against this bill because it seemed to be
depriving the states of their police powers in the area of
public health.

Mention was also made of the inconvenience

presumably involved in having a general quarantine main
tained by an authority many hundreds of miles away.

Repre

sentative Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania was convinced that
the only clause in the Constitution which would at all coun
tenance a federal quarantine was the commerce clause, and
that seemed to be stretching the point.
In the billfs defense Congressman Smith argued that the
states were incapable of forcibly preventing infected vessels
from entering their ports, and therefore broader control was
needed.

The bill finally approved was materially weaker than

the original.

Certain federal officers were empowered merely

to assist the respective states in the execution of their
quarantines.

Three years later this law was superseded by

16
the Quarantine Act of 1799 which somewhat enlarged the powers
of the federal government, at the same time reserving to the
states the primary authority in most matters pertaining to
quarantine, 33
The state of Louisiana had two significant experiences
with quarantine legislation early in the nineteenth century.-^
The first law was enacted in March, 1&18.

It contained pro

visions specifying which vessels were to be inspected, when
they were to be inspected, the length of time they were to
be kept in quarantine, the charge for this service, and the
amount of fine that violators of the statute would be required
to pay,

35
A quarantine station with a lazaretto ' was to be

constructed, at an undeten: ined place below New Orleans.

Some

of the details of the act are interesting:
. . , all vessels at the quarantine ground,
from any place in the West-Indies, and from any

33j\nnals of the Congress of the United States, Fourth
Congress— First Session (Washington, 1049), p p . 1347-59;
Fifth Congress (Washington, 1#51)j PP* 3^02-$04*
34During the Spanish Period Governor Salcedo had in
1$02 attempted to institute a quarantine.
The failure of
that measure was caused chiefly by an inefficient inspection
system.
In 1$17 the City Council of New Orleans tried u n
successfully to enforce a maritime quarantine, Duffy, ed.,
Medicine in Louisiana, I, 229-30; Proceedings of the City
Council, Vol. 3i Book 1, W. P. A. tr. in New Orleans Public
Library, New Orleans, Louisiana, pp. 5-6, 11-12, 19-20.
35a lazaretto was a "pesthouse" for the detention
of persons arriving on vessels subjected to quarantine.
Smillie, Public Health, p. 63.

17
port or place in America, as far north
as the state of South Carolina, or from
any port or place on the coast of Africa,
. . . or from any port, island, or other
place in the Mediterranean or in Asia,
or from the Madeira, Canary, Cape de Verd,
Bermuda or Bahama Islands, between the
last day of May ana the first day of De 
cember in any year, shall remain at quar
antine not less than four days after
their arrival, and that no intercourse
shall be permitted during ti;at period
between the crew or crews, or passengers
of such vessels and the city of New Or
leans. . .
This was trie type of general quarantine, indiscriminately
applied to all vessels arriving from a great number of ports,
that was greeted with irate condemnation both in lBlo and
later whei it vras attempted by the State Board of Health.
Powerful business interests,

supported by a majority of the

medical faculty, complained of an unjustifiable interference
with the commerce of New Orleans, and as a result the quar
antine was abolished in 1B19.

The very next summer the city

suffered one of its worst invasions of Yellow Jack, and the
advocates of quarantine renewed the clamor for protection.
The ever-increasing menace of yellow fever in New Orleans
moved the Legislature in 1$21 to approve a measure entitled,
"An Act to provide against the introduction of Infectious
Disease."

Indicative of popular, as opposed to professional,

opinion, this act classified yellow fever as an infectious
disease.

Maritime quarantine was to be invoked against

vessels suspected of transporting disease, the term of

3^Acts passed at the Second Session of the Third
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . . T&21~7New
Or1 eans, 18117j pp. 124-52.
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quarantine being a minimum, of fifteen days for those exper
iencing sickness during the voyage and a minimum of ten days
for those sailing from infected ports.

The law provided

that all craft considered dangerous must stop at a detention
station, or quarantine ground, which was to be located near
Fort St. Philip.

These vessels were not only to be detained,

but they were also required to undergo thorough cleansing
and purification.-^
The onslaught of Yellow Jack could not be restrained.
New Orleans sustained a fairly heavy mortality from that
disease in lo22, 1$23> and again in l£24»

Quarantine seem

ingly had failed, and as in 1$19> the business interests and
the non-contagionist faction among the city's physicians
induced the state Legislature to repeal the quarantine law.
But the quarantine issue was far from dead.

Doctors, busi

nessmen, and most New Orleans newspapers continued to point
to the necessity of keeping commerce free from any restric
tions which might adversely affect the city’s prosperity.
Unquestionably quarantine did involve serious inconvenience
and expense.

Nonetheless, many New Orleanians held to the

conviction that despite all the objections to quarantine
it might yet prove to be the most effective manner of cop
ing with the mysterious enemy.
vincing.

Their argument seemed con

They said the greatest threat to the prosperity

3?Acts passed at the First Session of the Fifth
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . ... 1&21 (New
Orleans, 18217, p p . "68-92•
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of New Orleans was disease, notably yellow fever.

Aside from

the frightful mortality, each epidemic was likely to cost the
city millions of dollars through the diversion of trade.

Why

not, then, expend every effort and utilize all possible means
to avert those costly scourges?
Others among the medical faculty of New Orleans denied
both the contagious nature of yellow fever and the theory of
meteorological-miasmatic causation.

The eminent, though

aberrant, Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright complained that these an
tagonistic factions were alike in their unscientific approach
and their adherence to abstractions.

He spoke of quarantine

as the "perish commerce" doctrine, and declared that efforts
to eliminate filth from New Orleans were "worse than useless
as a preventive of disease."

Cartwright’s solution was to

provide work in the shade for poor whites and immigrants,
the classes most susceptible to yellow fever, ana to reduce
taxes so that the poor would not be deprived of food, cloth
ing, and shelter.

"All those sanitary measures . . . which

may be instituted to protect New Orleans against pestilence,
would be incomplete and ineffectual," he averred,

"unless

the practice of making negroes out of the master race of
men, and turning them out to labor in the hot summer’s sun,
be abolished.

Samuel A. Cartwright, "Prevention of Yellow Fever,"
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, X (1&53- 5 k )»
2_94~306; DeBow’s Review," XXVI (T359)» 411*
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Credit for a somewhat novel theory of combatting
epidemics must go to Dr. Albert W. Ely of the Crescent City.
Ely contended that too much attention was given to the ex
ternal causes of disease, and too little to the human boay.
Governments had been notoriously unsuccessful in preventing
the spread of disease, declared Ely, because they had con
cerned themselves with such things as quarantine, fumigations,
and imaginary miasms.
public baths.

The panacea was the construction of

The body could be mightily armed by cleanli

ness, and pestilence would be summarily routed.

“Modern

nations have borrowed from the ancient Romans almost every
thing worth borrowing,” asserted Ely,

“except their magnif-

39
icent baths.” 7
Dr. Bennet Dowler, for many years editor of the New
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, advised yellow fever
theorists to keep an open mind.

Since the beginning of

the nineteenth century, yellow fever attracted so much
attention in New Orleans that all kinds of opinions were
expressed concerning the cause of epidemics, Dowler stated,
and such hypotheses tended to become increasingly positive
and dogmatic.

It was reported, he said, that a public

lecturer had recently maintained, that yellow fever in the
South was caused by eating the opossum.

Dowler declared

39Albert W. Ely, "On the Revival of the Roman Thermae,
or Ancient Public Baths," DeBow’s Review, II (1&46), 22S-39*
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that the public was so desirous of knowing the reason for
New Orleans’ recurrent pestilential invasions that ’’almost
every writer on this malady /"yellow fever_7> whether born
to solve this problem or not, thinks it his bounden duty to
satisfy the public, and to glorify science and himself, by
conceiving clearly and revealing fully what no one thor
oughly acquainted with both the amount of our positive
knowledge and deplorable ignorance of . . . causes can pro
nounce upon with certainty.”^
New Orleans’ unenviable reputation for filthy streets
and an air permeated with foul odors was well known.

No one,

not even those who proclaimed the salubrity of the city, had
the temerity to deny that this infamous reputation was jus
tified at least in part.

This situation was especially ser

ious for those within and without the medical profession
.who placed filth and disease in very close association.

But

in spite of the sanitary problems, newspapers and periodi
cals repeatedly made the claim that New Orleans was indeed
very healthy.

The editor of the New Orleans Medical and

Surgical Journal boasted in 1846 "that when a fair compar
ison should be instituted, the annual mortality of New Or
leans would be found to be as small in proportion to the
population as any large city in the Union; or indeed, the

^ B e n n e t Dowler, ’’Yellow Fever Epidemics of Norfolk
and New Orleans in 1855; with General Remarks and Reflec
tions," New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XII
(1855-5677” 321-39.
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world.

The New-Qrleans Directory for 1342 declared:

"No City on earth has been more slandered on account of its
general health than New-Orleans.

The bugbear of its dread

ful mortality is, however, fast fading away before the
light of truth.

Frequently statements appeared in the

press that the city was enjoying "uninterrupted health" or
"perfect salubrity."
the record,

Only an occasional epidemic marred

said these writers.

J. D. B. DeBow asserted

that in ordinary seasons yellow fever was "almost unimpor
tant," and that "on an average of the year-round, New Or
leans exhibits as small a mortality as any other great
commercial city in our coun tr y. "^

Witnin a few years,

however, these claims were perceptibly modified by the
findings of Drs. Barton and Sirnonds.
Usually, whenever an epidemic forced the press to
acknowledge a high mortality, the announcement was accom
panied by a reassurance that the "resident and respectable"
population had not been attacked, and that the deaths were
confined almost entirely to the lower classes, especially
immigrants.^

DeBow alleged:

"The cautious, the prudent

^•%ew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, II
(1345-46 ), T9 1.
^N ew -Orleans Directory for 1342 (New Orleans,
1342), II, 14.
^ D e B o w 1s Review, IV (1347), 401.
^ T h e thousands of poverty-stricken Irish and German
immigrants who settled in New Orleans during the 1340*s and
1350’s constituted a very real problem.
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and the more regular classes entirely escape the danger,
while the destitute and dissolute fall."^5
person was indeed in danger.

The "unacclimated"

Medical men were in disagree

ment as to the precise definition of the term "unacclimated,"
but there was a positive consensus tnat among this class
Yellow Jack and other epidemic diseases took by far the
heaviest toll.

The New Orleans Directory for 1$3$ affirmed

the belief that "500 die every year in passing through the
acclimating p r o c e s s . " ^
Dr. Barton, a prolific writer on most aspects of yellow
fever, agreed that the "cost of acclimation" was very high.
Barton*s definition of acclimation was "the adaptation of
man's physical and moral nature to the physical and moral
conditions of a country."

By physical conditions he meant

"elements of climate," ana by moral conditions he meant
"manners, modes of life, etc."

Barton was a determined ad

vocate of "temperance" for the unacclimated.

By observing

a proper diet, abstaining from stimulating drinks, wearing
heat-repellent clothing, exercising, and bathing frequently,
the acclimating process could be made easy.
wrote Barton, " . . .

"Unfortunately,"

this climate has to stand answerable for

all the sins of juleps and champagne— beef and bacon I"

A.7

^ Q e B o w * s Review, IV (l£47)> 401,
^ Gibson*s Guide and Directory of the State of
Louisiana j£l’
8'3&_/""• • • (New Orleans, lEJ £), pi 2 ^ .
47gdward H. Barton, Introductory Lecture on Accli
mation . . . (New Orleans, 1&37)» p p • 1-9•
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Most physicians of the mid-nineteenth century believed that
acclimation to yellow fever could be acquired only by having
recovered from the disease.

The comparative exemption of

creoles from the pestilence apparently resulted from an
inherited immunity.

Thus, the rather common assertion that

"our creole and acclimated citizens enjoy as good health as
any in the world.

. . ,

Most New Orleanians were certain their city was destined
to enjoy a bright future and claimed that the sanitary re
formers had been exaggerating.

Even if New Orleans were a

filthy city plagued by nuisances, it was felt that the less
said about it the better.

Denunciations were heaped upon

enemies from the outside who tried to picture the Crescent
City as "the black-hole of a modern Calcutta."

City offi

cials and responsible citizens argued that the appalling
mortality tables of New Orleans were not only incomplete
and inaccurate, but also deceptive.

Many of those who died

in the city, went the argument, were incurables who had
migrated there because of the "genial climate and temperate
latitude,jf

only the facts were made known, New Orleans

could no longer be slandered.
The facts, when they were compiled and published by

^ N e w Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, II

(1845-46) ,”T 5 7 •
^Ibid.,

VIII (1851-52), 135-
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illustrious members of the medical faculty, came as a
shock.

Even after omitting from the mortality lists the

deaths caused by epidemics, hew Orleans was demonstrably
unhealthy.

It was only with this salient realization that

public health in Louisiana achieved any substantial pro
gress.

Furthermore, the most fatal epidemic in the state’s

history was required before Louisianians were ready to in
stitute a permanent health organization.

However, the half

century preceding the creation of the State Board of Health
was not entirely barren of reform, and consequently that
era deserves adequate attention.

CHAPTER II

PUBLIC HEALTH IN LOUISIANA, 1804-53
The history of public health and sanitation in Loui
siana can be traced back to the forty years of Spanish rule.
New Orleans was at that time only a small city> and the
entire province was very sparcely populated."''

Fortunately

there were New Orleanians, sometimes influential ones, who
were interested in improving the appearance as well as the
salubrity of their city by promoting sanitary reforms.
Measures aiming at swamp drainage, street cleaning, improved
interment practices, and maritime quarantine were discussed
and acted upon during the era before the Louisiana Purchase.
Little material progress was achieved, however, because of
the general indifference and inertia which characterized
both the Spanish officials and the residents of the city.
Only the ravages of a fearful epidemic seemed motivation
enough to rouse the populace from its lethargy.
Within the first year after the establishment of the

-'-Estimates as late as 1785 placed the population of
the Crescent City at barely five thousand, and that of the
vast area known as Louisiana at between ten and fourteen
thousand. Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 220.
2Ibid., pp. 220-32.

26

p

27
American regime in New Orleans, the City Council created
what evidently was the city’s first effective Board of
Health*

A permanent "health committee" was chosen by the

Council, and its five members, two of whom were physicians,
were commissioned by Governor William C. C. Claiborne July
9, 1304.

This Board of Health met each week and presented

reports to the Council.

It had power to enforce sanitation

and was authorized to assume control of the decrepit quar
antine system established by Spanish Governor Salcedo in
1302.

In the interest of public health the Council on

July 25 adopted an ordinance requiring butchers to clean
slaughterhouses of all accumulated filth "so as to remove
the danger of the very contagious diseases which all this
decaying matter might cause."^

During the August 3 session

of the Council the Board of Health advised that the Commis
sioner General of Police be urged to require that all garbage
and filth be thrown into the river instead of being dumped
near the Protestant cemetery, and second, that an ordinance
be passed necessitating that "all Physicians, Surgeons, and
Apothecaries pass an examination before the Faculty, when
they cannot produce their diplomas.

. . ."

The Council re

solved that the first proposal was not practicable because
of the batture;^ but the examination requirement was approved,

3lbid. , pp. 333-34.
^Proceedings of the City Council, Vol. 1, Book 1,
pp. 143-44.
^The elevated river bed that was laid bare when the
river was low.
It tended to collect all sorts of deposits.
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thus aiding the Board in combatting quackery.^
The Board of Health attacked such abuses as the prac
tice of burying the dead too close to the surface of the
ground and the failure to maintain sanitary conditions at
Charity Hospital; it asserted also that the "incapacity of
women of every color practicing Midwifery is making daily
more victims of their ignorance.

. . »"

The Board's at

tempt to expose conditions at Charity Hospital provoked
bitter replies from the director of the hospital, Dr. Louis
Fortin.

Fortin, who was ultimatly dismissed, denied that

conditions were as intolerable as portrayed, and claimed
that the information which was the basis of the expose' had
7
been obtained by questioning patients.'
During 1H04 the achievements of the New Orleans Board
of Health were indeed extensive.

On September 12 the Coun

cil considered a letter from the Board declaring its in
tention to organize a medical society so that doctors might
"submit the result of their observations, which would be
recorded in a periodical journal and form a treatise on
diseases in Louisiana and their cure.”

The Council, being

aware of "the discord existing among physicians,” implored
the governor to intervene in the hope of consummating this
a
salutary project.
Claiborne expressed his hearty approval

Proceedings of the City Council, Vol. 1, Book 1,
pp. 151-52.
?Ibid., pp. 154> 169-75.
gIbid., p. 174 .
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of the proposed monthly meetings of the society, but be
cause he professed to know little about "medical subjects,"
he declined the honor of delivering the initial lecture.

A

meeting of the medical society was held in November, but
there is no further record of its proceedings.

The sharp

conflict developing between the French and the American
physicians in New Orleans may well have made this organiza
tion unworkable.9
Early in 1305 the Board of Health seems to have been
permitted to fall into desuetude.

The energy manifested by

the Board during the year 1304 was in large measure a result
of the major epidemics of both smallpox and yellow fever
which descended upon the city.

The improvement of general

health conditions in 1305 apparently convinced most New Or
leanians that the Board had outlived its usefulness, and
during the succeeding decade no similar institution was
nn

created.
Public health was not entirely neglected in the years
following the death of New Orleans 1 first effective health
organization.

Dr. John Watkins, who had supplied the Board

of Health with much of its energy, became Mayor of the city
in July, 1305*

Shortly thereafter, he and the Council se

cured the Governor’s permission to eliminate certain pools
of water which were deemed injurious to the city’s health.

^Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 336-37.
^°Ibid., pp. 339-90.

Furthermore, both the Territorial Legislature and the City
Council showed considerable interest in conditions at
Charity H o s p i t a l . ^
worthy of attention.

One piece of early legislation is
The Legislative Council of the Terri

tory of New Orleans, during its first session enacted a law
empowering the Governor to appoint one or more inspectors
of flour, beef, and pork.

All such provisions coming into

New Orleans were to be examined carefully and graded in
order that accurate weight and fair representation of qual
ity would be maintained.

The fine for altering the mark of

an inspector was fifty dollars, half of which would go to
the prosecutor and the other half to the Charity Hospital.

12

It is not known whether this law was efficiently executed,
but certainly the mere fact the legislation existed indi
cates an awareness of the importance of food in determining
the general healthfulness of the populace.
Though very little progress was made in sanitation
during the decade after 1&05, Mayor Girod in 1&12 proceeded
in the right direction by decreeing that excrement had to
be thrown into the river . ^

Unfortunately, little attention

was given to the problem of getting the waste into the
current.

The resulting conditions were described by

llV o i d , } pp. 390-91.

^2Acts passed at the First Session of the Legisla
tive Council of the Territory of Orleans, December 3i 1804
(n .p ., n .d.) pp. 3 9&-406
13

Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 392.
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Governor Claiborne:

". . . the pollution constantly strik

ing a person walking on the Levee, and which arises from the
filth of the city thrown into the water’s edge, is too offen
sive for a civilized person to submit t o . " ^
A great flood precipitated the next important measure
in the long and arduous battle against filth in the Crescent
City.

New Orleanians were sufficiently aroused by the dread

ful inundation of 1816 to grant a body of medical men author
ity for the maintenance and promotion of public health.

The

Comite'Medical, or "health committee of New Orleans," a body
originally established to regulate medical licensing, was
assigned the task of dealing with the dangerous health situ
ation created by the uncontrolled waters of the turbulent
M is si ss i pp i. ^

On May 10 the Council requested that this

Board render advice as to what means should be taken to
prevent miasmata from vitiating the air when the flood waters
receded.^
The Committee recommended that all streets, gutters,
and houses be thoroughly washed as quickly as it became
feasible to do so.

Homes were not to be re-entered until

they were completely dry and had been fumigated.

Six inches

l^The Louisiana and Mississippi Almanac for the year
1&13 1quoted in ]_ Jones__/, Annual Report of the Board of
Health of the State of Louisiana,to the General AssemSTy,
for the Year 1882 (Baton Rouge, lS'SJ), p. 29f»
■^Duffy,

ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I,

^Proceedings of the City Council, Vol.

p. 9.

393.
2, Book 6 ,

of quick lime was to be thrown over the cemetery upon the
recession of the flood waters, and bodies which had become
exposed were to be reinterred in deep graves.

The Charity

Hospital was to be subjected to an exhaustive cleansing be
fore it could resume operation.

The Board also suggested

the construction of three dumping wharves on the river bank
to dispose of refuse, dead bodies, and sewage.

But even if

these recommendations were followed, thought the members of
the new Board of Health, the epidemic might still be unavoid
able.

Reflecting contemporary medical theory, the Board

asserted that vast areas had been flooded and later exposed
to the sun’s rays, and warned that Trif some favorable meteor,
such as rain or a strong wind in a favorable direction, does
not come to the aid of the said means . . . disease, more or
less grave, will spread its ravages among the inhabitants of
the city."

Individuals were exhorted to strengthen their

resistance against disease by bathing;, living temperately,
and eating wholesome food.

Fumigation was also counted upon

heavily to battle the terrifying miasmata.

17

'

Undoubtedly

the Board’s advice was sound, and it may have contributed
to rendering the year l£l 6 free from serious pestilence.
On March 1$, 1317 the City Council established New
Orleans’ first great sanitary code.

The twenty-four ordi

nances comprising the code dealt with a multiplicity of
abuses, many of which had attracted the attention of previous

^Duffy,

ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 393-95.

councils.

Property owners and tenants were required to

clean the sidewalks and gutters in front of their houses
daily, and during the summer they were obliged to water the
streets.

Oysters were not to be sold in the city during

the summer.

Privies had to be dug at least three feet from

the property line and at least seven feet deep; they could
be emptied only during the night, at which time the contents
were to be dumped into the river or poured into deep trenches.
A prohibition was ordained against the deposit of excrement,
garbage, liquor, or filth of any kind in gutters, ditches,
canals, and on sidewalks, as well as on the levee and the
river bank.
The sanitary code forbade the raising of hogs within
the city limits and stipulated that stables and cattle sheds
were to be kept Min the greatest condition of cleanliness.”
Stagnant water was not to be allowed to stand on lots, yards,
or grounds within the city.

Permission to construct addi

tional slaughterhouses, tanneries, starchworks, private
hospitals, or sanitariums within New Orleans or the incor
porated suburbs was to be denied.

The killing or skinning

of cattle within the city limits was absolutely forbidden.
There were to be no burials in churches, temples, chapels,
or any building where people assembled ”for the celebration
of their cults;” all burials within the city’s confines were
restricted to the cemeteries.

Graves had to be at least

four feet deep, and no more than one body was to be placed
in a grave.

Owners of dead animals were required to bury
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them outside the city limits.

The Mayor was authorized to

prevent the unloading of leather, furs, coffee, salt meat,
or other provisions damaged to an extent they might be
dangerous to the public health.

It was made unlawful to

keep spoiled meat or fish anywhere in the city.

Fines were
1a
specified for violations of each of the ordinances.
This
sanitary code shows clearly the immense concern felt by New

Orleanians regarding putrefaction believed to emit miasma,
and in turn, to produce the spread of disease.
The year 181? brought the return of yellow fever to New
Orleans.

The Council attempted to head it off by adopting

a quarantine, but this measure was put into operation much
too late.

Early in June news was received of an outbreak

in

the West Indies, but the quarantine could not be readied
until July 26 because the details of inspection had to be
worked out.

The quarantine, when it did finally go into

effect, provided a strict control

of incoming vessels.

No

ship was to enter the port of New Orleans without a certif
icate signed by at least two physicians.

Significantly,

recognition was given by the Council that the quarantine
could scarcely operate without the cooperation of the Gov
ernor, the Parish Judge, and r,the commodore.tT

It became

evident that the state was much more able than the city to

-^Ordinances and Resolutions of the City Council,
December 24, 1816, to February 19, 1821, W. P. A. tr. in
New Orleans Public Library, pp. 229-38.
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provide the needed quarantine station downstream.^

The

epidemic raged with unremitting fury during August and Sep
tember.

On September 20 the Council adopted a resolution

"to insure public sanitation and to find means of giving
assistance to the indigent sick.

..."

In addition to

providing for daily cleansing of the streets and gutters,
this measure made it possible to care for the sick and des
titute at city expense.

Medical treatment, drugs, and food
on

were made available to those in need during the emergency.
The alarming mortality resulting From the visitation
of Yellow Jack, together with the signal failure of the city
of New Orleans to act with resolve in imposing quarantine,
goaded the state Legislature to action early in l£lS.

"An

Act to establish a Board of Health and Health Office, and
to prevent the introduction of Malignant, Pestilential and
Infectious Diseases into the City of New Orleans" was passed
March 17.

The Board of Health, as it was officially termed,

was comprised of five men, three of whom were licensed phy
sicians.

The primary function of this body was to adminis

ter the new quarantine imposed as a part of the same act.
The details of the quarantine and of its demise were related
in chapter one.

The Board was also charged with the duty of

seeing to the removal from the city of all filth which might

^proceedings of the City Council, Vol. 3> Book 1,
pp. 11- 12 , 19- 20 .

20Ibid., pp. 4S-51.
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endanger the public health.

pi

The Board of Health found itself confronted by formi
dable opponents.

Aside from the expected antagonism of

commercial interests and a large faction of physicians, the
Board also discovered the City Council to be aggravatingly
hostile.

One Board member reported* in the Louisiana Courier

that city officials had been notably uncooperative, espe
cially with regard to the vital matter of rendering financial
assistance.

Despite the explicit provision in the act re

quiring the City Council and the Police Jury of Orleans Par
ish to levy a tax on slaves and real estate, complained the
writer, no action had been taken.

The Council, resenting

the transfer of some of its powers to the Board of Health,
"took umbrage" against the health authorities, he continued,
and "observed profound silence" when the Board attempted to
borrow the needed

capital.

^2

The act creating the New Orleans Board of Health and
the quarantine was repealed within the space of one year.
The Governor, by the act of repeal, was authorized to pro
claim any further quarantine at his own discretion, but in
granting this power to the Chief Executive, the Legislature
seems merely to have been pacifying disgruntled contagion.
23
ists.

21

Acts passed at the Second Session of the Third
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . . 1^1^, pp. 124-52.
^ L o u i s i a n a Courier, August 23, 1313.
^J ones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, Vol. 3>
Part 1, p. cxliv.
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Two years later, in 1321, the Louisiana lawmakers again
attempted to halt the nearly perennial incursions of Yellow
Jack by establishing another state quarantine.
tary code was also formulated.

A new sani

The Board of Health was re

established and was granted extensive powers in matters
pertaining to quarantine and to sanitation.

The Board was

to be responsible for establishing and maintaining quaran
tine stations and for seeing that streets were cleaned and
nuisances removed.

This act also required the daily publi

cation during the summer of a detailed account of deaths in
New Orleans . ^

Little is known of the Board's effectiveness

in promoting sanitation, although it is evident from Board
of Health notices appearing in New Orleans newspapers that
its members were actively at work in their official capaci
ty.

The Mayor of New Orleans was the ex-officio President

of the body, and unlike the situation in 131$, the health
officials and the City Council were able to work together
harmoniously.

The l^ayor appears to have been particularly

interested in sanitary reform.

Unfortunately the majority

of New Orleanians had become inured to the opprobrious
condition of their city and were apathetic regarding any
25

kind of change. '
Reformers endeavoring to transform New Orleans into a

^ A c t s passed at the First Session of the Fifth
Legislature . . . 1321, pp. 63-92.
The features of the
quarantine were described in chapter one.
^^Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 401-404.
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clean, healthy city were repeatedly thwarted by a much
larger number of citizens who denied that their city was
unhealthy.

This latter group claimed to the contrary that

New Orleans was unusually salubrious, and regarded both quar
antine and sanitation as expensive, useless innovations.

The

advocates of quarantine against the importation of yellow
fever were dealt a crushing blow by epidemics which followed
the establishment of the most recent quarantine law.

The

year 1321 was free from pestilence, but the following summer
witnessed the return of Yellow Jack in all its fury.

The

result was a mass meeting which took place in the Crescent
City in January, 1323.

The participants moved and carried,

11that the late epidemic had tested the total inefficiency
of the quarantine laws and regulations; we consider them not
only useless, but in the highest degree oppressive and in
jurious to the commerce of this city; and that application
ought to be made to the Legislature for the purpose of
having them annulled .11

A memorial to that effect was

straightway addressed to the Legislature, but without imme
diate success.
sentiment:

Governor Robertson echoed the prevailing

"The State resorted to quarantine, under the

expectation that it would add to the chances of escape from
this dreadful visitation ^“ yellow fever__7 «

If this hope be

fallacious, if not good effect has been produced, if even
a procrastination of its appearance has not resulted from
the measure, then should it be abandoned, and our commerce
relieved from the expense and inconvenience which it
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occasions.
Sentiment for repeal of the quarantine law became in
creasingly strong among influential classes in New Orleans.
Nonetheless, the Legislature granted the quarantine a rather
lengthy trial.

Eventually, however, the experiment had to

be written off as a failure.

Early in 1$25 the Legislature

abolished the Board of Health and ordered the Governor to
dispose of the quarantine station and the property previously
held by the B o a r d , ^

Thus New Orleans had three Boards of

Health during a period of less than ten years, and all of
them might reasonably be classified as failures.

The ex

piration of the first quarter of the nineteenth century
found the public health movement in New Orleans, and in
all of Louisiana, still in its infancy.
New Orleans was rapidly becoming a great commercial
city.

As the settlement of the Midwest proceeded apace in

the thirties and forties, produce in ever-increasing quan
tities descended the Mississippi to New Orleans where it
was transshipped on ocean-going vessels.

During its com

mercial ’'golden age,” between 1825 and 1&40, the Crescent
City became renowned for its wealth and was rivalled only
by New York as the first port in the nation.

The intense

26jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, Vol. 3? Part
1 , pp. cxlvi-cxlviii.

2^Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 405.
2#Jerome St. Julien Ducrest, ’’New Orleans Commerce,
1830-1860” (M. A. thesis, Louisiana State University,
1926 ), p. 3 .

40
activity and prosperity characterizing New Orleans during
those years did not fail to attract travelers from the
East and from Europe.

Florence Brink has noted that ac

counts of the bustling metropolis written by visitors al
most invariably contained a description of muddy streets,
filthy gutters, odious mosquitoes, dread of epidemics, and
general untidiness and lack of sanitation.^9

New Or

leans came to rely increasingly upon foreign and domestic
trade, residents tended to become ever more sensitive to
criticism by outsiders.

To those inconsiderate enough to

mention New OrleansT unhealthfulness and heavy mortality,
its defenders could point out, with a considerable degree
of truth, that the sizeable "floating population" was in
large measure responsible.

There was certainly some foun

dation for the ubiquitous fear that to admit New Orleans
was more unhealthy than other port cities would be detri
mental to her future prosperity.

Moreover, despite re

current epidemics, most of the residents of the booming
entrepot were too busy to concern themselves with matters
of public health and sanitation.
The yellow fever invasion in 1337 brought the creation
of a new health board by the Society Me'dicale de la Nouvelle
Orleans, the cityfs French medical society.

However, little,

^ F l o r e n c e Roos Brink, "Literary Travellers in
Louisiana Between 1$03 and 1360," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly, XXXI (194-3), 399.
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if any, use appears to have been made of this body."

Four

years later a combination of public pressure and an impend
ing yellow fever outbreak bestirred city officials to in
stitute another Board of Health for New Orleans.

The

General Council ^1 passed an ordinance in June, 1$41 estab
lishing a Board to consist of three aldermen, three phy
sicians, and three private citizens.

This new body was

invested with authority to adopt and enforce sanitary reg
ulations and was required to publish a mortality list at
stated intervals.

12

The Board, under the presidency of

Dr. Edward H. Barton, appears to have been quite active
daring the epidemic of 1 B 41 > but public interest in san
itation was still noticeably lacking.

The Picayune, on

August 26 , printed a notice from BartonTs office pro
claiming the prevalence of yellow fever in New Orleans,
although noting that the disease was "mostly confined to
the laboring classes and the intemperate."

Barton warned

the unacclimated to be especially careful of intemperance
in their "drink, food, or indulgence of the passions."

33

^ D u f f y , ed., Medicine in Louisiana, II, manu
script in progress.
^ B e t w e e n 1&36 and 1$52 New Orleans was divided
into three municipalities, each having its own council.
There was, however, a General Council empowered to deal
with matters of concern to all three municipalities.
32New Orleans Medical Journal, I (1644-45)> 96-97.
33New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 26, 1&41.

The 1341 epidemic was one of the most deadly in the
history of New Orleans.

The Board of Health could do little

against its unsuspected foes, the Aeaes aegyptl, although
it did provide mortality figures which were printed in the
newspapers until the yellow pestilence disappeared in No
vember.

During 1342 the Board became virtually inactive,

and before the close of the following year it had ceased
to f u n c t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y the General Council in 1344
constituted the Hedico-Chirurgical Society, an organization
of both French and American doctors, as the Board of Health
for New Orleans.

The Society, in turn, created nine of its

members into a "Committee of Public Hygiene."

Sanitary re

forms were promulgated, but as in the past, very little of
a practical nature seems to have been accomplished,-^
The Council was commendably rigid in its determination
to bring into existence an effective health board.

On July

16 , 1346 another organization was created, this one com
prised of twelve practicing physicians.

The Board of Health,

as it was again termed, was charged with keeping accurate
meteorogical records,

complete morta_Lity statistics, and

instructed to give early notice of the existence of an
epidemic disease.

In addition, the new' body was to have

the entire sanitary condition of the city under its

34New Orleans Medical Journal, I (1344-45)» 97•
35ibid., p p , 97 , 217.
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supervision and control.-^

At the organizational meeting

held August 20, Dr. James Jones was elected President of
the Board, although he relinquished the post to Dr. William
P. Hort before the end of the year.
The new Board of Health was assailed later in the year
by some New Orleans newspapers for having failed to report
the presence of a yellow fever epidemic.

The Board replied

that many of the reported cases were in reality malaria, and
the public should feel assured that well-authenticated cases
would be made known.3?
from TTF.n

The Daily Delta printed a letter

(possibly Femmer) defending the position of the

Board:
It is lamentable to witness the state
of feeling among the community in regard
to the Board of Health and the prevailing
sickness.
It is known that v/henever any
thing like fellow Fever appears at this
season of the year it becomes a subject of
the most vague, perverted or exaggerated
rumor.
As a vast number of persons in all
parts of the country are upon the eve of
coming to the city for the purpose of
commencing the business of the season, the
most intense effort is felt and all sorts .
of inquiries are made in regard to the
safety of the step. . . . It is by no
means an easy matter to make a perfectly
correct report of the existing state of
health when an epidemic is just beginning
to prevail.
The position of the Board of
Health in this city is any thing but an
enviable one— they are urged, entreated,
commanded to report, and perhaps as soon

3^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, III,
(1B46-47) .T7l 7 741 /-72; Picayune, July 17, 1^46.
37New Orleans Daily Delta, August 22, IB4 6 ;
Picayune, October 1&, 13457
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as they have done so with the best lights
they could obtain, they are accused of
falsehood by some, of ignorance by others,
and totally damned by another set, as
prejudice or sordid pecuniary interest
may dictate.'®
The letter accurately presented the problem.

Whenever pes

tilence struck New Orleans, the officials whose power it
was to declare an epidemic were attacked bitterly by one
faction if they did so, and by another faction if they did
not.

In this case the Board of Health seems to have been

correct in refusing to proclaim the prevalence of yellow
fever.
The importance attached to the problem of epidemic
diseases did not prevent the Board from devoting a great
deal of attention to sanitary reform.

The first Report of

the New Orleans Board of Health, written by Dr. William P.
Hort, contained a warning against undue confidence that epi
demic yellow fever would never return.

Hort was greatly

disturbed that regulations would not be carried out fully.
The city was unusually filthy, declared the Report, and
attention was directed particularly to the river banks
upon which filth and garbage of every description had been
deposited.

The Report asserted further:

"Complaints of

stagnant and putrid water in vacant lots, and even under
houses in some instances, in the back streets of the city,
were made early in the season; and the stagnant and putrid

-^ Da i l y Delta, October 1B, 181+6.
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condition of the gutters, and the accumulation of filth at
the crossings of the streets . . . was a subject of general
remark."

Approbation was given to the recommendations made

in 1$45 by the Physico-Medical Society, an organization of
New Orleans’ English-speaking physicians.

Among the recom

mendations were those for removal of nuisances from back
yards and lots, filling of swampy places within the city
limits, removal of offal from the streets, cleaning the
streets by using the free flow of river water whenever
possible, and requiring scavengers (collectors) to throw
garbage and offal into the current of the river rather than
in empty lots or in the rear of the city.

The Report also

commended Dr. E l y ’s proposal that free baths be made avail
able to the public . ^

The measures advocated by the Board

of Health contained very little,

if anything, new.

Sani

tary codes had been on the books for three decades, but
adequate attention had never been given to the problem of
enforcement.

Despite the Board’s efforts, general health

conditions in New Orleans at the end of IB 46 were indeed
deplorable.
The following summer, the General Council of New Or
leans adopted an ordinance providing a mild quarantine
for the protection of the city.

Vessels arriving at New

Orleans with infectious or contagious disease on board

•^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, III
(1& 46- 47 )
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had to anchor in the middle of the river just below the city
until the disease disappeared.
enforce this provision.

The Mayor was empowered to

The Board of Health was charged

with the duty of inspecting infected vessels and diseased
persons and reporting the results of its investigations to
the Mayor.

Vessels were forbidden to move from their an

chorage until the Board certified that they were no longer
infected.

One hundred dollar fines were to be paid by

owners or captains of vessels for violations of the ordi
nance.

Ail fines and penalties collected under provisions

of the ordinance were earmarked to the Board of Health.

This

quarantine remained in force for several years, but received
little attention.

During the quarantine’s first few months

in operation in 1847 New Orleans suffered one of its most
severe yellow fever outbreaks, thereby undermining public
faith in it right from the beginning . ^
The obvious bewilderment that resulted from the peri
odic scourging of Mew Orleans by yellow fever produced
during the 1840 ’s renewed activity by the advocates of a
rigid state quarantine.

A feeling developed gradually among

the general populace that sanitary reform was not the entire
answer, and that Louisiana had never given quarantine a
really fair trial.

In 1844 a committee of the state House

of Representatives reported that it had decided "almost

^°E. D. Fenner, ed., Southern Medical Reports
(New Orleans, 1851) > II» 57-5"^
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unanimously, that the disease Z~y ellow feverJ 7 is infectious
and transmissible, and in most, if not all instances, has
been introduced in vessels from other ports, into this city."
Accordingly, the committee recommended passage of a quar
antine l a w . ^

The Legislature failed to act, in all prob

ability because of the heated controversy any such proposal
invariably provoked.

Dr. Hort, the prominent sanitarian,

remarked in 1345 that the Legislature had not enacted a
quarantine law because of the opposition of public opinion
and a large majority of the medical profession .^2

pn dem

onstrating the inefficacy of quarantine legislation, Hort
stated a simple, and by no means unusual, explanation of
the rising tide of "black vomit":
Disease follows in the track of civili
zation, not carried by the people from one
country to another, but developed by the
great physical changes brought about by
industry, and agricultural pursuits.
The
surface of the earth once sheltered from
the sun’s rays by luxuriant vegetation is
laid bare to the action of those rays; the
surface of the earth is turned up by the
plow, exhalation and evaporation follow;
vegetable matter is decaying in large
quantities, or large cities are built,
and people become crowded together within
a very limited space, and filth and offal

^-Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House
of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, Second SessionSixteenth Legislature, January 1, 1844 (New Orleans, 1844),
p p . 80-8l.
^ W i l l i a m P. Hort, "An Essay on the Subject of
Quarantine Laws . . .
New Orleans Medical and Surgical
Journal, II (1345-46), 1. Hort was certainly correct in
stating that most physicians were against quarantine.
Public
opinion, on the other hand, was moving in the opposite
direction.

accumulate.
Then marshes are exposed,
and great changes must be going on in
the atmosphere near the surface of the
earth; and is it at all strange, that
under such circumstances, new diseases
should be developed?^
In 1848 a quarantine for Orleans and Jefferson Parishes was
considered by the Louisiana lawmakers,

this time as part of

a bill re-constituting the New Orleans Board of Health.

The

measure, when it finally was enacted into law, contained no
mention whatever of quarantine.^
The action of the Legislature in creating a new, strong
er Board of Health for New Orleans was, as usual, the result
of a savage epidemic.

Yellow fever mortality rose in 1847

to well over two thousand, a figure high enough to shake
the complacency of all but the most immovably conservative.
The sanitationists were still strong enough to prevent the
enactment of another quarantine law; thus the "Act To
Establish a Board of Health in and for the Parish of Or
leans" represented a signal victory for this faction.

The

Board was to resemble rather closely the one created by the
General Council of New Orleans in 1846, but the new insti
tution was granted more authority in promoting sanitation
than had any body in the past.

^ Ibi d., p . 3•

ournal of the House of Representatives of the
State of Louisiana, Session of TS 48 (New Orleans, T S 48 ),
p. 87; Acts passed at the "First Session of the Second
Legislature of the 'State of Louisiana , . . 1848 (New
Orleans, IS4STj Act No. ITS, pp. 110-11.

The Board of Health was to consist of twelve members,
four of whom were to be appointed by the New Orleans General
Council, and the Mayor of New Orleans was designated its
President.

The Board was empowered to appoint for each ward

of each New Orleans municipality a "Health i/arden" whose
duty it was to provide for the removal of "any nuisance
likely to prove injurious to the public health."

Property

owners and tenants were liable to a lawsuit if they failed
to comply with an order to remove a certain nuisance.

Those

having contracts with the city were to be held strictly
accountable for failure to keep the streets clean.

The sex

tons of the cemeteries were made subject to fines for neg
lect in reporting all interments to the Board.

The three

New Orleans municipalities were to provide the Board a
maximum of five hundred dollars in operating expenses per
year.

The Board was required to report annually to the

several councils on the health of the city and the means
whereby it might be improved.^

Governor Isaac Johnson

consented to the measure March 16, 184$, the very same day
he approved a bill authorizing him to appoint a five-man
sanitary commission.

This commission was assigned the task

of gathering information concerning health conditions in
New Orleans, after which these finnings were to be presented

^ Acts passed at the First Session of the Second
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . . 184$» Act No.
172 , pp. 110- 11 .
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to the next L e g i s l a t u r e . ^
Despite the well-meaning efforts of the sanitationists,
the war against filth seemingly could not be w o n .

One month

after the Legislature re-vitalized t h e Board of Health, the
editor of the Picayune remarked:

"Our citizens have just

reason to complain of the filthy condition of our streets,
which are apparently growing worse and worse.
offence is rank, and ’smells to heave n .' ”

, . . The

He asserted that

the Board of Health, with the aid of the sanitary commis
sioners, was duty-bound to seek some w a y of improving

the

system whereby street collecting carts "succeed in gather
ing about three pints of unpleasant

compost within a square,

with which they triumphantly retire.

The editor of the

New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal found fault with
the c i t y ’s drainage system, and indicated his uncertainty
whether the new Board had yet been given sufficient power
to regulate ’’the entire hygiene o f the city .’’^
Dr. Hort,

a few months later,

defended the Board by

explaining that very little had been accomplished only
because health officials had not received proper cooperation
from city a u t h o r i t i e s . ^

This theme was elaborated upon in

46I b i d . a p. 12.
^ P i c a y u n e , April 19, 1&A-S.

jg
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, IV

(ldV7-48),"797.
^ W i l l i a m P. Hort, ’’Remarks connected with the sanatary
condition of the city of N e w Orleans,” N e w Orleans Medical
and Surgical J o u r n a l , V (lSlS-49), 261, 263 .
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the Report of the Board of Health for 1&4& which described
the lack of sanitation in New Orleans.

The Report, of which

Hort was in all likelihood the author, declared that munici
pal Councils had sometimes adopted wise police r eg ulations,^
but all resolutions and ordinances were unavailing because
of failure to enforce them.

The Report stated that the Board

in 1 $4 # had established the requirement that contractors
must remove filth from the streets within two hours, but
despite this, two days often elapsed before anything was
done.

Furthermore,

care had not been given to seeing that

garbage was cast into the current of the river.

Another

problem was the inadequate compensation received by the
Health V/ardens.

The Report called attention to the diffi

cult task which confronted those officers in endeavoring to
carry on inspections in the face of antagonists who resented
the intrusion.51

Nearly half of the Report was concerned

This statement was certainly true.
For example,
an ordinance passed by the Council of the First Municipality
December 20, 1&47 compelled contractors to clean daily all
gutters, streets, alleys, etc. Garbage collections were to
be made twice each day, and all residents of the municipal
ity were required to have their waste ready in "suitable
vessels." On December l£, 1&4S, the Council of the First
Municipality created a three-man committee to work with the
Mayor on providing for the cleaning of streets and private
homes.
City Council Minutes and Proceedings, First Munici
pality, July 21, 1347-February 19> 1^49> pp. 126-32;
City
Council Ordinances and Resolutions, Municipality No. 1,
January 3 j 134&-December 31* 1349 > Manuscripts in New
Orleans Public Library.
51nThe Annual Report of the Board of Health, On the
Sanatory condition of the City of New Orleans, for 1343 » TT
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, V (1343-49)>
W 7 - Q 8 , 616-17.
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with the cholera outbreak that began in December.

The

author refused to take a stand on the question of whether
or not the cholera was imported, although the inference
can be drawn without great difficulty that he believed the
disease to be of local origin— that it was something other
than Asiatic cholera.

A definite assertion was made that

the pestilence still prevailing when the Report was written
was not contagious but had been transmitted through the
a ir .^2
Some local newspapers were rather critical of the
manner in which the Board of Health handled the epidemic.
Mayor A. D. Crossman, President of the Board, issued a
statement December 15 that two cases of cholera had been
reported.55

Two days later the Daily Delta commented on

the excitement caused by exaggerated reports of the preva
lence of Asiatic c h o l e r a . ^

The Board declared the existence

of an epidemic December 22, at the same time warning the
public that the powers possessed by the Board were limited
to enforcing health regulations, reporting on the general
health of the city, and making recommendations for the preservation of the public h e a l t h . T h i s

declaration brought

52Ibid., pp. 617-23.
^ Picayune, December 15, 1S/*.B.
5^-paily Delta, December 17, 134S.
55ibid., December 23> 1$4$«

a bitter denunciation from the editor of the Picayune who
56
blamed the Board for having precipitated a panic .J

An

editorial appearing January 2, 1$49 assailed health offi
cials for having done nothing more than report the number
of cholera deaths.

The "Board of Death" had greatly exag

gerated the extent of the pestilence,

it was alleged,

thereby causing the city to become deserted.

The Picayune

maintained the true situation to be that cholera deaths had
been restricted, almost entirely to homeless, pennyless
immigrants.^7

The Picayune1s attitude was as common as it

was understandable because much of New Orleans*

prosperity

resulted from a booming business carried on during the
winter.

The proclamation of an epidemic undoubtedly cost

the city many thousands of dollars by diverting business
to competing cities.

Months later, when cholera deaths

were numbering well over two hundred per yreek, the Picayune
was sti'll reassuring the public that the disease was con
fined primarily to strangers and the lower classes, and
that talk in other cities about an epidemic in New Orleans
was highly contemptible.^
New Orleanians had shown no inclination to face the
truth and admit that their city was inexcusably unhealthy.
At mid-century, however, this characteristic complacency

^ P i c a y u n e , December 24, 1$4$.
57ibid., January 2 , 1 $49 «
5%bid., March 25, 1$49.
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was shaken as never before by the publication of statistics
by Dr. J. C. Simonds portraying New Orleans in a very un
favorable light.

In a series of nine articles published in

the Daily Delta during the summer of

Simonds sought

to prove New Orleans* desperate need for sanitary reform.
Mortality rates of cities in the United States and Europe
were compared,

and these figures tola the almost unbelievable

tale that mortality in New Orleans was from two to four
times greater than in any of the other great cities for
which' Simonds supplied data.

Before presenting his re

markable findings, he noted New Orleans’ reputation for
being the most unhealthy city in the country and the need
of a thorough investigation to get at the truth.

Simonds

carefully analysed his statistics in the Daily Delta and
later in volume two of the Southern Medical Reports. ^
Simonds remarked on the common assertion by its cit
izens that except for epidemics New Orleans was very healthy,
and he immediately proved it to be utterly false.

Simonds

attempted further to show the absurdity of attributing
high mortality rates to the city's floating population by
pointing out the equally large numbers of immigrants and
visitors in cities having a much lower mortality rate.
Attention was particularly directed to the prevalent

59paily Delta, June 28, July 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12,
13, 18, 1850.
6 ^ J . C. Simonds, "On the Sanitary Condition of New
Orleans, as Illustrated by its Mortuary Statistics,"
Southern Medical Reports, II, 203-46.

55
practice of greatly over-estimating New Orleans' population
in order to make the mortality rate appear lower.

The Board

of Health was a special target for Simonds' attacks.

During

1B50, declared Simonds, the Board and the Mayor were busy
congratulating the citizens of New Orleans on the city's
healthfulness while two epidemics prevailed and. the lives
of one in every sixteen inhabitants were t a k e n . ^

Simonds

urged the usual reforms such as keeping the streets clean,
but in addition, he called for an investigation of hygienic
conditions in hospitals, asylums, workhouses, private dwell
ings, factories,

"butcheries," and dairies.

Above all, he

emphasized the need of compelling the Board of Health and all
its officers to enforce sanitary regulations.
Another physician who sought to awaken New Orleanians
from their lethargy was the irrepressible Dr. Edward H.
Barton.

A veteran sanitary reformer, Barton, in 1$50>

renewed his assault on the abominable conditions he saw
abwut him, conditions which he believed brought grief to
his city in the form of epidemics.

The Annual Report of

the New Orleans Board of Health for the year 1$49> written
by Barton, must rank as one of the most important documents
in the history of public health in Louisiana.

The Report

related the Board's unceasing efforts to enlighten the

. C. Simonds, The Sanitary Condition of New
Orleans (Charleston, South Carolina, lt>5l) , p. "53«
^ I b i d . , pp. 6, 71.
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public about sanitary matters and to prescribe cures for
acknowledged ills which infected the city.

Rather sur

prisingly, Barton's Report did not show New Orleans to be
unhealthy in some respects when placed on a comparative
basis with other large cities.

Simonds, writing later,

manifested impatience with the Report's obvious tendency
to defend New Orleans from the most damaging accusations
by outsiders.

Even so. Barton did point out clearly that

the Crescent City had "a mortality exceeding any city in
America, and mainly attributable to removable causes."
The mortality was at least double what it should be,
claimed Barton, and much could be done to reduce it.

There

never had been any real attempt to drain New Orleans; offal
had never been removed from the streets as ordered by the
Board of Health; and there had been an inexcusable will
ingness to allow filth of all descriptions to accumulate
in the gutters.

Simply by giving proper attention to

sanitary measures, thought Barton, mortality could be
materially diminished; no expense, he maintained, should
£^
be spared in achieving that goal,
Simonds and Barton by no means succeeded in converting
everyone in New Orleans to their way of thinking.

Five

months after having printed Simonds’ devastating articles,
the editor of the Daily Delta remarked:

"We aver, and

"The Annual Report of the Board of Health
Southern Medical Reports, I, 92-94*

1$49_7,"
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we challenge contradiction to our declaration, that New
Orleans, at this present moment, in point of health and
salubrity, is not exceeded by any city in the Union, and
greatly surpasses four-fifths of the towns, villages, and
localities in the South-west.

One of ante bellum New

Orleans' greatest publicists, J. D. B. DeBow, took an en
tirely different attitude.

Shocked by what he realized

were facts, DeBow printed statistics proving the insalu
brity of his city and urged that an even more intensive
investigation be made.

His duty was plain, he stated;

the alarm had to be sounded to shake citizens and city
officials from their inertia.
reluctance that DeBow remarked:

Nonetheless, it -was with
"We have been the last

to yield assent to the proposition that New Orleans is an
unhealthy city, very unhealthy, and have done as much,
perhaps, as any one in circulating the contrary opinion.
. . • The facts are, however, against us,

. . . ^5

The state Legislature, not totally unaware of the
gigantic task which lay ahead, passed an act in 1B 50 in
creasing slightly the police powers of the Board of Health
and extending'its jurisdiction to include the neighboring
city of Lafayette.
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The Board as re-constituted was to

^^Daily D elta, December IB, 1B50.
^ D e B o w ’s Review, IX (1B50), 245-46.
Lafayette was a suburb of some fourteen thousand
population located immediately above the American sector of
New Orleans.
The two adjacent communities were consolidated
in IS 52 , with Lafayette terminating its nineteen year history.
John Smith Kendall, History of New Orleans (Chicago, 1922),
II, 747-50.

5^
comprise sixteen members including the Mayor of New Orleans.
The Board of Health was enabled to require of physicians at
any time na statement of such contagious maladies as may
exist under their charge.’*

The Board was also empowered to

impose, by majority vote, fines for breaches of sanitary
regulations.
very l i t t l e . ^

Aside from those additions the new act changed
The Board of Health Report for lB$o most

assuredly gave no indication that anything important had
yet been achieved in the realm of public health.

The Re

port stated two "great objects’* deemed essential goals for
the city, and placed the blame on municipal authorities and
certain uncooperative physicians for New Orleans’ failure
to reach those goals in the past.

First, no unauthorized

burials should be permitted in order that the cause of
death and the number of deaths could be accurately deter
mined.

The Report complained of physicians who refused to

sign burial certificates for patients they had attended.
The second objective mentioned in the Report was the im
provement of public hygiene.

Attention was called to a

variety of nuisances, chiefly those connected with accumutations of filth.

6$

The value of the New Orleans Board of Health remained

^ A c t s passed by the Third Legislature of the State
of Louisiana . . . 185(1"(New Orleans, 1850}, Act No. 430,
pp. 252-54.
^ " A n n u a l Report of the New Orleans and Lafayette
Board of Health, for the Year 1$50,” Southern Medical
Reports, II, 40-72.
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a controversial question.

One of the institution's most

outspoken defenders was Dr. Abner Hester, editor of the
New Orleans Medical and Su rg ic al Journal.

An editorial

appearing in the September, 1S50 issue commended the "con
stant and unceasing efforts made by the Board of Health,
through the Health Wardens, to improve the sanitary condition of our city, during the past summer."
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A year

later Hester ascribed the good health enjoyed by New Or
leans during the summer of 1$51 to the clean streets and
70
gutters placed under the Board's supervision.
In the
November, 1851 issue the Board of Health was again credited
with having maintained the health of the city:
Quietly and without ostentation did
the members assemble regularly every week
to examine the cemetery reports, and the
reports of the Health Wardens, to learn
the actual sanitary condition of New
Orleans and Lafayette, and to suggest
and have carried out every measure cal
culated to preserve the health of our
population, and to ward off all epidemic
diseases.
Although the members of the
Board receive no reward for such labors,
and wield but little power, yet through
evil as well as good report they have
faithfully discharged their duty to the
public and set an example in this re
spect, which some of our municipal
bodies might emulate with credit to
themselves and advantage to the public
good.71

6 % e w Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, VII
(1850-51) ,“ 252.
7°Ibid., VIII (1851-52), 265 .

71Ibid., p. 399.
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Four months later the Board no longer existed.

The

following February the Legislature completely reorganized
the government of New Orleans, ending the arrangement
whereby there were four councils for the Crescent City and
another for the city of Lafayette.

A "Common Council" was

provided for all of New Orleans, including Lafayette which
was annexed.

No mention whatever was mode of the Board of

Health by the Legislature,
came inoperative.*'7'^

so automatically the Board be

Shortly thereafter, the House passed

a bill granting the new Council the power to make all san
itary regulations.

No action seems to have been taken by

the Senate, probably because legislation was deemed un~
necessary.
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The May, lh‘52 issue of the New Orleans Monthly

Medical Register contained an editorial rejoicing that no
Board of Health existed.

The editor asserted:

"Perhaps

the highest and only service it performed was that, which
prayed for its own dissolution, under a conscientious con
viction, that, organized as it was, it was a burden and a
fraud on the community."

The editor declared that the

Council’s practice of delegating public health powers to
a subordinate body had never worked:
The evil lay precisely in the division
of functions.
The old Board could legislate,

^ A c t s passed by the Fourth Legislature of the
State of Louisiana . . . 1$52 (New Orleans, 1852J7 Act No.
71, pp. 42-55.
73journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana,
First Session-Fourth Legislature, January T 9 , 1&52 (n.p.,
n .d .), p. 173*
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with wisdom and propriety suitable to
our exigencies, but it was powerless to
enforce its ordinances.
Its authority
was scoffed at in the four quarters of
the city, its officers defied and its
advice respected as a oiece of gratuity,
for which no one was obliged.
Yet the
public expected of this body, thus dis
armed and contemned Z"sic_7, to guard
the avenues through which the disease
was introduced, and to preserve the
public health, while its voice as,a
public sentinel was disregarded. ^
The advice went unheeded.

On May 10 the Council re-

solved to organize another Board of Health.
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Just what

powers were granted to the new Board cannot be precisely
ascertained, but certainly this institution accomplished
virtually nothing.

No one cared until the following year,

1053, when the return of Yellow Jack to New Orleans pro
duced almost indescribable scenes of death.

^ %Iew Orleans Monthly Medical R e g i s t e r , I (1051-

52), 94-95.
75p ic ay un e. Ma y 19, 1052.

CHAPTER III
THE GREAT EPIDEMIC AND ITS AFTERMATH

The yellow fever epidemic of 1$53 was

raost deadly

invasion of pestilence to strike New Orleans throughout its
long history.

Moreover, Yellow Jack was bp no means con

fined to the Crescent City, as several areas in Louisiana
and neighboring states were also attacked and suffered an
enormous mortality.

The epidemic was made all the more

terrifying by the belief so commonly held among residents
of New Orleans during the years just preceding 1353 that
yellow fever would never again return to their city with
the malignancy which characterized this disease in the past.
The prevalent optimism resulted from the fever1s failure to
produce a heavy death toll in the five year period following
the deadly outbreak of 1&47.

Dr. Hester commented in the

May issue of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal
that New Orleans had been "blessed with extraordinary
health."

He asserted that after having prevailed four

years, cholera had become " e x t i n c t , a n d very little ship
fever (typhus) had been brought in by recent immigrants.
Interestingly, Hester then remarked:

■^Hester was notably incorrect in making this affir
mation.
The following December he v/as among hundreds in
Louisiana who succumbed to cholera.
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It is somewhat extraordinary tnat_up to
this moment . . . but few musquitoes [_ sic J
have been seen. We generally have myriads of
these troublesome insects by this time of the
year.
The rela ,ion that this fact may bear
to the state of health both now and hereafter
will be worthy of notice, as the elements
that enter Into their generations may be 0
intimately connected with morbific causes.
Hester was much closer to the truth than he could have sup
posed.

Two months later the editor of the Daily Delta com

plained tiiat he had never known mosquitoes to be quite so
bothersome.

Not only had the "ordinary Creole mosquito"

been present, but there were also great numbers of what he
called the "black intruder."

He did not fail to see the

bright side to the situation, however, as he editorialized
philosophically:

"...

we don't believe Yellow Jack will

favor us with his grim presence this year, for the simple
reason that Providence does not afflict us with two curses
at one and the same time.

. . ."3

This bit of wishful

thinking was published a month after the first cases of
yellow fever had been reported.
The first of the Crescent City's more than eight thou
sand yellow fever deaths in 1353 was reported by the Board
of Health as having occurred during the week ending May 23.
The Board advised the public June 13 that seven deaths had
taken place during the preceding week, and that new cases
of the disease had appeared every week since May.

Nine

2New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, IX
(1352-53)7~343.
^Daily Delta, June 29 > 1353.
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more deaths were reported on June 25.^
newspapers,

The New Orleans

believing that nothing should be printed which

might injure the city’s prosperity, refused for many weeks
to countenance anything as totally undesirable as another
epidemic.

On June 22 the editor of the Crescent stated,

apparently without flinching, that yellow fever had become
an "obselete /~sic_7 idea” in New O r l e a n s . ^

The next day

the Picayune printed a letter to the editors from a person
termed a ’’good authority.”

The gist of the epistle was that

no cause for alarm existed over ”the fancied existence of
yellow fever in this city to a very great extent.”

The

Board of Health was assailed by the writer for having un
just! fiabljr created an alarm, thereby causing many New
Orleanians to leave the city.

The Board had evidently

been inactive before the issuance of the yellow fever
reports because this "good authority” did not know of its
existence until this time.^
An editorial by Dr. A. Forster Axson appearing in the
New Orleans Monthly Medical Register July 1 decried the

^DeBow’s Review, XV {1$53)» 59$. According to Dr.
Fenner, yellow fever was introduced into New Orleans in
May by the ship Augusta. The Augusta had presumably be
come infected from close contact with the disease-laden
Camboden Castle from Kingston, Jamaica.
E. D. Fenner,
History of the Epidemic Yellow Fever, at New Orleans, L a .
in i'8'53 TNew York, 1854) > pp. 15-16.
% e w Orleans Daily C r es ce nt , June 22, 1353.

^Picayune, June 23

>

1353.

sanitary condition of New Orleans and the c i t y ’s failure to

provide accurate mortality figures.
step to be taken,

asserted Axson,

of a really effective,

The first remedial

should be the organization

non-political Board of Health.

Axson

attached a great deal of importance to his claim that in the
past political bias had been largely responsible for the
7
selection of Board members.
The newspapers, in the mean
time, had begun a campaign for vigorous action to cope with
the city’s sanitary problems, although care was taken not
to mention the motive of the renewed effort.

Only the New

Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal would admit that there
had been deaths caused by yellow fever, and this admission
was coupled with a statement that the general health of the
city was "extraordinarily good."
During July the epidemic gained momentum at a reckless
pace.

The Board of Health reported 204 yellow fever deaths

in New Orleans during the week ending July 16.

Even at this

late date the only city paper willing to acknowledge the
presence of the yellow pestilence was the Orleanian.

But

the true seriousness of New Orleans’ plight could no longer
be concealed froin local residents, and the usual mass
9
exodus from the city was well under way.
The increasing

?New Orleans Monthly Medical Register,

II

(1852-53),

118-19.
a
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, X
(1853-54), 137.
^DeBow’s Review, XV (1853), 603.
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gravity of the situation produced among the newspapers a
gradual and reluctant surrender to the facts during the
ensuing weeks.

The Daily Delta apprised the public of

the presence of yellow fever July 20, but made itself
appear ludicrous by stating that it was the ,Tleast serious
of several descriptions of fever,” and that if victims
would avoid excesses,

discard their fears, and use simple

remedies, mortality would be ’’very insignificant."'^

The

Weekly D e l t a , in a similarly optimistic vain, commented:
"From its early appearance in our city, we are led to be
lieve that the present visitation of this disease will be
of short duration,

and of comparatively moderate severity.

The Picayune confessed July 21 that Yellow Jack was "spread
ing" and "fatal," but attached the reassuring note that it
had been "mainly confined to the unacclimated laborer and
the poor emigrant."

12

The Common Council was implored repeatedly to take
action of some sort to prevent the spread of disease,

but

the pleas were apparently ignored as long as possible.
Mounting public pressure finally bestirred the Council to
call a special meeting July 25 at which time a new Board of

10Daily D e l t a , July 20, 1353.
•^New Orleans Weekly D e l t a , July 20, 1353*
•^ P i c a y u n e , July 21, 1353*
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Health was established.^

The Board was organized the very-

next day with Mayor A. D. Crossraan as President and Dr.
Axson as Secretary.

Dr, Hester was elected Port Physician

and was placed in charge of the quarantine station at
Slaughter-house Point (Algiers), at which all vessels from
foreign ports would henceforth be required to stop before
crossing the river to New Orleans.

This plan of instituting

a quarantine when epidemic yellow fever was already pre
vailing, DeBow characterized as ridiculous.’*'^'

The Board

was ordered to enforce sanitary regulations, and was granted
ten thousand dollars to be used at its own discretion.
The consensus among the public seems to have been that
the Council acted too late.

The editor of the Crescent

suggested that half the sum of ten thousand dollars spent
six months earlier to clean the streets would have done much
more good.

He said that he believed the quarantine to be

TTthe most salutary provision in the ordinance, and should
be rigidly enforced.
the quarantine.

An Orleanian editorial also defended

The success which had attended the employ

ment of quarantine in other countries was noted, and then
the editor added sarcastically:

"Are we r e a l y / ~ s i c _ 7 so

much wiser, so much more advanced in science, and so much

^ A p p a r e n t l y the only other beneficial measure
adopted by the Council prior to its adjournment until Oc
tober 1 was the granting of two thousand dollars to the
Howard Association.
D eBowTs Review, XV (1353) j 603.
^ I b i d ., pp. 613-14*

^ Crescent, July 26, 1353.
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freer from all the old rules and prejudices, than the little
rest of the world?"

The Orleanian denounced the Common

Council for failure to help those already suffering from
yellow fever:
The Common Council met yesterday, and
they tell us they have made a Board of
Health!--May God help the stricken ones!
Vie had hoped to have told to-day of things
of charity and of confidence; but we can
do no such things.
For the future we
will trust to our city council as we will
for milk from the he-goat, ana silk from
the spider.
Assistance for the afflicted poor was being provided, by a
remarkable group of young men who on July 14 revived the
benevolent organization known as the Howard Association.
The primary object of this institution was to see that the
poor received medical attention.

The Howard Association

had been founded during the yellow fever epidemic of 1337>

17

and was reorganized whenever New Orleans suffered most from
pestilence.

A high percentage of those who contracted

yellow fever in 1B53 were classified as "indigent sick,"
and were provided with needed medicine and attendants.
Most of them were treated at their residences, but many
were taken to hospitals and infirmaries where proper nurs
ing could be made available.

The Board of Health established

for the use of the Howards several infirmaries as well as
three orphanages to care for children whose parents had

■^New Orleans Daily Orleanian, July 26, 1$53*
^ D a i l y D elta, July 24> 1&53 •
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fallen victims to the plague, and relief was extended to
id
destitute widows.
Newspapers printed each day a notice
from the Howard Association for the benefit of those in
need of help.

This notice contained a list of practicing

physicians who unselfishly offered their services without
charge, and a list of apothecaries who volunteered to grant
assistance whenever summoned by the Howards.

A list of

"Relief Members" was supplied in order that those requiring
financial aid would know to whom to apply.

19
7

These ambitious projects resulted in considerable ex
pense, but all the necessary funds and more were furnished
by the generous contributions of the citizens of New Orleans.

20

In December the Howard Association issued a fis

cal report on its operations during the past summer.

More

than eleven thousand cases of yellow fever had been treated
by members of the Association, and nearly ten thousand of
the victims were foreign born, stated the report.

Total

expenses had been about $ 162 ,000 , and the unused balance
which remained was in excess of $66,000.

21

Unfortunately

•^Orleanian, July 16, 1^53; Picayune, October 19j
1$53 ; Crescent, September 1, 1853.
•^Crescent t August 10, 1$53.
The Howard Association also received funds from
the people of New York, Washington, Philadelphia, and other
cities in many parts of the country.
^ P i c a y u n e , December 21, 1&53*
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the Howards would have ample occasion to use this surplus
in the near future.
The month of August witnessed the climax of the epi
demic.

During a period of three weeks yellow fever mor

tality averaged approximately tv/o hundred per day, the
total for the entire month going well over five thousand.
Ghastly scenes of suffering and death became omnipresent.
An editorial appearing in the Weekly Delta described the
"Horrible Spectable" at one of the cemeteries:
The coffins were deposited on the
ground by the cartmen, wno then left;
there forty of them remained until yes
terday morning, unburied.
The action of
the sun, through the frail enclosure,
produced a rapid decomposition of the
bodies, several of which swelled, so
as to burst the coffins.
Attracted by
the unusually violent and offensive
effluvia, several citizens in the neigh
borhood. visited the spot, when the
horrible sight was presented, of forty
coffins unburied--through which the
ghastly, reeking bodies of as many
victims of the pestilence might be
seen, whilst the odor was almost overp o w e r•
i n g .77
^
Until nearly the middle of the month New Orleans
newspapers claimed with some justification that the disease
was confined in large degree to paupers and immigrants.^
But on August 11 the editor of the Daily Delta felt called

^ Weekly Delta, August 14i 1853*
23Dr. Axson asserted that "ninety-nine of every
hundred dying, were of our poor and foreign population."
New Orleans Monthly Medical Register, II (1852-53)> 130.
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upon to record publicly the startling truth:
Stilj onward stalks the dreadful
pestilence tnrough our afflicted city.
Every minute seems to give it strength
and vigor.
Increased victims appear to
snarpen rather than glut its savage appe
tite.
It leaps over all barriers and spurns
all opposition.
Beginning with the poor,
the ignorant and desolate, it has acquired
strength enough to defy all. the appliances
of wealth, of comfort, of scie_.ce, and
of art.
It can no Ion. er be taunted
with undue virulence towards the "lower
classes."
It has established, b> most
gloomy proofs, its title to the epithet
of a general leveler.
The sick, the
lonely, Lne gifted, the virtuous, the
strong as well as the votaries of vice
and destitution, the poor and the unvirtuous, the ignorant and imprudent —
all alike, fall before the remorseless
sickle of' this great destroyer, ana are
gathered into one common harvest of
death.
Business in New Orleans came almost wholly to a
standstill.

The New Orleans Price-Current managed to ig

nore yellow fever until the August 13 Issue mentioned that
"an unusually fatal epidemic" had dulled the m a r k e t . ^

The

August 27 issue declared that the epidemic had completely
deranged all business operations.

"Very little produce,

of any description, is coming in from the interior," the
journal reported, "and as for our leading staple, Cotton,
the supply seems to have almost entirely ceased at the
moment; the backwardness of the crop, and the sickness in
the city, and in some of the river towns, having combined

^ D a i l y D elta, August 11, 1$53.
^ N e w Orleans Price-Current, Commercial Intelli
gencer and MerchantsT Transcript, August 13, H?53»
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to limit the early receipts. ,f‘"
v e]low Jack had begun to spread over the countryside.
Heavy death tolls were bein'- recorded in cities, villages,
and rural areas, althouvh most o'" those areas did not feel
the full brunt of the tidal wove c-f disease until

lent "tuber,

the Crescent reported September 7 th=<t all parts of the
country incl udir •• areas ecnrinered exerrnt fro a veil on fever
had bean attacked.
ceer

Accord.; n-~ tc tins account hatch os had

'isltea vy veil or fever "r!.n a

0.-1

f aine:ti ve fere,''

and i n ; obile the pestil ence was ravinv "with a virulancy
unprecedented.

fh-3

presence of yellow

"ever at Thibodaux

was said to have "created a oenic smonr the citizens veryin---v on frenzy."

At tultcn (near F.onrc-e) "inhabitants were

.fleeiiv 1,0 the country, leavim-- scarcely any to take care
on
of the sick,
1 ire Alexandria led .-river uepublican de
clared a few days later that only a few cases had appeared
in the Alexandria area, but despite the absence of immediate
canver several families had moved to the pine woods.

2f

The

Crescent, of September 13 mentioned a number of cities where
yellev; fever was prevailing.

Amonm them were Plauuemine,

Bayou Bara, Vidalia, Pointe Coupee, and. Baton loupe in
Louisians;

//oodville, Vicksburg, Pass Christian, and

Biloxi in Mississippi; and Houston, Texas.

The Baton

"°lbid., Aurust 27, 1353.
-^Crescent , September 7, 1353.
Alexandria led liver republican, September 10,

1353.
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Rouge Weekly Cornet affirmed that sixteen hundred cases had
been reported in the capital city, and very few families,
black or white, had excaped the disease.

29
'

Until well into

October the number of cities and villages invaded by yellow
fever continued to mount.
The most spectacular events were those enacted in the
Crescent City during the month of August.

MThe King of

Terrors had full sway,” remarked DeBow, ’’hearses were con
stantly passing, with hot haste through all the principal
streets; and carts, wagons, and cabs, filled with the sick
going to the hospitals, met the passer-by at every step.
. . . Many were founo dead in their beds, in stores, in the
■5Q
streets, and in other places.”"^
The city officials who had
failed to join thousands of other New Orleanians in their
flight from peril during tne early stages of the epidemic
were made the victims of fierce denunciation for failing to
do anything.

Furthermore, the question was raised as to

what the Board of Health had done with the ten thousand
dollars voted to it by the Common Council.
On August 19 the Board was driven by desperation to
order purification of the air— not by sanitary measures,
but by cannon-firing and tar-burning’
.

The newspapers had

printed letters from older residents of the city describing
the success which attended such efforts in the past, and

^ B a t o n Rouge Weekly Comet, October 2, 1853•
3 % e B o w fs Review, XV (1853)> 624*
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health officials could no longer postpone the experiment.
Four hundred cannon discharges were to take place daily in
the public squares,

and tar was to be scattered profusely

in the streets and set afire.
greatly disturbed the sick,

The noise from the cannons

so the Mayor quickly ordered

that part of the experiment terminated.
was c o n t i n u e d . T h e

The tar-burning

Board of Health was deluged with

suggestions of all sorts.

A letter appearing in the Daily

Delta from one Thomas Maguire advised the adoption of a
plan with a "more beneficial effect in banishing yellow
fever from our city than all the medicine you can admin
ister."

He advised employing a marching band to parade

the streets along which pestilence was raging with the
greatest ferocity in order to raise the spirits of the
suffering.^ 2
The deplorable sanitary conditions in New Orleans were,
in the meantime,

coming under increasingly bitter attack.

It seemed simple indeed to ascribe the entire tragedy to
filth which abounded on every hand.

An editorial appearing

in the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal described
the slum area where the first cases of yellow fever were
reported:
The streets in this vicinity, for
the most part, were unpaved, or planked,
and the culverts, gutters, etc., were

Ibid., pp. 626-27.
-^Daily D e l t a , August 21, 1$53»

filled with water, saturated with filth
and decaying vegetable and animal matter.
The crowded state of these huts and low
wooden tenements, with their floors steep
ed in mud and water, is admirably calcu
lated to generate and propagate the germ
of a disease which had already been sown
in their midst,33
Theeditor of the Orleanian urged the Board
create

of Health to

a sanitary commission to investigate trie circum

stances which had given rise to the prevalence of yellow
fever.

Tc him the cause of the epidemic was clear:

"Vie

have sinned against sanitary rules--with no sufficient
sewers, with our water closets adjoining the cisterns,
with intra-mural burials of our fellow creatures, with
crowded closets upon damp, unventilated floors and per
colation water nigh to the whole surface of our soil, why
should we wonder that Death comes a bidden g u e s t ? " ^
An entirely different viewpoint was held by one of
Hew Orleans’ elder physicians, Dr. J. S. McFarlane.

His

unusual theory concerning the relation of filth to yellow
fever was first made public in a letter to Mayor Crossman
wnich appeared in the Daily Delta July 2$.
wrote:

”, . . 1

McFarlane

say, sir, that so far from believing

that the filth and impurities in our streets, yards and
suburbs, have anything to do with the creation of a
yellow fever atmosphere, I believe that, to a certain

33jjew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, X
(1853-54),“ 275.
34orieanian, September 28, 1853•
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extent, they are calculated to retard its formation ."35
The Crescent was the first of many to flay the doctor
unmercifully for what was generally regarded as an open
display of ignorance or insanity.

Its editorial of August

2 concluded:
It is really ridiculous to assume
that offensive matter operates as a pro
tection against yellow fever, for although
it may not directly produce that scourge
of our city, it certain.i.y debilitates the
system, and renders it more susceptible
to the disease.
It is a well-known fact
that those who are uncleanly in their
persons, and who dwell in the filthiest
sections of the city, have been victims
t the fever.
Indeed, if filth be a
protection, then ought New Orleans be
the healthiest city In the world.
N.B.— Would it not be well, in
pursuance of Dr. McFarlane's theory, to
have a public laboratory established,
where ail manner of nauseating fumes may
be Chemically evolved, and furnished to
every citizen t-> be carried in a nose
bag? How about that?36
McFarlane, not to be deterred, immediately reiterated
his contention that filth and offal tended to retard the
spread of yellow fever.

He defended his position by point

ing out that yellow fever was not, in contrast to malarial
fevers, a disease of miasmatic origin.

Malaria had been

prevalent in New Orleans since 1347 because there had been
sufficient swamp drainage and tree-cutting to expose the
the filth in the rear of the city to the sun's rays.

35paily Delta, July 2$, 1853.
-^ C r e s c e n t , August 2, 1853•

In
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this way a miasmatic atmosphere conducive to malaria but
not to yellow fever had been created.

The excessively

heavy rains of 1853 drowned the swamp area once again, he
wrote, preventing the noxious exhalations which would have
produced malaria and restrained yellow fever . ^
The editor of the Crescent was still unconvinced.

He

asserted that McFarlane was the only member of his pro
fession who believed that filth in any way prevented yellow
fever.The

doctor then became noticeably hostile, causing

the Crescent to announce its intention to say no more about
McFarlane ’’unless in /~the_7 future he shall attempt to
overwhelm us v/ith his mystical theories, or to befoul us
with his vulgar epithets--in which case we promise him we
shall not fail to meet him in his own style of controversy,
however it may involve us in the necessity of immortalizing
his folly by enshrining it in print.”39

Several months

later DeBow wrote that McFarlane’s theory had been ridiculed
throughout the world, and ’’its originator pronounced either
a fool who deserved pity, or a knave who deserved the se
verest punishment.
September brought gradual relief to the stricken city

-^Daily Delta, August 6, 1853; DeBow’s Review,
XVI ( 18 50 > 464-H^;
^ C r e s c e n t , August 8, 1853.
39jbid . } August 12, 1853*
^ D e B o w ’s Review, XV (1853)> 600.

of New Orleans,

During the first week of the month approx

imately one hundred persons became victims of the scourge
each day, but successive weeks exhibited a noticeable re
duction in the death toll.

Not until October 13, when

yellow fever fatalities numbered only about five daily,
did the Board of Health regard conditions as sufficiently
improved to warrant a declaration that the epidemic was
officially at an end.

Mortality figures for the epidemic

are notoriously inaccurate because of the hundreds of un
reported burials, but assuredly the victims of "black
vomit" numbered well over eight thousand during 1$53»
The discussion pertaining to the origin of the outbreak
and the means wnereby a similar calamity could be averted
in the future was under way many weeks before the last
cases were reported.

Editorials appearing in the Weekly

Delta during September took issue with the sanitationists
by declaring that the epidemic proved that yellow fever
was not generated by local causes.

Attention was called to

the admittedly salubrious atmosphere in such cities as
Mobile, Pensacola, Natchez, and Vicksburg, each of which
had been victimized by a devastating invasion of Yellow
Jack.^

Dr. M. Morton Dowler, one of the cityfs most

prolific writers on the subject of yellow fever, asserted
his belief that the disease in question was "native, local,

^ W e e k l y D e lt a, September 4> 1$> 1&53
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and annual” in New Orleans, but that very little was known
as to its cause or why it should have prevailed with such
severity in 1$53.

One thing was certain, he said:

11. .

. . the application of quarantine to yellow fever, in our
city, is neither useful, expedient nor humane, and deserves
the unanimous condemnation of all c on c er ne d, ^
Mayor Crossman pointed to the renewed interest in the
contest between the contagionists and the non-contagionists,
noting especially the influence of the epidanic in leading
,Tvery many of our fellow-citizens to advocate the establish
ment of a permanent and rigid quarantine as the only measure
calculated to afford security for the future.”^

An in

creasingly large faction in New Orleans had become con
vinced that events more than justified granting quarantine
another trial.
of immediacy.

The tragedy of 1853 injected the element
Assuming the lead in publicly advocating an

experiment with a new, "judicious” quarantine were the
Picayune and the Bulletin, two of the city’s principal
newspapers.

The campaign was launched while the epidemic

still raged, creating an uncommon receptiveness to any
positive proposal.
The Bulletin carried a series of editorials which
sought to show logically that yellow fever could not have
originated in Louisiana, and that in each outbreak suffered

^ ^Daily Delta, October 6, 1353*
^ Picayune, October 19> 1853.
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by New Orleans the disease had been imported.

The existence

of yellow fever in port cities of the United States was said
to be a result of commercial contact wit.h the West Indies
and other areas where that malady was indigenous.

Further

more, yellow fever was described as "eminently contagious
and transmissable."

Since science had been wholly unable to

keep it under control, declared the Bulletin, the only remedy
was to shut it out.

Consequently, a rigid quarantine should

be imposed against all vessels having in any way had contact
with an infected port.

The quarantine as proposed would

operate twelve months of the year and thereby protect New
Orleans from all foreign pestilence.

The main quarantine

station was to be located on the opposite bank of the
Mississippi, downstream as far as Fort J a c k s o n , ^ and a
lesser station would be established at the Rigolets and
operate only from May 1 until November I.

Quarantine offi

cers were to be given extensive powers, resistance to their
legal commands subjecting offenders to fine and imprison
ment.

The cost of the project, stated the Bulletin, would

probably be little more than the present cost of treating

^ D u r i n g the latter stages of the epidemic the Board
of Health established a temporary quarantine at Fort Jackson,
about seventy-three miles below New Orleans.
The purpose
of this move was to prevent immigrants from arriving too
soon and thereby providing Yellow Jack with new material.
Orleanian, September 10, 1853; Weekly Delta, September 11,

iw r.
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patients with infectious diseases at Charity H o s p i t a l . ^
In August the Picayune began a series of lengthy edi
torials aimed at convincing the public that quarantine de
served a fair t r i a l . ^

first, it was demonstrated that the

prevailing epidemic had been introduced by a ship from Rio
de Janeiro.

The editor, admitting that the utility of quar

antine was open to question, avov/ed his conviction that
events had demonstrated clearly the need for undertaking a
thorough experiment.

"Surely any pecuniary inconvenience,

however great, which the enforcement of quarantine may
occasion,1' he asserted,

"is not to be balanced in the scale

against the lives of thousands of human beings.

. .

The editorials also lauded the sanitationists.

There were

many individuals, it was rioted, who were
a nevi
miasma.

actively demanding

sanitary police system designed to prevent or destroy
The Picayune heartily endorsed this agitation:
Let our city establish and rigidly
enforce the most stringent and energetic
sanitary measures to insure its cleanli
ness and the purity of its atmosphere and
to guard in every possible manner against
the local origin of the disease.
But at
the same time let us have a wise and welldigested system of quarantine to protect
us against the possible importation of

^ Yellow Fever; its Causes and Consequences:
A
Series of articles published in the New/ Orleans Bulletin,
during the Epidemic of 1353 (New Orleans^ 1355) , pp. 4^-43 .
^ Y e a r s later Dr. McFarlane accused the Picayune
of having been responsible for the quarantine and for the
creation of the State Board of Health.
Daily D el ta ,
August 25} 1353.
^ Picayune, August 31> 1353*
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pestilential diseases from abroad.
Such
seems to us to be the course of a wise
prudence.^®
The Picayune maintained that objection to quarantine
regulations had arisen because of unwise enforcement pro
cedures.

This problem required immediate rectification:

■"v'/e would have the most carefully matured and judicious
quarantine regulations established and enforced rigidly,
yet discriminately,

and in a manner as little vexatious
go
to commerce as possible. , . .
Picayune editorials
reiterated those same basic points time and again, appar

ently with considerable effect.

The editor asserted that

the importation of yellow fever in 1353 was an established
fact, making a quarantine necessary.

The September 14

ed

itorial urged a number of sanitary reforms which included
draining the swamps all the way back to Lake Pontchartrain.
Several editorials made the sensible point that no good
reason could be found why those favoring quarantine and
those favoring sanitation were always at odds.

Sanitary

measures did no harm, and quarantine, even if it should
prove to be worthless, declared the Picayune, would pro
duce no injury "beyond a little unnecessary expenditure
from the municipal f i s c u s . " ^

A later editorial affirmed:

"The wisdom and necessity of establishing a quarantine for
our city may now be regarded, we apprehend, as a settled

^Ibid.
49Ib id .
50jbid., September 4> 14> 13, 25> October 25> 1353*
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question among the people of Mew Orleans.”
The Picayune of October 2 pointed to the need of a per
manent board of health for New Orleans to take the place of
the existing temporary one.

The proposed organization

would be in charge of sanitary improvements and would issue
weekly mortality reports throughout the year so that the
generally good health of the city would be demonstrated.
An October 9 editorial coupled the quarantine proposition
with one urging the Council to create a permanent board of
health.

If legislation were deemed necessary, the Council

was exhorted to have the matter brought up at the next
meeting of the Legislature.^

This barrage of editorials

continued for several months.
The temporary Board of Health, born during the height
of the pestilence,
wisdom and.resolve.

carried on its work with commendable
Infirmaries and orphanages were created

to aid sufferers of the epidemic,

sanitary measures were

adopted to purify the air (although the Board hardly de
serves credit for having instituted tar-burning and cannonfiring), a temporary quarantine was instituted as a pre
cautionary device, and weekly mortality reports were made
public.

As the emergency neared its conclusion the Board

of Health appointed a six-man Commission to gather infor
mation pertaining to the cause and characteristics of the
epidemic.

The members of this "Sanitary Commission” were

^ I b i d ., October 2, 9» 1^53 •
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Mayor A. D. Crossman, and Drs. A. F. Axson, E. K. Barton,
J. C. Simonds, J. L. Riddell, and S. D. McNeil.

Evidently

Crossman was added to the Commission merely to give it an
official flavor.

In discussing the appointments, the 'Weekly

Delta criticized the selection of a body composed almost
entirely of physicians.

"Besides the natural tendency of

doctors to disagree,” warned the Delta, "this subject of
yellow fever has been peculiarly the bone of contention of
the faculty, scarcely any tvra concurring in the main points
of its nature and history.”

Carrying the attack further,

the editor suggested that there might be a lack of public
confidence in the Commission because of the belief held by
many that doctors were "pecuniarily interested in the existence of epidemics,"^

The Crescent emphatically dis

agreed :
The Board of Health for this city have
done well— acted wisely in selecting a com
mittee of medical men for the investigation
of medical matters. . . . We deem it very
ungracious, untimely, and uncalled for in
our contemporary in making any attack upon
the constitution of the committee that
would, in our view, tend to underrate or
injure its position for usefulness in the
discharge of the important task committed
to its care, and from which, if faith
fully executed, much good is expected to •
result.53
The editor of the Baton Rouge Weekly Comet found no fault
with the composition of the new sanitary board, but he did

^ W e e k l y De lta, October 2, 1253*
^ C r e s c e n t , October 4, 1253*

plead with its members to accumulate facts rather than
expound t h e o r i e s . T h e Commission’s Report, however,
was not forthcoming until December of the following year.
Without question the residents of New Orleans were aroused during the autumn of 1£>53 as they seldom had been
before.

The usual lethargy was temporarily submerged.

De

mands vrere frequently voiced that some action be taken to
forestall the recurrence of a disaster similar to the one
which so recently had taken the lives of many thousands.
The Common Council, back in session after its hasty ad
journment in July, immediately solicited views from some
of the city’s prominent medical men as to its course of
action.

The doctors recommended adoption of an underground

sewerage system, paving the streets with some hard material
which would render them easy to clean, establishment of
cheap bathing houses, provision for enlarged water works,
and completing the drainage of the lowlands around the
55
cit y . ^

An ordinance was prepared by the City Council creating
a city health department under a ’’Health Officer” who was
to be appointed by t h e Council and receive a salary of six
thousand dollars.

The Health Officer was empowered to

appoint as many deputies and employees as he might require.
The proposed ordinance granted the Health Officer complete

^ B a t o n Rouge Weekly Comet, November 6, 1$53«
55paily D e lta, October 19, 1$53 •
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control over all matters relating to the health and cleanliness of Mew Orleans.
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His powers would have been ex

tensive— too extensive, thought some.

The Health Officer,

complained the Crescent, was being put in command of the
entire police force, and the stipulation that he might
''enter into any premises at any time between sunrise and
sunset" was outrageous.

The Crescent stated further that

the salary to be paid the Health Officer was excessive,
and his appointive power would lead to corruption.
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This

very controversial ordinance was considered by the Council
several times,

although no action was taken.

In December a substitute measure which would have
created a permanent
the Council.

city Board of Health was examined by

A Board of five physicians was to have been

given virtually absolute power over all aspects of sanitation and quarantine."10

The Semi -weekly Creole, a per

sistent advocate of public health reforms, noted December
2k that the entire matter of creating a health department

for New Orleans had been laid on the table.
editor declared:

Angered, the

"That, under existing circumstances, no

sanitary measures have been adopted, is a matter of aston
ishment.

Continued neglect, after the public disaster of

last summer, is insane— nay, is a criminal trifling, which

5^Picayune, October 20, 1853•
5?Crescent, November 25 > 1853*
^ P i c a y u n e , December 13» 1853*
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should not only excite public indignation,

but be followed

with the severest pe nalties."^
When the Legislature met at Baton Rouge in January 1354,
the Picayune again called attention to the need for action
in providing New Orleans with an effective quarantine.

The

editor stated that although police juries of the parishes
and municipal authorities in the cities had in the past been
granted powers necessary to enact ordinances and regulations
to protect against the importation of contagious diseases,
the powers had proven inadequate.

A quarantine for New

Orleans could not be effectual, continued the editorial,
without the cooperation of the parishes below the city.
Consequently, some sort of legislation to accomplish this
objective was deemed n e c e s s a r y , ^

A month later the Bee

emphasized the need for a "complete, thorough and rigorous"
quarantine, asserting that its utility or inutility could
definitely be established by proper enforcement for a number
of years.

The point was made that this plan would in no

way be incompatible with ether aspects of public health:
the removal of filth, the supply of pure water, and free
ventilation.

Furthermore, according to the editor, the

quarantine would be only "a temporary inconvenience, to
tally insignificant in comparison with the evil and mis
chief it is designed to correct."

The Bee maintained that

59wew Orleans Semi-Weekly Creole, December 24, 1653.
^ P i c a y u n e , January 15, 1654.
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its position had strong support:
. . . the conviction is gaining ground
that the Fever is an imported malady; that,
having been brought hither from abroad, its
advent may be prevented by judicious sani
tary precautions, and that it is the bounden duty of the State to essay quarantine
regulations, and thus practically to solve
the problem which has so J.ong agitated the
public mind.61
The Baton Rouge Daily Advocate, one of tne many Louisiana
journals expressing entirely different views, predicted
that a disappointment lay ahead for the quarantinists:
We have too much confidence in the
present Legislature, to think that they
would enact the ridiculous stupidity of
attempting to quarantine the State of Lou
isiana, and the greater part of the Mi s
sissippi Valley, even if tne farce should
cost nothing; but when so utterly pre
posterous an experiment would necessarily
involve an enormous expense to the State,
already overburdened with taxes, it is
beyond the range of conception that they
could think seriously,of perpetuating
the stupendous folly.
Governor Paul 0. Hebert told the state Legislature at
the beginning of its 1854 session that the sanitary condi
tion of New Orleans had become a matter of great importance
to the rest of Louisiana.

Railroads were rapidly making

the most distant villages seem suburbs of the state's
metropolis.

Observation and experience, declared Hebert,

had shown that epidemics were bred and fostered in large
cities.

Attention was directed by the Governor to New

^ N e w Orleans Bee, February 10, 1854.
^ B a t o n Rouge Daily Advocate, February 7» 1854.
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Orleans, presumed to be the focal point of infection, and
he expressed hope that a recurrence of the scenes of the
preceding year could be averted by proper attention to
hygiene.

The legislators were told that either they must

do something or else grant the city of New Orleans suffi
cient power to accomplish the needed reforms,

Hebert

asserted further that a great deal of attention should be
given to the findings of the Sanitary Commission concerning
the origin,

character, and causes of the recent epidemic . ^

On February 23 a joint resolution was offered to the
House of Representatives:
Whereas, it appears to be the desire of
the people of Louisiana that a quarantine
should be established at some point on the
Mississippi river, below the port of Nev, Or
leans, for the purpose of preventing the
spread uf contagious and infectious diseases,
and believing the whole of the valley of the
Mississippi deeply interested in the said
quarantine, we believe that it should in
part be made a national affair.
Be it therefore resolved, by the State
and the House of Representatives of the
State of Louisiana in General Assembly
convened, that our Senators be instructed
and our Representatives requested to use
their best efforts with the General gov
ernment to secure an appropriation for
a quarantine at some point on the Mis
sissippi^ river, below the city of Mew
Orleans. ^
The resolution was based upon the findings of the Joint

^ Journal of the House of Representatives of the
State of Louisiana"/ 1 3 (n.p., n.d.), p . 3•

^ I b i d ., p . 36.
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Committee on Public Health which had been gathering opinions
on the feasibility of a quarantine from various interested
persons and orgainizations in Nev. Orleans.

The Committee’s

Majority Report declared New Orleans to be ’’the focus of
all the Epidemics which have visited /"~Louisiana_7. ”

Quar

antine stations should therefore be located on the Mississippi
and Atchafalaya rivers and a third one by the lakes.

The

Committee asserted its belief that yellow fever was infec
tious, although, this assertion was immediately qualified by
the following statement:

’’That yellow fever proper cannot

be imported and spread without the existence of an atmos
pheric predisposition to tnat disease, your committee does
not doubt.”
The Committee did not hesitate in announcing its con
viction that yellow fever as well as other foreign diseases
had repeatedly been brought to New Orleans in the hulls of
ships.

The Report attempted to fix the origin of the 1853

epidemic on the ship Augusta which landed at New Orleans
in Kay with some sick crew members.

The problem of the

appearance of immigrants at times when the city was ex
periencing an epidemic was also noted:
We hold that to ship them to this port
in the summer is immoral and unchristian,
and that our safety, as much as theirs, re
quires that they should not be allowed to
enter our port, where death awaits them.
Compel the captain of a ship, arriving here
in the summer, to land his passengers at
the Quarantine ground, with provisions for
their support, or quarantine such vessels
until the sickly season is passed, and
emigration to this port in the summer will
soon cease.
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The Public Health Committee’s Majority Report contained what
was regarded as an important statement by the Hew Orleans
Chamber of Commerce that a quarantine would be "no obstruc
tion to commerce and of great benefit to the city,"
Report declared in conclusion:

The

"Your committee recommend

a system of Quarantine, which whilst it will tend to pro
mote the public health of the State, will throw as little
restrictions as possible in the way of commerce."6?
The Counter Report of the Pp'olic Health Committee,
written by the minority, opposed the establishment of a
really effective quarantine system.

Something termed a

quarantine was devised, probably to placate public opinion.
The Report maintained that the best means to insure the
health of the state was to "keep the atmosphere pure in
all localities by the removal of all decaying vegetable
matter, freshly exposed earth mould, be, liable to be
acted on by heat and moisture.

. . ,

The Picayune, commenting on the Report, pointed with
particular glee to the approval granted quarantine by the
Chamber of Commerce.

Picayune editorials,

its readers

were reminded, had often emphasized that epidemics did the
commerce of New Orleans far more harm than a quarantine

65report

of the Joint Committee on Public Health
(New Orleans, 1$54T> pp. 3-6.
^ Counter Report of the Joint Committee on Public
Health (New Orleans, 185477 P* 4*
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could possibly do.

The editor remarked on the general

agreement in New Orleans and in the Legislature that quar
antine must be given another trial. ?

A few days later

the Picayune asserted that nineteen-twentieths of the
people desired a quarantine, but showed obvious concern that
the legislators would soon adjourn without enacting a quarantine law.
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These fears were realized; the very next day

the House postponed all quarantine legislation until the
next session.
A week later the editor of the Picayune, having in his
possession both the weak quarantine bill reported by the
minority of tne Committee on Public Health and the much
stronger bill proposed by the majority, expressed his as
tonishment that those bills had been summarily disposed of
by the Legislature.

The bill reported b/- the Committee

majority he rated excellent.

This bill would have created

a board of health composed of trie Mayor of New Orleans, six
councilmen, the resident physician at each quarantine sta
tion, two other physicians,
ex-officlo.

and the Covernor as president

'i'ne board was to have been granted full power

to decide when and against whom a quarantine should be pro
claimed.

Because of the Legislative’s failure to act, the

Picayune advised the City Council to establish the most

^ Picayune, March 9, 1 $ 54 •
6'^Ibid., March 12, 1354.
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efficient quarantine possible under the circumstances.

Q
'

The editorial of April 6 revealed a tinge of bitLerness:
. . . what has New Orleans ever done
towards the establishment of a medical
police? vfnat is her sanitary system? She
has none.
There is nothing that can pre
tend to the designation of a system of
sanitary measures.
Quarantine to protect
her people against the introduction of the
pestilential seeds of foreign diseases
she has none.
An internal police to pre
vent the origin and spread of local mal
adies, she will not adopt.
The absence
of either an external or an internal
system of sanitary police cannot be
viewed, under all the circumstances,
otherwise than as exceedingly discred
itable to the intelligence and public
spirit of our city.7^

Echoing this sentiment the Semi-Weekly Creole declared:
H . . . all prudent communities have taken prompt measures
to remove from populous neighborhoods all incitements of
disease.

. . . New Orleans alone has taken no step of pru

dence— established no system of quarantine--adopted no
sanitary regulations.

71
. . .n

The debate continued.

Some demanded a quarantine,

whereas others argued for the enforcement of rigid sanitary
measures; there were also those who advocated both, but
above all there was, at least among the articulate, an
increasingly strong conviction that public health reform
was a matter of pressing importance.

The return of Yellow

Jack during the summer of 1&54 bolstered the position of

^ I b i d . , March 19> 1$54.
^ I b i d .i April 6, 1354*
etni-Weekly Creole, May 2?, 1354-
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the reformers.

The loss of thousands of lives (though

only two thousand this time) always provided the surest
means of arousing the public.
In December, 1$54 the long-awaited Report by the New
Orleans Sanitary Commission appeared.

This Commission, it

will be recalled, had been appointed in October,
the Board of Health.

1853 by

It consisted of five of New Orleans’

most eminent physicians and mayor Crossrnan, who were in
structed first, to inquire .into the etiology and mode of
transmission of yellow fever;

second, to report on sewerage

and drainage problems; and third, to consider the desir
ability of quarantine.

The fourth problem assigned to the

Commission was producing a thorough report on sanitary
conditions in New Orleans, together with suggestions for
their improvement.^

The Commission conducted lengthy in

vestigations, gleaning information on the four topics under
investigation from professional and non-professional sources
in Louisiana and nearby states.

The Commission sat as a

Court of Inquiry in New Orleans daily for about three months,
and one member was sent to Eastern cities to gather infor
mation on their sanitary conditions and practices.

Aid was

solicited and obtained from the national government in the
Commission’s efforts to acquire from the entire "yellow

?2Baton Rouge Weekly Comet, February 8, 1855; Daily
De lt a, December 12, 1854; Report of the Sanitary Commission
of New Orleans on the Epidemic Yellow Fever, of 1855 (New
Orleans,' 1854), pp. iii-iv.
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fever zone" facts pertinent to the problems under examination.
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The result was a 542 page Report, most of it the

work of the Commission’s chairman, Dr. Barton.
The Sanitary Commission's Report contained a discussion
of some length on each of the four matters which had been
investigated.

Dr. Axson and Dr. McNeil wrote the first

part of the Sanitary Report, dealing with characteristics
of yellow fever.

Axson and McNeil concluded that the epi

demic of 1^53 was of spontaneous origin, caused by "very
peculiar meteorological conditions" combined with "local
causes"

(lack of adequate sanitary measures).

Dr. Riddell,

author of the second part of the Report, recommended a
sewerage system for New Orleans.

Basically, the plan was

to allow river water to flow freely through the gutters,
thereby carrying filth to the rear of the city.

Dr. Simonds

declared in the third section of the Report that the Com
mission was unanimous in approving the establishment of a
n\
quarantine.
This was indeed a surprising recommendation
from a group of non-contagionists, but their point was that
the problem of whether or not yellow fever was contagious
or infectious could be dismissed.

The yellow fever virus,

thought the Commission, had often been introduced into New
Orleans by vessels from infected ports.
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The virus tended

Report of the Sanitary Commission, pp. iv-v.

74The Commission had recommended the passage of a
quarantine law the preceding spring when the matter was
being debated by the state Legislature.

to operate on an already vitiated atmosphere, thus producing
an epidemic constitution.

The benefit of a quarantine in

preventing the importation of admittedly contagious and in
fectious diseases, _i. _e., smallpox and typhus, was also
mentioned.^
The final portion of the Report was the work of Barton.
A veteran sanitary reformer, this was his most ambitious
effort at publicizing the need for cleaning the city of Hew
Orleans in order to prevent future epidemics.

Barton, assumed

that most febrile diseases were variations of one basic dis
ease.

Yellow fever was an acute illness resembling rather

closely the most severe malarial fevers, and was caused by
an especially malignant composition of the atmosphere.

Re

gardless of the obvious inaccuracies involved in his think
ing, Barton's recommendations were sound.

He has earned a

high rank among pioneers in public health by his persistent
efforts to show the public that a large portion of New Or
leans' shocking mortality could have been averted by proper
sanitation.

The "preventable mortality," asserted Barton,

comprised more than half of the total mortality.

Though he

was primarily interested in New Orleans, Barton saw the
problem of filth and disease as a general one:

75"Report of the Sanitary Commission of New Orleans
on the Epidemic Yellow Fever of 1853 >tf New Orleans Medical
News and Hospital Gazette, I (1854-55)j 529-31.
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Poverty, filth, intemperance, wretch
edness and crime have a similar paternity.
Disease originates from them, and, taking
the winds of the morning, it spreads itself
to the uttermost parts of the earth. Wher
ever it finds food it localises itself and
becomes developed, and hence, under a cer
tain concentrati :n, the inhabitants of the
palace, as of the hovel, become its victims.
Hence, all the world is interested in san
itary measures--in eradicating the seeds
of disease, and tnus make a brotherhood of
all mankind.'
Near the conclusion of the Commission1s Report, Dr. Barton
listed seventeen recommendations for the improvement of
sanitary conditions in Mew Orleans which were being offered
to the Council.

Allusion previously has been made to quar

antine and sewrerage; in addition, draining the swamps, pav
ing the streets, providing a more adequate water supply,
removing slaughterhouses from the city, discontinuing bur
ials in the city, and establishment of a powerful health
department were also urged.
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The Sanitary Report attracted a great deal of comment,
both favorable and unfavorable, but with the former pre
dominating.

However, Dr. M. Morton Dowler and Dr, J. S.

McFarlane found much in it with which they disagreed.
Dowler1s exceedingly biting criticism was not directed at
the Commission in general, but rather at Barton in partic
ular,

In the first place, remarked Dovrler, Barton had not

only covered his own topic but those of the other four
physicians as well, and in so doing had laid 1Tthe public

76Re port of the Sanitary Commission, p.
77Ibid., pp. 452-53.

purse under contribution for the publication of what he
unwarrantably denominates a Report, but which is really a
tedious book, abounding in absurdities, extravagances, and
self-glorification, totally unexampled in the annals of the
documents of our science."

Dowler believed the cause of

yellow fever to be unknown, and did not hesitate to crit
icize both the sanitationists and the quarantinists for
asserting theories lacking in foundation.

He stated that

for Barton to expect the public to finance expensive san
itary measures and pay for a quarantine as well was utterly
absurd.

Barton’s comment about the possibility of making

"yellow fever an impossibility in New Orleans" was singled
out by Dowler for particular ridicule.^

McFarlane appar

ently limited his criticism of the Commission’s Report to
a denial that the recommendations would do any good.
A few months later Barton answered his critics with a
polite and capable rebuttal.

Dowler was not mentioned at

all, and McFarlane was dismissed with the remark that he
had been "endowed-with some extraordinarily queer notions."
Barton did, however, direct a biting attack at those still
refusing to admit that New Orleans was unhealthy.

The myth

that the Crescent City was blessed by unparalled salubrity,
said Barton, had been "constantly dinned into the public

Morton Dowler, /~Review of the_7 "Report of
the Sanitary Commission of New Orleans on the Epidemic of
1353i” New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XI (135455) > 524-23.
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ear, until finally, it has become a kind of moral treason
to admit that people die here at alll"?^
The popular demand for an effective quarantine and an
adequate sanitation prograin gained momentum.

Opposition to

what were regarded in some quarters as expensive innovations
had been strong enough to forestall legislative action on
public health matters in 1354, but the restlessness engen
dered by many of New Orleans’ leading physicians and news
papers continued to grow.

If there really was a heavy

"preventable mortality," as Barton maintained, why not do
something to reduce the total?

Yet, with so little agree

ment on all aspects of public health, what could be done?
Fortunately the answer was soon forthcoming.

^ E d w a r d H. Barton, "Report read to the Academy
of Sciences, New Orleans, in Defence and Explanation of
the Report of the Late Sanitary Commission,” New Orleans
Medical News and Hospital Gazette, II (1355-5677 9$, iOU.

CHAPTER IV
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE STATE BOARD 0? HEALTH
In January, 1$55 Hew Orleans was host to the Southern
Commercial Convention.

This Convention, with sessions ex

tending over a period of six days, attracted delegates from
Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, Mary
land, Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, Kentucky,
vania, and Georgia.

Pennsyl

Indicative of the increasingly wide

spread interest in public health, a committee on quaran
tine was created with M. R. Jennings of T.ouisiana its chair
man.

On the fifth day of the Convention the following pre

amble and resolution were reported by the committee and
adopted:
Whereas, for the past two summers
several of the southern States have been
severely visited by the terrible scourge
of humanity the yellow fever, tending more
than any other cause to cripple the ener
gies, impair the prospects, and affect the
commercial as well as other interests of
the country; and whereas ship fever, ty
phus, typhoid, and yellow fevers, small
pox, and other infectious and contagious
diseases are imported into our seaport
towns-Resolved, That it is the opinion and
firm conviction of this convention, that
all the States bordering on the Atlantic,
south of 33 degrees, and those on the
Gulf of Mexico as far as the mouth of the
Rio Grande, are bound by their commercial
interests and their future prosperity in
100
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this Union of States, as well as by the
cause of suffering humanity, to establish
during the warmer months of the year, at
their discretion a rigid quarantine in
all their seaports, and ordinary marine
communication with the ocean,1
Rufus Dolbear of New Orleans, speaking in favor of the reso
lution, declared that his city was falling far behind New
York in the matter of export trade, and placed the blame on
recurrent epidemics.

He ridiculed those who opposed quar

antine because of a mistaken fear that the commerce of Newr
Orleans would be injured.^

On the surface it appeared that

even the Crescent City's commercial interests were anxious
to give quarantine another trial.
In the meantime some New Orleans newspapers were again
launching campaigns to goad the Legislature into enacting
public health measures.

The Semi-Weekly Creole, probably

the Crescent City's most outspoken paper, carried several
hard-hitting editorials calling attention to the need for
quarantine and sanitation laws.

One of the editorials,

appearing early in 1655, opened with the statement:

"Pub

lic health is the most important element of public pros
perity."

This assertion was followed by such remarks as,

"New Orleans has never adopted any measure of protection
to public health which could be dignified with the name
of a system," and, " . . .

the utmost negligence has been

iDeBow's Review, XVIII (1655), 630.
^Ibid., pp. 63 0-31.
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evinced by city and state authorities, as trough human
life were utterly valueless and all measures of precaution
were entirely hopeless."^

A Baton Rouge paper declared:

". . . it is pretty certain that an impression now prevails
with the public, and with the Legislature, which looks
favorably to quarantine, as at least one of the means of
securing the country against the annual occurrence of the
terrible pestilence."^

Dr. Samuel A. Cartwrright, for many

years a determined opponent of quarantine, conceded in a
speech delivered to the State Medical Society:

. .

public sentiment demands a Quarantine and . . . it is useK
less to resist it."^ The Picayune, of course, concurred:
The first and paramount measure which
demands the attention and the action of the
Legislature, is the establishment / ~ o f J
a quarantine for this city.
Public senti
ment is now clear and unanimous in favor
of this measure.
Even the old and most ob
durate opponents of the quarantine system
now concede the propriety of establishing
a quarantine for this port, and are in
^
favor of giving the measure a fair trial.
As the legislative session neared its termination, however,
the Picayune became worried that a quarantine might again
fail of enactment despite "the unanimous and settled con
viction of'the whole people of New Orleans, the opinions

•^Semi-Weekly Creole, January 17, 1&55*
^Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate, February 1, 1^55•
^Daily Delta, February IB, 1$55*

^Picayune, February 27 > 1&55.
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of the highest medical authorities among us, the cautious
and laborious conclusions of the late sanitary commission
and the earnest recommendation of the Chamber of Commerce.
. . .”7

Fortunately this fear was unjustified.

The measure entitled, ,rAn Act to establish quarantine
for the protection of the State,” approved by Governor Paul
0. Hebert March 15, 1$55, provided Louisiana with the core
of a comprehensive public health program for toe first time
in thirty years.

This act was delayed in the Legislature

for several weeks because of a determined minority, but
chiefly through the pertinacity of Senator A. L. Trudeau,
Chairman of the Health Committee, it was repeatedly brought
before the Legislature until it passed.

The vote in favor

of the new quarantine law was fourteen to seven in the Send
ate and fifty-five to eighteen in the House.
As significant
as the adoption of a state quarantine was the provision that
the quarantine was to be administered by a new organization:
a State Board of Health.

Louisiana thereby became the first

state to institute a permanent body whose functions it was
to protect and promote the public health.
Most of the twenty-nine sections of the act dealt with
the quarantine and the Board of Health.

Quarantine was to

be established on the Mississippi at a point at least seventy

7Ibid., March 11, 1555.
a
Journal of the Senate, Second Legislature— Second
Session / l555_/, p. 72; Journal of the House of Representa
tives , Second Legislature--Second Session TTl355_/, p". 142.
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miles downstream from Mew Orleans, the precise location to
be selected by the Board of Health.

The Board of Health

was to consist of "nine competent citizens of the State,"
three to be chosen by the City Council of New Orleans, and
the other six to be appointed by the Governor with the ad
vice and consent of the Senate.

The nine members were to

be "selected with reference to their known zeal in favor of
o
the quarantine system,"-7 and were to be commissioned by the
Governor for a term of one year.

Each of them was required

to take a special oath to enforce and comply with the pro
visions of the act.

The Board was to meet at least once

each month from November 1 until June 1, and once each week
during the warm months.

The President of the Board was to

be chosen by the other members and was to receive an annual
salary of two thousand dollars.

He was required to reside

in New/ Orleans from where he v/ould superintend the quaran
tine stations.

The Board was to hire a Secretary who would

also act as Treasurer; the Secretary was to receive a salary
of fifteen hundred dollars.

The Board of Health was author

ized to employ all lesser personnel at the Mississippi Quar
antine Station, to fix the term of quarantine for vessels
which were detained (though a ten-day minimum was stipulated),
and to make any regulations deemed necessary to effect a

^This very important provision was inserted by a
last-minute House amendment.
Journal of the House of
Representatives
$55_7 j p. 139.
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,Tproper system of quarantine,"^
A quarantine station was also to be established on the
Rigolets to protect the entrance into Lakes 3b. Catherine
and Fontchartrain, and a third station was to be located
on the Atchafalaya River.

The authors of this act recog

nized that these stations vjould be much less important
than Mississippi Station, but they believed that sufficient
commerce v/as being conducted on the Atchafalaya and through
the Rigolets to ’warrant a quarantine.

Atchafalaya Station

v/as to remain in operation from May 1 until November 1; in
addition, it had to remain open, as did Rigolets Station,
from the time a quarantine proclamation was issued until the
Board of Health voted to suspend quarantine for the season.
The Resident Physicians and other officers and employees
were to be chosen by the Board of Health.^
The most important officer in the new quarantine es
tablishment was to be the Resident Physician at Mississippi
Station.

He was to be appointed by the Governor and re

ceive a salary of five thousand dollars for his full-time
job.

Should help be needed, the Board of Health could

authorize the Resident Physician to employ an Assistant
Physician at an annual salary of two thousand dollars.

It

^ Acts passed by the Second Legislature of the State
of Louisiana . 1 ." l'd55 (New Orleans, 1855) Act No. 33^1
pp. 471-72.
13T b i d ., pp. 472-73.
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was the Resident Physician’s duty to inspect all vessels
entering the mouth of the Mississippi to determine whether
’’cholera, yellow fever, pestilential, contagious or infec
tious diseases” were present.

He was empowered to grant a

certificate declaring the vessel exempt from those diseases.
However, if it should be determined that tne vessel had come
from an ’’infected, district,” or had persons on board with
dangerous diseases, it became the duty of the Quarantine
Officer, as he was also called, to detain the vessel for
a period of not less than ten days.

The sick were to be

compelled to disembark at the quarantine ground, after
which the vessel would be fumigated, cleansed, and required
to submit to any other rules and regulations which might
be established later by the Beard of Health.

All costs for

these operations were to be borne by the captains and owners
of the vessels.

The basic charge for inspection was to be

twenty dollars for ships, barks, and sea-going steamers,
and fifteen dollars for all others.

Of vital importance was

a provision which declared, ” , . . the amount collected for
such inspections . . . shall form a fund for the support of
1o

the quarantine,”-^

When it became necessary to invoke a quarantine, the
Governor was to issue a proclamation upon the advice of the
Board of Health.

The act required the Governor to declare

’’any place where there shall be reason to believe a

^2Ibid,, pp. 472-74-
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pestilential, contagious or infectious disease exists to
be an infected place," and to state the number of days
vessels arriving from those places were to be detained in
quarantine.

After the issuance of a quarantine proclama

tion, all vessels coming from places declared to be in
fected were made subject to detention upon their arrival
at any of the three quarantine stations.

Masters of vessels

refusing or neglecting to stop were to have their vessels
sent back to the station to under-go quarantine, after which
they might be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or
both.

Fines were also specified for breaches of regulations

established by the Board of Health.
Mississippi Station was to bo equipped v/ith two hospi
tals for the sick, a house for quarantine officials, and a
store for freight talcen from vessels ordered to unload.

A

sim of fifty thousand dollars was appropriated to set up
the quarantine stations as specified. 13
J
The Board of Health was placed in charge of promoting
sanitation in New Orleans, and was given power to cause the
removal of any substance deemed detrimental to the health of
the city.

The commissioners of streets were ordered to con

form to mandates from the Board of Health unless they were
in conflict with city ordinances or state laws.

The Board

could pass and enforce sanitary ordinances for New Orleans,

13Ibid. , pp. 474-76.
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if the ordinances were approved by the Council.

It was em

powered also to issue warrants to any constable, police
officer, or sheriff in the state to apprehend a person
violating any of the provisions of the act.

The Governor

was directed to appoint a special police officer, designated
as Marshal, who was made subject exclusively to the orders
of the Board of Health and was required to reside at the
Mississippi quarantine ground.
The Quarantine Act, as It was called, was the most
significant law in the history of the public health movement
in Louisiana.

It is true that the quarantine and the Board

of Health were concerned primarily with New Dr leans; three
of the Board’s nine members were chosen by the City Council,
and the Board was legally bound to carry on its official
functions from the Crescent City.

It is clear, however,

that the framers of the act intended to create a State
Board cf Health, and that New Orleans was given special
representation on the Board only because her commercial
interests were being jeopardized by the quarantine.

This

preoccupation with the state’s metropolis resulted from a
generally-held conviction throughout the state that pesti
lence was imported into New Orleans, and from this focal
point, other areas were infected.

Thus the Legislature

overwhelmingly approved a measure which was, according to
its own terms, to provide ’’protection for the State.”

■L^Ibid., p. 472.

The stipulation in the Quarantine Act requiring that
Board of Health members be "selected with reference to their
known zeal in favor of the quarantine system" was inserted
by the House because the legislators, being aware of fac
tional differences in New Orleans, undoubtedly feared, that
the Board might fall into the control of non-contagIonists,
thereby undermining the quarantine establishment.

Opposi

tion to quarantine and to the Board of Health centered in
New Orleans from the beginning.

Crescent City business

leaders were especially irked by the provision in the act
making the quarantine self-supporting.

.In accordance with

the new law all craft seeking to approach the port of New
Orleans would thereafter be charged an inspection fee, and
vessels required to undergo quarantine would be forced to
bear all expenses incurred during the detention.
long, newspapers, anti-quarantine physicians,

Before

and those

interested in trade with yellow fever ports were denouncing
the quarantine as "an unnecessary burden upon commerce."
Over this issue the continued existence of the State Board
of Health was at stake.
The quarantine system was placed on trial in 1355.
Although organizational difficulties made it impossible to
inaugurate the quarantine until well into the hot season,
apparently yellow fever was not introduced prior to the
issuance of the Governor’s first quarantine proclamation.
The Board of Health Heport for 1&55 stated that yellow
fever had been imported by the steamer Ben Franklin which

110

arrived at the Mississippi Station three days after the
quarantine was announced.

15

As early as April 22 the Pic

ayune exhorted the newly-formed Board of Health to take
immediate action aimed at introducing quarantine and sani
tation regulations.

The Quarantine Act, asserted the editor,

not only legalized quarantine but also contemplated a system
16
of local sanitary measures.
The question of sanitation
did not remain in the foreground, ana Picayune editorials
during succeeding v.reeks gave much greater attention to the
need for an immediate quarantine before the seeds of pesti
lence were planted.

A May 5 editorial declared:

lrIt would,

indeed, be a burning shame to-New Orleans, if after the
maturing and adopting of apparently a very complete system
of quarantine it were rendered perfectly nugatory by the
failure to put /~it J

into operation,

The Board of Health met in April and elected Dr. Samuel
Choppin its first President.

IB

Choppin, an editor of the

New Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette and a vocif
erous and persistent advocate of a strict quarantine, was
described by the Picayune as "a gentleman . . .

in whose

•^Report of the Board of Health of the Stat e of Lou
isiana to the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives
/
(New Orleans, 1356), pp. 9-10,
•^Picayune, April 22, 1&55.
17Ibid., May 5, 1355.
IB
Only four of the nine Board members were physicians.

Ill
energy, judgment, and fidelity the public may repose the
fullest confidence."^*9

pr< p. D. Baldwin was appointed by

the Governor to the important post of Resident Physician
at Mississippi Station.

The Board, in accordance with the

law, chose the Resident Physicians for the other two sta
tions.

The Quarantine Station on the Rigolets was estab

lished at Fort Pike, and Atchafalaya Station was located
upstream from the Gulf where Wax Bayou flows into the
Atchafalaya River.

The site selected for the Quarantine

Station on the Mississippi River was described by Dr.
Choppin as "spacious, well drained, and with a sufficiency
of handsome shade trees.

..."

Its location, according to

Choppin, was on the left bank of the river seventy-twc miles
below Nev: Orleans and thirty-four miles from the head of the
passes.

The quarantine ground had an eight acre frontage on

the river and was forty acres deep..

As provided in the or

ganic act, two hospitals (a "Main Hospital" and a "Minor
Hospital"), a dwelling, and a warehouse were constructed.
At the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Stations, a steamboat
was utilized as a temporary hospital and dwelling until
the permanent structures were erected. 20
The Board of Health enjoyed no honeymoon period during

1^Ibid., May 13, 1855.
^Report of the Board of Health / 1855 J } p. 3;
Nev; Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette, II (185555T,” 1^~.
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the early months of its existence.

The Daily Delta was

hostile from the first, and before long nearly all New Or
leans newspapers were assailing the Board for misusing its
delegated powers.

An editorial entitled,

T,The Secret Board

of Health,TT appearing in the Delta May 17, asserted indig
nantly that reporters had been banned from Board meetings.
Of this restriction the editor remarked:

"i/e can appreciate

the anxiety of these learned gentlemen to draw the veil over
their professional quarrels, just as we comprehend, very
clearly, the object of their dog-latin prescriptions and
cabalistic doses,TT
proceedings,

The public should be apprised of their

continued toe editor, "as a check and restraint

upon that inherent and unconquerable disputatiousness'* of
Ol
the medical profession.
The May 30 resolution by the
Board of Health proclaiming epidemic cholera present in Hew
Orleans aroused the ire of the Delta still more,

i/hen,

eight days later, the resolution was rescinded, the editor
commented that the whole thing had been "a mere medical
hallucination."

The mere rescinding of the original reso

lution was not, he felt, sufficient to remedy the mischief
already done, since many citizens had fled from New Orleans.
"It may restore the confidence of our citizens in the health
of the city," he wrote, "but it will diminish their faith in
the Board of Health."

22

Mortality figures showed the

21Paily D e lta, May 17, 1855.
22
Ibid., June 8, 1855.
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resolution to have been anything but a medical hallucina
tion; 366 cholera deaths were recorded in hew Orleans during
the first half of .1355, most of them occurring at the begin-

ning of the warm season. 23
The public was advised by some of the local journals to
be cautious and not to expect a great deal from the quar
antine or the Board of Health in 1355*

The Picayune warned

that the quarantine should have taken effect April 1 instead
of two months later.

Evidently, stated the editor, at least

one season would be required to establish necessary regula
tions and put the quarantine stations in efficient operating
24
order.
"A Physician,” whose letter appeared m the Hew
Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette, declared that the
Board of Health had not yet been given sufficient power to
deal effectively with local sanitary problems.

The City

Council, he felt, was too jealous of its authority to assist
the Board in its legal pursuits.

"Let the ’Board of Health'

issue an order to the 'Commissioner of Streets’ tomorrow
morning, and see whether it will be obeyed,” he asserted,
"They would be laughed to scorn by the very scavengers.”
This physician possessed, however, ”an abiding faith” that
the recently-elected Council would "offer the hand of con
fidence to our Board of Health, and so far from throwing

2-%ew Orleans Medical Nev/s and Hospital Gazette,
II (1355-5^17 229-30.
^ P i c a y u n e , May 31 j 1355.

114
any obstacle in their way, will volunteer every facility
in their power to the advancement of the great cause of
hygiene.
The reason for the intense criticism of the Board of
Health during the summer and fall of 1355 was the G ov e r n o r ’s
quarantine proclamation of June 4.

It soon became evident

that many of the advocates of quarantine were unwilling to
sacrifice in any degree tne commerce of New Orleans in order
to enforce a really stringent
proclamation,
declared:

quarantine.

Governor H e b e r t ’s

issued upon the advice of the Board of Health,

’’All ships coming from any port in the Torrid

Zone, or vessel wtiich may have cleared from other

por ts ,

but has last sailed from a. port within the T r o p i c s ,

r

subject to a Quarantine of not less than ten d a y s .

The

are_ 7

ports of Savannah and Charleston shall also be included.”

The legality of the proclamation could be questioned be
cause of failure to specify particular places, other than
Savannah and Charleston,
believe a pestilential,
existed.

’’where there

was_7 reason to

contagious or infectious disease”

The area placed under ’’interdict” ( a term used

frequently by the opponents of quarantine) was vast, and
the Board of Health certainly had no knowledge of the

II

^ % e w Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette,
(1355-5577 137-887

^/""Review of_7 ”An Act to establish Quarantine for
the protection of the State,” New Orleans Medical and Sur
gical Journal, XII (1355-56), 133.
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presense of disease in all of the ports included in the
decree.
The proclamation stated that ships sailing from ports
in the Torrid Zone would be subject to quarantine for not
less than ten days.

The cost of the detention,

according

to the Quarantine Act, had to be borne by the captain or
owner of the vessel.

Aside from the charges demanded for

in spe cting, cleaning,

and fumigating the ship, a five dollar

fee was assessed for the care of every sick person landed
at the Quarantine Station.

In addition,

the ten days or

rnore daring which the captain and crew were required to r e 
main at the quarantine ground was' a period of time lost to
profitable occupation.

This alleged crime against commerce

seemed especially grievous because reports reaching New Or
leans almost invariably described the ports against which
the quarantine had been proclaimed to be free from any kind
of pestilence.
The Daily D e l t a , on June 24, displayed indignance over
the detention of the brig Mary Elizabeth which had sailed
for New Orleans from Havana.
editor to quarantine

It seemed ridiculous to the

Ma healthy ship, having no discoverable

infectious matter on board."

27

Three days later attention

was directed by the Delta to the case of the Orizaba which
had arrived at Mississippi Station from Vera Cruz.

There

was no epidemic in Vera Cruz, and there had been no sickness

^ D a i l y Delta, June 24, 1^55
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on board the ship, declared the editor; yet a ten day de
tention was required.

The entire quarantine

system was

being defeated, he maintained, by stubborn adherence to
the letter of the law.

He reported further (although it

was never confirmed) that all passengers on the Orizaba
had been required to take an oath stating whether or not
they had ever had yellow fever.

Those swearing in the

affirmative were supposedly given a permit to proceed to
New Orleans, whereas those never’ having incurred the dis
ease were "compelled to sun themselves for ten days in the
society of the pragmatical and arrogant officials at tire
station.
The Picayune joined tire Delta and other New Orleans
newspapers in denouncing the administration of tire quaran
tine.

Detention should not be required, thought trie Pica

yune , unless there was "probable danger."

"The law under

which the Board acts," continued the editor, "gives indeed
a wide discretion to the officers appointed to carry it into
effect; but there is nothing in it to justify the arrest of
commerce carried on by healthy vessels with healthy ports.
. . ."

The Pica?/une asserted further that the law forbade

the Board of Health from stopping "clean and healthy vessels"
unless they had sailed from ports previously declared "in
fected" places.

"The extreme rigoi^ exercised in this case

/""the Orizaba 7 , averred the editor, is . . . unnecessary

2^ I b i d . , June 2 7 , 1855
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to the legitimate objects of the law, not required by any
of its directions,

of no service to the public health,

oppressive to private interests,
commerce of the city."

29

and very injurious to the

This was strong language for a

journal which a short time earlier had so energetically
advocated a strict quarantine.
The D e l t a 's ■campaign against the quarantine and the
Board of Health proceeded without let-up.

"The origin of

all the difficulties which have tended to make Quarantine
odious to our citizens can be discovered in the Gove rnor’s
proclamation," declared the editor,

"The responsibility

. . . rests on the Board, and on it alone."
he continued,

"...

the worst enemy of quarantine has been

30
the Board of Health."^
asserted:

Consequently,

A letter from an anonymous writer

"No epidemics, no suspension of navigation in

our Western rivers, which have yet befallen us can be com
pared in their deleterious effects, with this same procla-

31
m a t i o n . T h e

question of the legality of the proclama

tion was brought to a climax June 29 'when the steamer
Crescent C i t y , arriving from Havana,

refused to undergo

quarantine and proceeded directly to New Orleans.

The

Quarantine Act stipulated that such violations would result
in fines not exceeding two thousand dollars, or imprison
ment not exceeding twelve months, or both, at the discretion

^ P i c a y u n e , June 27> 1&55.
^ D a i l y D e l t a , June 29, 1355*
^1I b i d .
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of the court.

Possibly the captain of the Crescent City

was merely seeking to provide a test case, but regardless
of his motive the Board of Health was forced to take some
kind of action.
problem:

One of the local newspapers summarized the

"If this vessel runs the quarantine with impunity,

the whole action of the Board is a perfect farce,

32

may as well abandon their trust at once."v

and they

The very next

day the Board proceeded against the captain of the Crescent
City in the ordinary form of complaint before a justice of
the peace.

33

The attitude of the Hew Orleans newspapers brought a
fierce denunciation from the Baton Rouge Weekly A d vo cate .
The Delta was assailed for having referred to the Governor's
proclamation as a "temporary hallucination."

"The injustice

and flippancy of /~that_7 journal towards the State Execu
tive," declared the Advocate,
or,

"pander only to certain local,

it may be New York influences."

The Picayune and the

Bulletin were especially vulnerable:
Look at their back numbers, and note
the imposing procession of editorials,
communications, letters, i c ., made up of
ingredients of dogmatic assertions and
lachrymose lamentations, demanding, invok
ing, imploring the Legislature to confer
upon the afflicted city of He w Orleans and
the State at large, also the whole M i s s i s 
sippi valley, the costly blessings of an
experimental quarantine. . . . Quarantine*.
Quarantine I That was the only salvation
for all, and something more for a few.
What mortal law-givers could resist such

3^Semi-Weekly Creole, June 30, 1£55•
33 picayune, July 1, 1855*

a bilious tide of tears and ink, with
imprecations well stirred in 1
. Ours did
not.
But with flagrant inconsistency, now
that the clamorers have got the great con
summation of their wishes, they complain
of its enforcement in the only manner to
secure any possible blessings pertaining
to it.
We suppose they believe it a good
enough thing theoretically and generally,
but not specially, when it conflicts with
their immediate interests or convenience.-^
The Board of Health, recognizing the June 4 proclamation
to be of questionable legality,

drew up a second proclamation

basically as rigid as the first but with the additional fea
ture that it conformed to the letter of the law.
by Governor Hebert July 10,

As announced

the new proclamation in effect

amended the previous one by specifying ports in wh Lch there
was reason to believe pestilence existed.

Included, in the

decree were several ports in Cuba, Jamaica, Santo Domingo,
and other West Indies Islands, as well as ports in Mexico,
Cent ra l.America, and the northern part of South America.-''
The Picayune, which had been urging a relaxation of the
quarantine, seemed greatly disturbed about the attempt being
made by the Board of Health to maintain a rigid,
system.

inflexible

"Though the proclamation be within the letter of

the law," commented the editor,

"we are not persuaded that

it is in compliance with the spirit and real intent or
useful purpose of the law."-^

-^Baton Rouge Weekly Adv ocate, July 5j 1^55 •
3 ^Picayu ne, July 11, 1355•
36I b i d .
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Shortly thereafter, as a result of mounting criticism,
the Board published supplemental regulations anno,racing that
one of its ’'discretionary po we r s ” was to be exercised.

That

is, the Resilient Physician was authorized to permit vessels
and passengers to come directly to New Orleans when found to
be clean and healthy.

The editor o f the Picayune was re

lieved that the "oppressive r ul e s ” had been suspended, but
he felt that the quarantine modification would have been
unnecessary if it had not been for the iniquitous procl a
mations.

Both proclamations,

he declared, though they were

drafted by the Board of Health,

actually deprived the Board

of its discretionary power to allow healthy vessels to pro
ceed without detention.

In addition, asserted the Pi c a y u n e ,

tne proclamation by requiring a ten day quarantine had d i 
vested the Board, of its discretionary power to fix the time
limit for the detention of v e s s e l s . ^

These discretionary

powers were given to the Board of Health by the Quarantine
Act,

continued the editorial,

but tne proclamations placed

health officials in a position where they could not legally
modify their own regulations.

The Board was urged to re

quest the Governor to revoke his proclamation,

thereby

3?The assertion was not exactly correct.
Section
six of the Quarantine Act granted to the Board of Health
discretion in determining the number of days of quarantine,
but this power was qualified by the provision that the de 
tention period was "not to be less than ten d a y s . ” Acts
passed by the Second Legislature of the State of Louisiana
. . . I l 5 5 , Act No. 336, p. 472.
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restoring to itself its legal discretionary powers.

36

Whether legal or not, by easing the quarantine the
Board of Health had shown "symptoms of returning sanity
and common-sense," commented the D e l t a .

The Delta modestly

credited the press with having prompted the "better spirit."

39

Nonetheless,

criticism of the quarantine and the

Board of Health continued unrelenting.

The Baton Rouge

Weekly C o m e t , after referring t o quarantine laws as "bar
barism belonging to the dark ages," attacked the quarantine
system on four counts:
indirect.

"F i r s t , the expense direct and

Seco nd , the injury done commerce.

conflict— direct with Christian principles,

Th i r d , the
and Fourth,

the absolute tendency the law has, to increase instead of
diminish d i s e a s e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y the editor failed to
elaborate on the last two points.
The Board of Health was called upon by the Picayune
to do something about the "muddy, disagreeable flavor" of
the city's drinking water and also

the stagnant water

forming quagmires under many New Orleans homes.

The Board

was clothed with extensive powers to correct sanitary abuses,
done.^

asserted the editor,

but virtually nothing had been

At tne next Board of Health meeting a resolution

■^ D a i l y D e l t a , July 13, 1335*
^ B a t o n Rouge Weekly C o m e t , July 14,
^ P i c a y u n e , August 15> 1655*

1655.
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was adopted notifying the Picayune that three times the City
Council of New Orleans had rejected a sanitary ordinance
drafted, by health officials,

and therefore the Board con

sidered its duties limi .,ed to matters involving the quaran
tine.

The editor of the P i c ay un e, while agreeing that the

Council had "deplorably neglected its part, of tne duty,"
claimed that the Board of Health, had been granted sufficient
power to correct sanitary abuses without

attempting to shift

IO

responsi bil ity.+
As the debate over public health policy continued,

the

state of Louisiana was for the third consecutive year vis
ited by epidemic yellow' fever.

Some twenty-six hundred

died from that disease in New Orleans, and the pestilence,
as before, was by no means confined to the Crescent City.
The epidemic spread throughout much of Louisiana and into
neighboring

states.

Among the afflicted cities were Baton

Rouge, Port Hudson, Plaquemine, Pain co urt vilie, and Laterproof in Louisiana;
in Mississippi.

and Vicksburg,

Natchez,

Fort Adams,

and Natchez

famed throughout the lower M i ssis 

sippi Valley for its experiments with quarantine,
1855 to prevent the introduction of yellow fever.

failed in
L^

In

attempting to protect their citizens from the raging

4 2I b i d ., August 17, 1855.
^ I'lew Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette,
II (1855-5^77 369-70; Pica yun e, September 25, 1855; Daily
D e l t a , September 3, 1855*
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pestilence,

the villages of Opelousas and Clinton adopted

local quarantines.
ordinance

The Town Council of Clinton passed an

ich forbade any person arriving from an area

where yellow fever was prevailing to come within the cor

poration limits.

'd
Violators were to be fined fifty dollars.'1'1

The Opelousas quarantine ordinance was similar, except the
ban included not only persons, but also "Goods, Merchan
dize £ sic_7 j Bedding, or other objects . . . supposed to
convey or communicate the Yellow' F e v e r . " ^
The "triune" epidemics of 1853-4-5 brought to New
Orleans, and to Louisiana as a whole,
toll.

a frightful death

The advocates of quarantine had been able to use the

1853 and 1854 epidemics in their campaign leading to the
passage of the Quarantine Act, but the political situation
was altered in 1855 by the return of Yellow Jack in the face
of the quarantine.

It seemed to many that the Board of

Health had failed utterly in its primary task of utilizing
the quarantine to prevent the importation of pestilence.
Had the quarantine been given a fair trial?

Those

favoring retention of this institution argued that one sea
son was not sufficient to determine anything conclusive con
cerning its merits.

The New Orleans Medical Kews and Ho s

pital Gazette pleaded for a continuation of the quarantine
and the Board of Health.

The cost of the experiment had

^ C l i n t o n American P a t r i o t , August 25, 1855*
450pelousas C o u r i e r , September 22, 1855*
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not been great, it was argued, when one considered what
epidemics cost New Orleans.

In the past, trade had been

diverted to other ports, immigration had been checked, the
confidence of foreign capitalists had been lost, and prop
erty values had remained low because of the cityfs inability
to prevent frequent yellow fever visitations.

The state,

according to the Medical News, had the undoubted power to
promote the health and prosperity of its citizens.

Not

enough had been done, declared the editor, to put into
operation hygienic measures used elsewhere to combat dis
ease.

The state government had shown itself to be "penny-

wise and pound foolish" in matters of public health.

The

Medical Kews editorial stated that the quarantine was "in
trinsically good." and should be rigidly enforced against
all infectious diseases the year round.

The state was ex

horted to direct every effort toward a campaign to destroy
and prevent yellow fever.

""The thing is possible," con

cluded the editor, "the expense should be counted as nothing;
the means are simple and ample.
New Orleans newspapers felt very differently.

The

quarantine had been "vexatious to commerce," they said, and
there was absolutely no proof that it could prevent yellow
fever.

Early in December the Picayune challenged the need

for a twenty dollar inspection fee.

II

The Quarantine Act

^ N e w Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette,
(1S55-56T7 417-21.
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provided that ships, barks, and sea-going steamers were
to be charged twenty dollars, and all other vessels fifteen
dollars.

These fees had to be paid at the Quarantine Station

before the vessels were allowed to proceed to New Orleans.
The Picayune questioned the need for this requirement during
the winter month.s when it was "only a ceremony in ninetynine cases out of a hundred."

The same editorial mentioned

complaints about needless delay at Mississippi Station; ves
sels arriving at night or late in tne day were said to have
been compelled to wait until the next morning to be inspected.
Supposedly some vessels had been delayed as much as twentyin
four hours.
A revision of the quarantine law was termed
by the editor of the Picayune "absolutely necessary,"

Evi

dently the revision he had in mind would have prevented any
future proclamation from designating a large number of inj&
fected ports.
A week later the Delta called for the "to
tal repeal or thorough modification" of the Quarantine Act
by the next Legislature.

The quarantine and the Board of

Health, according to that journal, were despicable institu
tions:

’
We commenced our experience of the
beauties of quarantine when a Board of
Health was organised, which assumed un
limited authority over our commercial

^ T h e Resident Physician at Mississippi Station
immediately informed the Picayune that the story of delays
at the quarantine ground was untrue,
^ P i c a y u n e , December

1355*
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interests on a plea of sanitary reform;
and signalized its career by placing so
many restrictions on vessels coming to
this port, that our ordinary and legit
imate trade was absolutely paralyzed for
a while.
All State officers were more
or less subject to the Board, and the
Governor had no more discretion or in
dependent wall in the execution of its
commands than the Street Commissioner
in City Hall or the Health Officer at
the Station.^9
The Board of Health Report for 1355 j the first annual
Report to the Legislature by the Louisiana State Board of
Health,

was drafted by the President of the Board, Dr,

Samuel Choppin, and the Secretary,

Charles A. Labuzan,

50

The Report contained first, an account of the establishment
of the

quarantine

financial report.

stations, and second, the Secretaryfs
The fiscal statement showed the Board

to be in debt by nearly seventeen thousand dollars, al
though five thousand of the original fifty thousand dollar
appropriation had not yet been collected,

while Mississippi

Station produced an income of nearly twenty thousand dollars,
the Rigolets and Atchafalaya Stations provided revenue which
could be described only as negligible.

On the other hand,

as Dr. Choppin and other quarantinists pointed out, the
chief expenses (those attending the creation of the quar
antine stations) had already been incurred.

Choppin

^9paily D e l t a , December 11, 1355*
50

The first Reports were rather short, and were
invariably the work o f the Boa rd ’s President.
The Secre
t a r y ’s financial statement was attached, usually at the end.
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expressed his belief that in the future the quarantine
establishments would, support themselves, but he said that
at present he must ask for an additional appropriation of
twenty thousand dollars.

He told the Legislature that the

state had a "solemn duty to protect its citizens, not only
from foreign invasions and internal outbreaks, but also from
the invasion and spread of diseases.

The obligation,"

Choppin declared, was "imposed by the law of nations and
of nature."

New Orleans had suffered "incalculable losses"

from the introduction and spread of epidemic diseases,
continued the Report.

The appropriation of fifty thousand

dollars was, consequently,

"but a- small capital to produce

so enormous an interest as is to be expected from it.

. . ."

Choppin reported that 1,149 vessels had been examined
at the three quarantine stations, and that only twenty-one
of those had been quarantined for having sickness on board
or being in a foul condition.

51

Figures were presented to

show that goods imported from the West Indies, Mexico, and
Central America amounted to only a small fraction of New
Orleans’ total imports.

Choppin concluded that the inter

ruptions of commerce caused by the quarantine had not been
serious at all.

It seemed like a anall consideration when

weighed against the health of the city and state.
The Report asserted that quarantine was based on two

^ H e mad.e no mention of quarantines imposed against
vessels having sailed from "infected ports,"

assumptions:

first, that epidemic diseases were caused by

a specific contagion, and second, that healthy communities
could be saved from contagion by keeping infected persons
and articles at a distance.

"The existence of quarantine

lav/s and sanitary regulations in all of tne enlightened
governments of the world,'1 asserted Choppin,

"is a strong

argument in favor of the policy of such establishments,

for

a system of such antiquity, and so constantly sanctioned by
the test of strict investigation on the part of learned and
practical men must be founded on true principles."

Quar

antine was described as a "most important auxiliary" in the
battle to free New Orleans from "the odium of insalubrity."
There could be no doubt, he said, of the influence of quar
antine in excluding such admittedly contagious diseases as
small-pox and typhus.

.Choppin claimed that there was every

reason to believe yellow fever could also be classified as
a contagious disease and, he maintained, a thousand cases
in Louisiana and Mississippi might be cited to prove this
point.

He expressed his conviction that the steamer Ben

Franklin had imported the deadly yellow fever contagion into
New Orleans in
Dr. Choppin believed it impossible to suppose that his
antagonists possessed "that interest in the welfare of our
people which entitles their opposition to respect."

The

Report stated that despite opposition to the Board of Health,
the quarantine system put into operation the past summer
had been "productive of much good."

Mention was made

particularly that many immigrants had been kept away during
the yellow fever epidemic.

Choppin called upon his cohorts

not to be discouraged in the face of ''opposition of ignorant
bigotry on the one hand and of the basest mercenary intoler
ance on the other.17

He concluded the Report by commending

the members of the Board of Health for the "earnestness and
diligence with which they labored amidst the outcries of an
opposing community,

and not.withstanding the vile abuses

heaped upon them by mercenary newspapers.

. . .Tl^ "

The fate of the Board of Health was at stake as tne
Legislature convened in January,

IB 56.

The Board's oppo

nents had from the beginning been more influential and
articulate than its adherents.

During the first month of

the session a joint resolution was adopted "to investigate
the accounts and acts of the Board of Health,
ai.iine the quarantine ■system. "53

k

and to ex-

special Joint Committee

of the two Houses was appointed to carry out the terms of
the resolution.
March,

The Co.niittee1s Report, made public in

criticized the quarantine and the Board of Health,

after which a recommendation was made for the repeal of the
Quarantine Act.

First, the Report criticized the bookkeep

ing; procedures of the Secretary,

declaring that it appeared

the Board's business had been "rather loosely conducted."

5^-Report of the Board o f Health

£~1$55_7>

PP* 3-12.

53Journal of the House of Representatives of the
State of Louisiana'^ 1 356^7 fBaton- Rouge~, 1^ 56), p. 41.
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Furthermore,

she Committee alleged that the seven thousand

dollars paid by the Board for the land upon which the Mis
sissippi Quarantine Station was located was more than ten
times what the land was worth.

Al.. except twenty acres was

a worthless salt marsh, claimed the Report, and the little
good land which was available was subject to floods.

The

Committee stated that upon examining the book of the Resi
dent Physician at the Mississippi quarantine ground it dis
covered that most of the vessels subjected to detention were
clean and healthy.

In other cases, the Report asserted,

unhealthy vessels had been permitted to unload their sick
passengers and proceed to Rev/ Orleans.

Another complaint

was the unnecessarily large number of employees at Missis
sippi Station.
The Report of the Joint Committee called attention to
figures made public by the Secretary of the Board of Health
indicating that nearly eleven thousand dollars had been
expended on "furniture, medicines,

provision, &c." for the

Mississippi Station, whereas upon inspection the Committee
concluded that all the furniture and moveable effects at
the station could not have had a total value of more than
one thousand dollars.

It was noted too that quarantine

officials had been very reluctant in providing the Commit
tee with any information.

Upon investigation of the prac

tical operation of the quarantine,

continued the Report,

the Committee discovered general agreement that the quar
antine experiment had proved "expensive, inconvenient, and
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extremely burthensome."

The Committee reported its convic

tion that "no modification of the law can be devised that
will be of any essential benefit as regards public health;
your Committee being satisfied that yellow? fever and cholera
cannot be excluded by any system of quarantine."

The Report

concluded with a recommendation for the outright repeal of
the existing law.

It was signed by seven Committee members,

and the eighth announced his agreement with everything in
the Report except the recommendation to terminate quaran-

54
tine .^
The House of Representatives proceeded no carry out the
recommendation.

On March 4 a measure entitled,

"An Act to

repeal an act to establish Quarantine for the protection
of the State," was introduced into the House and referred to
the Committee on Commerce.

Ten days later the bill was re

ported favorably from the Committee, and the opponents of
the quarantine attempted to hurry it through t h e House.
Those wishing to see the quarantine continued argued that,
a fuller discussion of the matter was necessary.

Conse

quently the bill to repeal the Quarantine Act was made the
order of th e day for the following Monday.

When the bill

came up for discussion March 17 it was evident that the
overwhelming majority of House members were in favor of it.
Those who opposed the bill offered two reasons for m a i n 
taining the quarantine:

first,

it had not yet been given

5^Picayune, March 21, 1856.
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a fair trial, and second,

the necessary buildings had al

ready been erected and only a very small additional appro
priation would be required during the next year or two.

It

appears, moreover, that many of the sixteen voting against
the repeal bill disapproved of the administration of the
quarantine but preferred to have the Quarantine Act amended
rather than repealed.
The Senate debate on the bill to repeal the Quarantine
Act was conducted along much the sarise line, but the final
vote was entirely different.

Senator V.'alker, the maverick

member of the Joint Committee which had investigated the
operation of the quarantine t spoke of "the wretched manage
ment of the Board,

and their lavish and profuse expenditure

of the public funds," but he questioned the wisdom and jus
tice of abolishing the quarantine as soon as it became selfsustaining.

Furthermore, Walker critised the provision in

the repeal bill for the appointment of a commissioner who
was to receive jne thousand dollars for disposing of the
property belonging to the Board of Health.

Walker mentioned

that his constituents were opposed to the precipitate abro
gation of the quarantine.

They felt, he said, that quaran

tine should receive a fairer and fuller trial.

Another solon

remarked, that while he was convinced yellow fever could not
be kept out of New Orleans by a quarantine, however rigidly
enforced, he did believe the quarantine might prevent the
introduction of such diseases as cholera, smallpox, typhus,

133
and measles.
The proponents of the repeal bill argued that public
opinion called for the end of quarantine; only the officers
who received T,fat salaries” desired to have it continued.
The quarantine was alleged to have swallowed up large amounts
of state funds and to have become
a drag chain to commerce.”

”a burden, a shackle,

and

The opinion was expressed that

the quarantine was ”wholly inoperative in warding off or
preventing contagious diseases.”
Senator Berault, delivering the final speech on the
bill, ably defended the quarantine and the basic principles
of public health.

The great charge against the quarantine,

remarked Berault, vras its incompatability with the interests
of commerce.

He asked the members of Senate whether they

were willing "to bow before and worship the golden calf of
commerce.”

They were not there solely to legislate in the

interest of business, he thought;
sume a higher ground.
stake.

He pleaded:

instead they should as

The safety of their fellow men was at
. . this is a matter of humanity,

and not a case of dollars and cents.”

The Senate voted sev-

enteen to teri in favor of laying the bill on the table.

55

Quarantine and the State Board of Health were to be given a
further trial.

5^Reports of the House of Representatives, of the
State of Louisiana~7 1$56_/ (Baton Rouge', 1356) , pp. 59-60,
64- 5,* Journal of the House of Representatives / 18$6_/,
pp. 69, 103, 107; Official Reports of the S enat e of the
State of Louisiana / '185*6'/ (Baton Rouge, 1356) , pp. 70-71;
Official Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana
l_ 1^56_J (Baton R o u g e , 1356) , pp. $4-35 •

CHAPTER V
THE BOARD GAINS ACCEPTANCE

Despite its inauspicious beginning in 1$55> the Board
of Health managed to become a permanent

state institution.

Throughout its early history the basic problem was that the
fate of the Board and of the quarantine system were very
closely connected.

Opposition to quarantine usually meant

opposition to the Board of Health as well.

The yellow fever

epidemic of 1355 nearly resulted in the death of both, but
fortunately the following two years brought respite from
pestilence to the stricken city of New Orleans.

The year

1356, during which the quarantine was still very much on
trial, was comparatively healthy,

and this fact assured the

continuation of the experiment for another year.
by no means subsided,

Opposition

but public opinion was quite strongly

on the side of the quarantine whenever it seemed to be achieving results.
At the opening of the 1357 legislative session, Governor
Robert C. Wickliffe told the state lawmakers that although he
had never been an advocate of quarantine, he had come to the
conclusion that it would be "extremely inexpedient to repeal
the laws establishing it, as a fair experiment has not yet
been made, and it is now in such condition as to require no
pecuniary aid from the State for its support."
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He called
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attention to the disregard for the law evidenced by some
snip captains and commanders who dared not attempt law vio
lations in the North where quarantines were more rigid.
V/ickliffe seemed to be urging an amendment to the Quarantine
Act providing stricter enforcement.^

A quarantine bill,

probably not the type V/ickliffe desired,
the House of Representatives,
sage.

but

was introduced into

it failed of final pas-

Two changes contemplated by the bill were a reduction

of the inspection fee on small vessels and the granting of
permission for all vessels to pass directly to New Orleans
without inspection between November 1 and May 1.
The first real change made in the quarantine came -in
l$5l.

A law approved March l£ supplemented the Quarantine

Act of 1$55 by modifying some of the most important

pro

visions of the original act without necessitating any fun
damental alteration in existing practices.

The Board of

Health was officially granted the pov,er (which it had been
exercising)

of extending the quarantine period beyond the

number of days specified in the Governor's proclamation.
The Resident Physician was authorised to grant "persons
acclimated and healthy," permits to proceed to New Orleans

^Official Journal of the Senate of Louisiana
(Baton Rouge, 1 8 5 7 )t P* 5.

£

1&57.J7

^Official Journal of the Hous e of Representatives of
the State of Louisiana . . . j~ 1357 7 (Baton Rouge, 1#57),
pp. S7-38.
^Crescent, Marc h 2, 1#57*

while their vessel was in quarantine.

Further liberaliza

tion was found in the provision permitting "vessels out ten
days from infected ports, presenting clean bills of health,
not having nor having: had sickness on board, and
in foul condition,

...

. . . not

to pass to the City after thorough

fumigation by disinfecting agents.

. .

The Resident Physician v/as not only given more "dis
cretionary power," but he was also granted authority to
administer oaths needed in obtaining; pertinent evidence
concerning vessels,

cargoes,

and crews.

As before,

the

Resident Physician was required to furnish a certificate of
health to vessels "free from disease, not in a foul condi
tion, and not from as infected district,"

These certifi

cates were now to cost from five to thirty dollars

(a

modification of th- previous rates of fifteen and twenty
dollars), the respective charges being: based upon the type
of vessel and the point of origin.

The new act also stipu

lated tnat the Board of Health could,

in cases of emergency,

issue a quarantine proclamation with.out reference to the
Governor.
Health,

In compliance with a request from the Board of

the office of marshal was abolished.

The Quarantine

Act had provided the Board with a police marshal at the
Mississippi Station, but the maintenance of this functionary
was deemed by the Board a needless expense.

The act of 1^5$

also reiterated many of the provisions of the 1&55 act
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regarding fundamentals of the quarantine system.^

This

modification and clarification of the Quarantine Act marked
the acceptance by the state Legislature of the permanency
of the quarantine and the Board of Health*
The Governor of Louisiana issued a quarantine procla
mation during each of the five years from IS 56 to i860.

In

1356 no proclamation was forthcoming until July 21, at which
time vessels arriving at New Orleans from several ports in
the V/est Indies were made subject to the quarantine.

The

Picayune immediately criticized this action and also the
state Leg islature’s failure to modify the entire quarantine
system "notwithstand ing the general complaint of its vexa
tious interference with the commerce o f the c it y .”
have been expected,

As might

the primary objection was that ’’per

fectly healthy" vessels sailing from ports designated as
infected were detained ten days.

The very issuance of the

proclamation was the scat of the trouble,

felt the P ic ay un e,

because "it makes the enforcement of quarantine against
vessels arriving from such ports imperative,
necessary,

ination."

even when u n 

and deprives the Board of the right of discrim-

5

According to later accounts in the Picayune, the "right
of discrimination," or as it was otherwise known, the

^Acts of the Fourth Legislature of the State of
Louisiana, at its First Session . . , I 85I? (Baton Rouge,
1853), Act No.~259, pp. 187-897
^Picayune, July 29, 30, 1356.

discretionary power, was employed by the Board of Health
and the Resident Physician later during the summer.

On

August 1/+ it was reported that the brig Adams G r a y , upon
arriving from Kingston,
a seven day

Jamaica, had been forced to undergo

(not ten day)

it was revealed that

quarantineThe

following day

passengers and mail from the steamship

Ph il adelph ia, quarantined ten days for having stopped at
Havana,

had been taken by tow boat to New Orleans.

7

The

Picayune,, still not satisfied, maintained that the Adams
G r a y , the P h i l a de lphia , and many other

vessels should not

have been quarantined at all because they had no sickness
on beard.

On September 29» after a period of two months

in operation,
Health.

the quarantine was suspended by tne Board of

The P i cayu ne , taking cognisance- of the suspension,

announced gleefully that exporters and ship owners would
thereafter be able to send their goods and bring their ship
to New Orleans "without any fear of any inconvenience from
the

sanitary regulations that have been in force during the

sum mer .
Near unanimity of opinion existed among New Orleans
newspapers as to the vexatiousness of the quarantine, but
there was a decided difference o f opinion on what should
be done.

The editor of the C re sc en t, whose views were

^ I b i d . , August 14,

1^56.

7 l b i d ., August 15> 1&56.
^I b i d ., September 30> IS 56.

1.59
similar to those expressed by the P i c ay un e, declared somewhct reluctantly his belief that the quarantine had not yet
been given a fair trial:
We have strong hopes that a salutary
modification and improvement will be effected.
The laws are susceptible to useful amendment,
in several particulars.
They can be made
to bear less heavily .upon commerce and commucation with near and distant ports, v.:Lth
ou t imperilling the oublic health in the
slightest possible degree. . . . We are
not as strongly in favor o f quarantines as
we were some years ago.
Our faith in
their efficacy ha s been shak e n , but not
q
quite shattered to the level of unbelief.'
The question of the constitutionality of the Quarantine
Act was
1356.

brought before the Louisiana

The Board of Health,

mount of drafts drawn b;

brought

Supreme Court late

in

suit to collect the a-

captains of certain schooners in

payment for inspection fees at the three quarantine stations.
The defendants, Pooley, Nichol and Company, alleged that

the

fees demanded at Rigolets Station and Atchafalaya Station
were not legal because they had not been contemplated by
the Quarantine Act.

They based their case upon this point,

although maintaining further that the act was unconstitu
tional.

The Court ruled that the provisions of section

seven of the act which established the two quarantine sta
tions should be extended to include the right to collect
inspection fees.

In other words the act did contemplate

the imposition of those charges.

As for the constitution

ality of the law itself, the Court stated:

^C r e s c e n t , February 27, 1 $ 5 7 .

TTIt is conceded
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by the argument,

that the law is constitutional."'*'^

In 1357 the usual quarantine did not go into operation
until June 15.

Two months earlier,

was declared to be infected,

however,

Rio de Janeiro

and all vessels having sailed

from, touched, or stopped at that port were to be detained
ten days in quarantine.-*--*-

On June 7 the Picayune warned its

readers that an unusually rigid quarantine 'was about to go
into effect.

A thirty day quarantine was to be enforced

against all ports south of New Orleans where yellow fever
"usually or casually prevails."

The adoption of a measure

so sweeping in its scope indicated that the Board of Health
believed its position to be reasonably secure.

The editor •

of the Crescent questioned the legality of the proclamation,
and commented:

"...

we think the Board of" Health' have

exceeded their powers, and done a very vexatious and very
useless thing, in the issuing of this order,

and we hope

they will reconsider it before they put it into force,"
Probably in deference to this criticism, the Board did
change its instructions a week later and enumerated the
ports believed to be infected.

The ports subject to the

latest "interdict" were located in the West Indies, Mexico,
and northern South America.

12

-*-®3oard of Health of Louisiana v. Pooley, Nicol and
Co., 11 La. Ann. 743. Report of Cases Argued and Determined
in the Supreme Court of Louisiana and in the Superior Court
of the Territory of Louisiana (St. Paul, 1907), Book 2&]
pp. 619-21.
^ Report of the Board of Health

. . . 1 3 3 2 , p. 126.

•^Picayune, June 7, 1357; Crescent, June 15, 1357.
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The new,

severe thirty day detention period prescribed

by the proclamation brought

criticism fro;, even the strongly

pro-quarantine New O rleans Medical News and. Hospital G a z e t t e :
Unless a vessel be absolutely infected
when she arrives at the ground, we cannot
see the propriety of keeping her thirty
days in l i m b o . If she has yellow fever on
board, then, well and good; keen her forty
or sixty days; but if she is clean and
healthy, it seems to us that a detention
of e'ght, or ten days vail be quite suffi
cient to -•rove whether any of her nassenqq
pers or crew will manifest the disease. . . .
The prestige of the
when

Board of Health received a great

boost

for the second .straight year New Orleans was spared

a yellow fever epidemic.

Public opinio . se uted to he more

than ever convinced of the need for a stringent
However,

quarantine.

most oh th e ci t y ’s medical men were more

to adopt a wait and see attitude.

inclined

The Board, of Health a-

chieved a significant victory the folio, ing March when the
state Legislature voted to retain and
ably the Quarantine Act of 1355*

to supplement favor

The B o a r d ’s position was

thereafter not nearly so vulnerable.
Another visitation of epidemic yellow fever seerned. to
be the only tiling which could jeopardize the B o a r d ’s life,
and unfortunately, Yellow Jack assailed the Crescent City
in 1C5S with a ferocity exceeded only by the "great epi
demic" of 1353*

-n June a quarantine proclamation similar

to those of previous years was issued by the Governor,

and

newspaper criticism of this action was equally as bitter

IV

^■3New Orleans Medical News aid Hospital G a zette,
(1357-5377 304.
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as before.

Yellow fever appeared in July,

alarm was expressed at first.

but very little

On August 1 one of Ne w O r 

leans' medical periodicals reported in traditional fashion
that yellow fever was "not anything like epidemic

. . .

in

Hew Orleans," and that the few cases which had appeared were
almost wholly confined to the laboring

class and those ex

posed to the "vicissitudes of weather.

As late as .August

10 the Daily Delta referred contemptuously to the "exagger
ated reports" of yellow fever mortality in Hew O r l e a n s .^
In actuality, the daily death toll by this time had already
reached thirty.
it absurd

Four days later the same newspaper declared

to deny the presence of epidemic yellow fever.

The Board of Health,

in the meantime,

had been pro

viding newspapers with weekly mortality reports, but had not
declared the existence of an epidemic.

The Delta did not

miss tne opportunity to call the public's attention to this
fact.

The first of a long series of articles by Dr. J. S.

KcFarlane,

the same physician who had been so roundly ridi

culed five years before,

was printed in the Delta August 15*

A determined foe of both the Board of Health and quarantine,
McFarlane was given the opportunity to attack with all his
vigor the institutions he despised so deeply.
the old physician,

1/fIbid.,

Why, asked

had the Board of Health been created?

p. 391.

-J-5paily D e l t a , August 10,
l ^ Ibi d. , August 14, 1B$B.

iB^c.
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If it was merely to keep a record of the dead, a schoolboy
could have been employed.
the approach of danger,

If it was to warn the public of

the recent death toll indicated how

completely the Board had failed.

Despite the heavy mortal

ity, no epidemic had been declared.

ilcFarlane gave a ”his

tory" of quarantine which seemed to prove that yellow fever
was much less likely to prevail when no quarantine restrictions existed.

17

The prevalence of yellow fever in 1353 at

the very time a rigid quarantine was being enforced tended
to lend credence

to his claim.

The Board

of Health, and the

quarantine were,

declared ilcFarlane, "two as useless, if
1p
not pernicious devices as ever encumbered the city."-t-'"
In the?, ensuing weeks the epidemic became more deadly.
Its full intensity was reached during the month o f September
when yellow fever took the lives of more than eighteen hu n
dred persons in New Orleans.

The visitation was not com

pleted until mid-November, and by then the mortality list
had swelled to nearly forty-eight hundred.
Board of Health,

Strangely, the

in the face of this staggering death toll,

•*-^Ibid., August 15, 1$5$*
A much more reliable
authority, Dr. Stanford E. Chaille", agreed with McFarlane
as to the efficacy of quarantine. Chaille"presented figures
showing quarantines to be totally useless as a preventive
of yellow fever in New Orleans and elsewhere.
It appeared
from Chailld'1s study that epidemics were at least as bad,
and usually worse, whenever a quarantine was instituted.
Stanford E. Chaille', "Yellow Fever of 1353 in New Orleans,"
Ne w Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XV (1353-59),
1T7-T^

-^Daily Delta, August 25, 185$.
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did not acknowledge the presence of an epidemic.

In at 

tempting to defend its position the Scor'd explained to the
public that there were many definitions
demic.

Regardless of terminology,

for the terra epi

however, the B o a r d ’s

failure to alert the public to the presence of yellow fever
in New Orleans was inexcusable.
The unfortunate experience of 1 o 5£ was undoubtedly re
sponsible for the Board of H e a l t h ’s decision to return in
1&59 to a quarantine of only ten d a y s .
thirty day quarantine

The more rigorous

had been notably unsuccessful, and

its reapplication would have been virtually indefensible.
Early in May Governor V/ichiiffe proclaimed a quarantine
against vessels arriving at New Orleans .from various ports
south of the United States.

The Delta claimed there v/as

no information of an epidemic in any of those places, and
denounced the proclamation as Vs. gratuitous oppression and
annoyance of trie trade of t lie city.”

It was pointed out

that during lB'5’
1 more than thirty thousand dollars had been
extracted from vessels arriving fr o m healthy ports at d i s 
ease-stricken New Orleans.

’’Can folly and presumption go

further than this? ” asked the Pelt a , "Was there ever a peo
ple that

submitted so tamely to oppression and extortion as

ohis population of New Orl eans?”
antine, declared the editor,

Anyone resisting the quar

"would be pursued by a pack of

officials, that would never rest, until they hunted him down
and made him pay,

in t h e shape of costs and penalties, more

than John Hampden lost in resisting the ship mone;- tax of
Charles the

F i r s t .

Tt^

Fortunately, yellow fever did not

return in 1559, and public confidence in the merits of quar
antine was restored despite continued blasts from the local
pr e s s .
The quarantine proclamation by Governor Thomas 0. Moore
in June, 1560 differed from those of earlier years.

Moore

announced that the Board of Health had received information
from the American consul in Havana concerning the prevalence
of yellow fever there.

Moore was convinced of the necessity

for- establishing a quarantine against Havana "or any port in
which any pestilential,

contagious or infectious disease

shall be ascertained by the Board of Health to prevail.TI

The

Bo rird was allowed at any time to lengthen the list of infect
ed ports.

The proclamation did not specify the number- of

days detention would be r equ ir ed , because Moore authorized
the Board of Health to assume this power.

20

On July 14 a

notice from the Board of Health office asserted that in
conformity to the Governor's proclamation and the emergency
powers granted to the Board by the 1555 amendment to the
Quarantine Act, a large number of ports were being quarantined.

21

The year 1560 was another comparatively salubrious

19 l b i d ., May 5, 1559.
^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1 5 5 2 , p. 126.
^ Daily D e l t a , July 30, 1560.
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one for Nev.T Orleans,

although nothing like unanimity of

opinion existed as to the effect quarantine had on p r e 
serving the public health.
^ !e P i c ay un e, a. perennial advocate of public health
reform, obviously doubted whether quarantine was beneficial
to the city.

It began a lengthy campaign in the spring of

1659 directing public attention to various local sanitary
problems.

The Pi c a y u n e , continually stressing sanitation,

alleged that with the exception of maintaining the quaran
tine stations,

the Board of health had proven itself to be

an "absolute nullity,"

The primary difficulty was seen to

be the failure of the Board and the Street Commissioner to
cooperate.

The Street Commissioner should have removed

nuisances when they were reported to him by the Board of
Health, the editor declared.

It was well understood,

he

continued, that the Board was not responsible for the inac
tion,

because in past years the Street Commissioner had often

been apprised of nuisances without

effect.

gestions of any sort had not been welcome.

Reports or sug
The Commissioner

did not recognise the authority of the Board of Health in
matters affecting the condition of streets, yards,
and gutters.

lanes,

The Quarantine Act of 1556 required the Street

Commissioner to execute orders from the Board of Health,

but

according to the Pi c a y u n e , this provision had been completely
nullified by the qualification,

"whenever not in conflict
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with the ordinances of the city. "22

The Board o.f Health,

it was revealed, had asked the state Legislature for greater
power to achieve sanitary reforms.

The Legislature decided

that only the City Council could make this grant, and as a.
result nothing whatever was a o n e . ^
A year later t:.e Cre scent, anxious to have toe city
take act.on against the ubiquitous filth, remarked that in
salubrity had been a major factor in retarding the growth
of New Orleans:
The great drawback which New Orleans
has always felt in her career of prosperity
is probably her standing as regards health.
Our city has certainly the reputation abroad of being an extensive grave-yurd, and
the stoutest heart quails, the firmest cheek
blanches at the idea of encountering, un 
acclimated , one of our summer q idenics,
It is difficult to realize, in its full ex
tent, th- blignting influence that this
state of things has exercised upon some of
our most important interests.
It has made
the city a residence instead of a home.
. . . People come, forced by the exigencies of
business and allured by the hope of gain.
They remain during the business season, but
fly on the approach of summer, as from a
pestilence.
In this way they form and keep
up a chronic dread of our climate, W ’ ich will
never* permit tnem to settle down as permanent
citi sen s.24
Unquestionably, prospective residents of New Orleans were
deterred by filth.

A letter to the Picayune from "Civis."

contains a vivid description of some sanitary problems de 
manding attention:

^Picayune, April 12, 1S59.
23lbid., May 29, 1359.
24q rescent, April 2, 1360.

Piles of garbage and reeking filth
obstruct the streets and fill the gutters;
pools of stagnant water, which have stood
so long in undisturbed exposure to the
rays of the sun that they are, even at
this early day in the season, covered with
a thick a id sickening green scum, which is
continually agitated from beneath by the
teeming millions of slimy insects gener
ated in its filth.
Here we see and smell
a stinking mass of corruption accumulated
from some kitchen, stable, brewery or dis
tillery; there a dead dog, swelling and
festering in the noonday sun; while a
little further on we see a litter of eight
or ten puppies lying in a gutter, half
covered by the slimy mud and water, where
some hardened wretch has drowned, t h e m . * ?
A Picayune editorial June 3, 1360 returned to the sub
ject of the Board of H e alt h’s failure to become active in
promoting sanitation.
it was alleged,

The Board, as a sanitary commission,

should have been supervising the removal of

nuisances from streets,

levees, buildings,

lots,

and vacant

property, and recommending; a sanitary code to the Council,
The jurisdictional conflict between the Board of Health and
the Street Commissioner had prevented this, declared the
Picayune .

Board members had been doing nothing except keep

ing the ci ty ’s raortuary records,
where,” he said,

stated the editor,

"Else

"so many sinecure offices cannot be found.”

A recommendation was made that the Board appoint health ward
ens to inspect certain districts once or twice a week and
report the presence of nuisances to the Board and the Street
Commissioner.

The Picayune expressed hope that the

^ Picayune } April 22, 1360
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Commissioner would then be willing to assume his proper
responsibility.^0
Public health was a national natter was well as a local
one.

Quarantine,

especially, was attracting a great deal

of attention in port cities.

It was commonly felt that

quarantines imposed by states and municipalities had not
worked out well in practice.

As a result, the years just

preceding the Civil liar witnessed the convoking of four
hational Quarantine and Sanitary Conventions.

The Quar an 

tine Convention of 1 3 5 7 j Che first of the meetings, was the
brain child of Dr. Wilson Jewell of Philadelphia.

In

he succeeded in convincing the Philadelphia Board -of Health
to hold a national convention the following year to discuss
quarantine problems.

The letters of invitation described

quarantine laws then in effect as "antiquated,

def ect ive;1'

as "positively oppressive in t h e i r .operation upon the in
terests of commerce, when rigorously exacted;" and as hav
ing failed "in accomplishing the benevolent purpose for
which they were originally formed."

Uhat Jewell evidently

had in mind was a revision of state quarantine laws to r e 
duce their provisions to some common standard.
tations,

signed by Jewell,

The invi

"Chairman of the Special Co m

mittee on Quarantine," were sent to boards of health,
boards of trade, and two regular medical societies in each
of the principal seaboard cities.

26Ibid., June 3, 1360.

Present at the three-day

convention held in Philadelphia in May were seventy-three
delegates from nine states, nearly two-thirds of whom were
physic ians.^
The city of New Orleans v;as represented at the conven
tion, by

five delegates, all medical men.
The Board of Health
oa
seat t n reo; the City Council, t wo.
The B e e , which was very

enthusiastic about tre convention, must certainly have been
disappointed by the selection of two avowed non-contagion-

ists, Edward H. Barton and James Jones,
Council.

to represent the

The Bee had urged the appointment of "gentlemen

who are free from prejudices either in favor of or against
pQ
a system, of quarantine." ' Nonetheless, Barton was honored
by being elected vice-president of the convention.
Both contagionists and non-contagionists acre present
in Philadelphia, with the former faction apparently having
the majority.

Two important propositions were postponed

indefinitely by a unanimous vote:

the first of these was

that "Yellow fever is not contagious, per se," and the sec
ond asserted that yellow fever was "only propagated in a
foul or infectious atmosphere, analogous to that which gave
it birth,”

Also postponed indefinitely was a key non-con-

tagionist proposition asserting that quarantine, however

27Harold M. Cavins, "The National Quarantine and
Sanitary Conventions o f 1&57 to 1360 and the Beginnings of
the Am erican Public Health Associ at ion," Bulletin of the
History of M e d i c i n e , XIII (1943)> 404-405.
2^Picayu ne , May 21, 1357.

29Bee, April 23, 1357.
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rigidly enforced, could not alone protect a community .from
the introduction or propagation of disease,

and another non-

contagionist proposition which stated that properly enforced
sanitary measures could always protect a community against
tne origination and extent ion of yellow fever,

cholera, and

typhus.
Twenty-three propositions, contai ning many signIficant
points, were approved overwhelmingly by the convention.
Smallpox,

and under certain circumstances,

typhus,

cholera,

and yellow fever, could be introduced into a community by
foul vessels and cargoes,

and diseased crews and passenger's,

stated one of the propositions.

The delegates decided, how

ever, that those diseases could not become epidemic or en
demic "unless there exist in t he community the circumstances
which are calculated to produce such disease independent of
the importation."

These "circumstances" consisted of viti

ated states of the atmosphere,

from local cau se s, in con

nection with peculiar meteorological conditi nos."

Tne state

quarantine regulations operative at the time were termed
"inefficient, and often prejudicial to the interests of the
community."

Other significant points included in the prop

ositions were that all vessels should, be inspected immedi
ately upon their arrival, and no vessel should be admitted
to a port between May 1 and November 1 until after its hold
had been freely and fully ventilated.
Several of the twenty-three propositions contained d e 
tailed recommendations

for effecting an efficient quarantine

systt.rn.

In general, the quarantine suggested by the con

vention bore a striking similarity to that already in oper
ation in Louisiana.

It was recommended further that every

community institute a Board of Health to promote sanitation
and supervise the q u a r a n t i n e . ^
An important development at the Quarantine Convention
of IS 5 /

as the acceptance by tne delegates of a proposition

that similar meetings, designated National Quarantine and
qi
L'anitary Conventions, would be held in the future.'
Ac 
cordingly, a secorm convention convened in Baltimore in l'’t;'.
to discuss the possibility of adopting a uniform system of
quarantine laws.

The lo59 convention in Mew York succeeded

in drafting a sanitary code for cities.

The delegates to

this convention also accepted, by a vote of eighty-five to
six, a resolution declaring:

"In the absense of any evi

dence establishing the conclusion that Yellow Fever has ever
been conveyed by one person to another,

it is the opinion

of this Convention that the personal quarantine of cases of
Yellow Fever may be safely abolished,

provided that fomites

3^"Minutes of the Proceedings of the Quarantine
Convention," Mew Orleans Medical Nev/s and hospital Gazette,
IV (1^57-5'?) ,~2^3~79
3 1 I b i d ., pp. 271-72.
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of every kind be rigidly

r e s t r i c t e d , " 3 2

j t

ys

s ; .f e

ty

assume

that non-cont ngi•
•m i st s were fir: iy in control of the 1B5?
convent '.on.

A fourth convention was hold in Boston in 1160,

bo.t national jooiitical
developments
wade farther meet inrs
.
^
o
impossible.
The Louisiana Stale Board of Health sent three; of its
members to the Quarantine Convention of Iff?:

Dr. A.

Forster Axson, President of the board, Dr. Charles Delery,
and Dr. 11. 3. Lindsay.

Hew Orleans was represented again

in 1S5J$, but no delegates from Louisiana participated in the
last two convent!ons.^3
In the meant 1;:ie t e I ou is ia n a Bo:ird of Health was defending its posit i n on quarantine and sanitation as w ell
as other public h ea j_th issues in Its a ..nual Reports to the
state Le gislature .

The President of t he Board (design at sd

a so _>ta te health Officer) was largely responsible for the
material in these early Reports.

Dr. A . F o r st er A x so n occu

pied the post of B o ard President from 1^56 until I860, and

3 2Bennet Dowler, editor of the Lew Orleans Medical
and Surgical Journal, saw fit to discuss this resolution at
some length.
He thought it foolish to blame fornites for
the transmission of disease when no one was quite certain
what a fomite was.
The unacclimated, he averred, could run
from New Orleans at the appearance of an epidemic arid then
return later to houses filled with "fomites” and still not
contract the disease.
Bennet Dowler, "Remarks on the Pro
ceedings of the late Quarantine Convention, held at Lev/
York," New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XVI
(1SS9-60T7 520-25•
33cavins, "National Quarantine and Sanitary Con
ventions," ojp. cit., pp. 4 0 $-1 2 .
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hi:> leadership ' -.j • a major factor .in tl e Beard’s survival
duriip

to one crucial year’s.

"he four annual ueyoriL writ-

ten by Arson a u g beer; described by Dr. Ben :'n-edmaa as
"classics in public hea •t:

st besmaashin m - epidemiological

re a sort in r ."jLv
A significant feature of the l:‘5o Report was an impor
tant discussion of the etiology of .-yidcm'c diseases.
asserted that all eyoerience,
attested to ch.

Axson

profeslions. 1 os other.iso,

existence of cextssin diseases which were

contagious, others whLch were not only cont ,pious but also
capable o

being co’nsun icatec t; rougr the ••-tmosphere, and

a third type of d isense brans, doted eut irtd y by self-diffu
sion through tie atmosphere.

The se 1f-diffus i on occurred,

Axson declared, even thong:, the atmosphere did not exhibit
”a.r>y palpable morbid product recognisable by the senses or
susceptible of being isolated from the medium in which it
floats."

Yellow fever and cholera, thought Axson, were a-

rnong the disease falling into the second category because
they could be spread throughout a community either by direct
contact or by an atmosphere containin':ted with emanations
from the bodies of the sick.
i/hat was the value of a quarantine?

Axson maintained

that the community had to be protected from viruses which
were communicated by direct contact and from those which
contaminated tne atmosphere.

The oroblem in the case of

^ B e n Freedman, "The Louisiana State Board of Health,
Established 1^55»" American Journal of Public Health,XLI
(1951), 1231.

yellow fever was the lack of agreement as to tne origin of
the disease.

Axson stated that "a majority of our profes

sional citizens . . . contend that it oftener originates
here, than is i,. ported from abroad.”

The board of Health

admitted, its inability to decide the liicitcor«

,-xXson virio

certa in, however, that the very rnild visitation of yellow
fever in 1$5>6 had resulted from contact ■ ith Vera Cruz.
Epidemics since 1 153 had manifested abundant proof, he
wrote, that Yellow Jack by some means was transmitted from
the afflicted to the healthy.

Tne position that decaying

organic matter (mi a area) could produce tills disease to the
exclusion of other influences could not, claimec Axson, be
reasonably affirmed in the fsee of 'no large mass of testi
mony o'1 the past three years.
induced "morbid

Although "atmospheric states"

>redispositions," the basic factor in the

spread of disease, he asserted, was "morbid poison escaping
from the bodies of the sick, which, when placed in contact
with the healthy and susceptible, originates the same dis
ease and thus becomes self-extended."
The Board of Health Report for IB 56 declared that little
likelihood existed that a vitiated atmosphere would attain
an "epidemic constitution" without the

introduction of a

material virus, such as that of yellow fever.

The purpose

of the quarantine was to prevent the introduction of these
deadly viruses.

Axson was convinced of its efficacy:

". . . the whole tenor of observation and experience in
regard to the portability of yellow fever virus through the
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medium of vessels is so complete,
mulated,

that no hardihood,

however adventurous, will in

vite an issue of this point."
in the 1355 Report,

self-accordant and accu

Axson noted, as had Choppin

the "inconsiderable

. . . portion of our

shipping and commercial interests" actually affected by the
quarantine.^^
The Report mentioned that

the Board of Health had en

countered grave difficulties b cause of the absense of proper
facilities at Quarantine

(Mississippi) Station,

v/harves and

suitable warehouses were not available for vessels liable to
detention and required to unload their cargoes.

Complaints

of the inconvenience and loss sustained by "certain interests"
because of this inadequacy were regarded by the Board as jus
tifiable,

The federal government,

asserted Axson, had been

approached and requested to comply with the provisions of a
1799 law empowering the President of the United States to
have wharves and warehouses constructed for the use of ves
sels quarantined pursuant to the

laws of any state.

Axson

revealed that he had written to Secretary of the Treasury
James Guthrie concerning the matter,

but had been informed

by Guthrie that the government did not have the means to pro
vide for the construction of the requested facilities.

John

Slidell, United States Senator from Louisiana, was asked by
Axson to interpose with the government, but he received a

35fteport of the Board of Health, to the Legislature
of the State of Louisiana / II 56 / (New Orleans, 1857)',

pp. 3-11; 12-13.
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similar reply from G u t h r i e * ^
The Report called attention to the need for a plan to
reclaim all the swamp lands between the city and Lake Pontchartrain.

The health and wealth of Ne w Orleans could

thereby be greatly enh an ce d.

"The grand idea," Axson de 

clared, was "to get rid of all the surface water covering
the low lands in the rear of the city,

to ventilate the

city by opening up dry and accessible avenues to the lake,
to convert its swamps into useful ornamental meadows,

and

thus eventually to ensure the spread and growth, of popula
tion by inviting settlement on these reclaimed lands."

Upon

request by D m

Axson tne tity surveyor devised a drainage
***r'i
plan which was appended to the Reports '
51
The 135o Report concluded with detailed mortality and
meteorological tables ana the Secr et ar y’s fiscal statement.
Because of the unusual importance placed upon atmospheric
conditions by most contemporary physicians, proper attention
to meteorology was regarded as essential to any public health
report.

The S ecret ar y’s statement revealed that the B o a r d ’s

financial status had improved during 1356, the total debt
having been reduced to less than six thousand d o l l a r s . ^
A x s o n ’s first Board of Health Report formed the pattern for
those which followed.

A feature of the early Reports was a

36 I b i d ., pp. 11-12,

19-20.

37 Ibid., pp. 13-15, 21-24.
3 aI b i d ., pp. 71-72.

health problems In Louisiana.

Quarantine and sanitation

were, of course, the major topics of concern.

Copies of

the Board's most important correspendence was sometimes
att-" ched to the President's statement.

Mortality and mete

orological tables and a financial report usually foil owed,
altliougn not always in this order.

The Reports did not

change greatly in appearance- until toe x abdication of much
lengthier ones during tne seventies and eighties.
The annual Report for 1-57 devoted a great deal of
attention to the Quarantine Convention held durin0 May in
Philadelphia.

After informing the state Legislature that

the Congress of the United ft--ten Lao appropriated fifty

thousand dollar.?, for the construction of "suitable ware
houses, with wharves and enclosures" at Quarantine Station,
a discussion of the convention was undertaken by Dr. Axson.
Pointing to the difficulty of providing stanoardized quar
antine regulations for ports located at different latitudes,
Axson admitted that the convent on had been anything but
a resounding, success.

Even so, he avowed his belief that

the labors of the delegates had been ''neither altogether
barren nor uninstructivs."

Medical opinion in the North,

stated Axson, "was nearly unanimous as to tne non-infec
tious nature of Yellow Fever," and the same had been true
in the South until the epidemics of If53-55 demonstrated
quite convincingly that ye H o w fever -.as portable and in
fectious.

Axson felt that the agreements reached in Philadelphia,
most of which were sponsored by contagion!sts, represented
a triumph for science.
many doctors,
incorrect:

he said,

Observations since 1653 convinced
that their preconceptions had been

"The array of facts had become too multiplied

and emphatic, to altogether negative the notion that pes
tilential fevers were endowed with the attribute of con
taminating those who were brought witnin their 1ir.iMedi.hte
influence.Tn

The transportability of pestilence,

continued

the Report, had been affirmed by the convention delegates
when they accepted propositions declaring yellow fever,
cholera,

and typnus among tne diseases that could be intro

duced into a community by infected vessels.

Axson called

attention to the convention’s adherence to the ratner inter
esting proposition which said in effect that imported yellow
fever could be transmitted from person to person but could
not become epidemic unless local circumstances were conducive
to producing the disease independent of importation.

Axson

took exception to this implication that a vitiated atmosphere
could in itself create yellow f e v e r , asserting his belief
that the atmosphere was "only a vehicle for its transmission
like the other substances, that have become saturated with
the morbid principle

the yellow fever virus_7«"'^

The 1657 Board of Health Report took up the problem of

39fteport of the Board of H e a l t h , to the Legislature
of the State of Louisiana / 1357 7 (New Orleans, 1858),
PP. 3-13.
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providing the state with a plan for the proper registration
of e v e r y birth, death and marriage.

Aside from the social,

legal, and political importance of having this information,
Axson averred:

"All sanitary reform reposes on vital sta

tistics whose legitimate functions are to define and indi;r\
cate the sources of disease and deatu, lrl'J Reformers had
been telling the public for years that the relative health
iness or unhealthiness of Mew Orleans could not be accur*ately determined unless a lav; was enforced requiring only
authorized persons to record births and deaths.

Statisti

cal information, declared the Report, was regarded as
essential to all public health surveys.

M. Morton Dewier,

prominent New Orleans physician and public health leader,
asserted in 1356:

"As it now is, whether v;e be smitten

with the pestilence or be comforted by the assurance that
the public health is good beyond parallel, our histories
of the passing state of things in this behalf, are crude,
unsatisfactory, and inconclusive."^

Despite ail efforts

the importance of vital statistics was not generally recog
nized either in Louisiana or anywhere else.

Shryock main

tains that politicians of the era viewed professional ef
forts to accumulate public health data as tricks of the

^°I b i d ., pp. 13-14.

Morton Dowler, "A Cogitation of Public Health,"
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, Ji.11I (1356-57),
295.
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doctors to increase their t r a d e . ^
Another problem Axson thought deserved attention was
the excessive infant mortality caused by ignorant, untrained
midwives.

Axson for many years had been agitating for an

effective state control of mid-wifery.

In 1^5 L he denounced

"those empty and pretentious women, whom a vicious public
taste and a sense of false decorum have emboldened to a s 
sume the most responsible duties at

a most responsible cri

sis in the life o.f every

parturient mother.

Report related that some

years past Louisiana had a law p r o 

viding for the licensure

of persons attending women at time

of child-birth;

this statute,

it was noted,

The 1S57

hr. d been repealed

because of t he general belief that a monopoly was being cre
ated.

Axson told the Legislatur e :

"...

you have reduced

to a common level in the estimation of the law,
and
the

science,

knowledge and ignorance,

charlatanry

ana have encouraged

aresumptuous and the reckless to enter your firesides

and to tamper with life at its most tender' and important
crisis."
bility

The Report assigned to the midwives the res po ns i

for the large number of still-born infants and for

the large number who died of "infantile Lock .jaw.

^ R i c h a r d H. Shryock, "Public Relations of the M e d 
ical Profession in the United States:
I600-lo70,"
Annals
of Medical H i s t o r y , Vol. 2, No. 3> P* 321*
^New

Orleans Monthly Medical Register,

I (1S51-52),

107.
^ ^Report of the Board of He al th/ " 1S57

7,

pp. 17-21,

The Report, dwelled very briefly upon the problem of the
very high mortality each year from consumption

(tuberculosis

One in nine of the total mortality vas from this cause,
clared. the Report.

de

Only yellow fever and c:olera in their

epidemic years cumbered more v i c t i m s .

The most important

causative factors in the large number of consumption deaths
among the poorer classes, thought Axson, were "bad food,
insufficient ventilation in their sleeping apartments arid
overcrowding,

and the common hardships that beset the poor

and the improvident wherever they are found in large n u m 
bers."

Consumption took more lives in succeeding decades

than any other disease in Ne w Orleans,

including yellow

fever and cholera, but because the number of consumption
deaths were rather constant throughout

the year, epidemic

diseases continued to attract the attention of most public
health o f f i c i a l s . ^
The 155? Report was subjected to a bitter assault by
Dr. D. M . P. Mercier of New Orleans.

In a memorial to the

state Legislature, Mercier sought tc discredit
quarantinist views.

Mercier asserted:

Axson’s

"This report a-

bounds in erroneous interpretations of facts, and in poet
ical and fastidious lucubrations on matters entirely
disconnected with the subject; and restricts itself to a
disdainful silence with regard to patent and undeniable
facts, the revelation of which, would have upset the

^Ibid ., p. 21.
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edifice it was trying to build.

Mercier then attempted

to disprove the primary theses of the contagionists.

After

an unusually lengthy discussion he concluded:

We think that we have given proof that
yellow fever, cholera, typhoid fever and
some other diseases, against the introduc
tion of which in our community, quarantine
was established, originate spontaneously
here, wi thout the help of importation,
spread here, and sometimes take the charac
ter of epidemics. We come to the natural
conclusion that quarantine cannot protect
us against those diseases; and, th er e f o r e ,
becomes a useless measure,
"vie have, /
_ sic__7
proved, besides that quarantine has been
used in an injudicious and vexatious manner;
that it is a nuisance to our business; that
it was the cause of severe losses to many
of our merchants; and, finally, that its
result, in times not far off, will be to
take away from our ports and direct to
others ports, all our trade with Mexico,
Cuba, she West incies and South America.^'
The doard of Health Report for 155$, written after
Louisiana had recovered from a devastating ye]low fever
epidemic,

consisted primarily of an attempt by Dr.

to defend the B o a r d ’s quarantine policy.

Axson

Axson went to

great lengths in his effort to prov*- that the yellow fever
which appeared in New Orleans in 155£ had been imported on
the ship Elizabeth Ellen and
cable variety.

t. at

it had been of a communi

The quarantine had failed to prevent the

^ D. M. P. Mercier, ”/~A Memorial_7 To the Honorable,
the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of
the State of Louisiana. . .
New Orleans Medical and S u r 
gical J o u r n a l , XV (1555), 221.
47ibid., p. 251.
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introduction of the pestilence, he said, because its effec
tiveness had been undermined by the 1353 law which modified
the original Quarantine Act.

Axson was alluding to t h e p r o 

vision in the ne w law permitting vessels out ten days
says fifteen)

(he

from infected ports and presenting clean bills

of health to pass directly to New Orleans after having been
fumigated.

He noted that the Board had zealously opposed

this "fatal deviation

from all sail, rule and precedent in

tie experience of quarantine measures."

According to Axson

the loll act modifying the quarantine overloobed the "essen
tial circumstance of tainted cargoes,

and of

a

pestiferous

atmc-sobere
below decks,"
as in the case of the Elizabeth
*
*
--Ellen which "had on board and in her hold morbific agencies
of a character to induce sickness
Sickness,

among

officers and crew."

evidently yellow fever', hod b o :. present on the

Elizabeth. Ellen during its voyage from the West Indian port
of St. Thomas,

the Report continued,

but upon its arrival

at Quarantine Station no sickness on board was discovered,
so the vessel was fumigated arid allowed to proceed.

The

Elizabeth Ellen arrived in New Orleans June 4j and anchored
next to the ship Ind ependence.

Within ten days the son and

daughter of the captain of the Independence became ill with
yellow fever and died.

Soon other cases were reported,

in

cluding the men who had handled the corpse of the captain's
son.

Axson claimed that from the Elizabeth Ellen Yellow

Jack had been diffused throughout a large section of the city.
The Report for 1353 presented a history of yellow fever
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in Louisiana and concluded:
that the violent epidemic
scarcely an exception,

"It is . . . to be observed,

seasons have been coincident, with

with its importat i o n ."

The point was

emphasised again that the quarantine lav; as it had opera ted
in 1 o 53 was defective,

"not so mucr in principle as in the

compensations it seeks to give to our commercial marine."
Axson maintained that the

act had mads it impossible

for the Board of Health to det-in vessels regarded as being
suspicious.

Some amendments te the qua ran tin-- lav/s were

suggested by Axson, 'the objective being to create a system
of complete non-irx ^'Course between hew Orleans and vessels
arriving from yellow fever ports.

be asserted that there

would be no loss to the commerce of tne city, the only
change being that

suspicious ships would unload their cargoes

at Quarantine Station instead of New O r l e a n s .
goods

(fomites)

houses,

Susceptible

could be stored in the United States wa r e 

soon to be built, and re-shipped later by the con

signees or owners.

Presumably,

non-susceptible goods could

be taken to New Orleans without delay.

h^

Axson sought to defend the Board from the abuse heaped
upon it because of its inaction during the months of the
epidemic.

He explained that the Mayor had been informed at

an early date of the prevalence of yellow fever, and a
course of action had been suggested.
fault,

It was not the B o a r d ’s

Axson insisted, that nothing was done.

He was convinced,

^ Report of the Board of Health to the Legislature
of the 5tate of Louisiana
L / (Baton Rouge, 1859),
pp. 3-29.
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he said, that the general public vvas ignorant of the fact
the Board of Health had been given only limited powers:
By lav/ it is only a Board for the
purpose of organizing and administering
quarantine regulations.
It has none of
the attributes, nor can it exercise any of
the functions of a Board of Health, save
and except in subordination to city leg
islation, and through the comity of city
officials.
The whole scope of its powers,
as far as internal sanitary policing goes,
is simply to advise and suggest, but not
administer or enforce.
Axson declared that the Bo.-.rd of Health had not even been
given the legal power to demand from the sextons a daily
report of interments in the cemeteries,

and yet the Board

was supposedly custodian of Hew O r le an s1 mortuary records.
A man was employed,

he revealed,

to copy interment

totals

from tire s e xt on s’ bo o'-,s in order that the latest information
could be published.

Axson felt that mortality figures spoke

for themselves, and a formal announcement

in the newspapers

of tne presence of an epidemic was u n n e c e s s a r y . ^
The Retort of 1J>5# maintained that

the Board of Health

had desired in the past, and still did desire, to promote
remedial sanitary measures.

The sanitary powers granted

to the Board by the Quarantine Act of

1855

had been nulli

fied by the refusal of city authorities to cooperate.
vice had been given,

stated the Report,

with contempt or indifference.

49ib_id,, pp. 33-34.

Ad

but it was greeted

"By a singular accord of
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action,

if not of sentiment," Axson declared,

tionaries of every grade and rank,

"city func

ignored the existence of

abuses of common decency and scandalous nuisances,

end

seemed bent on experimenting with the patience and endurance
of our long-suffering c i ti ze ns ."
to a number of abuses:

The Report called attention

hotels poured their ordure through

the chief avenues of the city; gut tors "swellered" with the
blood and drainings of slaught er-pon s ; streets smelled from
the waste emitted by sugar refin e r i e s ; and unpaved highways
were broadcast with filth of all description from gutters,
yards,

a.id sta bles .

The Report

stated further that the

foremost causes of sickness and mortality in Mew O r l e a n s ,
aside from the importation of disease germs

from a b r o a d ,

were bad sewerag e, the existence of open stagnant d r a i n s ,
the continued presence of undrained marsh l a n d , accumula
tions of filth in the streets, and

over-crowding of immi

grants into badly ventilated buildings.
these omnipresent

Axson insisted that

sanitary problems were not

"active agencies

in the production of our epidemics," although sickness and
mortality were considerably enhanced by social abuses,

and

the c i t y rs reputation suffered.
Sanitary evils could be obviated easily enough,
clared Axson,

by observing

de

"a few plain but fundamental

principles /""needs_J7M which he enumerated in the order of
their importance.

First,

a system of levee draining from

the swamp into Lake Pontchartrain was needed.

Secondly,

New Orleans required a series of drains or sewers to carry

"fluid refuse" into the swamp at the rear of the city,
Wiich point the refuse would drain into the lake.

from

A recom

mendation for street paving; "as far and fast as circumstances
will w a r r a n t ” was included by Axson as part of principle
number t w o .

The c i t y ’s third great need was seen to be a

more plentiful supply of water for use in keeping the streets
thoroughly cleaned.

Fourth,

Axson suggested employing scav

engers to remove at regular intervals the rubbish and impu
rities which the water did not carry a w a y .

Fifth,

a system

of regulations v.as deemed necessary to remedy the problem
SO
of over-crowding in tne houses of the p o o r .^
The

Report concluded by noting t. at vaccination

in Louisiana had not been as general or as
formed as it should have been,

faithfully per

and that the Board had appro 

priated five dollars monthly to purchase fresh vaccine for
gratuitous distribution among the planters and citizens of
the state.

The Legislature was reminded that the Board en

joyed no legal power to enforce vaccination,

even though

experience had shown the wisdom of compulsory vaccination
and re-vaccination.

Even the "promptings of self-interest"

and the "innate horror of small-pox" could not induce many
people to submit to vaccination.

In effect, the Report

suggested that the Legislature enact a lav: providing for
compulsory vaccination for Louisianians to protect them from

50 l b i d ., pp.

34-33.
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smallpox against their1 w i l l . ^
The Board of Health Report for 1359 j trie last written
by Dr. Axson,

reiterated the recommendations made in the

1353 Report with regard to the enforcement of a stringent
quarantine.

"...

the quarantine regulations should be

rigorous and precise," it was asserted,

"designed rather to

exclude for certain periods of time all intercourse with
infected places,

than to define the con.diti.ons under which

such may be p^rmi ssable

sic__7«,f

Ships arriving at i'!ew

Orleans from infected places should be required to remain
in quarantine for a length of time to be aeter ined by the
Board of Health, Axson stated.

"Foul vessels,

with their

susceptible crews," as well as goods believed to be fomites,
could then be detained as long as necessary.
of that, declared the Report,

Anything short

"must emasculate the very pith

a n d .substance of the law, and make of the whole system a.
feeble and inert compromise of principles unworthy / of_7
the intelligence,

and deserving the prompt renunciation by

the Legislature of the whole plan of q ua ra ntine .
The 1359 Report reaffirmed the desire of the Board of
Health to take positive action to war... promoting better co n
ditions in New Orleans.

The Quarantine Act of 1 $ 5 5 j

it

stated, had explicitly contemplated that both quarantine

51Ibid., pp. 33-39.
5^Annual Report of the Board of Health, to the
Legislature of the State of Louisiana- / 1359_/ (Baton
Rouge, i960), pp. 3-4.
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and local sanitation were zo be parts of a program aimed, at
protecting the people of Louisiana from epidemics.

The

Board had put quarantine into operation immediately, Axson
declared;

but the City Council, whose assistance was needed,

failed to manifest any great interest

In sanitary measures.

Axson claimed that sickness and death often resulted from
causes "directly amenable to judicious enforcement of sani
tary regulations,"

He noted the existence of some diseases

"whose very essence / was_7 identified with putrefaction
and f i l t h .

State health officials found it necessary

to emphasise repeatedly during these pre-war years that the
Board of Health was responsible
for sanitary»
j.
« reform and was
not merely an institution charged v:ith managing the quaran
tine.
One of the basic problems preventing the inauguration
of a real program of hygienic reform,

the Iegislature was

told, was that the Board had been "in complete or partial
ignorance of the actual state of our population,

of its

numbers, the relative proportion of the sexes, color and
ages;

of their births and marriages; their occupation,

the

dwelling houses they inhabit, the supply of water and food,
the prevalence of intemperance,

crime and pauperism."

How

much was really known of the population of New Orleans?
Past censuses had not been detailed enough, according to
Axson.

"There is a long roll of mortality," he maintained,

^ I b l d ., pp. 6-9.

1m
1 /x
’’with its infinity of causes, destroying life or- impairing
health,

that must be explored before we can assume a people

to be regularly advancing in its moral and physical growth."
Accordingly,

the Board of Health recommended,

as it had in

the Reports of 1$57 and IB^S, that a Registration of Births,
Marriages,

and Deaths be established for t e city of Mew

Orleans and for the entire state. 51In i860 Dr, Axson was succeeded in the presidency of
the Board o f Health by Dr. Charles Delo'ry.
for the year 1 6'>q 55 was much
it,

Dele'ry*s Report

the same as those which preceded

but it did contain an unusual theory of the nature of

yellow fever-.

Delery noted the abserrse of epidemic disease

in New Orleans during IfoO; he declared that

it could not

have been a result of sanitary improvements because there
had been none.

He mentioned that the Council had since

ordered a. general cleaning p r og ra m, and beneficial results
were anticipated.

The few sporadic

cases of yellow fever

reported in i860 were not attributable to importation,
claimed Delery,
enforced.

because the quarantine had been strictly

The Board of Health was certain,

he said, that

the nineteen cases had originated in New Orleans.

Delery

generalized that perhaps indigenous yellow fever was

5^ I b i d ., pp. 9-14.
55The i860 Report was printed in both French and
English, as were the 1857 and 1859 Reports.
Lucy B, Foote,
compiler, "Bibliography of the Official Publications of
Louisiana, 1803-1934" (Mimeographed, Baton Rouge, 1942),

D. 424•
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sporadic by nature, and only the imported variety tended
to become

epidemic.

"Facts" were presented in th e Report

to defend this thesis, and it was suggested that there be
further investigation.

The Report concluded that quaran

tine was essential because it protected New Orleans and the
entire state from imported

(hence,

According to the 1260 Report,

epidemic)

yellow f e v e r , ^

many mortuary certifi

cates had been given by persons unknov/n to the medical p r o 
fession.

Furthermore,

stated Delery, mortuary records

revealed that the number of still-born infants was much too
high,

he placed the blame for this situation on "la plus

gross!ere ignorance" and the "deplorable incapacits" of the
rnidwives.

Many of them, he claimed,

their own n a m e s .

could not even write

Someone else signed their certificates,

and after1 the signatures the midwives placed their cross
mark.

Another serious abuse mentioned in the Report was

that of pharmacists who sold spoiled,

falsified,

and poi-

,. .
57
sonous medicines . '
Deldry,

after having investigated the damage done to

Mississippi Station by a storm,

presented in the Report an

interest ring description of the area around the quarantine
grounds.

The station was located on the left bank near the

river; behind it was Black Bay,

separated from the station

^ Rapport Annuel du Bureau de S a n t e , a la Legis la
ture de 1* Btat de la Louisiane / 1&%0 7 (Baton Rouge, 1 8 6 l ) ,
pp. 3-9.

57lbid., p . 9.
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by a prairie of some, twenty arpents _/ about tnirty acres_7.
Because o f the lack of elevation,
were

the quarantine rrounds

subject to flooding, both iron: the river and the bay.

The buildings were protected by a series of levees,

some of

which had been constructed by t i.e state and some by the
federal gov er nm en t.^
The financial status of the State Board of Health was
fundamentally sound during the period preceding the Civil
h’ar.

Only in 1 $53)

the first year of its existence,

the B o a r d ’s debt anything more than negligible.
and 1357 its assets exceeded its liabilities,

was

In I B 56

altnough

during the throe succeeding years the reverse was true.
The i860 deport 3:owed the deficiency to be about sixtysix hundred doll rs, not a large sum for an institution being
operated without e subsidy.

The figures revealing the B o a r d ’s

sources of income are very significant in indicating the rel
ative importance of the three quarantine stations.
for example,

In 1853,

quarantine fees from Mississippi Station brought

in 4 0 3 j403.50> which was about
B o a r d ’s total income.

eighty-five percent of the

Rigolets Station,

on the other* hand,

c9
produced only $707.25) and Atchafalaya Station, only $210.00.'''7

Summing up, the Board of Health was well established at the
time war Intervened to complicate its early history.

The

Board did, however, continue to exist as a state institution
until Few Orleans was occupied in 1362.

5^Ibid ., p. 10.
^ Report of the Board of Health yf~l353_7> P« 52.

CHAPTER VI
PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW ORLEANS DURING THE CIVIL WAR
'With the outbreak of the Civil War the functions of the
Board of Health were greatly curtailed.
expected,

As might had been

the Board's fiscal stability was put in very seri

ous jeopardy by the Union blockade.

Since the Board of

Health depended largely on quarantine fees for support, the
shutting off of trade with New Orleans amounted very nearly
to a mortal blow.

The Report of the Board of Health for

l£6l, written by State Health Officer G. A. Nott, informed
the Legislature that the Board’s expenditures had been cut
back "to the very lowest limit consistent with the preser
vation of its archives and the protection of the public
property.1'

The salaried officers had suffered a great deal,

declared the Report, but they had '’acquiesced patiently to
the necessities of the time."

According to Nott, the block

ade also had its beneficial aspect; he credited it with
having been partially responsible for preventing the inportation of disease.
Nott stated that he did not wish to enter into an ex
amination of the contagiousness or non-contagiousness of

^lBbl was the only year throughout a period of
several decades in which not a single death from yellow fever
was reported in New Orleans.
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yellow fever, but that he believed in granting the quaran
tine complete support until its usefulness was positively
disproved.

Aside from yellow fever, he said, "unquestion-

ably contagious diseases,” such as typhus and srallpox,
could certainly be avoided by the strict observance of
quarantine regulations.

The Report noted with dismay that

the Board of Health from want of power had tended to dwindle
into a mere "Board of Quarantine,” void of other functions.
In the public mind the Board held precisely this status,
continued the Report, but certainly the framers of the
Quarantine Act had not intended to restrict so narrowly the
powers of the institution they created.

Nott stressed his

point by asserting that quarantine was looked upon by the
Board of Health as being secondary in importance to sanitary
O

regulations.^
The Board’s Report for lB6l then called the Legisla
ture’s attention to an old abuse:
medicine,

persons practicing

surgery, and obstetrics in Louisiana with no

diploma of any kind.

Death certificates, the Report de

clared, had been obtained from these practitioners with
great facility; inidwives were equally as generous.

Nott

claimed that the municipal ordinance prescribing the form
to be observed by physicians in filling out death certifi
cates had been loosely observed.

On the mortuary returns,

^Annual Report of the Board of Health to the Legis
lature of the State of Louisiana J
(Baton Rouge,
1861 ), pp. 3-7.
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too often the cause of death was officially T,not stated."^
Mo further State Board of Health Reports were issued
until after the war because with the occupation of New Or
leans,

control of the Board passed into the hands of the

United States Army.

Dr. 0. A. Nott evidently continued as

State Health Officer until May 1, 1362 when Major-General
Benjamin F. Butler, Commanding Officer of the Department of
the Gulf, declared martial law in New Orleans.

James Parton,

a Butler eulogist, quoted the General as having stated that
tr.e "sum and substance" of his plan for governing the Crescent
City was to leave the municipal authority in the full exer
cise of its accustomed functions.

Butler announced his in

tention not to interfere with the administration of the
sanitary laws, although he changed his mind before long.^
State control over the Board of Health was relinquished
immediately, and Butler appointed as its new President Dr.
Thomas H. Bache, Medical Director of the Department of the
Gulf,

Bache was succeeded as Board President August 13,

1362 by Dr. Charles R. McCormack; McCormack was replaced in
December, 1363 by Dr. Richard H. Alexander.

Alexander ap

parently retained the dual post of Medical Director and
President of the Board of Health until the Federal occupa
tion came to an end.

The State of Louisiana did not resume

3fb id ., pp. 6-7.
^James Parton, General Butler in New Orleans (New
York, 1364), p. 295.
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control of the Board of Health until April, 1866.^
The appearance of federal troops in New Orleans aroused
speculation among the resident po'.ulation concerning the
probable fate of the invaders.

The city had been free from

epidemic disease for more than three years, and according to
some, a pestilential visitation, especially yellow fever,
was overdue.

Hopefully, the newspapers discussed the effect

the Louisiana climate and New Orleans filth would have on
the unacclimated Yankees.

School children, passing troops in

the streets, taunted them with a song which proclaimed joy
fully:
Yellow Jack will grab them up
And take them all away.
General Butler noted the rumor that in churches prayers were
being said that the pestilence might come as a divine inter
position on behalf of the brethren.6
The occupation forces were very much aware of the danger.
New Orleans* reputation for disease was w^ell known in the
North.

The approach of the hot season brought despondency

^Information regarding the tenure of the Medical
Directors of the Department of the Gulf was obtained by
Dr. Ben Freedman from the National Archives.
Freedman,
TTThe Louisiana State Board of Health, Established 1855
o p. cit., pp. 1284-85.
^Elisabeth Joan Doyle, "Civilian Life in Occupied
New Orleans, 1862-65" (Ph. D. dissertation, Louisiana State
University, 1955)j pp. 56-57; Bee, May 7> 1862; Benjamin
F. Butler, Butler*s Book (Boston, 1892), p.396.
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and even panic among Butler's officers, many of them asking
permission to be transferred.

The situation was especially

bad from Butler's point of view, because he had not a sur
geon in his army who had ever seen a case of yellow fever.
Butler said that with regard to this disease the new Health
Officer, Thomas Bache, "was utterly at sea."

Butler, real

izing the potential danger, quickly assumed personal control
over most aspects of nublic health in New Orleans.

7

Butler concluded from what information he had that
yellow fever was imported and that epidemics could be pre
vented.

He decided to rely on both quarantine and sanita

tion measures, and pressed their enforcement more effectively
than ever before in New Orleans history.

According to Butler,

a "very strict quarantine" was employed, "wherein thirty-two
and sixty-eight pound shots /~were_7 the messengers to exe
cute the health orders."

Incoming vessels were stopped at

Fort 3t. Philrp, five miles belov; Mississippi Station, and
none was allowed to proceed to New Orleans without a per
sonal order from Butler himself.

Bucler believed the ten

day quarantine which the state usually imposed was greatly
inadequate, so he determined to enforce a quarantine in the
literal sense:

a forty day detention.

As had been the

custom in Louisiana, the quarantine was applied against
vessels with sickness on board and those having sailed
from infected ports.

This stringent quarantine was credited

^Butler, Butler's Book, pp. 393-400.
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by Butler with having averted a dangerous epidemic/'
General Butler also waged a campaign against the filth
which for so long had been a characteristic feature of New
Orleans.

A message dated May 9 was sent, to tne Mayor and

the Council urging them to act immediately to improve the
sanitary conditions of the streets.

"Resolutions and in

action will not do," the message warned,

"Active, energetic

measures, fully and promptly executed, are imperatively
demanded by the exigencies of the occasion."

Butler noted

that in New Orleans many starving men were available who
could be recruited as a labor force to clean the streets.

Q

'Hie Picayune frequently urged the use of the unemployed in
this kind of work.

A May 27 editorial noted that city au

thorities had attempted to clean the streets and levees, but
much more remained to be done.

According to the editor,

there still were streets "absolutely noisome and sickening
to walk, so foul are the pestilential vapors that are con
tinually reeking up from standing pools of feculant filth.
Butler was determined not to allow these odious con
ditions to remain.

On June 4 he sent a special message to

General F. Shepley (acting Mayor of New Orleans) and the
City Council.

The message declared:

"The condition of

^Ibid., pp. 401-403.
^The War of the Rebellion:
A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
(Washington, 188277 Ser. 1, Vol. 6, pp. 723-24.
^ P i c a y u n e , May 27, 1862.
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the streets of the city calls for the promptest action for
a greater cleanliness and more perfect sanitary prepara
tions. Tl

Butler told the Council of his intention to take

care of his troops, but the Council was informed that it
would be responsible for the health of others in the city.
The plan he proposed to city officials called for the em
ployment of up to two thousand men during a period of at
least thirty working days for the purpose of cleaning New
Orleans.

Unskilled workers were to receive fifty cents for

ten hours' labor; skilled v;orkers would receive more.

It

was hoped the measure would have the salutary result of
improving sanitary conditions while, at the same time,
providing food for starving families.

The Council adopted

an ordinance embodying General Butler's proposals, the only
change being that men employed by the city were to receive
a dollar, instead of only fifty cents, for each ten hour
day at work.
Almost from the beginning Butler found it necessary
to supervise his own sanitation program.

Important orders

were soon issued providing a new sanitary code for New Or
leans.

The code compelled house dwellers to see that every

thing on their premises was cleaned within twenty-four hours
of daylight after they received notice to do so; they were
also required to whitewash unpainted outside wralls.

All

1^-Butler, Butler's Book, pp. 403-404; Picayune,
June 7, 1362.
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refuse had to be placed in receptacles which were to be
emptied twice each week

(evidently by army personnel).

Throwing anything whatever into the streets was prohibited.
Anyone guilty of an infraction of the orders was to be pun
ished by incarceration in the parish prison.

Unlike similar

sanitary measures in the past, Butler’s orders were enforced.
An example of the coercion employed was the sending of Fed
eral troops armed with bayonets to clean up the French Mar
ket.

While this ' as going on, Butler put tw .• thousand men

to work cleaning all the drains, ditches, and canals in the
city.

To aid them, the streets were flushed by all the water

the New Orleans water-works could provide.
Surprisingly,

]?

it appears that Butler’s efforts were not

especially successful.

The newspapers certainly were not

satisfied with Butler's sanitation program, or with that of
his successor.

Nonetheless, yellow fever did not take the

heavy toll among Union troops so desperately feared in some
quarters and hoped for in others.

Only two cases were re

ported in New Orleans in 1362, and they resulted from a
temporary relaxation of the quarantine.

When the cases were

discovered, Butler ordered that only acclimated men could go
near the victims, and everything which had been near them
was ordered burned.

These orders were carried out, and after

the death of the two patients, their bodies were cremated.

l^Butler, Butler’s Bo ok , pp. 404-407.
13Ibid., pp. 403-10.
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When General Butler was relieved of his command in New Or
leans near the end of the year, he listed for the citizens
of New Orleans in his "Farewell Address," two contributions
he had made to the city in the realm of public health:

"I

have demonstrated that the pestilence can be kept from your
borders," he said, and "I have cleansed and. improved your
streets, canals, and public squares, and opened new avenues
to unoccupied l a n d . " ^
Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks, Butler’s successor,
was less arbitrary,

less concerned with public health prob

lems, and too busy with military undertakings to accomplish
a great deal in the way of advancing sanitation projects.
In March, 1G63, however, the City Council passed ordinances
aimed at curbing a number of long-standing abuses.

Garbage,

offal, and other waste could no longer be cast into the
streets, but must instead be placed in boxes for collection.
Citizens were also forbidden to let garbage or offal remain
in yards or private alleys for more than twreaty-four hours;
to dump garbage into the river except at a specified place;
to obstruct gutters, drains, and ditches; or to dig up
streets without permission.

Hogs were not to be kept in

the First and Second Districts (the most populous residen
tial areas), and vicious, loud, or troublesome dogs could
not be allowed to run at large, stipulated other ordinances.
Also forbidden was delay in the disposal of dead animals,

■^Parton, Butler in New Orleans, p. 605 .
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allowing stagnant water to stand on o n e ’s property, the use
of manure to fill in lots, selling tainted meat, adulter
ating food or drink, keeping spoiled food, and carrying night
jars through the street in daytime.

Other ordinances pre

scribed the time and manner of emptying privies.

Violators

were to be fined from twenty to one hundred dollars, and
were to receive a thirty-day jail sentence.

15

Yellow fever was nearly as conspicuous by its absense
in 1663 as it had been the previous year.

A quarantine was

proclaimed April 6 by Military Governor Michael Hahn against
the usual Gulf and Caribbean ports.

The proclamation stated

that the Quarantine was to go into effect May 1, and the de
tention period was established at not less than ten days.^^
Evidently it was felt that the forty day quarantine imposed
by Butler had produced a noticeably adverse effect upon the
commerce of New Orleans.

The ten day quarantine was employed

again in 1664 and 1665, and with the same result.

Yellow

fever and cholera continued to be nc problem whatsoever.
New Orleans was far from being a healthy city during the
years of Federal occupation, but it was notably free from
serious epidemics.

The relative freedom from epidemic dis

ease enjoyed by Union troops assigned to the Department of
the Gulf seems to have come as a complete surprise to

-^poyle, "Life in New Orleans, 1662-65," pp. 67-66.
^ Picayune, April 7» 1663.

184
everyone, especially to the United States Sanitary Commission.
It appeared that calculations of the innate insalubrity of
the New Orleans area had been erroneous.

17

A difference of opinion remained as to the cause for
the long absense from epidemic yellow fever enjoyed by New
Orleans between 1858 and 1867.

If good luck cannot be con

sidered a factor, Federal authorities must be given credit
for their success in promoting health measures during the
four years of the occupation, and the Louisiana State Board
of Health is equally deserving of praise for its work during
the remaining four years.

The Board had been severely ham

pered before ti e ivar by lack of agreement within the city
concerning the merits of quarantine, and received no effec
tive cooperation in achieving sanitation.

Unlike the occu

pation forces, it had been without power to accomplish its
ends.

The experience of the war years 'was used later by

the Board of Health and other reformers in trying to prove
that oublic health measures could be successfully enforced,
and that Yellow Jack visitations could be prevented.

The

Board’s opponents pointed out that epidemic yellow fever
had also failed to make an appearance during the three years
preceding the occupation.

Nothing, according to them, had

been proven at all.
Inevitably the question was asked whether the quarantine

I7charles J. Stilled History of the United States
Sanitary Commission (Philadelphia, l8 &&), pp. 424-26u
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or the cleaning program deserved greater credit for having
contributed to New Orleans’ good fortune during the war.
The citizens of the city were as divided and uncertain over
this issue as ever.

The quarantine ana the blockade (which

had the same effect) reduced the city’s commerce sharply,
thereby tending to provoke resentment.

The 1365 quarantine

proclamation of Governor James Madison Wells,

issued shortly

before the termination of hostilities, brought criticism
from the Picayune«

Editorials appearing in May and June

voiced the same objections so often repeated during previous
years.

A large number of Gulf and Caribbean ports had been

declared infected places, alleged the Picayune, without any
positive knowledge that they really were infected.
controlled Board of Health was said to be at fault.

The armyThe

Governor should have been granted discretion to decide which
ports were infected, the editor maintained, and no port
should have been shut off from free intercourse with New Or
leans unless it was found to be the seat of disease.

The

city's merchants have been complaining, the Picayune con
tinued,

but only because the quarantine was ’’injudicious,"

There would have been no objection at all, asserted the
editorial, if the proclamation had been based on reliable
information.

13

The quarantine controversy was still very

much alive.
Dr. E. D. Fenner, writing in 1366, lauded the work

■^ P i c a y u n e , April 4> May 7, 1365.
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done by the occupation forces in cleaning New Orleans:
The city may be said to have been
cleansed and kept clean; at least when
contrasted with any thing of the kind
ever seen here before.
It was a Hercu
lean task, and, in our humble opinion,
nothing short of military despotism would
have accomplished it. The good work is
not yet completed, but its salutary ef
fects so far have been palpable, and
ought to encourage us to carry it on to
perfection.
Fenner reported that he had discovered from a conversation
with the Sanitary

C o m m i s s i o n e r s ^

that yellow fever had been

imported during every year of the occupation.

Mo epidemic

had developed, he believed, because of "admirable local sani
tary police."

V/hether yellow fever was endemic in New Or

leans, whether it was imported, or whether two distinct
types of the malady existed, Fenner was certain, as he had
always been, that yellow fever would not soread in anything
other than a vitiated atmosphere.

Dr. Fenner thus used the

experiences of the occupation to further his own sanitationist- views. 20
•

*

Dr. Elisha Harris of New York, a member of the Sani
tary Commission and a reknown public health leader, agreed
with Fenner and others that the enforcement of sanitary

-^The United States Sanitary Commission was sent to
New Orleans to investigate conditions after the close of the
war.
2<^E. D. Fenner, "Remarks on the Sanitary condition
of the City of New Orleans, during the period of Federal
Military occupation, from May 1862 to March 1866," Southern
Journal of Medical Sciences, I (1866), 23-24.

measures by the occupation forces had been a panacea for
New Orleans:
Throughout the entire period
of the
provisional government_7 . • . > the Provostjiarshal, the Military Governor, the Mayor
(an appointee of the provisional govern
ment), together with the Medical Director
of the post and certain subordinate health
officers have vigilantly administered the
regulations reletting to municipal hygiene
and cleanliness in New Orleans and vicinity.
During all that period the accustomed
scourgings of yellow fever have been sus
pended in that city, while the dire fore
bodings and prophecies of the inevitable
pestilence that would quick..y destroy the
Northern soldiery on reaching the Gulf
coast, remain unrealized.
The conditions
under which the "Crescent City” has ob
tained this remarkable immunity from a
doom which her own bitter experience
seemed to fasten upon her, are now as
well understood as were the apparently
inexorable causes of her former insalubrity.
Harris poin ed out that prominent New Orleans physicians
such as Fenner, Barton, and Simonds had for years maintained
that yellow fever epidemics could be prevented by civic
cleanlinessj these men, he said, had bee- proven correct.
The quarantine deserved less credit, Harris continued, be
cause, despite its rigid enforcement, cases of both yellow
fever and smallpox, "the only infections feared or guarded
against,” were detected in New Orleans.

Dr. Harris espe

cially emphasized the general salubrity

enjoyed by the

during the war years.

Orleans had never

He felt that New

city

in the past been blessed by such a remarkably high percentage
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of healthy residents .^
A few years later Dr. Stanford E. Chaille/ of New Or
leans, an amazingly prolific writer, upset the entire line
of reasoning of Harris, Fenner, and almost everyone else by
collecting and publishing available mortality figures.

The

war years had not been healthy ones, the facts revealed.

The

average mortality for the years 1363-65 was, in fact, dem
onstrated to have been somewhat greater than for the 1356-60
or the 1366-69 periods, even though 1353 and 1367 were epi
demic years.

This was true, stated Chaille'

despite a quar

antine r.oro perfect than civil government could possibly
erect and an unprecedented sanitation program enforced by
military authority.

C ha iHe' admitted that he did not know

the cause for this strange situation but he did note the
unusually large number of unacclimated persons in New Or
leans during the war.

Many Federal troops as well as New

Orleanians accustomed to leaving the city during the summer
months had been present and were prime targets for disease.^2
Chaille'’s information showed the leading causes of
death in New Orleans during the three war years to have been
diarrhea and consumption, each of them causing mortality in

21-Elisha Harris, "Hygienic Experience in New Orleans
during the War.
Illustrating the importance of efficient
Sanitarj*- Regulations," in Ibid., pp. 25-37*
^ S t a n f o r d E. Chaille', "The Yellow Fever, Sanitary
Condition, and Vital Statistics of New Orleans during its
military occupation, the four years 1362-65," New Orleans
Journal of Medicine, XXIII (1370), 563-33.

excess of two thousand.

The occupation troops were espe

cially susceptible to the former, and malarial fevers also
took the lives of great numbers of unacclimated Yankees.
Other diseases killing more than a thousand during the
three year period were dysentery and smallpox.2^

p r , Eugene

Sanger, a surgeon with the Third Division, 19th Army Corps
in New Orleans, reported that scurvy (a leading cause of
diarrhea), typhus, typhoid fever, and malaria were the four
primary factors in causing "so much disease and such fearful
mortality."

The 173d Mew York Volunteers, occupying Baton

Rouge, suffered most from "malarial fever of the intermittent
type."2^

Public health measures apparently had little effect

on Louisiana’s endemic maladies.
After Ray 1, 1362, when Butler and his men occupied
New Orleans, the former State Board of Health, whose members
had been chosen by the Governor and the New Orleans City
Council, ceased to exist.

The property of the Board was

taken over by the Union Army, and remained in its posses
sion during the next four years.

The quarantine laws of

the state were administered by a Board of Health and Res25
ident Physicians appointed by the Commanding General.

23Ibid., pp. 530-32.
2^The Medical and Surgical History of the War of
the Rebellion, Medical VolT (Washington, 1379)» Part 2,
p. 100; Part 3> PP • 415-16.
2^Report of the Board of Health to the Legislature
of the State of Louisiana / lBb5 / (New Orleans, 1367), p. 3.

The State Board of Health of Louisiana was reorganized
April 16, 1G66.

Dr. S. A. Smith was elected President by

the other members.

Because a quarantine had been established

a month earlier against cholera,

26

the Board found it nec

essary to elect Resident Physicians for the Atchafalaya and
Rigolets quarantine stations and an assistant for Dr. P. B.
McKelvey, the Resident Physician at Mississippi Station.
Governor James K. Wells was notified of these developments
and requested to effect the return of the Board’s property . ^
Wells complied with the request by notifying Major-General
E. R. S. Canby, the Commanding Officer of the Department of
Louisiana.

Canby referred to Lieutenant-General Dlysses S.

Grant the question of whether the Board of Health should be
allowed to return to civilian control.

General Canby evi

dently received an affirmative reply, because on May 15 he
issued an order stating that "the enforcement of the Quar
antine & Health laws of the State of Louisiana, will be
turned over to the officers appointed under those laws,
subject to the Military supervision and control required by
the orders from the Headquarters of the Army.

. . . ”

The

2°Picayune, March 21, 1B66.
27Report of the Board of Health /~1866_7> p. 3*
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change, according to Canby1s order, was to take place May

The State Board of Health received from the interim
Board only a small amount of movable property and, unfortu
nately, only a small portion of the old records.

The build

ings and grounds at Mississippi Station were found by Dr.
Smith to be in a condition described as "much dilapidated,"
The funds on hand and the records of the military adminis
tration were denied to the State Board, even though Smith
made a special request to the Medical Director of the D e 
partment of the Gulf that the money be transferred.
claim was taken to Washington, but to no avail.

The

The Board

of Health was thus placed in the position of having to com
mence operations after the war without cash assets,

The

serious financial plight of the Board was revealed in its
Report for 1366.

The total debt at th:

end of 1366 exceeded

fourteen thousand dollars, and receipts had by no means re29
turned to their pre-war level.
The Legislature was asked

2^The State Board of Health has in its library the
original letter from Canby to Wells informing the Louisiana
Governor of the disposition he had made of the State Board of
Health1s request for permission to reorganize, and it also
has Canby1s order transferring the Board from civil to mili
tary control.
Copies of these manuscripts appear in The
Louisiana State Board of Health Biennial Report, 1954- 55
(n .p ., n.d.J, pp. 49-51.
^ T h e problem was aggravated by the Legislature^
declaration that Louisiana money, which was depreciating
rapidly, was receivable in payment for all state debts.
Crescent, July 11, 1366.
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for an appropriation or a loan to enable the Board of Health
to pay off its indebtedness.

Smith, in making the request,

assured the Legislature that he confidently expected that
in the future, receipts by the Board of Health would equal
its expenditures.

His expectation went unrealized, and

the Board continued to flounder in fiscal difficulties for
years to come.

3°Report of the Board of Health /~1B66 7> PP* 3-4,

7-11.

CHAPTER VII
THE BOARD’S POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT
The war changed very little insofar as Louisiana's
health problems were concerned.

Smallpox, Asiatic cholera,

and yellow fever returned to New Orleans in epidemic pro
portions during ensuing decades, although consumption^ and
malaria, the most fatal endemic diseases, took a heavier
toll in lives.

Medical men still devoted a great deal of

attention to seeking means for preventing epidemics, but
success was sometimes long in coming.

Vaccination was able

gradually to conquer smallpox, and cholera disappeared from
Louisiana after 1B73,^ but yellow fever remained an enigma,
unsolved to the satisfaction of state health authorities
until the twentieth century.

In the meantime the contro

versy over quarantine, involving both physicians and laymen,
went on unabated, reaching a climax during the years fol
lowing the epidemic of IB 7 S.

■^-Consumption came to be termed officially, phthisis
pulmonalis.
This disease did not become known as tubercu
losis until the twentieth century.
^Leland A. Langridge, Jr., "Asiatic Cholera in
Louisiana, 1&32-1&73" Tm. A. thesis, Louisiana State Univer
sity, 1955), p. 126 .
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In 1866 New Orleans was visited by a severe outbreak
of Asiatic cholera.

The assault came in two waves, the

first occurring in the spring.

A quarantine was proclaimed

in March, but it came too late to influence perceptibly the
course of the dreaded disease.

By the time the State Board

of Health was reorganized in April, cholera was on the de
cline, and by June no cases whatever were reported.

The

second and more virulent v/ave descended upon the city during
July, reaching a climax in August and September, and killing
a total of about thirteen hundred persons in New Orleans
during the last six months of the year.
to maintain a quarantine,

The Board continued

but it was of little, if any, use

after the epidemic had begun.

Nothing, it seemed, could be

done to curb the spread of the pestilence in New Orleans
because the Board of Health’s functions were severely re
stricted by inadequate powers and non-existent funds.
The Board of Health, acting with prudent resolve, an
ticipated the recurrence of cholera, and prepared to give
battle.

Before the epidemic began, a ’’health ordinance”

was prepared by a joint committee of the Board and the City
Council.

The ordinance was passed by the Board, approved by

the Council, and published as a city ordinance.

It specified

fines of from five to one hundred dollars for the commission
of certain offenses felt to be injurious to the public health.
Among the offenses proscribed were throwing filth, offal,
or putrid water in any yard, gutter, or canal; impeding the
passage of water in any ditch or gutter; keeping a hog
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within the city limits; permitting any animal with a con
tagious disease to roam at large; disentombing a human body
without permission of the Board; selling poisonous medicine;
adulterating any food or drink; throwing a dead animal into
the river at any place above the water works; and offering
resistance to necessary examination of private premises.
More important than the sanitary code was the section in
the ordinance creating a special enforcement body of four
Health Officers,

New Orleans was to be divided into four

districts (later known as sanitary districts), and a "medical practitioner" was to be assigned to each district by
the Board of Health.

The Health Officers, popularly re

ferred to as Sanitary Inspectors, were to receive a salary
of fifteen hundred dollars, and were to have the powers
granted them by the Board.^
In compliance with the health ordinance,

early in

August the Board of Health stipulated the duties of the four
Inspectors.

The Inspectors were required to report to the

Board twice each week all cases of infectious disease in
New Orleans, and to report weekly on the condition of streets,
lots, sewers, dwellings, distilleries, dairies, and slaughter
houses.

Each Officer was to inspect his district personally

once each week.

If he should receive a complaint about an

infraction of the sanitary code, he was required to inspect
the matter within twenty-four hours. The Health Officers were

^Picayune, July 10, 1866.
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also ordered to notify a policeman or a Deputy Street
Commissioner concerning the removal of all nuisances.

In

addition, the Board of Health stated that the new health
officials had to keep accurate meteorological tables.^
When the proposal to create four salaried Sanitary In
spectors was under consideration, opposition to it was voiced
in several quarters.

One Council member protested that the

new sanitary code could be enforced by the Street Commis
sioners and their Deputies.

Another Councilman, seeking to

prevent the adoption of the ordinance, declared the new in
spection system more tyrannical than martial law.

The Pica

yune claimed that the "supplemental sanitary police’1 were
not necessary because a police force of five hundred officers
and men and a street commission were already charged with the
very same duties.

According to the editor, there were al-

reacy too many officials with an opportunity to evade respon
sibility.

Furthermore, he asserted, the salary to be paid

the health officers was too small to attract leading physi
cians, and too large for simply furnishing a periodic report:
"As it is, such a position will result in nothing but a
sinecure, and the most important work to be performed will
be promptly pocketing the $1500 annually.
The Crescent, an outspoken advocate of the ordinance,
declared the new sanitary inspection system to be "a great

^Ibid., August 9} 1866.
5lbid., July 7, 10, 28, 1866.
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advance in the right direction.”

The fear that a great deal

of money would be squandered was ridiculous, declared the
editor.

”How valid this objection is,” he remarked, "may be

gathered from the fact that it is positively less than has
been expended for similar purposes by any city having over
fifteen thousand inhabitants throughout the whole country.
...

We have carefully examined the ordinance prepared by

the Board of Health, and we have no hesitation in saying
that it is the most conservative and inexpensive we have
seen throughout the whole country."

A Crescent editorial

did, however, manifest apprehension that "physicians in
good practice, or physicians of intelligence and education,
/~would_7 not forsake their profession for the pittance of
$1500

a year."

It was felt that only doctors could enforce

the sanitary code properly, because only they could deter
mine with confidence what really was prejudicial to health.
Awake to the connection between the health and the prosperity
of New Orleans, the Crescent was an enthusiastic supporter
of sanitary reform:
This much we know, that clean streets
and clean dwellings are the invariable con
comitants to low bills of mortality, and
that filthy streets and filthy dwellings
are the inseparable companions of disease
and death.
It is true that our investiga
tions have not yet enabled us to ascertain
the remote causes of disease--more especially
of those epidemics which at intervals scourge
humanity; but we do know that the intensity
of all epidemics is aggravated by neglect
of hygienic precautions. We know moreover
that wherever filth abounds disease prevails,
and that typhus, small-pox, cholera, and
other epidemic diseases growr milder in their
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form just as they are combatted by the
enforcement of cleanliness.
The 1366 Report of the Board of Health, written by the
State Health Officer, Dr. S. A. Smith, declared that the four
physicians appointed to inspect the sanitary condition of
the city were "men of energy and probity."

They were said

to have worked zealously throughout the summer in enforcing
the sanitary code, and "the fact of their existence operated
as a constant spur to the Street Commissioners and to the
Police."

Smith maintained that there were no city officials

whose service did more for the public good, and none from
whom taxpayers received more benefit for the amount of money
expended.

After the cholera epidemic had run its course,

the Council refused to continue to pay the Health Officers
from funds in the city treasury.

Dr. Smith, forseeing the

demise of the new inspection system, complained to the
state Legislature that the Board of Health was being deprived
of any influence whatsoever on the sanitary condition of New
Orleans.

As in the past, the Council was being short-sighted

in its approach to public health problems.

7

While the epidemic raged, the regular weekly meetings
of the Board of Health were devoted largely to the matter
of exposing sanitary abuses.

The Sanitary Inspectors re

ported August 15 that New Orleans still had dirty streets

^Crescent, July 3> 17> 1366.
^Report of the Board of Health /~l366-_7> P* 4.
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and gutters; rotten fish were being sold in the market;
breweries and distilleries were guilty of "noxious exhala
tions;1’ drainage was inadequate; and the slaughter-pens
were found to be in a "very filthy condition."^

Toward the

end of August the Board of Health put out a circular con
taining recommended remedies for cholera.^

Nothing seemed

to do any good, as the epidemic raged furiously throughout
September.

The number of cholera deaths finally declined

in October, but sporadic cases persisted during the remainder
of 1366.10
The following year, 1367, witnessed the first post-war
yellow fever epidemic.

The Board of Health, prior to the

outbreak, conducted a spirited campaign to avert repeal of
the health ordinance passed in 1366.

At the beginning of

the year the Legislature was asked for aid in retaining the
services of the Sanitary Inspectors, but financial support
was not forthcoming.

The Mayor of New Orleans, in urging

the Council to provide them adequate salaries, mentioned
that the Health Officers appointed by the Board of Health
in 1366 were still on the job.

He instructed the Chief of

Police to detail two policemen in each district to assist
the Health Officers in enforcing the sanitary code,'*''*'

^Picayune, August 15 > 1366.
9ibid., August 23, 1366.
-^Report of the Board of Health
■*--*-Picayune, May 31 > 1367.

1366__7> p. 5.
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was reported at the Board of Health meeting held June 4 that
the four Inspectors were faithfully performing their duties
despite the refusal of the Council to pay them and the refusal of the police to
The 1367 epidemic

12
aid them.
struck later than most of the yellow

fever outbreaks which preceded it.

As late as August 14 the

Picayune described the

general health condition of New Or

leans as good.

later an increase in the number of

A week

cases was noted by this paper, but its readers were comfort
ed by the reassurance that at least seven-eighths of those
attacked were foreigners or Yankees.

On August 23 a com

mittee of the Board of Health reported to the people of New
Orleans that yellow fever of a mild variety was still on the
increase.

13

Six days later the Board finally admitted that

Yellow Jack had reached epidemic proportions, but reiterated
the assertion that the cases were of na very mild type.1'^*’
This optimism with regard to the supposed mildness of the
disease proved to be wishful thinking.

New Orleans had

1,637 yellow fever fatalities in September, and a total of
more than 3»100 for the s e a s o n . ^

The Board of Health found

12Ibid., June 5, 1367.
^ Picayune, August 14, 20, 2$, 1367.

^^Ibid., September 4, 1367.
5Annual Report of the Board of Health to the Leg
islature of the State of Louisiana / 1367 / (New Orleans,
1363), p . 13.
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that the quarantine and the use of disinfectants were to
no avail.

As one of the members remarked:

" . . .

for a

disease so intangible as yellow fever, it is almost impossible to find an antidote.
As before the war, the Howard Association was active
in alleviating distress.

Early in September the Board of

Health called upon the Howards, a group of public-spirited
young businessmen, to reorganize in order to provide the
poor with assistance during the epidemic.

It was reported

September 25 that the Howards had already aided, "personally
and pecuniarily," more than nine hundred needy persons in
New Orleans.

MAge, sex, nationality or color are nothing

to them," remarked the editor of the Picayune.

He noted

that donations of considerable size had been sent to the
Howards from Northern cities and corporations, and that
local merchants had also been very generous.

The Howard

Association, it was reported, handled 4>192 yellow fever
cases in New Orleans during 1567, and granted relief to
6,197 additional persons.

The Howards were not only active

in the Crescent City, but also performed meritorious service
in the adjoining towns of Jefferson City, Carrollton, Algiers,
and Gretna.

These "good Samaritans" deserve a great deal of

credit for having relieved some of the gloom from an otherwise dreary pestilential season.

17

•^ P i c a y u n e , October 30, IB 67
^-?Ibid., September 25
Medicine, XXI (1570), 414-15.

1567; New Orleans Journal of
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New Orleanians were still baffled by the yellow fever
enigma:

T,We are not aware that any new light has been

thrown upon the vexed questions of contagion and portability,
nor that its introduction from abroad has been established
with any degree of credibility,” declared the editor of the
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal.

No class was

spared by the epidemic, he said; even natives of New Orleans
found they were not immune.

1$

The Picayune commented on the

almost proverbial inability of doctors to reach accord on
matters pertaining to yellow fever, declaring that "hardly
any two of our physicians agree as to the nature of causes
of the fever or fevers which have desolated our city.”^
Many years were to pass before the answers were found to
some of the more perplexing problems.
The 1367 Report of the Board of Health informed the
Legislature of the Board’s embarrassment for want of funds
to meet current operating expenses.

The appropriation made

in 1367 had been insufficient to pay off the Board’s indebt
edness, the legislators were told, because of the rapid fall
in the value of state certificates.

The Report also asserted

rather bitterly that the Board of Health wag still ”in truth
only a Quarantine Board for any practical purpose.”

The

large, general powers of the Board to watch over the health
of the city were null, continued the Report, except when the

l % e w Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XX
(1367-63), 419.
•^ P i c a y u n e , October 15 > 1367*
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Council was willing to cooperate.

Dr. S. A. Smith, Board

President and author of the Report, asked that health offi
cials be given a broader grant of independent power.

In

describing the procedure used by the Board of Health during
the yellow fever epidemic, Smith related:

’’Every house

where a case was reported as having occurred, was, under
the direction of the Health officers, cleansed and fumigated
with sulphurous acid gas and with carbolic acid.

The prem

ises likewise were subjected to the provision of the health
on

ordinance, and the privies purified by sulphate of iron.”*
In 1868 no Board of Health Report was issued.

The po

litical situation in Louisiana caused the omission, as con
trol of the Board passed from Democrats into the hands of
Republicans.

The six state-appointed Board of Health mem

bers were among the large number of Democratic officials who
lost their positions when the Radical regime was established
in the state.

Dr. Smith, the State Health Officer, and the

five others had served since their appointment by Governor
Wells in 1866, but Henry C. Warmoth, upon becoming Governor
in 1868, decided that state health authorities should be
members of his own party.

A bitter wrangle developed between

the dispossessed Board members and the new appointees.

The

six former members and the two Council-appointed members
(the third having died) would not recognize the new, re
organized Board of Health.

When the new body assembled

20Report of the Board of Health /~1367_7> PP* 3-5»

8-9.
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November 6, there still had been no amicable solution to the
controversy.

According to Dr. C. B. White, the Board Pres

ident replacing Smith, the outgoing members refused to re
linquish their office, their books, or their money; they
encouraged the bringing of law suits against the Board; they
injured the B o ar d1s credit; and they caused it much needless
expense.

White was especially concerned about the failure

of the former Secretary and Treasurer, Dr. George W. Dirmeyer,
to account for the money left in his possession.
brought against Dirmeyer,
the Board of Health.

Suit was

and the decision was in favor of

The case was appealed to the Supreme

Court, but no evidence can be found of a judgment ever having been given.
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No question can be raised concerning the B o a r d ’s conti
nuity during the Reconstruction crisis; it never ceased to
function under Louisiana’s jurisdiction.

There was merely

a change in personnel, albeit an unharmonious one.
Reconstruction Act, officially entitled,

The first

"An Act to provide

for the more efficient government of the rebel States,"
while it did provide that Louisiana be included in a military
district, did not destroy the state as a political entity,

22

A pronounced curtailment in the functions of the Board of

^ Annual Report of the Board of Health to the General
Assembly of Louisiana . . . 1&69 (New Orleans, 1370), p. 5.
^Acts
ica, Passed at
gress, and the
ington, 1^67),

and Resolutions of the United States of Amer
the Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Con
First Session of the Fortieth Congress (Wash
pp. 6O- 0 I.
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Health was apparent in 1B6B, but state authority over public
health was never relinquished.
Dr. C. B. White, who became State Health Officer in

1 B6 B, retained this post for nearly eight years, until he
was removed unwillingly when the political situation was
reversed.

During tnose years the annual Reports of the

Board of Health to the state Legislature changed their ap
pearance very noticeably.

The President's report, the mor

tuary report, the Treasurer’s report, and the meteorological
report were still important features, although the latter
was absent from the 1B69 Report, as it had been from the
1&66 and 1B67 Reports of Dr. Smith.

The important transfor

mation was in the increased length of the Reports, a change
occasioned largely by the inclusion of rather detailed re
ports by the Sanitary Inspectors.

Various special reports

and other information pertinent to the operations of the
Board were also attached quite frequently.

The 1B75 Report,

White’s last, was nearly 250 pages long, whereas his first,
the 1B69 Report, contained only forty-six pages.

The tend

ency to present masses of detailed information reached its
climax a few years later with the exceedingly long reports
of Dr. Joseph Jones.
The financial condition of the Board was not favorable
throughout most of this period despite generous legislative
appropriations during the years of Radical rule.

Dr. White

stated in the IB69 Report that his predecessors had contract
ed debts amounting to about twelve thousand dollars and had
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let the buildings at Quarantine Station on the Mississippi
deteriorate.

He noted that twenty thousand dollars had been

appropriated by the Republican Legislature in 1869 to pay
off the debt and provide needed 'repairs, but even this sub
stantial amount was insufficient, according to White, b e 
cause of the low price secured for the warrants on the
treasury.
postponed.

The debt was paid, but the repairs had to be
An additional appropriation of five thousand

dollars in 1870 allowed the Board to complete the renovation
of Mississippi Station without relapsing immediately back
23

into a state of indebtedness. ^

The Sanitary Inspectors played an increasingly impor
tant role in executing the sanitation program of the State
Board of Health.

Sanitary Inspectors (originally called

Health Officers) had first been appointed in 1866 and as
signed responsibility for maintaining the cleanliness of
certain districts in New Orleans.

The Inspectors reported

at the weekly and monthly Board of Health meetings, de
scribing nuisances in their respective districts and sani
tary operations which had been undertaken.

The First

Sanitary District comprised the old American sector above
Canal Street; the Second District was the French Quarter
from Canal Street to Esplanade; the Third District was the

^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1869, pp. 5-6,
30; Annual Report of the Board of Health, to the General
Assembly of Louisiana .
187^~(New Orleans, 1871), pp. 6 ,
67.
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area below Esplanade; and the Fourth District (the former
city of Lafayette) was adjacent to the First, above Felicity
Street.

All except the Fourth District extended from the

Mississippi back to Lake Pontchartrain.

In 1870 the Algiers

area on the right bank of the river became the Fifth Dis
trict, and the city of Jefferson, or Jefferson City, was
annexed to New Orleans and became the Sixth District.

The

Sixth District constituted the part of New Orleans above
Toledano Street as far as the city of Carrollton.

Like the

Fourth District, the Sixth extended back from the Mississippi
to the lower limits of Carrollton, a city of considerable
area which blocked New Orleans' expansion westward and northpi

westward.

Carrollton was annexed in 1874 and was created

into the Seventh District,

The Seventh was a narrow district

between Upper Line Street and Lower Line Street, stretching
from the river to Lake Pontchartrain.

Lower Line became the

boundary between the new district and the Sixth.

25

These districts were primarily political, but in 1866,
when New Orleans consisted of only four districts, the
health ordinance had provided an inspector for each.

In

^ A c t s passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the Third Session o t the First Legislature
. . . and at the Extra Session . . * 1870 (New Orleans,
1870), ex. sess., Act No. 7» PP« 3-31.
^ A c t s passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the Second Session of the Third Legislature
. . . 1874 (New Orleans, 1874)> Act No. 71, p. 19; Annual
Report of the Board of Health of the State of Louisiana to
the General Assembly^or the Year 1^77 (New Orleans, 1^7"§T,
p. 114.
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1870, as part of a very important measure bearing the cap

tion,

"An Act to amend an act entitled 'An Act to establish

Quarantine for the protection of the State,'" the Louisiana
Legislature officially confirmed this policy.

The new law

stipulated that the Board of Health should appoint Sanitary
Inspectors for each of the four New Orleans districts and
one each for Algiers and Jefferson City> which almost imme
diately became the Fifth and Sixth Districts of New O r l e a n s . ^
The Inspectors were to receive a salary not exceeding twentyfour hundred dollars, which was to be paid them by the city.

27

During succeeding years these district Health Officers usu
ally received two thousand dollars, marking an increase of
five hundred dollars over the salary granted them prior to
the act of 1&70.

They were invariably members of the medi

cal profession, although the law did not require it.
The 1B70 amendment to the Quarantine Act of 1$55 en
hanced considerably the powers of the State Board of Health.
Many of the Board's original powers were enumerated again,
and four additions are worthy of note.

The most important

of these permitted the Board to pass and enforce sanitary
ordinances for the city of New Orleans.

Previously, all

ordinances sponsored by the Board were required to have the

26The act creating the Seventh District stated that
this new political unit was to have a Sanitary Inspector with
the same powers, duties, and salary as the other Inspectors.
Acts passed . . . at the Second Session of the Third Legis
lature . . . 1#74» Act No. 71> P» 221.
2?Acts passed . . . at the Extra Session . . . 1^70,
Act No. 7» p. 31; Act No. 14* p. 55.

'
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approval of the Council.

Secondly, the Board of Health was

granted power to sue in any civil court for the collection
of fines.

A third significant provision declared that those

responsible for keeping the streets clean, notably the Street
Commissioner and Street Contractor, were to be held personally
liable for refusal to obey ”any necessary .sanitary order or
ordinance” of the Board of Health.

Fourth, the Board was

granted control of the sanitary police, and in the event of
an epidemic, could call upon the Board of Metropolitan Po-

25

lice for additional help. '

While the act of 1570 was cer

tainly not all that health authorities might have aesired,
the position of the Board of Health in attempting to effect
sanitation in the Crescent City was materially improved.
The Board told the Legislature at the end of the year that
the act had ’’greatly increased its labor, its opportunities
for benefitting the community, its r e s p o n s i b i l i t y h a s some
what increased its necessary expenditures, ana has immensely
increased the amount of sanitary service accomplished.”^^
The Board of Health continued to have trouble with the
New Orleans City Council.

To the usual difficulties involv

ing the enforcement of sanitary regulations, political dif
ferences were sometimes added.

The denunciations of the

Council by the Board of Health tended to be rather bitter
during the years after the war.

The Board won a significant

2^Ibid., pp. 54-56.
29fieport of the Board of Health . . . 1570, p. 6 .
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victory in 1370 v/hen the Legislature granted it power to
issue its own ordinances.

One of the factors probably m o

tivating the state lawmakers to enact this provision was
the appeal made by Dr. White in his 1369 Report:
The Common Council of New Orleans . . .
entertain a pleasingly favorable opinion of
their own capacity judiciously to use power,
and wisely to enact laws on all matters,
those of hygiene included, but are unwill
ing to trust the direction of sanitary
matters to a body, fairly representing the
interests of the community, and most of
whom by education and experience may in
sanitary matters be classed as experts.
The gross neglect of the health and
life of the people shown by the Common
Council of New Orleans (with some honor
able personal exceptions) makes it evi
dent that the power to pass and enforce
sanitary regulations for New Orleans
should be confided to the Board of Health
as the only means of securing prompt and
intelligent and therefore effectual care
of the public health.30
The cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever scourges con
tinued.

The final cholera outbreak occurred in 1373, but

the latter two diseases assailed New Orleans nearly every
year during the seventies.

The yellow fever epidemic of

1373 took an exceedingly heavy toll of lives, although until
that time, smallpox was the malady which seemed to attract
the most attention.

Mortuary statistics taken from Board

of Health Reports are revealing:

In 1370, 537 deaths from

smallpox were recorded in New Orleans; in 1371, only 2; in
1372, 40; in 1373, 505; in 1374, 605; in 1375, 342; in 1377,

3^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1369, pp. 7-3.
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1 ,099 ; and in 137$ smallpox killed a total of 151 persons
in New Orleans . ^

Each of the annual Board of Health Re

ports during this era contained a discussion of the extent
to which yellow fever and smallpox had prevailed during the
preceding year.

Another section of the Reports was devoted

to a discussion of the supposed origin of yellow fever, its
mode of transmission, and measures taken by the Board of
Health to prevent its spread.

As it was recognized by health

authorities that smallpox had become a preventable malady,
the Board repeatedly recommended to the Legislature the
enactment of laws providing free and compulsory vaccina-

32
tion.-3*
Overoptimism wiuh regard to general health conditions
in New Orleans remained a serious problem for the Board of
Health.

The Board found that reform came slowly when pop

ular fear and dismay were lacking.

New Orleanians had for

decades been self-conscious of their city’s reputation for
insalubrity, and now, as before, they seemed more anxious to
combat outside criticism than to support the Board of Health
in its public health program.

The newspapers, as might have

been expected, were among the Board’s most persistent antag
onists.

They were unwilling to admit that the Crescent City

3^-No figure is given for 1376 because no Board of
Health Report was issued in that year.
32jyiore detail pertaining to vaccination will be
found in chapter VIII.
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was unhealthy,

although they certainly did not express any

doubt that it was filthy.

The editor of the Pi c a y u n e ,

scanning the 1373 Board of Health Report,

confessed that

one o f his purposes was to discover "our real advantage
. . . over other large cities of the Union."
the Report that cholera,

He noted from

smallpox, and yellow fever had

brought the death toll to nearly a thousand in New Orleans
during 1373) but he felt that in a population of 200,000
this mortality should be considered very small.

The edi

torial concluded with the hope that the continued health
of New Orleans would "prove to strangers our advantages over
other climes.

33

Evidently the 200,000 population estimate of the Pic
ayune was conservative,

because Dr. Chaille', an excellent

statistician, placed the probable figure at from 210,000
to 215,000,

although the annexation of Carrollton

6,495) intervened between the two estimates.

(pop.

Chaille^em

phasized in a number of articles the importance of accurate
census figures, because the usual tendency was to exaggerate
the city’s population.

One of the evils caused by these ex

aggerations, he maintained, was the resulting under-estima
tions of the death rate, which in turn produced failure to
OI
understand the true sanitary condition of New Orleans.

33p icayune, March 10, 1374*
^ S t a n f o r d E. Chaille', "The Vital Statistics of N ew
Orleans, from 1769 to 1374)" N e w Orleans Medical and Surgical
Journal, n.s., II (1374-75)> 4 f S.

Dr. C. B. White, State Health Officer from 1868 until
1876, persistently urged the Legislature to entrust the
Board of Health with the registry of vital statistics.

The

1872 Board of Health Report recommended that nthe duties of
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths in the parish
of Orleans, be made, by enactment, a part of the duties of
the Board of Health, and that the fees exacted for this
registration, go to its general support; thus relieving the
State of an unnecessary burden of several thousand dollars
a year."

The Report recommended further that the Board be

made ex-officio State Registrar of Vital Statistics.35
the 1873 Report White informed state lawmakers that the
Board’s financial difficulties would be considerably lessened
if it were granted the fees collected for registration of
births, deaths, and marriages in Orleans Parish.

He pointed

to the importance of compiling truly accurate vital statis
tics, because these statistics, he said, were "the foundation
of the science of H y g i e n e . E a r l y

in 1874 the Board d i 

rected a communication to Governor William P. Kellogg, in
forming him that fees derived from the registry of vital
statistics would go a long way toward helping finance the

^^Annual Report of the Board of Health, to the
General Assembly of Louisiana . . . T§72"'(New Orleans,
1373 J, pT~5j:
3 6Annual Report of the Board of Health, to the
General Assembly of Louisiana . . . 1§73 (Mew Orleans,
1874), p. 1 0 .
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state health organization.^7

A letter to the Picayune from

"X" supported the Board*s position by pointing out that the
fifteen dollars a day collected by the Registrar would pro
vide income for the Board of Health which otherwise would
come out of the state treasury.

33

Not until 1377 did the General Assembly transfer the
registry from the Parish Recorder to the Board of Health.
The President of the Board, as provided in an important
1377 law, was made ex-officio recorder of births, deaths,
and marriages for Orleans Parish, and he, in turn, was under
the general direction and control of the Board as a whole.
All fees collected were to go to the Board.

The new law de

clared that all births and deaths were to be reported to the
office of the Board of Health within twenty-four hours.

The

Board was also to be notified of all marriages by the "offi
cer, priest, or ecclesiastic" performing the ceremony.

The

fee for recording births and deaths was set at fifty cents,
and the fee for recording marriages was to be one dollar.^9
Dr. White, in the 1373 Board of Health Report, and Dr.
Samuel Choppin, in the 1377 Report, called upon the Legis
lature to create local boards of health.

White maintained

that there should be an organization of this type in all

3 7pjcayune, January 3, 1374.
3 ^Picayune, February 3, 1374.
39Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the First Session of the Fifth Legislature
. * • and at the Extra Session . . . 1877 (New Orleans,
1377), Act No7“30, pp. 119-20.
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incorporated towns and villages in Louisiana.

These local

boards, White continued, should be given power to secure the
enforcement of sanitary ordinances and provide for the prompt
abatement of nuisances injurious to health.

Furthermore,

suggested White, they could be prepared to take action
should there be an impending epidemic.

White contemplated

that the local boards of health would provide an ample supply
of pure and fresh vaccine virus between November 1 and May
31, and furnish gratuitous vaccinations.^

Four years later,

after the Legislature had granted the State Board of Health
the registry of vital statistics in Orleans Parish, Samuel
Choppin, who was then Board President,

recommended the in

stituting of local boards in the country parishes to. keep
records of births, deaths, and marriages.

These Boards

should also, thought Choppin, be empowered to promote san
itation in their respective areas, especially by offering
free vaccination to all.

He stated that it might be feasi

ble to constitute the police jury of each parish as its
board of health, with the condition that a "suitable medi
cal man" be elected secretary, executive officer, and reg
istrar of vital statistics.

All statistics so obtained

would be reported each month to the State Boara in New O r
leans.^

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1&7?, pp. 12-13.
^ -Report of the Board of Health

. . . 1&77» p. 17.
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In 1882 the Legislature responded by passing,

"An Act

To provide for the organization of local boards of health
in the State of Louisiana."

The municipal authorities of

all incorporated towns were authorized to constitute them
selves local boards of health with power to pass ordinances
for the prevention of contagious disease, to abate nuisances
dangerous to the public health, to regulate drainage and
ventilation for all buildings, and to record vital statistics.
These boards of health were required to choose registered
physicians as health officers.

The police jury In each par

ish was empowered to constitute itself a board of health for
the parish, with powers identical to those granted to the
IO
municipal boards.
After 1871 W hite’s greatest problem in his post as
State Health Officer was the mounting indebtedness of the
Board of Health.

For the first time since the war the

Board was'solvent in 1870 as a result of the $25,000 which
had been appropriated to it by the state Legislature in
1869 and 1B70.

At the end of 1871 the Board was again in

debt, but only by about $1,800.

This indebtedness White

blamed on a "cyclone" which did $ 2,500 worth of damage to
Mississippi S t a t i o n . ^

Dr. S. C. Russell, the Secretary

^ A c t s passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the Regular Session . ! . 1882- ("Baton Rouge,
1382), Act No. 92, p. 114.
^ Annual Report of the Board of Health to the Gen
eral Assembly of Louisiana . . . 1871~T N e w Orleans, I 872 ),
p p . 9, 106-107.
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and Treasurer during the Republican era, reported at the
end of 1372 that the Board’s debt had risen to more than
$5,000, with the prospect of its becoming much g r e a t e r . ^
White noted in the 1373 Report that the debt had risen to
$6,200, and he asserted that if the Board had had enough
money to provide house-to-house vaccinations, the smallpox
epidemic which took the lives of more than five hundred
persons in New Orleans could have been prevented.

45

Still greater attention was given to the unfavorable
fiscal status of the Board of Health in the 1374 Report.
White informed the Legislature that the Board’s debt was
$10,000, and an appropriation of $26,000 was necessary to
support the Board and the quarantine during 1375.

This

situation had been caused, he said, by the "deficient ap
propriation’’ of 1373i and the failure of the 1374 General
Assembly (Legislature) to make any appropriation at all.
Furthermore, White declared, the operating expenses of the
Board of Health had gone up since 1369, whereas receipts at
Mississippi Station, its chief source of income, had fallen
off from $25>00u to $19,000.

He mentioned that the Board

had been deprived of $2,600 because certain New York steam
ship proprietors had succeeded in obtaining an injunction
from a federal court forbidding the collection of quarantine
dues from their vessels.

Another factor contributing to the

44Report of the Board of Health . . . 1372, p. 139.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1373, p. 10.
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Board's financial plight, asserted the Report, was the in
creasing number of services rendered to the public.

Prior

to 1370, it contended, the Board of Health had performed
fewer functions:
made;

no meteorological observations had been

no extended or systematic recording of the facts of

epidemi.cs had been done;

tinere

had been no laboratory work;

no vaccine had been furnished to physicians; no purchase of
scientific instruments had been made; and there had been no
house-to-house inspections.

Dr. White told the Legislature

that unless financial aid was forthcoming, the entire quarin
antine system was threatened with immediate dissolution.
The General Assembly finally relented, and in 1375
appropriated $24,000 ,rfor the maintenance of health and
qua rant i n e .

However, the Board was able to get its

money only in installments, and debts could not be paid
fast enough.

At a special meeting held April 27, 1375» a

declaration was made that no funds existed for the main
tenance of quarantine, and after June 1 the quarantine would
have to be entirely abandoned.

49

A few days later Dr. White

^ I t is true that the annual Reports from 1366 to
1369 contained no meteorological information, but the pre
war Reports did.
^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1374, pp. 1,

14-16.
^ Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana, at the First Session of the Fourth Legislature
. . . and at the Extra Session . . . 1375 (New Orleans,
1375), P. ^5.
49

Picayune, April 23, 1375.
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wrote an official letter to Governor Kellogg describing the
financial plight of the State Board of Health and the reasons
why it had gotten so deeply into debt.

.The most serious im

mediate problem was the rapid diminution of revenue from
quarantine dues during the first four months of 1$75.

White

pointed out that the Board's total receipts for April, 1&74
had been $2,000 as compared to $400 for April, 1&75.

Kellogg

was informed that if the quarantine were to be continued,
inspection fees would not meet one-fourth of the Board’s
current expenses.

White expressed his fear that the $24,000

appropriation would prove to be insufficient.

He complained

that the Legislature had not yet given the Board of Health
the expected registration of vital statistics (which would
have provided a substantial income).

White reported to

Kellogg the Board’s decision that the quarantine could no
longer be maintained after June 1.

The Resident Physicians

.

at the Atchafalaya and Rigolets Stations had not received
their 1S74 salaries, White stated; the boatmen and employees
had not been paid since January; and the President and Sec
retary of the Board had not collected their salaries during
the past year.

In desperation White told the Governor that

the Board of Health could ”no longer be held responsible in
any degree for the general health of the city, and especially
its freedom from epidemic; and therefore it formally and
officially declares to your Excellency its irresponsibility.”^

5°C. B. White
Orleans, May 1, 1&75,
Department, Louisiana
Mss., Louisiana State

to Governor William P. Kellogg, New
in Governors’ Correspondence, Executive
State Archives, Department of Archives
University.
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The twenty-four thousand eased the situation, but the
problem was still serious because the Board continued to
operate at a substantial deficit.

During a meeting held

March 24, 1$76 White told the other members that because the
1B76 Legislature had failed to appropriate additional funds
for the support of the Board of Health, the continued ex
istence of the Board was very much in doubt unless the Gov
ernor acted quickly to raise money.

A resolution was adopted

requesting White to present Governor Kellogg a statement of
the Board*s financial condition along with a recommendation
that he place under its direction the registration of vital
statistics and the inspection of meats.

51

The forecasts of the impending doom of the State Board
of Health made by its members were aimed primarily at be
stirring state officials to take action toward providing
financial assistance.

There is no evidence that the quaran

tine or other services performed by the Board were curtailed
at any time.

No Board of Health Report was issued at the end

of IG 76 , but the 1$77 Report revealed an indebtedness of
nearly eight thousand dollars still extant.

By this time,

however, help had come, and the Board was deriving income
from the registration of vital statistics and the inspection
of coal oils to protect the public from explosions.

Dr.

Choppin, the new State Health Officer, manifested concern

^ Picayune, March 25, 1&76.
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over the debt, but the crisis had been successfully p a s s e d . ^
Of the services performed by the Board of Health, the
maintenance of the quarantine continued to attract the most
attention.

Although the quarantine was presumably operated

in the public interest, a general belief existed among New
Orleanians that this institution should be self-supporting.
But with the declining receipts from quarantine fees, the
three stations found it increasingly difficult to make their
books balance.

The Quarantine Act of 18$5 stipulated that

the Resident Physician at Mississippi Station should receive
a salary of $5,000 and the Assistant Physician, $2,000, so
those expenses necessarily remained constant.
was exhibited elsewhere, however.

For example,

Rigid economy
the salary

received by the Resident Physician at Rigolets Station in
1870 for four and one-half months service had been $ 1,390
(ten dollars per d a y ) ; the Resident Physician at Atchafalaya
Station

53

had received $300 per month for six months.

By

1874 their total yearly salaries had dropped to $$00 and

$900 respectively; in 1875 their pay was down to only $400
and $ 6 0 0 . ^

These two stations were operated only during

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health
139-40, 1 4 ^ 7 ^

. . . 1877» pp. 20,

^ D u r i n g the early seventies this quarantine station
was often referred to as Brashear Station, Brashear being the
port near which it was located.
After 1876, when the name
Brashear was changed by the Legislature to Morgan City, the
official title, Atchafalaya Station, was once again the com
mon designation.
^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1870 » p. 70;
Report oi1 the Board of Health , . . l874> 68-70; Report of
the Board of Health . . . 1875, p* 75.
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the warm months, and very few vessels were inspected.

Grant

ing this, it is still difficult to understand how competent
physicians could be obtained at salaries so unbelievably low.
The year 1876 brought the termination of Republican con
trol of the Board of Health.

At the annual organizational

meeting held in April, Dr. Felix D. Gaudet was elected State
Health Officer by a five-to-four vote, upsetting the incum
bent, Dr. White.

For eight years the Board had been com

prised of six Republicans appointed by the Governor, and
three Democrats chosen by the New Orleans City Council.

For

some undisclosed reason, in April, I 876 two of the Republi
can members, Alfred Shaw and Dr. William H. Hire, decided
to vote with the Democrats and elect Gaudet the new Presi
dent of the Board of Health and Dr. Y. R. Lemonnier, another
Democrat, the Secretary and Treasurer.
means the end of it.

But that was by no

Dr. White was unwilling to accept his

defeat, and sought to use his political influence to void
the election.
Governor Kellogg removed the two renegade Republicans
from the Board, and replaced thei7i with Drs. S. C. Russell
and G. W. Lewis, who were more to White’s liking.

This

change was made, it was alleged, because Shaw and Hire had
failed to take the oath required of all Board members to
support the quarantine system.

White and most of the others

had not taken this oath for years, but now the letter of the
law was to be observed.

Gaudet, Lemonnier, and Dr. J. F.

Finney, the Democrats, quickly took the oath.

White, however,
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maintained that the April election had not been valid be
cause at the time it was held not all of the Board members
had been duly qualified and commissioned.

Those alleged to

have been improperly elected included Gaudet, Lemonnier,
and the seven Sanitary Inspectors.
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At a Board meeting

held in May Russell and Lewis were seated as Board members
to fill the vacancies created by the absense of Shaw and
Hire.

White was then re-elected President and Russell was

re-elected Secretary and Treasurer.

Seven Sanitary Inspec

tors were also chosen, making a full complement of two men
who claimed to have been duly elected to each of the nine
r£
positionso
Both the Picayune and the Democrat lambasted White for
having perpetrated this high-handed maneuver.

Neither paper

could understand why Dr. White was so determined to retain
a $2j00-a-year job, unless he also received some undisclosed
income.

The Democrat mentioned that accusations of graft

had been made, but nothing had been proven.
declared:

The Picayune

"There must be something of profound considera

tion in the offices attached to the Board; otherwise so
lame an excuse for revolutionizing the former election would
not have been a t t e m p t e d . I n all probability the innuendos

^^New Orleans Democrat, May 5, 1576; Picayune, April
27, 1576.
^ Democrat, May 6, 1576; Picayune, May 6, 1576
£~afternoon ed._/.
_
^ D e m o c r a t , May 5, 1576; Picayune, May 6, 1576
[_ afternoon ed._/
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were misplaced, but it does appear strange that White, a
first rate public health official, should have clung so tena
ciously to an office providing relatively small remuneration.
White succeeded in getting an injunction against Gaudet
and Lemonnier enjoining them from "usurping” the positions
of President and Secretary.

Lemonnier, however, refused to

turn over the seal, the books, or anything else to White and
Russell.

Lemonnier steadfastly maintained that the entire

matter would have to be decided in court; White, at length,
agreed.

The decision went against White and Russell, their

case being dismissed and the injunction dissolved.

The

Court recognized Gaudet as President and Lemonnier as Sec
retary, and enjoined their predecessors not to interfere with
them in the performance of their duties.

At the June 3

Board of Health meeting, attended only by Republicans, White
announced that he had written to Dr. Gaudet informing him
that he and Russell proposed to relinquish their offices.
The other Board members still unwilling to surrender, would
not approve this action, and adopted a resolution instructing White to withdraw the proposition.

A quick solution

to the controversy did not appear likely, but before long
a compromise was found.

Drs. Lewis and Hire resigned, and

Messrs. H. Bonzano and Alfred Shaw were accepted as Board
members.

Governor Kellogg agreed to let Gaudet become

^Democrat, May 9, 31» 1376; Picayune, June 2, 4>

1376*
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President of the Board with the understanding that Russell
would be elected Secretary.

Most of the Republican members

were not satisfied, but the Court refused to hear an appeal
of its original decision, so very little could be done.

7

As a result of this disappointment, during the remainder of
the summer only three or four of the total membership of nine
usually attended the regular Board of Health meetings, the
Republicans often being absent.

It is unfortunate that in

all the confusion attending the political dispute, the Board
found it impossible to issue an annual Report for 1876.

The

eventual outcome was the complete reorganization of the
Board by the Legislature, with a one hundred per cent turn
over in its personnel.
In 1877 the Legislature passed, nAn Act to reorganize
and render more efficient the Board of Health of the State
of Louisiana

. . . ,,T commonly called act number eighty.

Its most significant provision (on the surface, at least)
was the extension of the term of Board members to four years,
wath four (instead of six) of the nine members appointed by
the Governor,

and the other five elected by the City Council

of New Orleans.

The President and Secretary were to be e-

lected by the other members in alternate years, and were to
receive salaries of twenty-four hundred dollars and two
thousand dollars respectively.

The act granted the Board

of Health authority to make all rules ana regulations

^ D e m o c r a t > June 10, 1876; Picayune, June 18, I 8 7 6 .
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regarding vaccination, but this provision was partiallyvitiated by including the condition that vaccination could
not be made compulsory.

Another provision granted the Board

power to incur, with the assent of the City Council', T,such
necessary and reasonable expense as occasion may warrant”
in protecting and preserving the salubrity of New Orleans.
These expenses were to be paid by the city, but only when
they were within the budget appropriation of the Council.
The Board was required to forward each year to the Mayor
and Council an estimate of anticipated expenditures charge
able to the city of New Orleans.

The estimate was to in

clude the salaries and "reasonable expenses" of the Sanitary

60

Inspectors.

The 1&77 act prescribed a very unusual procedure:
Every year the Board of Health would be compelled to submit
to the City Council a detailed statement of all income dur
ing the preceding year and an estimate of its probable in
come for the ensuing year; if the Board’s income for any
year should exceed its expenditures, the surplus was to be
paid to the city of New Orleans.

The remaining provisions

of the 1B77 act were concerned with clarifying the respon
sibility of the New Orleans police to assist the Board of
Health, clarifying the Board’s power to enforce the quaran
tine, and granting to the Board the long-sought registry

^ A c t s passed . . . ah the Extra Session . . . 1&77,
Act No. BO, pp. 117-lB.
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of vital statistics.^
As might have been expected, the Board of Health was
not entirely satisfied with this reorganization.

Dr. Samuel

Choppin, who became Board President in 1 8 7 7 remarked in
his annual Report that in effect the new act gave the City
Council control over the Board’s expenditures, and hence,
its operations as well.

The Council was placed in a posi

tion to thwart the entire sanitation program in New Orleans
by failure to budget its money wisely.

It had been given

concurrent jurisdiction, said Choppin, over such things as
the purchase of disinfectants, the salaries of the Sanitary
Inspectors and the sanitary police, the rent on the offices
of the Inspectors, and even the Board’s stationery.^

Choppin

^ Ib id . , pp. 118-20.
^^choppin, it will be remembered, had also been the
first State Health Officer, 1855-56.
^^This question was settled in 1885 by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
A lawsuit resulted from an attempt by the
Board of Health to appoint Sanitary Inspectors and sanitary
police for New Orleans at salaries in excess of those provid
ed in the appropriation made by the City Council.
The city,
refusing to pay the salaries, maintained that its charter
empowered the Council to fix the compensation of every offi
cer, both city and state, whose salary it must pay, and to
prescribe the number of officers.
The action taken by the
Board of Health was, according to the defendant, a deroga
tion of this right.
The Board relied on the act of 1877
which empowered it to protect the health of New Orleans,
but the Court noted that the same act stipulated that the
Board could incur expense only with the assent and concur
rence of the Council.
The Board lost its case.
The State
ex. rel. Board of Health v. City of New Orleans et als.,
37 La. Ann. 894 > Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in
the Supreme Court of Louisiana . .
Book 44> pp. 571-72.
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also acknowledged displeasure regarding the action of one
of the legislative branches in striking from the bill before
its passage a section which would have empowered the Board
of Health to prosecute violations of sanitary ordinances
ir: criminal courts as misdemeanors punishable by fine or
imprisonment.

Furthermore, he declared,

hog Orleans should

not have been granted a majority of the representation on
the Board of nea1t h.

Choppin reminded the Legislature that

the origin.a] tb:-ory of its formation was to pa bo it a 3tr 1 e
-o~-rd

bhr city of New Orleans havin^ been allowed .special

re- re

.jta tion 1 n consideration o p its m e a t commercial in

terests.0^"

It did seer s bit incongruous for a flute hoard

of nealth to have five of its nine members chosen by a City
Council.

^ lieport of the Board of Health . . „ 1377, pp. 13-19.

CHAPTER VIII
SANITARY OPERATIONS
The Louisiana Board of Health, though theoretically
responsible for the maintenance of public health throughout
the state, did very little in promoting sanitary reform out
side of New Orleans.

The sponsors of the Quarantine Act of

1&55 contemplated the Board’s function to be primarily the
administration of the quarantine,

but from the beginning

the Board of Health had partial responsibility for main
taining the cleanliness of New Orleans.

Periodically the

Legislature increased the powers of the Board and placed
additional officials and employees under its control, and
as a result, services rendered to New Orleanians tended to
be constantly increasing*
Filth per se was commonly regarded as a source of dis
ease, but there was a radical difference of opinion as to
whether it was the primary cause.

The germ theory of dis

ease was still in its formative stage, although it was rap
idly acquiring adherents.

Not until near the end of the

century was the fact definitely established that germs
caused disease— not disease in general, however, but a
myriad of specific diseases.

It was only then that miasma

(or miasm}, the supposed cause of much of the sickness, was
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proven

to be imaginary.

The result was a generalrealiza

tion that filth had to harbor a certain
order to perpetuate a d i s e a s e B u t
much later.

kind of germ in

this discovery came

In the 1374 Board of Health Report Dr. J. T.

Newman, Sanitary Inspector of New Orleans' Second District,
expressed his continued adherence to the miasma theory by
asserting, in words which could as well have been written
by Benjamin Rush:
Exhalations arising from marshes, low
shores of rivers, undrained yards, alleys
and privy vaults, constitute poisons of such
intensity, that it .produces fevers of dif
ferent types and severity. The last men
tioned places generate a poison
so highly
concentrated that animal life soon becomes
impaired when continuously exposed to its
influence.
The form and severity which
these emanations produce are in proportion
to the amount of moisture and the heat of
the sun's rays.
It is by a consideration
of the degrees of temperature that the
relation of different types of fever be
comes apparent.
A moist and calm state
of the atmosphere combined with excessive

•*-By 1379 the editor of the New Orleans Medical and
Surgical Journal had already heard enough of "the hullaba
loo that has been raised by heedless sanitarians about nox
ious effluvia, foul drinking water, offensive sewer gas,
and the exhalations of decaying animal and vegetable mat
ter." He cited the case of Dr. Rudol Emmerich, "one of
those redoubtable Germans who are always ready to sacrifice
themselves on the altar of science." Emmerich selected two
of the dirtiest open ditches in Munich, and proceeded to
drink a quart or more of their undiluted contents daily.
By chemical and microscopic examination of the water he
discovered that it contained fragments of garbage, dirty
rags, hairs of men and beasts, and particles of fecal mat
ter.
After a month of drinking this .,:ost undesirable bev
erage, Emmerich was as well as ever. He then persuaded two
of his patients to imbibe that same concoction; they also
suffered no ill effects. Emmerich concluded that "the use
of the most foul and putrid drinking water produces no in
jurious result on the system in health." New Orleans Med
ical and Surgical J o u r n a l n.s., VII (1379-30), 430-31.
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heat, I have noticed are always favorable
to an outbreak of epidemic fevers.2
It was probably a good thing that many New Orleanians sub
scribed to this belief.

It seems very doubtful that there

would have been any serious effort at all to clean New Or
leans merely for aesthetic reasons.
During the weekly and monthly Board of Health meetings
and in the annual Reports the Sanitary Inspectors described
sanitary conditions in their respective districts.

Some

times these district reports were rather brief, but often
they were long and detailed,

especially in the yearly sum-

marizations which were included as part of the Board of
Health Report to the Legislature.

Among the problems dis

cussed were the cleanliness of the district, the extent of
sanitary operations, the merits of disinfection, the best
method of disposing of the contents of privies, the proper
location for slaughterhouses, proposals for an improved
drainage system, overcrowding in the public schools, and
the willingness of many individuals,
to submit to vaccination.

especially Negroes,

Fortunately,

interest in these

matters was not confined to state health officials.

Within

the medical profession there was an ever greater tendency
to assume responsibility for public health, and New Orleans
newspapers were as anxious as ever to see their city clean
and healthy.

The state Legislature, whether under Republican

^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&74, pp. 91-92.
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or Democratic domination, showed on occasions that it also
was not unaware of health problems.
The sanitary abuse attracting the most attention was
the deplorably filthy streets ana gutters.

This problem

was perennial, and one which no authority, either civil or
military,

had everbeen notably successful in solving.

The

Sanitary Inspectors were often dissatisfied with the general
condition

of their district, but usually they asserted that

the worst

nuisances had been abated.

Dr. F. B. Albers,

First District Inspector, reported that at the time he be
came Sanitary Inspector early in IB69 , streets, gutters,
yards, privy vaults, and many premises were in extremely
filthy condition.

According to a plan suggested by the

President of the Board of Health, a thorough inspection
program was carried out.

"By the first day of July,” Albers

declared, "the entire First District had been thoroughly
inspected and cleaned, and its healthy condition can be, in
a great measure, attributed to the efficient manner in which
it has been done."

3

Not so enthusiastic was Dr, Gustavus Devron, Sanitary
Inspector of the Third District in 1$75, who expressed his
regret that the old method of cleaning gutters persisted.
The contents of the gutters were thrown into the middle of
the street, Devron declared, "there to dry or to be washed

^Report of the Board of Health . . , IB6 9 , p. IS.
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back into the gutters by the next rain."^

In 1873 Dr. Joseph

Holt, reporting on the Fourth District, described its sani
tary condition as "excessively bad."

This was caused, he

said, by the absolute negligence of city authorities and
their employees, the continual dumping of garbage into the
streets, the filling of lots with waste from the dumping
ground, and finally, the failure to have the District prop5
erly cleaned by sanitary engineering.
These matters also
drew comment from State Health Officers.

White spoke in

18?0 of the "very filthy condition of the streets," and
Choppin, in 1878, expressed disapprobation regarding the
£

custom of using kitchen garbage to fill in streets and lots.
Picayune persistently advocated that the Mayor and
Administrators utilize the city’s water supply in cleaning
streets and gutters.

An 1871 editorial entitled, "Wash Out

the Gutters," claimed that New Orleans' back streets were
"very offensive to the eyes and exceedingly offensive to
the nostrils and lungs."

This condition could be remedied,

thought the editor, by opening the street hydrants regular
ly and often, thereby permitting decayed and offensive mat
ter to be swept away from the gutters at least once each
night.

A few days later the Picayune complained about the

^Report of

the Board of Health .

. .1875>

p. 139.

^Report of

the Board of Health .

. .1878,

p. 86,

^Report of
the Board of Health . . .1870,
Report of the Board of Health ."I . 1878, p. 15.

p .43;
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spasmodic attempts made in the past to wash a few gutters
and scatter a disinfectant once or twice a season.

There

had been no thorough, systematic, intelligent performance
7
of duty by city officials,,
The following May the same
newspaper carried an editorial bearing the caption "Flush
the Streets," with the sub-title,
ease."

"Foulness Generates Dis

Despite the presence of "the incubating season of

pestilence and disease," the editor complained, the Admin
istrator of Improvements could noi be incited to perform
his most responsible duties.

It seemed a crime, he contin

ued, that "with the mightiest river on the continent flowing
at our feet, whose cleansing waters could daily wash away
the ordinary offal of London and Paris combined, we still
sicken and die for the want of its purifying presence."
A week later the Picayune proclaimed:

"All the distin

guished authorities upon the questions of sanitary reform
are agreed t h a t 'the most efficient antidote for purposes
of disinfection is simply pure water."

Water, it seemed,

was the great purifier which would solve the city’s "hygi
enic complications."

The plea of economy was mere mockery,

averred the editor, because the cost of a single epidemic
on the population, the commerce, and the industry of New
Orleans would be more than quadruple the most liberal

?P icayune, September 16, 19> 1&71.
^Ibid., May 3, 1372.
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expenditures that could be made in cleaning the city.^
Shortly thereafter, Dr. White wrote to the Mayor sup
porting the contention of the Picayune:

"The Board of

Health earnestly recommend that whatever else be left un
done, the street gutters be flushed every second night with
large quantities of water . . .

so managed as to keep every

gutter running full of water for at least thirty minutes."
Dramatically the Picayune announced:

"Let the water plugs

be opened, let the streets be drenched, and let the seeds
of pestilence be washed away from our doors!"
nately it was not that easy.

10

Unfortu

Five years later the follow

ing comment appeared in a Picayune editorial:
It cannot be an impossibility, with a
great river rolling by our doors, to keep
these open drains at least partially cleansed
with a regular supply of fresh water.
But,
year after year, the evil continues, and with
returning summer, different localities of
the cit}'- reek with a nauseous and poisonous
atmosphere, as the contents of the foul
ditches swelter under tlie hot sun, breeding
wretchedness and disease. ^
Probably the most extensive functions performed by the Board
of Health during the post-Civil War years were those connect
ed with disinfection.

Everything which might possibly breed

disease was disinfected:

ships, houses, streets, gutters,

clothing, furniture, privies, and so on.

9lbid., May 9, 1^72.
10Ibid., May 19, 1S72.
n lbid., July 16, 1&77.

There seemed to be
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wide agreement, within the medical profession at least,
that disinfectants could prevent the spread of disease.
Each Board of Health Report contained a great deal of in
formation about disinfection procedures employed by the
Board in striving to avert epidemics of yellow fever, small
pox, and other maladies.

Interestingly enough, health offi

cials did not agree on the purpose of disinfection.

Those

tenaciously adhering to the theory that miasma produced
sickness and the ever-increasing number of physicians who
placed' the responsibility for disease on germs were at log
gerheads on most issues, but regarding one matter they were
in general accord:

disinfectants could be found to prevent

epidemics.
The difference of opinion with respect to the purpose
of disinfecting was clearly revealed in the Board's annual
Report for 1372.

Dr. C. B. White, the Board President,

directed attention to a circular issued by the Board of
Health to the citizens of Louisiana advocating the use of
disinfectants and deodorants during the summer months.

In

the circular 'White evaluated the relative merits of various
chemicals employed in disinfecting and deodorizing.

The very

fact White was so concerned about the effect of noxious odors
upon public health indicates clearly that he believed in the
death-dealing powers of miasma.
stating:

The circular concluded by

"The Board of Health consider the destruction of

these foul odors from gutters and privies, as a matter of
the greatest sanitary importance, and urges upon every
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householder immediately to use the means herein recommended,
to free himself and family from the noxious influence of

12
these ill-smelling, unwholesome exhalations.”

Dr. Alfred

W. Perry, writing in the same Report, asserted:

”Our sys

tem of disinfection is based on the propositions, 1st. That
yellow fever is produced by an organic living germ.
That it is portable in ships, cars, clothing,

etc.

2nd.
3rd.

That it is solid and not readily diffused through the air,
but sticks to solid bodies.”

Perry discussed further the

methods of destroying organic g e r m s . ^
An excellent concise account of the Board’s disin
fecting and fumigating operations was recorded by one of
the Sanitary Inspectors in the annual Report for the epi
demic year 1B7#:
Disinfection with carbolic acid was
commenced with the first case of yellow
fever, and the acid, diluted with five
times its bulk of water, was applied to
the squares containing the cases of yellow
fever--every yard, privy vault, and alley
receiving a supply.
In all, lj?66 premises
were disinfected, and the streets around
eighty squares were sprinkled with carbolic
acid (ten per cent, solution).
In applying
the acid to the streets, the time of appli
cation was late in the evening.
The hand
sprinkling was done in the day time.
Not
withstanding the thorough application,
there was no abatement of the fever, and
on August 14th it was discontinued.
From
that time until the close of the epidemic
the Board of Health turned its attention
to fumigation, and the rooms where yellow
fever occurred were subjected to the fumes
of burning sulphur. About five pounds were

•^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&72, pp. 51-54.
-^I b i d ., pp. 95-96.

burned in an ordinary-si zed room.
The
clothing and bedding of the sick were
sprinkled with pure carbolic acid,
fumigated with sulphur and boiled, the
matresses /~sic J
destroyed or made
over.
The great yellow fever epidemic of 1S7£ shook the faith of
some disinfection enthusiasts, but despite failure to avert
the spread of disease, disinfecting and fumigating opera
tions were continued, apparently without noticeable abate
ment .
In lB$4 the Board of Health produced a circular primarily

on disinfection which was sent to physicians throughout the
state of Louisiana.

The circular declared that diseases

communicable "of their own infection or contagion are to be
regarded and treated as enemies to be resisted and stamped
out."

Isolation, cleanliness, and the use of disinfectants

were evidently envisioned as the means whereby this goal
might be attained.

A special kind of disinfecting procedure

was prescribed for infected clothing; another for patients’
discharges; another for patients’ bodies; another for houses
and apartments; another for yards, stables, gutters, privies,
and so forth; and another for corpses.

15

An important facet of the work performed by New Orleans’
Sanitary Inspectors was the conducting of frequent inspec
tions.

A typical record was presented by Dr. Gustavus Devron

•^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 187S, p. 54.
. E. Hawkins Papers, 1$57-1929» Department of
Archives Mss., Louisiana State University.

of the Third District in the Board of Health Report for

1B75.

Devron inspected seventy-four hundred premises d u r 

ing the year,

securing rather extensive information about

general sanitary conditions.

His statistics revealed,

example, the number of houses with hydrants,
cisterns,

for

the number with

and the number with no water supply at all; they

shewed also the number of houses used as dwellings,
ber used as stores,

the num

and the number of vacant houses.

The

total number of rooms in the dwelling houses was recorded,
as well as the number of persons, white and Negro, occupying
those premises.
floors, roofs,

In addition, Devron noted the condition of
and privies in the buildings he inspected.

The report disclosed the average amount of cistern water
for each person in the seventy-four hundred premises,

the

average amount of water for each room, and the average num
ber of persons for each room.

Devron stated the number of

inspections made during the year; the number of nuisances
abated; the number of notices issued to empty,
repair,

and disinfect privy vaults;

rebuild,

the number of notices

to clean premises, to repair houses, to fill lots, to con
struct gutters,

and so on.

The number of yellow fever and

smallpox cases reported in the Third District during the
year was made public,
nated,

as was the number of persons vacci

and the number of street blocks disinfected with

carbolic acid.

This report and man y others indicate that

the Sanitary Inspectors were assiduous in performing their
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primary duties.

A problem which seemingly attracted too little atten
tion from the Board of Health was the common practice em
ployed by New Orleans markets of selling spoiled and
adulterated commodities.-^

Furthermore, Inspectors fre

quently found the markets to be disgracefully filthy.
Greater concern was manifested about these conditions in
l£66 than in the years following; evidently considerable
progress was being made.

Among the matters discussed at

Board meetings during the summer of 1S66 were "tainted
meat," "unripe and spoiled fruit," and "very bad flour."
In September one of the Inspectors reported that thirtytwo butchers in the Poydras Market had been arrested for
throwing offal about their stalls and not removing it when
required to do so by law.
was fined five dollars.

Each of the careless butchers
A month later the Sanitary Inspec

tor of the Second District reported condemning diseased
meat, and urged that the law against vending stale fish be

■^Report of the Board of Health . , . 1&7_5> PP*
141-42.
17

Adulteration was by no means a new problem.
An
18$2 editorial in DeBow’s Review condemned the adulteration
of "ardent spirits." DeBow asserted:
"Beer is not only
adulterated with unwholesome ingredients, by retail grocers,
but the brewers are in the habit of mixing up substances in
their enchanting caldrons that are revolting to think of."
He described the kind of adulteration used frequently in
brandy, gin, rum, wine, and other liquor. DeBow^s Review,
XIII (1852), 397-403.
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strictly enforced.

He previously had told the Board that

a regular trade confined solely to the sale of tainted meat
IS

was being carried on.

Not until 1550 did the Legislature

take cognizance of the danger and enact a statute to pro
scribe most of these abuses.

An act approved March, 1550

made it illegal to adulterate or to sell an adulterated
product.

The same law prohibited the sale of "tainted pro

visions or stale vegetables, or other articles of food, the
sane being in a condition of decomposition, or unfit for
food."

A further ban was placed on the slaughter and sale

of unhealthy livestock.*^
The French Market was often found to have contravened
good sanitary practices.

In 1574 a complaint was registered

by J . T. Newman, Sanitary Inspector of the Second District,
that the fish and shrimp houses "torture all the neighbors
with their odors."

His proposal was to move those houses

to a floating boat on the river,

"as decomposing fish is

the most air-poisoning matter known."
he remarked:

Three months later

"The only thing that keeps the market and

neighborhood healthy is a liberal supply of

d i s i n f e c t a n t s .

"20

In his yearly report Newman mentioned that "meats of a very
questionable character" had been sold in the French Market.

•^Crescent, August 29 j 1566; Picayune, September
19, 26, October 24) 1566.
i9Aets passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the Regular Session .
I l"5o0 TNew Orleans,
1350), Act- No. 237“ pp. 23-24.
^ P i c a y u n e , June 6, September 5j 1574.
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He said that he had compelled some butchers to throw away
meat they were trying to sell.

21

Newman’s efforts seem to

have been largely unavailing because he declared during the
following summer that the French Market had never been seen
more filthy.

22

Closely allied was the sanitary problem created by the
city’s slaughterhouses.

These establishments were apparently

very numerous along the river

f r o n t ,

23 and were regarded al

most universally as having an adverse effect upon the public
health.

Not only were complaints of noxious odors common,

but it was maintained that offal from the slaughterhouses
found its way into the river and made the city's drinking
water unhealthy and foul.

Most of the slaughterhouses were

located above the water works, seeming to lend credence to
this belief.

In 1B69 Louisiana’s Republican Legislature

passed an act which altered the situation radically.

The

privilege of slaughtering all the meat to be consumed in
Orleans and Jefferson Parishes was granted to a monopoly
corporation, The Crescent City Stock Landing and Slaughter
House Company.

Everyone else was prohibited from keeping

or slaughtering any cattle, sheep, or hogs in the parishes

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1§74> p* 96.
^ P i c a y u n e ,■ July 24, l$7i>.

23A ccording to the 1B69 Board of Health Report,
forty slaughterhouses were extant in the Fourth District
at the end of that year. Report of the Board of Health
. . . lBb9> p. 27.
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of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard.

The corporation

was required to locate its slaughterhouse at the lower
extremity of New Orleans or below.

The Governor was em

powered to appoint an inspector to examine all animals in
tended for slaughter in order to ascertain whether the meat
was fit for human consumption.^
New Orleans butchers and stock dealers were very re
luctant to remove themselves from the city, and according
to the Picayune, they tried to convince their fellow citi25

zens that dirt was healthy. '

Undouotedly the Legi sl at ur es

action in creating the monopolistic Slaughterhouse Company
was open to criticism because many small dealers were dea

prived of the means of making a living.

/

The Board of

Health, nevertheless, approved of this measure, and in 1870
the Hirst District Sanitary Inspector asserted that better
meats were sold in the markets after the new slaughterhouse
went into operation.

The reason given for the improvement

was the success enjoyed by the new "Inspector of Beeves,

^ A c t s passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the Second Session of the First Legislature
. . . 1869 I~New Orleans, 1869) > Act No. 118, p p . 170-72.
^ P i c a y u n e t December 26, 1869*

2&It should be noted that the question of the con
stitutionality of this monopoly went to the United States
Supreme Court in 1873.
The Court upheld the action of the
Louisiana Legislature by a vote of five to four.
The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, Cases Argued and Decided
in the Supreme Court of the United States (Rochester, New
York, I 920 ), Book 21, Law. Ed., pp. 394-442.
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etc." in not permitting the slaughter of diseased a n i m a l s . ^
Some years later Dr. Gustavus Devron, Sanitary Inspector
of the Third District, made a special report to the Board
of Health concerning the Slaughterhouse Company.

Devron

referred to the act of 1869, which had established the mo
nopoly, as a "sanitary measure."

"Frequent inspections of

the slaughterhouse buildings," he declared, "have proven
the desire of the superintendent to maintain the same in
a clean and proper condition, making the establishment not
only a proper and valuable public institution but a sani
tary one, as the law creating it had for a main object."
Dr. Devron presented statements from physicians and from
residents living in close proximity to the new slaughter
house, indicating that, to quote one of them, "its estab
lishment has added to the general health of the city of Dew
Orleans."

Devron concluded that the remarkable absense of

odor characteristic of the new establishment was made pos
sible by the large amount of water supplied by its own
pumps and its system of draining all nuisances into the
river.
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Dr. Choppin, the President of the Board of Health,
complained in the 1877 Report that the meat inspector
should not be a political appointee:

"The inspection of

stock at the slaughter-house below the city and of meats

27fte£ort ojT the Board of Health . . . 1870, p. 57.
^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . I87j>> pp.

247-53.
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intended for human consumption is a duty properly requiring
the supervision of the sanitary authorities, and should be
vested in the Board of Health.”

Only persons qualified

through education, Choppin maintained, could protect con
sumers from decomposed and abscessed meat.

The Legislature

was told by Choppin that inspection fees would relieve the
Board’s financial

d i f f i c u l t i e s .

^9

Privies constituted another health problem.

The usual

procedure was to allow excreta to collect in a privy vault
constructed of wood, iron, brick or other material, which
was buried in the back yard.

Whenever the vault became

full, the fecal matter was hauled away by T,nightmen,” socalled because they were hired to perform this odious task
at night.

Health authorities as well as other citizens

complained incessantly about the evils of the system,
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but they had difficulty in finding an adequate substitute.
Remembering that the majority of New Orleanians, both med
ical men and laymen, believed odors were injurious to
health,

it is little wonder that efforts were made to find

some less offensive method to dispose of "night-soil."
Typical recommendations were those of Dr. F. B. Albers,
First District Sanitary Inspector in l£69:

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1&77» p. 1$.
■^Note, for example, a letter from one D. J. Murray
which appeared in the Picayune during the summer of 1B69.
Murray complained that many of the privies were "filled to
overflowing” before the nightmen removed the waste.
He
described the privy system as "most pestilential." Pic
ayune, August 6, IS 69 .
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I would respectfully suggest that
the present system of disposing of the
contents of privy vaults by buckets and
night carts be abolished; and the latter
be made of iron or some other strong ma
terial, and be air tight, and so con
structed that the air would be exhausted,
by which means all that would be required
to fill a cart would be to turn a stop
cock, and the contents of the privy could
be transferred to the cart.
Should night
contractors also be required to disinfect
those places shortly before emptying them,
they might pursue their labors at all hours
of the day, and there would be no occasion
to poison the atmosphere of the city be
cause people are asleep and do not know
that the air reeks with disease-bearing
stench.33Sanitary Inspectors frequently mentioned the nuisance
of "defective privy vaults."

Constant rains sometimes

brought the contents of the vaults to the surface of the
ground, and there they remained.

Many vaults, particularly

the wooden ones, were rotten and completely useless.

The

soil was permitted to absorb the human excrement, or at
least the liquid portion, thus constituting a health haz
ard, especially if care had not been taken in properly
locating the privy vault.

In 1370 the Board of Health,

exercising a newly-acquired power, adopted an ordinance
stipulating that all privies built in the future had to
be walled with brick or stone, laid in cement its whole
depth, and constructed with a water-tight bottom.

The

vaults had to be buried in the ground at a specified depth,

33-Report of the Board of Health . . . 1369, pp.
13-19.
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and iher^ ^ 3

a prohibition a-sins! lcc.sit.in0, tnem close

to streets or buildings.

ine ordinance a .Iso stated that

whenever a privy was filled to within one loot of the
vault's surface,

or whenever an ofTicer of the Board of

Health .should so order,

the firivy would have to be emptied

within forty-eivht hours.

removals were to be made between

eleven o 1clock- p.m. anJ four o'clock a.m.,

and the contents

of the vault had tc be deodorised before the removal could
be made.

Another o rd in an ce , adopted about the same time,

required the disinfecting or deodorising of privies when
ever an order from health authorities was received by an
owner or tenant.-^
The problem was considerably altered in January,

1271,

when the state Legislature created another monopoly corpo
ration, this one for the removal of night soil.

The chanre

was accomplished by the pa scape of TTAn Act tc improve the
sanitary condition of the city of New Orleans,

and to ^rant

certain privileges to the Mew Orleans Sanitary and Ferti

lizing Company."

The preamble to the new law declared the

health of the people to be of "paramount importance,Tt and
stated ^further that "the soil of the city of Now Orleans
J_ w a 3_7 impregnated with noxious exc rem ent, poisonin'.' ’sells
and creatine exhalations injurious to life, health and com
fort, all of which originate JTd_J in the sinks and vaults

32
152-59.

heport of the Board of Health . . , 1272, pp.
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now in use."

The law forbade the construction of any more

privy vaults in New Orleans, and ordered the closing of
the ones in existence.

The New Orleans Sanitary and Ferti

lizing Company was given the exclusive right, for ten years,
to remove all fecal matter allowed to accumulate under the
operation of the ,TDry Earth System."

"Earth closets” with

movable vaults which could hold at least twenty gallons
were to be sold and rented by the company.

The company

could charge a maximum of one dollar for disinfecting and
removing the contents of the

vault.

The Picayune was outraged at the establishment of this
"odorous and obnoxious corporation.”

The editor maintained

that it was a "scheme . . . concocted to deplete the already
depleted pockets of the people of New Orleans."

A week later

the Picayune printed a letter from the company defending the
earth closet systein as an improvement added to the comfort
and health of New Orleanians.

The letter noted that Dr.

White, the State Health Officer, was one of the supporters
of the innovation,3^

No further criticism or commendation

of the company can be noted; evidently, the law was'not
enforced.
A similar corporation was chartered by the Louisiana

33Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the Tirst~~£ession oi1 the Secon5~Legislature
. . . l87l (New Orleans, 13*71), Act No. 102, pp. 16-17.
3^-Picayune, January 15 i 22, 1871.

Legislature in 1$74.

The New Orleans Sanitary Excavating

Company was given the "exclusive privilege," for twentyfive years, of cleaning and emptying privies in New Orleans.
Specific charges were listed for cleaning privy vaults,
based primarily upon the number of persons using them.

The

privies were to be cleaned only once a year unless the
33
Board of Health ordered otherwise. J

all well received.

The act was not at

The Picayune immediately denounced the

measure which created a "grand monopoly of night work,"
thereby depriving some of the cityTs Negro population of
their means of livelihood, and also establishing higher

charges.^

Dr. J. T. Newman remarked in the 1874 Board

of Health Report that the employees of the company had not
performed their duties well.

Their method of removing the

"boxes," Newman averred, was "a gross violation of all hy37

gienic principles."^'

A different opinion of the company

was manifested in the 1&75 Report.

According to Dr. White,

the introduction of an odorless apparatus for emptying
vaults was "one of the most important sanitary events of
the year and of the hygienic history of New Orleans."
asserted further:

He

"The system works perfectly, the

^ Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the First Session of the Second Legisla
ture . . . 1&74 (New Orleans, 1874*17 Act No. 46, pp. #3-36.
36pjLcayune» March 14, 1374.
3?Report of the Board of Health . . . 1#74* PP*
93-99.
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fearful nuisance of the old plan is abated, and the commu
nity universally and cordially commend the change.
bucket and cart system is forever abolished."32

The

Two years

later, however, with the Legislature once again under Dem
ocratic control, the monopoly was liquidated.
peting companies were quickly formed.

Eight com-

39

Despite the introduction and use of the new apparatus
for collecting accumulated fecal matter, the problem of
defective privy vaults remained.

Dr. Joseph Holt reported

that in his District (the Fourth) they constituted "the
greatest sanitary evil."

"The wooden work of these vaults

has long since decayed," he remarked, "leaving nothing but
a common sink or pit, which quickly fills with water in wet
weather, and overflows during a rain, flooding yards and
gutters with liquid o r d u r e . " ^

A year later Dr. Choppin

declared emphatically that privies were the most dangerous
enemies of the lives and happiness of Mew Orleanians.^
Hospitals and hotels had a far more difficult problem,
because they had to find some sanitary means to dispose of
great quantities of human waste accumulated in a short
length of time.

Charity Hospital had two large vaults

3 ^Report of the Board of Health . . . I275i pp.
32-39.

3^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1277 1 p. 10.
^QIbid., p. 71.
^-Report of the Board of Health . . . 1272, p. 27.
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situated on the hospital grounds which received the solid
portion of the excrement.

The liquid portion, however,

was allowed to run into open gutters on Gravier and Common
Streets,

Those same gutters were also filled with urine

from some of the city’s hotels.

The stench greeting res

idents of the area can well be imagined, but fortunately
this abuse was pretty well eliminated by 1&77.

Tiie St.

Charles hotel was the first of the large structures to find
a suitable means of disposing of its fecal matter.

It was

noted in the 1&7S Board of Health Report that a pipe had
been laid by the hotel connecting its vault with the river.
A force pump emptied the contents of the vault d a i l y . ^
Another matter of great importance to all New Orleanians
was that of drainage.
involved:

Two closely related problems were

First, the question persisted as to how the

streets and gutters of New Orleans could best be drained,
and second, it was commonly believed that if the swamps
in the rear of the city were drained, New Orleans would be
a much healthier place in which to live.

Beginning in 1B67

the Picayune carried numerous editorials advocating the
adoption by the city of a system of underground drainage
in order to "effectually prevent our sewerage from being,
as now, a source of disease."

New Orleans’ m any open

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1&75*
^9;
Report of the Board of Health . . • 1^77, p. 10; Report of
the BoarcT oT'Health . . . 18?B, p. 2 B ; Picayune, August T7>
TH77"
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ditches and canals, which carried refuse of all sorts into
Lake F'ontchartrain, had often been accused of being the
cause of pestilential visitations.

Draining hew Orleans

was simplified considerably by its topography, which in
general constituted an inclined plane sloping northward
from the river to the lake.

Metairie Ridge, skirting the

rear of tfte city, did provide some complications, however.
Though the Board of Health regarded drainage as a health
problem, formidable obstacles, which could be handled only
by engineers, prevented immediate progress.
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The City Council and the Chamber of Commerce were also
vitally interested in this matter.

In 1B69 the Council

appointed a Board of Engineers headed by General Braxton
Bragg.

The Board proposed a plan for underground drainage,

and described it as ”both simple and comparatively inexpen
sive."

Several years later Colonel Thomas S. Hardee, the

City Surveyor, formulated a system of underground drainage
which presumably would have aided in keeping the city clean,
and would also have dried up the s w a m p s . ^

Limited drainage

operations were attempted, but no comprehensive system was
put into effect during the seventies.

Lack of sufficient

capital weighed heavily.
A typical complaint was made by Dr. Keber Smith,

^ Picayune, September 20, December 12, 1B6B.

^Ibid., December 7» 1^69; Report of the Board of
Health . . . 137£, pp. 255-61.

253
Sanitary Inspector of the Fourth District,

who declared

that a lack of uniformity existed in the general plan of
drainage.

The whole rear of his district, he said, was

"undrained by reason of irregularity of the level of the
gutters, which are nothing more than ditches dug along the
sides of the s t r e e t s . T h e

Third Sanitary District, com

prising the lower part of the city, had the most serious
drainage problem.

Health officials were convinced that dis

ease was the result.

"This want of drainage," asserted the

Board of Health Report for 1877, ,Thas always been a source
of disease, the stagnation of water generating malarial
fever, and the inhabitants will continue their just cause
of complaint as long as the drainage system is not more
i6
properly carried out."^
Dr. Choppin remarked on the im
portance of thorough drainage in reducing the number of
cases of malaria^? and consumption.

Action was needed, he

told the Legislature, to provide thorough draining of the
swamps back of the city, cutting down of all undergrowth
between the city and the lake, and opening all streets, well
paved or shelled to the lake, with gutters flushed from the
river.

Compliance with these recommendations, Choppin

^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1869, p» 28.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1877> p. 56.
was generally known that swarnps and malaria
were intimately associated, although virtually no one sus
pected that malaria was actually transmitted by the Anoph
eles mosquito.
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stated, would reduce the mortality of New Orleans more than
ia
thirty per cent.
The attention of the Board of Health was directed in
1874 add 1875 to the unhygienic surroundings found at the
parish prison.

Sanitary Inspector J. T. Newman described

in his reports the abominable conditions endured by the in
mates.

The most serious problem was overcrowding which,

with ventilation dangerously inadequate, created conditions
facilitating the transmission of disease.

Newman reported

in 1875 that the prison’s privy vaults had not been emptied
for three years, and v/ere "full to overflowing.”

He con

cluded that the cells were ’’totally unfit for the accommo49
dation of animals, much less men and women.”
The unsanitary conditions frequently found in New Or
leans cemeteries constituted a long-standing public health
problem, as well as being a bane to the aesthetic sensitiv
ities of the city’s residents.

The Sanitary Inspectors paid

surprisingly little heed to the disgraceful conditions in
some cemeteries, although it should be noted that the health
menace was sometimes over-estimated,

A lengthy and famous

graveyard expose"-was written by Dr. Joseph Holt in the 1878
Board of Health Report.

Locust Grove Cemetery (known more

commonly as Potter’s Field) was the object of his assault.

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1878, pp.

10-11.
49fieport of the Board of Health . . . 1874 > pp.
96- 98 ; Report of the Board of Health . . . 1875 > pp. 113-14.
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In this cemetery, characterized by numerous abominations,
wer*e buried many of the poor people of New Orleans.

One of

the worst abuses, according to Holt, was the practice of
burying, over a period of years, several bodies in a single
grave.

In doing so, old coffins were sometimes uncovered

and bones scattered.

Coffins were frequently buried only

two inches below the earth’s surface where they could eas
ily be uncovered and subjected to the rays of the sun.
Bodies were in this way exposed, creating a "disgustingly
perceptible” stench.

Holt described the problem created

by epidemics, when dead bodies were piled in heaps awaiting
burial.

Residents near-by were correct in becoming alarmed,

because flies swarmed from corpses into houses in the neigh
borhood.
Dwellers in the Potter’s Field area petitioned the
City Council, describing the intolerable conditions, but
no action was taken.

Holt said that he appended to the

petition his official report, based upon repeated inspec
tions.

Potter’s Field was declared to be "an outrageous

nuisance.”

First, stated Holt’s report, good sanitary

practice was not being observed; second, ”it /"Potter’s
Field_7 was a violation of the plainest laws of humanity
and instinctive decency,

in the infliction upon the help

less of such loathesome sights and disgusting smells;”
third, residents in the vicinity were being injured by a
rapid depreciation in property values.

Holt declared that
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the Council did nothing about the Potter’s Field nuisance—
he would have located the graveyard elsewhere— because those
who were buried there were poor, as were the petitioners.
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Sanitary Inspectors reported frequently that public
schools were in deplorable sanitary condition.

After in

specting a school building at the corner of Claiborne and
St. Peter streets late in 1372, Dr. S. S. Herrick communi
cated the following remarks to the State Health Officer:
The drainage is deficient, the gutters
being out of repair.
A portion of the yard
is unpaved and too low. The earth closets
are broken and offensive to smell; the privy
structures need repairs; the urinal has be
come a positive nuisance from faulty con
struction and neglect.
On the day of my
visit two of the school rooms were de
serted, having become intolerable from
smoky stoves.>1
The 1375 Board of Health Report contained an unusually large
number of similar accounts.

Dr. White, commenting on con

ditions in general, asserted that a majority of teachers
were either ignorant of, or totally disregarded, ordinances
of the Board of Health.

Especially bad, thought White, was

the crowding of jrounger children into low, badly-lighted,
badly-ventilated rooms . ^

Dr. Herrick, reporting on the

First District, attacked the problem statistically, by the

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . , 1373, pp.
90-93.
^ Picayune, December 2, 1372.

^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1375, p. 33.

use of charts.

His point was that school children were

being over-crowded, and were thereby deprived of sufficient
fresh air to retain good health.
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Dr. J. T. Nev/man, Second

District, stated that he was "forcibly struck with the un
hygienic surroundings and unscientific arrangement of the
apartments devoted to school purposes."

"A great many of

the buildings are sadly deficient in light and ventilation,"
Newman declared, "and the desks and furniture are so situa
ted as to almost exclude what little light the srriall windows afford."-'

Dr. George K. Pratt, Sixth District, also

manifested great concern about over-crowding in the public
schools.

Tuberculosis, he said, was often directly trace

able to the breathing of impure air.

Pratt was convinced

that a child’s good health should not be jeopardized:
"The little learning which they get is not worth the sacri55
fice of health which must be made to obtain it." '
Because smallpox was regarded as being preventable,
the Louisiana Board of Health was active in seeking means
whereby recurrent epidemics of this disease could be avert
ed.

Although it was generally recognized in medical circles

that vaccination was the solution to the problem, convincing
people that they should submit to this kind of preventive
measure while still enjoying good health was no simple

53Ibid., pp. £9-97.
3^Ibid., pp. 114-15*
55Ibid., pp. 172-74*
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matter.

With smallpox cases being present in New Orleans

almost incessantly during the seventies, isolation (quar
antine) and disinfection were the usual means employed in
attempting to forestall an epidemic.

One of the first or

dinances adopted by the Board under authority granted to
it by the act of 1370 prescribed procedures to be followed
in the battle against smallpox.

The ordinance granted to

the Board power to remove smallpox patients to a hospital
whenever it was deemed necessary for proper treatment or
to prevent the spread of disease.

The Board was empowered

to quarantine and disinfect any place which might harbor
smallpox infection.
Health,

At the discretion of the Board of

infected clothing, bedding, and other material

could be disinfected or destroyed.

A further provision re

quired that cases of smallpox and other diseases believed
to be contagious or infectious were to be reported to the
office of the Board of Health within twenty-four hours.
The most important section of the ordinance declared that
no pupil could be admitted to a public school without a
vaccination certificate from a practicing physician or
visible proof of a successful vaccination.

The Board,

it

was stated, would at all times provide gratuitous vaccina56
tion at the offices of the Sanitary Inspectors.

^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1372, pp.
154-56.
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In 1$72 the Legislature created what became known as
the "small-pox hospital.”

The ”Act to establish an hos

pital for small-pox and other contagious diseases” stipu
lated that there should be an "exclusive hospital for
small-pox,” and that all indigent cases of this malady
should be sent there.

The hospital could oe used for other

contagious diseases at the discretion of the Board of Health.
The city was to pay the hospital on a per diem basis for
treating the indigent.
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The Board of Health criticized

the smallpox hospital during succeeding years because it
was believed that patients were not well cared for, and
little effort was being made to prevent the spread of the
disease.

In addition, the three dollar per day charge

collected by the hospital on each patient was deemed ex
travagant.

At a Board meeting in 1876 a resolution was

adopted requesting the Legislature to repeal "act Mo. 60,”
and a year later the request was gr an t e d . ^

The methods actually employed by the Board of Health
to prevent the spread of smallpox were described by Dr. J.
T. Newman in the 1875 annual Report.

When a patient was

sent to the hospital, the room from which he had been re
moved was immediately disinfected with gases "evolved from

5?Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana at the Second Session of the Second Legisla
ture . . . 1872 TNew Orleans^ 1872), Act No"I 60, pp. 107-106.
^ P i c a y u n e , February 5> 1876; Acts passed . . . at
the Extra Session . . . 1877» .Act No. 16, p. 21.
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the common formula of the chloride of soaiura and the black
oxide of manganese and sulphuric acid.”

The clothes and

bedding of the patient were immersed in boiling water.
Patients isolated at home were allowed to see no one ex
cept a nurse, and a yellow warning flag was placed in front
of each infected dwelling as a notice to prospective visi
tors.

All suspicious localities were searched in order to

discover concealed cases, of which there were many because
of the "gross neglect” of physicians to report them.

The

Board of Health never' did receive anything resembling com
plete cooperation.

Newman mentioned that patients often

were discharged from the hospital too soon and carried the
infection with them.

Patients isolated at home were fre

quently visited by friends and relatives in spite of prom
ises that they would observe regulations.

According to

Newman, some visitors paid with their lives for disregard
ing the yellow flag.^9
A phenomenon which attracted a great deal of attention
during this era was the disproportionately large number of
Negroes who contracted smallpox.

Dr. Newman remarked that

although smallpox was not confined to any race or class,
Negroes seemed to be much more susceptible.

Furthermore,

he stated, mulattoes tended "to enjoy an immunity against
this malady proportionately as they 7~were_7 removed from

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1$7J>, pp.

100-101.
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the Harnitic stem."

In 1677 Or. Joseph Holt noted that in

his District, the Fourth, for every white person who became
ill with smallpox, three Negroes contracted the d i s e a s e . ^
More significantly, he noted that ninety per cent of the
cases occurred among the lowest class of blacks and whites.
"Neither race nor color," Holt concluded, "confers immunity
from or occasions special liability to the disease; the
AL "I

question is one determined by the social standard."
Vaccination was the only answer.

Vaccination is the

process of implanting the living virus of cowpox in a per
son to protect him against smallpox.

As early as 1669 the

Board of Health introduced a program of gratuitous vaccina
tion for all who desired it.

Unfortunately there were

many, especially Negroes, who did not avail themselves of
the opportunity.

The Sanitary Inspector for the Second

District reported that in the schools he visited, five per
cent of the white children were found unprotected, whereas
sixty-six per cent of the Negro children were unprotected.
Only children whose parents did not object were vaccinated,
he declared.

The Fourth District Inspector reported, in

contrast, that he had vaccinated many Negro pupils, but

^ I t was asserted that during the smallpox epidemic
of 1672-73, four-fifths of the mortality in New Orleans was
among Negroes even though they numbered only one-fourth of
the population.
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal,
n . s ., I (1673-74), 134.
^libid, , p. 100; Report of the Board of Health
. . . 1677, pp. 65 - 66 .
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found it impossible to vaccinate white children because of
opposition from the school director.

&2

It should be point

ed out that only a small percentage of adults had ever sub
mitted to vaccination, and the Board of Health seemed
reasonably content to concentrate on school children.
In 1S70 the Board adopted an ordinance which, among
other things, made vaccination a requirement for admission
to oublic schools.

Each Saturday the Sanitary Inspectors

furnished free certificates of vaccination to those entitled
to them, and vaccinated at the Board’s expense all who ap
plied for this service.

Other physicians also performed

vaccinations, and the Board of Health kept a supply of
vaccine for "gratuitous distribution" to them.

In its 1370

annual Report the Board recommended a comprehensive plan
which would have extended free vaccination throughout the
state, thereby offering protection to all of Louisiana.
The 1672 Report contained the recommendation that vaccina
tion be offered at every house in New Orleans.

Two years

later the suggestion was made that the Board establish a
"bovine vaccine institute" to facilitate the distribution
Z. O

of the cowpox, or bovine, virus.
Free vaccination was not enough; the Board gradually

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1669, po.

21 , 27 .
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1670, pp.
24, 26-29; Report of the Board of Health . . . 1872, p.
15; Report of the Board of Health . . . 1674, p. 106.
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began to advocate compulsory vaccination as well.

It had

been thought that the ordinance compelling school children
to be vaccinated would suffice, but this ordinance was not
enforced effectively.
school.

Moreover, not all children attended

The Board of Health also publicized the need for

re-vaccination, but its entreaties went largely unheeded.
Basically, the reason health officials were insistent that
the state adopt a system of compulsory vaccination was their
conviction that popular ignorance and superstition would
perpetually keep the percentage of those protected at a
dangerously low level.

To the amazement of physicians,

not everyone wanted to be protected.

The problems encoun

tered were characterized by Dr. Holt:
The colored people do not avail them
selves of vaccination in any measure as to
the whites.
In this connection we may ex
plain why this disease is almost confined
to the lowest class of whites and blacks.
Here we are apt to find naturally associ
ated with the conditions of life favoring
pestilence, indolence, slothfulness, igno
rance.
The negroes, of all others, hold
with the most zealous faith the creed that
"If it is Go d fs will for them to have small
pox they will have it; and if it is not his
will they will not have it; and to get vac
cinated is to tempt the Lord." Unfortu
nately, on the part of the lower class
there is an obliviousness to fear of the
disease.
They regard one of their number
covered with the loathsome eruption with
the same complaisance that the educated
look upon varicella.°4
One of the leaders in the fight for compulsory

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health . . . 1&75, P* 14$*
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vaccination was Dr. Joseph Jones, who became the State
Health Officer in 1880.

Jones declared that between 186?

and 1877 there had been 33>449 cases of smallpox and vari
oloid (a mild form of smallpox) in New Orleans.

This as

tounding figure indicated to him that sanitary inspection,
disinfection, and free vaccination, the means of countering
the disease employed by the Board of Health, had not been
of great value.

It also indicated, he said, T,the most la

mentable neglect of the great and sole means of protection
against this disease, namely— VACCINATION.”

The only

methods which would really destroy smallpox in New Orleans,
he concluded, were first, the constant supply to the Sani
tary Inspectors and other practitioners of medicine of a
sufficient quantity of fresh, reliable vaccine to meet the
needs of the entire population, and second, compulsory
vaccination.

Jones, at the same time, advocated writh ardor

the responsibility of the state for the maintenance of
public health:
Each unprotected inhabitant who neg
lects, or wilfully refuses vaccination, is
a source of constant danger to himself, to
his family, to his neighbors, and to the
whole community; and the state has the pow
er and the right to institute at the hands
of competent medical men COMPULSORY VACCINA
TION, for the full and equal protection of
all her citizens.^

65joseph Jones, "Compulsory Vaccination.
The Es
tablishment of a Uniform System of Vaccination for Citizens
and Inhabitants of the State of Louisiana by Legislative
Enactment," Report of the Board of Health . . . 1877> pp.
196-97, 204.
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Immediately after the Civil War the Board of Health
found itself confronted with a strange, new public health
problem.

Each year more attention was given to the rapidly

increasing number of deaths caused by coal oil explosions.
Coal oils were coming into common use in New Orleans for
illuminating purposes; danger was present because many of
the oils had a flashing point which was too low.

In the

annual Report for 1B69 Dr. White stated that there had been
fifty deaths by burning in New Orleans during the year, and
most of them had been caused by coal oil explosions.

He

requested legislative action to keep unscrupulous dealers
from flooding the market with dangerous illuminating flu
ids. otl

The following year the Board of Health adopted an

ordinance regulating their sale, but the measure was voided
by a court decision which declared that such regulations
could be made only by the state.

The Board then issued an

address to the public with information about the relative
safety of different petroleum products, and the Legislature
was again urged to provide necessary legislation.

The law

recommended by the Board of Health would have created a
coal oil inspector and gauger for each city and town in
the state with a population of two thousand or more.

The

sale, gift, or delivery of any oil not having been in
spected, or being found to have a flashing point of 110°

^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&69, p. 19*
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Fahrenheit or lower, was to be pr oh ibited.^

The Picayune

also took cognizance of the situation, and asked the Gen
eral Assembly for regulatory legislation.

It asserted the

need for a law to prohibit the sale of unsafe illuminating
oil and the storage of large quantities of oil in thickly
populated parts of New O r l e a n s . ^
Successive Board of Health Reports presented detailed
information on coal oil explosions.

The number of injuries

and deaths mounted, and property loss was sometimes consid
erable.

Early in 1876 Dr. White told a Board of Health

meeting that there had been 311 fatal coal oil accidents
during the preceding nine years.

He said that he had pre

pared another bill for the General Assembly, this one to
forbid the sale of any oil with a flashing point lower than
125° Fahrenheit.^9

The act passed in 1877 was essentially

the bill recommended by the Board of Health in 1870 except
that 12$° was established as the minimum flashing point.
The sale, gift, or delivery of coal oil with a lower flash
ing point was to result in a heavy fine unless the oil was
stamped, "Explosive and dangerous."

A still heavier fine

was to be imposed if the oil was sold without having been
inspected.

In all parishes except Orleans the District

67Report of the Board of Health . . . 1870, pp.

12-22.
^ Picayune, September 25, 1871.
^ i b i d ., January 8 , 1876.
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Attorney was made responsible for prosecuting cases against
violators of the new statute.

The Board of Health was as

signed this duty in Orleans Parish.

The lav/ declared that

the inspector and gauger of coal oils for Orleans Parish
70
was to be an appointee of the Board of Health.
The Re
port of the Coal Oil Inspector became a part of succeeding
annual Reports of the Board of Health.

The Reports indi

cated that it was not easy to enforce the provision in the
new law requiring a high flashing point for coal oils.
However, a gradual improvement was noted,

71 and there was

a corresponding decrease in the number of explosions.
During the last month and a half of 1372 the Board of
Health found itself faced with an "epizootic," i. e . t an
epidemic affecting animals.

The epizootic which visited

New Orleans was a distemper that spread very rapidly among
horses and mules.

At a special Board meeting held November

16 a communication was received from iV[ayor Benjamin F.
Flanders requesting the Board’s opinion on a horse quaran
tine and asking for cooperation in enforcing cleanliness
and precautionary disinfecting measures in the large car

7°Acts passed . . . at the Extra Session . . ,
1377 1 Act No. 37, pp. 60-62..
^ T h e ratio of oils attaining "the standard of
safety" was only fifteen per cent in 1377, hut this ratio
advanced on an average of about four percentage points a
year.
The Coal Oil Inspector asserted that by 1334 about
forty per cent of the oils inspected reached the standard
of safety.
Report of the Board of Health . . . 1373, p.
140; Biennial Report of the Board of Health, of the State
of Louisiana, to the General Assembly, 1334-T335 (Baton
Rouge, 1386], p. l5d.
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and livery stables of the city.

Board members professed

ignorance as to what action should be taken, but they
decided that a quarantine could not be maintained.

A res

olution was adopted recommending "a full and thorough ex
amination and disinfection of all public and private stables
be at once made under the direction of the sanitary inspec
tors. rf^
The inspection of stables began November 22, about the
time the first cases were reported.

The primary object of

this work was to inform owners of animals how to put sta
bles in satisfactory sanitary condition and how to treat
sick animals.

Only a week or so after the epizootic began,

horses and mules throughout New Orleans were ill.

Fortu

nately the disease was not very malignant, mortality being
about one or two per cent.

Nonetheless, for several weeks

transportation in New Orleans was greatly curtailed, and
business suffered as a result.

In treating the distemper

simple remedies such as rest, warm blankets, soft food, and
warm drinks were usually advised by the Inspectors.

The

epizootic abated during December, but there were still cases
73
present In the city at the end of the year.'^
Complaints of the failure of the New Orleans municipal
government to cooperate in enforcing sanitary regulations

^ P i c a y u n e , November 17, 1872*
73jbid., December 1, 21, 1872; Report of the Board
of Health . . . 1872, pp. $4-86.

persisted.

Ordinances adopted by the Board of Health

beginning in 1870 proscribed most of the abuses suffered
by the city for decades, but the sanitary poxice, detailed
to assist the Board, were too few and too ineffective.

In

1877 the Legislature, seemingly aware of public health
problems, enacted a law designed to correct the noisome
condition in which the batture was usually found.

The new

law forbade any person, company, or corporation to drop
offal, garbage, night soil, or dead animals from wharves or
landings within Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes
All waste had to be placed on boats at a nuisance wharf and
towed daily to the lower limits of the city.

There the ref

use was to be emptied into the middle of the river.

The

Board of Health was empowered to prosecute all violators of
the law.

7A

The Picayune, in June, 1878, carried a progressive
editorial demanding the submergence of individual rights
in the interest of public health.

This editorial indicated

a growing appreciation of the state’s responsibility for
promoting the general welfare of its citizens.

The editor

believed that residents of Mew Orleans were ready to pay
the price necessary to bring about a cleaner, healthier city
There is no municipal expenditure of
which tax-paying citizens will complain
less than that which is necessary to keep

Acts passed . . . at the Extra Session . . .
1877, Act No. 14, pp. 19-20.
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the city in a cleanly and healthy condition.
If the Mayor and Administrators expend
every available dollar for this purpose,
their action will be most approved by the
most intelligent among the citizens of
New Orleans; and even if they put a strained
construction upon the law and go farther
than a timid interpretation may warrant,
their action will be justified in the eyes
of those who consider the demands of public
safety as equivalent to the positive pro
visions of the statutes.
It ought to be
in the power of the Council to make the
city pure, to give it clean streets, to
divest it of all putrifying £ " sicJ
sub
stances, to supply it with abundant water,
to secure cleanliness in all public places,
to compel the prompt removal of all in
fecting substances, to prevent the intro
duction and sale of unwholesome provisions
in public and private markets, to make
filthiness in all its forms penal, and to
forbid tne individual citizen from doing
that which endangers the public health
or interferes with the general safety.
To effect this, any required thoroughness
of inspection should be employed, even
though it might seem to the thoughtless
to border on espionage.
No citizen has
a right to suffer on his premises a nui
sance that endangers the health or in
terferes with the sanitary comfort of
his neighbors.75
These sentiments, and others like them, brought promise
for the future of public health.

75picayune, June 24, 1$7&.

CHAPTER IX
THE QUARANTINE CONTROVERSY,

1366-73

During the years following the Civil V/ar the quaran
tine issue continued to excite a great deal of bitter con
troversy in Now Orleans.

Never had there been conclusive

proof that the quarantine could prevent the importation of
yellow fever, even if it were conceded that yellow fever
was imported at all.

The efficacy of quarantine in dealing

with smallpox was generally accepted, but strangely, the
prevention of smallpox did not seem to be regarded as suf
ficient reason for the imposition of a quarantine.

Smallpox

was not characterized by terrifying mass-mortality epidemics;
furthermore,

it was commonly supposed to be a Negro disease.

The quarantinists, as aggressive as ever, pointed out that
cholera- and typhus were also commonly listed among the im
ported maladies.

It was to no avail.

Yellow fever held

the center of the stage, and in the public mind, quarantine
was thought of only in relation to it.
As before, the anti-quarantine faction was headed by
powerful commercial interests opposed to any interference
with trade.

The prosperity of New Orleans was being sacri

ficed, they said, t6 the quixotic notions of a few wilful
men.

The businessmen were ably seconded by non-contagionist

physicians and most of the city’s nev/spapers.
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of Health, returning to state control in May, 1S66, could
not well ignore this concerted opposition.

Federal mili

tary authorities left the new State Board with a quarantine
to enforce, but they could not transfer their enforcement
powers.

Attempting to pacify its most dangerous antago

nists, the Board was necessarily cautious.

The Crescent

reported that at a meeting held in July uthe sentiment of
the board was very manifest— that while everything neces
sary to the preservation of the public health ought to be
done, nothing whatever that could improperly or unnecessar
ily trammel commerce or harass citizens ought to be toler
ated."1
The quarantine did not prove to be very successful in
1S66 or 1B67.

Both cholera and yellow fever visited New

Orleans in 1B66, and a serious yellow fever epidemic struck
during the following summer.

With the state suffering from

fiscal difficulties during the post-war years, it is not
surprising that the "useless expenditures" of the Board of
Health came under attack.

The Picayune remarked:

"The

great machinery of the Board of Health as now in operation
involves a heavy, and in some cases unnecessary expense."*'
At a Board meeting in 1S67 Dr. Warren Stone, one of the
members of the Board of Health, declared his inability to
see any benefit produced by the quarantine, but he thought

■^•Crescent, July 26, l$b6.
■^Picayune, September 16, 1S66.
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that to satisfy the public, a rigid quarantine would have
to be continued.^

The Board was criticized at the time

of the l£67 epidemic for failing to do anything about a
vessel impregnated with yellow fever which lay in port at
New Orleans for more than a month.

It was alleged that New

Orleanians had been infected from this ship, and that the
Board of Health had been apprised of the situation.

The

Board was charged with neglecting its duty to protect the
residents of the Crescent City from contagious disease.^
Much to the Board’s dismay, a great epidemic followed.
In 1363, as a consequence of the adoption of Radical
reconstruction, the quarantine was ordered by military
authority.

This quarantine was unique because it was en

forced at the command of General Grant in Washington, and
applied to every Southern port from Virginia to Texas.

All

vessels arriving from infected ports were ordered to be
quarantined fifteen days and thoroughly fumigated.

Vessels

having "epidemic" diseases on board were made subject to
fifteen days’ detention following the termination of the
first case, after which they were to be fumigated.

All

civil and military authorities at ports within the five
districts created by the first Radical Reconstruction act
were commanded to make and enforce proper quarantine

3Ibid., July 3 i 1367.

^•Francis Barnes, "Yellow Fever in New Orleans,"
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XX (1367-63),
196-97.
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regulations.

A month later the order was amended to extend

the detention period from fifteen days to twenty-one days.
The Picayune doubted the wisdom of attempting to enforce a
rigid quarantine, arguing that in the past such attempts
had failed.

While conceding that Butler’s quarantine had

been successful, it had been, said the Picayune, a yearround embargo, one which could not possibly be kept in
5
peacetime.
There is no indication as to how efficiently
the quarantine was enforced, but it should be noted that
the year 1363 was relatively free from pestilence.
The Governor proclaimed a quarantine in 1869 and 1870,
the detention period in 1370 being set fifteen days instead
of the time-honored ten.^

Both yellow fever and smallpox

attacked New Orleans in 1370, each of them taking well over
five hundred lives; cholera mortality for the year was in
excess of one hundred.

The yellow fever outbreak was pri

marily autumnal, as had been the case three years earlier
when the death toll mounted to more than three thousand.
The most significant event surrounding the 1870 epidemic
was the action taken by Texas.

The Governor of that state

proclaimed a quarantine against New Orleans, an act which,
according to the Picayune, cost the Crescent City millions

^Picayune, May 2, June 6, 16, 1868.
6New Orleans Journal of Medicine, XXIII (1870-71),
^74; Picayune, May 27, 1869.
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of dollars in trade.

7

New Orleans was outraged, but

trouble vras only beginning; her neighbors wanted protec
tion .
A national system of quarantine was suggested as the
solution.

New Orleans, some maintained, could not then be

discriminated against.

The New Orleans Republican advo

cated this plan; the Picayune did not agree.

Commenting on

remarks by the editor of the Republican, the Picayune clar
ified its own position:

We agree with him as to the damaging
effects of quarantine upon commerce, as to
its glaring defects, as to its peculiarly
pernicious influence upon this city, as to
the unscrupulous advantage taken of quar
antine as a pretext by rival cities, as to
its perversion for local objects, as to
the inconvenience and damage of many sys
tems inconsistent with each other and often
conflicting, and especially as to the obso
lescent old notion on which our damaging
and pernicious system is founded. But
while concurring fully in the diagnosis of
the disease, we dissent from the prescrip
tion for its cure. The Republican calls
for the establishment by Congress of a
national system of quarantine to super
sede the present local laws and regula
tions, claiming the authority of Congress
to make such laws, under the general grant
of power to regulate commerce. Whether
the right to prescribe quarantine regula
tions exist in Congress or not, or under
whatever specific branch of powers such
right may be claimed, there is no assur
ance that such 1 X . 7 national system
might not become an instrument of oppres
sion. Unquestionably Congress has the
right to forbid local rules detrimental
to commerce, and a law prohibiting States
and cities from arresting vessels, goods

^Picayune, October 3 0

,

1$7Q.
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and passengers, except for named causes,
would be of beneficent operation.
But
whatever Congress may do, the present
absurd quarantine ought to be abolished.
The Picayune, the paper which led the way in promoting es
tablishment of the state quarantine in 1355, became a bitter
critic of this institution during the early seventies.

The

city’s prosperity should not be sacrificed, the Picayune
maintained, to a device which had proven itself worthless:
Our commerce with the countries south
of us is growing in extent and importance.
We cannot afford to have it interrupted
every year, for five or six months, for
the sole purpose of affording a delusive
security to a few hundreds of timid and
unacclimated visitors or residents.
The
great business of this metropolis must not.
be suspended to gratify caprice, or in
compliance with a superstitious conception.
The quarantine has done no known and pos
itive good; it has done an immeasurable
amount of known, felt and positive hurt.
It has done more to paralyze and dwarf
our trade and influence than anything
else.9
In September, 1371 Texas again imposed a quarantine
against New Orleans.

The Picayune blamed Dr. G. W. Peete,

the Health Officer at Galveston, for the outrage, because
he was alleged to have obtained the proclamation from the
Governor of Texas.

At the insistence of Hew Orleans mer

chants Governor Henry C. Warmoth of Louisiana wrote to the
Governor of Texas, informing him that New Orleans had had
only five cases of yellow fever, and that the Texas quarantine

% b i d . , January 29, 1371*
9Ibid.,, January 19, 1371.
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was a serious impediment to commerce.

The businessmen

of New Orleans held a special meeting at the Merchants'
Exchange on Common Street and adopted a resolution condemn
ing the Galveston Board of Health and the Governor of Texas.
Dr. Peete, declared the editor of the Picayune8 invited
the quarantine so that he might profiteer.^

The climate

of opinion in New Orleans was evidently one of hostility
toward Galveston because of the conviction that the quar
antine was a malicious attempt to injure the commerce of
a competitor.

It was probably true that Galveston was

anxious to have a state quarantine levied against New Or
leans in retaliation for the frequent inclusion of Gal
veston on the lists of ports proclaimed to be infected by
the Governor of Louisiana,
Dr. White called the attention of the Legislature to
newspaper talk about the uselessness of quarantine regula
tions, but added that the Board of Health was "decidedly
in favor of their continuance and thorough enforcement.TT~^
Shortly thereafter, the merchants and the Chamber of Com
merce of New Orleans appealed to the Legislature to repeal
or revise the Quarantine Act.

The Beard of Health was under

attack from the commercial interests of New Orleans because
it was a state institution, with a majority of appointments

-t-Qlbid., September 29

,

1S71.

^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1^71? pp. $-9.
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being made by the Governor.

Business circles repeatedly

asserted that the Board should be run by the city.

Fur

thermore, the businessmen considered it grossly unfair that
the Board should depend upon the taxation of commerce for
most of its income.

The "Quarantine Tax" was repeatedly

assailed from many quarters, but the Legislature could not
be moved.
In the meantime the United States Congress was dis
cussing the quarantine.

A joint resolution of the House,

passed March 1, 1.372, sought to provide "a more effective
system of quarantine on the southern and Gulf coasts."
This resolution directed the Secretary of War to detail
one of more medical officers of the regular army to visit
every port and town on the Gulf of Mexico subject to in
vasions of yellow fever.

The officers were to confer with

authorities in those ports and towns relative to the es
tablishment of a more uniform and efficient system of
quarantine.

In addition the officers were to ascertain

all facts pertaining to epidemics in the area and how those
outbreaks could be prevented.

The investigators were to

make a detailed report of their findings to the Secretary
of War.
The House resolution was amended by the Senate, the
most important amendment being sponsored by Senator William

^ P i c a y u n e , March 10, 16, 1372.
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P. Kellogg of Louisiana.

It stipulated that the medical

officers were not to find a means to prevent epidemics, but
rather they were to determine "whether any system of quar
antine /"was J

likely to be effective in preventing inva

sions of yellow fever, and if so, what system /~~would_7
least interfere with the interests of commerce at said
ports."

Another amendment provided that the investiagion

was also to Include towns and ports on the Atlantic coast
which were subject to yellow fever.

The resolution as

amended was concurred in by the House.

In New Orleans it

was remarked that the acceptance of the amendment was "an
auspicious recognition by Congress of the weight of tie
enlightened and liberal sentiment which regards all known
systems of quarantine as essentially ineffective, and as
equally barbarous and pernicious in their restrictions upon
commerce." 13
J
The Board of Health adopted a new practice in 1372.
Full and detailed health reports were sent every week to
all principal cities of the North, Northwest, and South
west, each accompanied by a special remark that New Orleans
was free from epidemic diseases.

The reports were sent

particularly to points of importance in the Mississippi

The Congressional Globe:
Containing the Debates
and Proceedings of the Second Session, Forty-Seconcf Con
gress '. ^ ^ [Washington, D. C., 1872) Part 2, p. 1330;
Part 4> p* 3435; Part 5> pp. 4094-95; Picayune, May 21,
1372.

V a l l e y . U n q u e s t i o n a b l y this innovation was adopted be 
cause of the feeling among Nev.? Orleanians that their city
had been harmed in the past by unconfirmed rumors and un
verified reports.
of quarantine.

But nothing could pacify the opponents

"Medicus" wrote to the Picayune that the

proclamation of a quarantine in 1372 was "a proclamation
of commercial war.”

It was certainly not true, he said,

that yellow fever prevailed in all of the ports in the vast
region south of New Orleans included in the quarantine.
”Medicus” remarked:

"It really looks like a systematic,

concerted plan to annihilate the commerce of this unfortu
nate place.”

Editorial comment in the Picayune remained

unfavorably disposed toward quarantine.

”Yeliow fever,

according to the sapient Drs. White, Warmoth « Co., is
always imported on shipboard in the shape of some sort of
foreig;n merchandise,” declared the editor,

"The effect of

this theory is to furnish a handsome and lucrative business,
in dull seasons, to a lively set of quarantine officials."^
The Board of Health, as immovable as ever, informed
the Legislature that it did not feel justified in recom
mending any change in existing quarantine regulations.
Dr. C. B. White, the President of the Board, told the law
makers:

"The scientific sanitary desideratum in quarantine

•^Picayune, July 9> 1372.
-*-5ibid., June 13, July 21, 1372.
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is, /~sic J

certain, rapid disinfection of the loaded

vessels by agents not inimical to craft or cargo, and it
is in this direction that inquiry in the immediate future
should be m a d e . " ^

Ever greater attention did seem to be

given to disinfection during the seventies.

This change

was caused primarily by the rise of the germ theory of
infection, although miasmatists were likewise inclined to
believe that disinfectants represented something of a pan
acea.

In order to destroy germs (or odors) disinfection

was used on streets, buildings, personal belongings, and
so forth; and it was also a feature of the quarantine.
The process was nothing new, but greater emphasis was being
placed upon its
One of the

efficacy.
New Orleans Sanitary Inspectors, Dr. A.

W.

Perry, told, the American Public Health Association in 1375
that a means existed to protect a port by quarantine with
out delay to commerce.

In the past, he asserted, even the

strictest quarantines had failed to keep out foreign dis
eases such as yellow fever and cholera because of failure
to destroy all of the germs.

Demanding a lengthy detention

period for vessels having sailed from infected ports, thought
Perry, was the method of quarantine least dependable, most
costly, and most oppressive
the problem was

to commerce.

The solutionto

to disinfect the ships with gaseous or

volatile disinfectants applied with a special apparatus

•^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1372, p . 10.
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soon to be adopted by the Board of Health of Louisiana.
Perry claimed that every part of the vessel and every crev
ice of the cargo could then be reached.^7
with Perry.

Dr. White agreed

In the 1873 annual Report he complained that

the Board had not been given ample funds to experiment with
disinfection.

White avowed his conviction that only by the

use of disinfectants could ships and their cargoes be rendered harmless to a community.

18

Every summer a quarantine was proclaimed by the Gov
ernor of Louisiana upon the advice of the Board of Health
in spite of persistent opposition.

The 1874 proclamation

by Governor Kellogg declared the usual yellow fever ports '
on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean to be infected.
Vessels from those ports were to be detained for ten days,
"or for a longer period, as may be considered necessary by
the Board of Health.”
nant.

New Orleans newspapers were indig

The Picayune suggested that ship owners offer re-

19
sistance to the imposition of quarantine fees. 7

A man

mentioned as having successfully defied the Board of Health

■^A. V/. Perry, "Effectual External Sanitary Regula
tions Without Delay to Commerce," Public Health Reports and
Papers Presented at the Meetings of the American Public
Health Association in the Year 1873 (New York, 1875)> I»
437-40.
-^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1873i p. 18.
-*-9picayune, June 17} July 30, 1874*
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was Charles Morgan, owner of a large steamship line.

Mor

gan had, in May, 1&74, received an injunction from the
Circuit Court restraining the Board from collecting quar
antine fees from his steamers.

The injunction was issued

by Justice Bradley of the United States Supreme Court,
during one of his visits to New Orleans.

The Board of

Health repeatedly maintained that its revenue had been
20
seriously reduced by the Court’s action. '
In 1$76, when
the Board tried to delay some Morgan steamers, Bradley
issued a further restraining order.

Dr. Choppin prepared

to ignore the ruling, but he was warned by Morgan’s attor
neys that he could be prosecuted for contempt of court.
Choppin evidently succumbed to the threat.

21

The Board of Health was told by M organ’s attorneys
that further injunctions could be secured easily because
the Louisiana quarantine was clearly unconstitutional.

It

was alleged that the constitutional prohibition against the
levying of tonnage duties and the regulating of commerce
by a state had been violated.

Dr. Joseph Jones, when he

became State Health Officer in lBGO, was informed at once

20see Report of the Board of Health . . . 1$74» p.
15; C. B. White to Governor William P. Kellogg, New Or
leans, May 1, 1$75, in Governors’ Correspondence, ojs. cit. ;
Minutes of the Board of Health meeting held August 16,
1 3 7 7 i in the Picayune, August 17, 1377•
2^Leovy and Kruttschnitt to Samuel Choppin, Presi
dent of the Board of Health, New Orleans, August 4> 1377',
Harry J. Leovy to I. N. Marks, New Orleans, May 19, 1$6Q,
in Joseph Jones Papers, 1^32-1919, Gummed Stub File Book,
Business Papers, Department of Archives Mss., Louis.i.ana
State University.
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that the injunction still applied.

Courts had frequently

found quarantine charges unconstitutional, Jones was told,
so it was the duty of the Morgan Company to resist their
payment.

In one of the letters received by Jones, the

company sent a check for one hundred dollars "as a contri
bution” to defray the running expenses of the Board of
Health.

Another letter contained a free pass for Jones

and his family, good on the Morgan railroad line.

The

pass remained unsigned by Jones, indicating that he did not
• x.
22
use it.

Jones continued in his efforts to collect quarantine
dues from the Morgan Company.
court near the end of lS3l.

The matter finally went to
The District Court ruling

held that Morgan was correct and that the quarantine sys
tem of Louisiana which had been established in 1#55 was
"illegal” (unconstitutional?).

Several other companies

then brought suit against the Board of Health.
very life was placed in imminent p e r i l . ^

The Board’s

It was finally

saved in January, 1384, by the Louisiana Supreme Court, and
later by the Supreme Court of the United States (May, 1836).

^ L e o v y to Marks, May 19, 1380; Attorney's Depart
ment of Morgan's Louisiana and Texas Railroad and Steamship
Co. to Jones, New Orleans, May 26, 1830; Chas. A. Whitney
and Co., managers of the Morgan Co. to Jones, New Orleans,
May 2$, 1880; Morgan Co. to Jones, New Orleans, July 14»
1880, ibid.
^ Annual Report of the Board of Health, of the State
Louisiana, To the General Assembly for the Year 1883
TBaton Rouge, 135477 PP« clxvi-clxix.
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Basically, the argument used in court by the Morgan Company
was that the inspection fee which was demanded of all ves
sels was unconstitutional.

Act number sixty-nine, passed

by the General Assembly of Louisiana in 1332, was singled
out for- special attack.

This law established a new list

of fees, based upon the size of the vessel to be inspected,
which the Resident Physician at Mississippi Station was rep J.
quired to charge.
The Board of Health argued that all
fees and charges imposed on vessels by the quarantine laws
of the state were exactions in compensation for services
rendered, and were not taxes.

No tonnage duty, within the

meaning of the Constitution, was being charged, the Board
maintained, and no regulation of commerce was involved.
Both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court concurred in the Board1s contention.

The

latter Court indicated that the quarantine laws established
by Louisiana were a rightful exercise of the state’s police
power for the protection of health.

The inspection fee was

a part of all quarantine systems, said the Court.

^^Acts passed . . .
1332, Act Wo. 69, P* 90.

25

at the Regular Session, . . .

^ M o r g a n ’s Louisiana and Texas Railroad and Steam
ship Company v. The Board of Health of the State of Louisi
ana, 36 La. Ann. 666 , Report of Cases Argued and Determined
in the Supreme Court of Louisiana . . . , 0£. cit., Book
43, p p . 416-21; Morgan’s Louisiana and Texas Railroad and
Steamship Company, Plff. in Err., v. Board of Health of the
State of Louisiana and the State of Louisiana, 113 U. S.
455, Cases Argued and Decided in the Supreme Court of the
United States, o£. cit., Book 30, Law Ed., pp. 237-43*
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After many years of litigation, the State Board of
Health of Louisiana had triumphed.

Jones noted in 1334

that the Morgan Company was indebted to the state of Lou
isiana by an amount exceeding fourteen thousand dollars.
Other companies were likewise thwarted in their effort to
undermine the quarantine for their own pecuniary gain.

One

of these companies, the Cromwell Steamship Line, owed the
Board eighty-four hundred dollars.

The Board of Health

had many crises during its early history, but probably none
was quite as crucial as the one involving the contentions
of Charles Morgan.
Many of New Orleans1 leading physicians drafted in
1375 a "Petition to the Board of Health in regard to Quar
antine."

Among those signing were Dr. A. Forster Axson,

former State Health Officer, and Drs. Stanford E. Chailie''
and S. M. Bemiss.

According to the petitioners, the quar

antine experiment had failed to protect New Orleans from
yellow fever, and the city’s commerce had been seriously
damaged by the repetition of the quarantine.

The Board

was asked not to recommend any future restrictions on vessels
from infected ports other than to require disinfection and
the removal of the sick, the detention for which was not
to exceed twenty-four hours.

27

^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1333, p.
clxxi i .
27^ew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journ a l , n.s.,
II (1374-7TJT 9 ^

The Hew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal supported
the petitioners.

State authorities, explained the editor,

had been left with no discretion in quarantine matters.
Whenever legal notice was given that a port was infected,
the law required the imposition of a quarantine.

It was

also deemed unfortunate that Board of Health members were
selected on the basis of "their known zeal in favor of a
quarantine system" despite the quarantine’s "entire infea
sibility and impracticability at the present time."

Dis

infection, declared the editor, was much more effective as
a disease preventive than was detention.

The Picayune also

found much to laud in the petition, because editorially
that paper had written off quarantine years before.

Fur

thermore the sentiment of the community was said to favor
the petitioners.

About two weeks after the petition was

drawn up, the Chamber of Commerce appointed a committee to
confer with the Board of Health concerning modifications
which could be made "in the onerous restrictions in the
present quarantine

law.

"23

The Board of Health, at a special meeting in June,
1$75)

succumbed to the pressure and adopted a resolution

which perceptibly modified the quarantine.

The ten day

quarantine period, stated the resolution, was thereafter
to be regarded as having begun on a vessel’s date of

23lbid., pp. 960-62; Picayune, May 2, 11, 1 75
&

-
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departure from an infected port.

It was easy to understand

why the Picayune should have expected that under this new
arrangement nvery trifling embarrassments” would be en
countered by commerce; in many cases it must have virtually
eliminated detention altogether.

Fortunately the resolu

tion apolied only to ships with a clean bill of health, and
an indefinite detention was still to be enforced if actual
cases of yellow fever were found on board.
quarantine seemed satisfied.

The critics of

29

The satisfaction was short-lived.

Two weeks later

tne Board’s cleansing and disinfecting procedure on ships
in quarantine was assailed as being abusive.

The assail

ants were passengers aboard a steamship which had arrived
at Quarantine Station from Vera Cruz, and accordingly been
detained.

They complained that their rooms had been flooded

with water and carbolic acid, and because of constant rains,
the dampness throughout the ship was unbearable.

They had

also been molested, they declared, by an immense army of
mosquitoes.

Furthermore, two doctors who were among the

passengers asserted that the close proximity of vessels
at the quarantine ground had been conducive to the spread
of disease.

The combination of disinfection and detention,

they said, had placed the health of the passengers in
jeopardy.

The Picayune commented that the doctors had

pretty effectually established ’’the proposition that the

29pjcayune, June 12, 1875*
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quarantine regulations at 1'Jew Orleans, apart from their
fatal effect on the trade of the city, are absolutely
prejudicial to the health of the passengers, and therefore
provocative of the very large dangers they are assumed to
prevent."^0
A few days later a reply to the accusations of the
passengers by Dr. M. A. Southworth, the Resident Physician
at Mississippi Station, was printed in a New Orleans paper.
All charges about the health of the passengers being endan
gered by detention were denied.

Southworth maintained that

the rooms on board ship had not been flooded with water and
carbolic acid; they had only been "freely sprinkled."

The

Picayune stated in rebuttal that no criticism of Southworth
had ever been intended because he was only doing his duty.
It was the Board of Health and the quarantine law which
were at fault.

The law, much to the disgust of the editor,

required that Board members be professed adherents of the
quarantine, an institution which he described as "a use
less, cumbrous,
problem.”

impotent compromise with the yellow fever

31

The period of quarantine was materially reduced by
the Board of Health in 1375.

According to Dr. Southworth,

vessels more than ten days from an infected port were quar
antined only about eight hours.

^ Ibid., June 23, 1375.
33-lbia. , July 2, 1375-

Moreover, Southworth told
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the General Assembly that vessels arriving before the ten
days had elapsed were permitted to continue to New Orleans
one day early because he counted the date of departure from
the quarantine ground as one of the ten.

He relied on dis

infection, fumigation, and aeration, he said, and was not
greatly concerned about the detention period.^2

q. w. R.

Bayley, a Board of Health member, urged the Chamber of
Commerce of Newr Orleans to adopt a resolution recommending
that the Legislature grant authority to the Board of Health
’'to permit, at its discretion, the passage of vessels from
infected ports to the city, after the same have been satis
factorily and thoroughly fumigated and disinfected, in lieu
of the prescribed time-detention called for by the existing
quarantine law.”

Bayley was motivated, as was Southworth,

by a conviction that the ’’time-detention” principle had
proven unworkable, or even useless.

Bayley was also inter-

ested in pacifying the business community. J
In the meantime, talk of a national quarantine pro
ceeded apace.

Throughout the Mississippi Valley there was

mounting dissatisfaction with state and local quarantines
because they were said to be ineffective.

Southworth

stated in the 1$75 Board of Health Report that he did not
believe the national government would in-cerfere with state
quarantine laws.

Congress had previously recognized, he

said, that the right to establish and regulate a quarantine

33Ibid., p. 23*
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was among the reserved, powers of the s t a t e s . ^

Southworth

may have said this in all seriousness, but he must have
been aware that a very real threat of federal intervention
in quarantine matters existed.

During the previous year,

1 $74 > a bill which would have instituted a general quaran
tine had actually passed the House of Representatives.
The quarantine measure of 1874 was introduced by Con
gressman F. G. Bromberg of Mobile, who claimed that because
of an inefficient quarantine at Pensacola in 1873 > yellow
fever was transported by rail to Montgomery, in his state,
where at least one hundred persons had died from the disease.
Bromberg pointed out that Shreveport and Memphis had suffered
fearful, epidemics in 1873 because a disease-laden vessel
had been allowed to proceed through the quarantine to New
Orleans.

35

If a national quarantine had been in existence

in 1873 j he concluded, thousands of lives would have been
saved.

The bill provided that the Surgeon-General of the

Army, the Surgeon-General of the Navy, and the Supervising

3/*Tbid., p. 215.
3 ^Harvey E. Brown, the Army surgeon sent by the
Secretary of War to investigate quarantine procedures in
compliance with the joint resolution of Congress previously
described, reported in 1873 that "when the disease /~yellow
fever_7 prevails at New Orleans, it invariably, after some
weeks, breaks out in those towns having a steamboat commu
nication with the city, and that those towns having no
steamboat communication (as Vidalia, opposite Natchez) al
ways escape; and that those who establish a local quarantine,
and refuse to prevent the landing of steamboats during its
prevalence in New Orleans, also escape." Harvey E. Brown,
Report on Quarantine on the Southern and Gulf Coasts of
the United States (New York, "T873)»" P • 1 1 ^
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Surgeon of the Marine Hospital Service were to form a board
to make quarantine regulations which would apply to all
vessels arriving in the United States from foreign coun
tries.

It was made mandatory that all regulations have the

approval of the President.

States and muncipalities were

to be allowed to maintain their own health and quarantine
regulations if they did not conflict with the national
system.

36

Congressman Samuel S. Cox of New York offered an
amendment (which was accepted by Bromberg) that, in ef
fect, virtually nullified the rest of the measure.

The

amendment substituted a declaration that the national
quarantine was not to be ,rso construed as to apply to the
health regulations and quarantine measures maintained by
States or municipalities” in place of the previous ban on
local regulations which were in conflict with the proposed
federal quarantine.

Cox, a defender of states 1 rights,

was in reality opposed to the very principle of a general,
uniform quarantine establishment.

He felt that quarantines

should be left to state and local authorities because the
type of regulations needed varied from port to port.

The

wants and needs of New York, San Francisco, and New Or
leans, for instance, were not the same, Cox averred, and
a board in Washington could hardly do justice to all of

36congressional Record;
Containing the Proceed
ings and Debates of the Forty-Third Congress, First
Session (Washington, D. C., 1374)» Vol. 2, Part 5 j pp.
4562-63.

293
them.

He revealed that New York had just instituted "a

perfect quarantine establishment," costing two million
dollars.

Cox was convinced that the original quarantine

bill, as proposed by Bromberg, would have endangered this
establishment, and would thereby have jeopardized the in
terests of the port of New York City.

The adoption of his

amendment, he said, rendered the bill "comparatively harm'ij

less."y '

The Congressman from New York had a strong argu

ment, and one which was to be heard again.
The Louisiana quarantine was modified quite radically
in 1676.

The General Assembly, in harmony with the new

conviction which seemed to be growing on all sides, revised
the quarantine law to leave the question of detention at
the quarantine stations completely to the discretion of
the Board of Health.

All vessels arriving from infected

ports had to undergo disinfection, fumigation, and puri
fication, but then they could be allowed to proceed without any further detention.

3S

The Board, under different

leadership during the summer of 1$76, did not hesitate to
take advantage of the new law.

Ships from infected ports

were quarantined only twelve hours, during which they were
disinfected with sulphurous acid gas and carbolic acid.
Upon their arrival at Mew Orleans, the cargoes were also

37lbid., pp. 4564 -65 .
Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Louisiana, at the Second Session of the Fourth Legisla
ture . I . 1675"" (New Orleans’^ 1676 j, Act No. 66, p. 110.'
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disinfected.

It was decided that unacclimated persons

arriving frorr. yellow fever ports would be quarantined for
six days, because the Board felt that six was the average
number of days it took for one exposed to yellow fever to
come down with the disease.

Passengers embarking from

points where yellow fever did not prevail were made to
suffer no delay other than the time required for the Resi
dent Physician or his assistant to make a general inspection
■an
of the vessel. 7
The "new Board of Health" which came into existence
in 1B77 apparently was satisfied with the results obtained
the previous summer when the modified quarantine was in
operation.

The Board seemed convinced that thorough^dis

infection and inspection could insure New Orleans against
all danger from epidemic d i s e a s e s . ^

Although 1877 was

free from epidemics, things did not go very smoothly.

The

Resident Physician at the Rigolets reported to the Board
that schooners passed his station without stopping, "and
often cursed the honorable Board of Health,"

The Board

declared that no provision to enforce the collection.of

39picayune, July 7, 23, October 3j I 876 .
4-°Ibid., May 13, 1377.
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quarantine dues e x i s t e d . ^

Toward the end of the season

a Picayune editorial asserted that quarantine laws had be
come loose and inadequate, and reported a movement afoot
to have the Legislature repeal the laws ”or so amend them
as to conform with the necessities of public health and
commerce in this city.”

TIIn its present form,” continued

the editor, ”the quarantine act is scarcely comprehensible,
and even where comprehensible is often found impractical or
injuriously destructive.”^

Nonetheless, no legislative

action was taken for several years.
The Louisiana Board of Health adopted a new view of
yellow fever in the 1B77 Report to the Legislature.

Dr.

Samuel Choppin, the Board President, wrote:
The Board of Health accept the theory
that yellow fever is a zymotic disease,
contagious in its nature by the multiplica
tion of its germs, the infecting distance
of which is at first short; that it trav
els upon surfaces, and like the orange, the
banana, and the sugar cane, is an exotic,
its cradle being the Antilles; and, there
fore,• have earnestly
prevent
*> endeavored to t
'
its introduction into New Orleans by a
more rigid system of quarantine and the
use of disinfectants.^

4-llbid., June 29, 1$77; The 1B?7 act which reorgan
ized the Board of Health (Act I\!o. £0, ex.. sess., o£. cit.)
stated that a person violating any of the rules, regula
tions, or ordinances of the Board of Health pertaining to
quarantine, or refusing to allow a quarantine officer to
inspect or disinfect a vessel, could be sued by the Board
for damages not in excess of five hundred dollars for each
offense.
It is uncertain why the Board of ilealth found
itself unable to prosecute.
^ P i c a y u n e , September 30, 1$77*

^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&77, p * 13 •

This was the first time the Board had officially taken an
unqualified contagionist stand with regard to Louisiana’s
most feared enemy.

Dr. C. B. White,

State Health Officer

during most of the decade following the Civil War, had
been a confirmed adherent of the belief that miasma pro
duced disease.

Some of the Sanitary Inspectors, and per

haps some of the other Board members as well, had accepted
the germ theory of disease, but this theory did not become
official dogma until 1$77»
Choppin pointed out that only one case of yellow fever
had been reported in New Orleans during 1S77.

A man with

this dreaded malady arrived from Havana in November, but
he did not become ill until after his ship had docked at
New Orleans.

As soon as he died, everything he had touched

and every place he had gone were disinfected with carbolic
acid.

Choppin stated that three lessons had been learned

by the absence of yellow fever in 1&77.

The first of these,

he said, was that yellow fever could be completely destroyed
in New Orleans by an unusually severe winter; second, the
quarantine system was useful; and finally, there was rea
sonable hope that Yellow Jack could be conquered by the
combined action of frost, quarantine, and disinfection.

44

Dr. Choppin was a staunch defender of the much-maligned
quarantine.

He told state lawmakers that ten cases of

^ Tbid. , pp. 14-15*
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yellow fever had been intercepted at Mississippi Station
in 1877 > and two more, at Rigolets Station.

He maintained

that the mere use of disinfectants locally in New Orleans
would not suffice to prevent an epidemic.

The quarantine

should be retained, asserted Choppin, although he agreed
that the detention period was unimportant.

He was satis

fied that careful inspection and thorough disinfection of
incoming ships had proven adequate to arrest the importa
tion of any foreign pestilence.^
The 1877 Report also contained some other important
recommendations.

It was noted that Charles Morgan and

some other ship owners had successfully resisted quarantine
exactions.

The Legislature was asked to modify the quar

antine charges so that they could not be construed to be
taxes on tonnage.

The fees, it was suggested, should be

graduated according to the work performed.

Choppin ad

mitted that the fees might have been too high, but they
had to help defray the Board’s expenses in New Orleans as
well as pay for the maintenance of the quarantine stations.
The Legislature was urged to memorialize Congress on "the
absolute necessity of passing a law authorizing the States
to levy a tax for quarantine purposes upon all shipping,
as a matter of self-protection."^

^5lb i d ., p . 15,

^6Ibid., pp. 15-16.

The following March Senator James 33. Eustis of Loui
siana introduced a bill which would have authorized states
to impose a tonnage duty on vessels for the purpose of
maintaining a quarantine.

The bill was never reported out

in

of committee.

The Picayune remarked that Congress had

never in the past made such a grant of power, but the
preservation of public health was an objective vital enough
to merit an exception.

If Congress had the right to levy

duties to protect domestic manufactures, asserted the Pic
ayune, it must certainly also have the right to bestow
power on states to impose duties to protect the health of
the nation’s seaports.

Furthermore, continued the editor,

T'. . . w e are compelled to act upon the assumption that
yellow fever may be imported, and that it can be excluded
by a rigid system of quarantine.

These expressions

seemed strangely out of place in the Picayune which, al
though it had always manifested an interest in public health
measures, had long considered quarantine exactions an anath
ema.

Significantly, this journal was soon to become a loyal

defender of the state quarantine and the State Board of
Health.
During the month of April, 1$7$ the Board became

^Congressional Record:
Containing the Proceed
ings and Debates of the Forty-Fifth Congress, Second
Session (Washington, D. C., 1$7$) , Vol. 7 > Part 2, p. 1&22.
^ Picayune, March 22, 1$7S.
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involved in an interesting dispute with the fruit dealers
of Mew Orleans.

The trouble stemmed from the effect the

fumes of sulphurous acid gas had on the color of bananas.
The schooner Clara L. Dy er , with a load of bananas and
cocoanuts from Jamaica, was subjected, to fumigation and
disinfection according to the usual procedure at Mississippi
Station.

In the process some of the bananas were discolored.

The captain of the vessel immediately lodged a claim against
the Board of Health for damages amounting to thirty-five
hundred dollars.

Dr. Choppin was present when the cargo

was unloaded, and he maintained that not twenty per cent
of the cargo was injured.

He reported to a Board of Health

meeting held April 4 that some of the ripe bananas had been
"bronzed,” but that their taste has not been vitiated.
green ones were not affected at all.

The

It appeared that the

Board of Health did not intend to do anything about the
matter.^
The following morning the fruit dealers held a meeting.
They complained that because of the effect the sulphurous
acid gas had on the bananas, a cargo valued at thirty-five
hundred dollars was sold at auction for nine hundred dollars.
The dealers adopted a resolution protesting against any
further fumigation of fruit cargoes.
given for the resolution was:

^9ibid., April 5, 1373.

One of the reasons

"it has never come within
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our experience or knowledge that any single case of conta
gious fever was ever brought to this city on a fruit vessel
or by medium of a cargo of fruit.”

A petition to the Gov

ernor was also adopted alleging that a repetition of the
proceedings in the Dyer case might result in breaking up
a prosperous trade.

Choppin’s story of the moderate

effect of fumigation on the bananas was laid open to ques
tion by a letter printed in the Picayune April 6:
The ripe ones xvere turned the color
of very dark leather, and their taste was
very materially affected; the green ones
were nearly black, and I am confident when
turning ripe will become entirely so.
I
witnessed the sale of the cargo, and the
loss was at least 75 per cent of what the
fruit would have sold for had it not been
injured by the process of ’’fumigation.”
Should this thing continue, I desire to
say to the people of New Orleans that the
fruit trade, so far as the bananas are
concerned will be entirely broken up.
Many of the consumers are afraid to eat
it, dreading they will be poisoned, and
in fact it looks bad enough to ’’poison
me.”50
Choppin attempted to end the matter by ordering the
Resident Physician at Mississippi Station to allow the
fruit dealers to remove their fruit prior to fumigation.
He absolutely refused to allow vessels from Jamaica or any
other yellow fever port to by-pass the quarantine, because
he believed it was a matter of history that the great epi
demic of 1353 had been introduced by a vessel from Jamaica.

5QIbid., April 6, 1378.

Choppin felt that importers would regard the new arrange
ment as being satisfactory, but this was not the case.
Near the end of May the Board was served with an injunction
restraining it from quarantining and fumigating a fruit
schooner arriving from Jamaica.

Choppin hastened to the

judge who issued the injunction, and successfully con
vinced him that the order endangered the entire system by
which the Board was seeking to keep yellow fever from New
Orleans.

He told a Picayune reporter that the Board was

conducting a great quarantine experiment.

"The efficacy

of quarantine and disinfection was to be thoroughly test
ed," he declared, "and should they again prove successful,
any fear of the introduction and prevalence of yellow
fever in this city would be at an e n d . " ^

The Board de

pended on disinfection in 1^76 ana 1$77} and had been
elated with the results; one more year, felt Choppin,
would establish the utility of this approach to quaran
tine.

Much to the chagrin and dismay of everyone, within

a very short time the Crescent City was to be visited by
one of its most devastating yellow fever epidemics.

^ I b i d ., April 10, 11, June 1, 1$7$-

CHAPTER X
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF HEALTH
In I 878 yellow fever scourged the Mississippi Valley
and the Gulf Coast as never before.

Although mortality

totals in New Orleans were less than in 1853 and 1858, the

1878 epidemic devastated a wider area.

The exact number

of deaths cannot be accurately ascertained, but most esti
mates placed the total figure at about twrenty thousand.
What caused the disastrous visitation of Yellow Jack?
Many residents of the Mississippi Valley thought they knew
the answer to this question; the Louisiana Board of Health
was held responsible.
As frequently happened, the epidemic failed to reach
its peak until late summer and early autumn.

It was not

until the latter part of July that the presence of yellow
fever in New Orleans first attracted attention.

A Picayune

editorial appearing July 24* while imploring the Board of
Health to publish all facts relating to the health of the
city, mentioned that fourteen cases of yellow fever had
been reported during the past few days.

All of the af

flicted were said to have been unacclimated, and therefore
no cause for alarm existed among habitual residents of the
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Crescent City.'*'

The following day a Picayune editorial

informed the public that twenty-one cases had been reported
by the Board of Health, eleven of which terminated fatally.
The Board was fully convinced of its ability to confine
those cases, declared the editor, and no apprehensions were
2
being entertained that the disease might spread.
The Mew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, appearing
August 1, evidently anticipated a large-scale outbreak.

The

possible origin of the latest pestilential invasion was
discussed, but no conclusion w a s reached.

The Board of

Health was attempting to stamp out yellow fever by disin
fection, reported the editor, but this device was proving
3
less effective than before.
Local quarantines against New Orleans had in the past
years presented only a minor problem, but in 1878 the Cres
cent City found itself nearly isolated.

Alarm and dismay

regarding action taken by some localities was manifested by
the New Orleans press as early as August 1.

The right of

self-protection was admitted, but exclusion and non-inter
course were said to have been carried to ridiculous excesses.
Such places as Houma, Bayou Sara, and Vicksburg quickly
established rigid quarantines against Mew Orleans when news
of yellow fever circulated, but Mobile, which suspended

•^Picayune, July 24, 1878.
2Ibid., July 25, 1378.
^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s,,
VI {1873-797, 177-79.
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rail communication, bore the brunt of assaults from Crescent City newspapers.

4

Mobile had a perfect right to quarantine, but not to
establish a blockade against interstate commerce, asserted
the Democrat.

Placing an absolute embargo upon commerce

between New Orleans and Mobile,

continued the editorial,

was a power reserved exclusively to the Congress of the
United States.

The Democrat suggested that restrictions

had not been established for sanitary reasons, but only
because the Alabama city was jealous of New Orleans and
sought to destroy her trade.

The Picayune felt that

"senile fear" rather than jealousy had motivated Mobile to
create the questionable quarantine.

The Louisiana State

Board of Health adopted a resolution declaring the Mobile
quarantine "unnecessarily harsh," and requesting that
through passenger and freight trains be allowed to pass
after undergoing fumigation and disinfection.

5

During ensuing weeks the number of local quarantines
multiplied.

According to the Picayune, all principal towns

in Louisiana and most small villages within three hundred
miles of New Orleans had fenced themselves in by adopting
restrictions forbidding intercourse writh Louisiana’s dan
gerously infected metropolis.

Included in the list of

^Democrat, August 1, 1378; Picayune, August 1,
1373.

^Democrat, August 1, 1373; Picayune, August 2,
1373.
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major cities imposing quarantines were Natchez, Memphis,
Galveston, Pensacola, Cairo, and Cincinnatti.

On August 6

Democrat spoke of a "reign of terror" in the South,
and stated that it had become impossible to give the number
of towns and villages which had quarantined against New Or
leans.

A week later the Picayune asserted:

"The quaran

tine against this ciay by the landings along the bends is
working serious injury to our local packets, which are
debarred from putting off their persons or merchandise at
these various points."0
By mid-August the number of new cases of yellow fever
reported every twenty-four hours had reached one hundred,
and the daily death toll was averaging about twenty.

The

Board of Health at this time considered declaring the ex
istence of an epidemic, but decided against it chiefly
because many cases of yellow fever were of a very mild
variety.

Two days later, however, the Howard Association

announced to the public its intention of granting aid to
the destitute sick.

The Picayune reported August 20 that

the Howards were sending nurses and physicians wherever
they were needed, and were supplying afflicted families
7
with food and other necessities.
The Board of Health continued delaying the proclamation

°Picayune, August 1, 13, 187$; Democrat, August
6, 1878.

7picayune, August 16, 20, 1878; Democrat, August
17, 1878.

of an epidemic, believing it unwise to create undue alarm.
Mortality from yellow fever passed the thousand mark before
the Board was ready to admit that the disease was prevail
ing in the Crescent City.

Partly justifiable was a fierce

attack on the Board and its President, Dr. Samuel Choppin,
by the Chicago Times.

Louisiana health officials were

accused of having suppressed information regarding the
real extent of the epidemic.

This unfavorable opinion of

the Louisiana Board of Health was evidently a general one
throughout much of the Mississippi Valley and the Gulf
Coast.

"In their criminal endeavor to shield themselves

from isolation, brought on by quarantine restrictions,"
declared a Corpus Christi psper, "they have endangered the
lives of thousands, and have laid themselves open to a just
censure from the world."
Mew Orleans felt the full brunt of the epidemic during
September when approximately nineteen hundred Mew Orleanians
succumbed to yellow fever.

By October the number of cases

reported since July 1 was approaching ten thousand, and
mortality from Yellow Jack wras nearing three thousand.
Throughout the first half of October the toll continued to
mount, with some fifty lives each day being taken by the
remorseless invader.

As was expected, the epidemic faltered

during the latter part of the month and receded sharply.

^Democrat, August 20, 30> 137$•
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Staggering death figures were also being reported by other
cities and villages, especially Memphis.

Finally, on Novem

ber 7 the Board of Health announced it was safe for absen
tees to return to New Orleans.^
Gradually the surrounding areas suspended their quar
antines against New Orleans.

But some localities chose to

be unduly cautious and retain their restrictions after the
danger was gone.

The Democrat of November 11 urged the

immediate raising of quarantines everywhere; trade was said
to have already suffered enough.

When Galveston declared

its intention of maintaining a quarantine until December
20, that city was accused of intentionally seeking to injure
New Orleans commercially.

10

Long before the epidemic had run its course, a threeman Yellow Fever Commission was appointed by the SurgeonGeneral of the United States.

This action was taken in

response to petitions and individual appeals made to
President Rutherford B. Hayes,

calling upon him to create

a special body to investigate the epidemic.

Dr. Samuel

M. Bemiss of New Orleans, the President of the Commission,
let it be known early in October that sessions would be
held in the Crescent City for about one week before the
Commission moved on to other cities.

^Ibid., November 10, 1&7$.
IQIbid., November 11, 13, 1376.
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information on the origin, spread, or prevention of yellow
fever were asked to present this information to the Commis
sion either orally or in writing.

A few days later a

circular letter was addressed to the public containing
twenty-five questions which it was hoped "all intelligent
citizens and lovers of humanity” would answer promptly.
In this way the Commission presumably expected to gather
all important facts relative to the epidemic of 1373.
Shortly thereafter,

11

the Louisiana Board of Health

created a Yellow Fever Commission of its own.

Dr. Choppin

stated that the object of this Commission was "to inquire
into the cases of the prevailing epidemic, and to make a
report to the Legislature, so that action could be taken
with a view of preventing its recurrence.”

Choppin ap

pointed five Board members whose duty it was to investigate
the course of yellow fever throughout Louisiana.

12

Com

paratively little was heard of this state Commission, how
ever, because the federal appointees attracted an unusual
amount of attention.
A report from the Commission headed by Dr. Bemiss was
to be presented to the annual meeting of the American Public

^ Picayune, October 4, 6, 1373; Democrat, October
7, 1373; J. M. Woodworth, "A Brief Review of the Organiza
tion and Purpose of the Yellow Fever Commission," Public
Health Reports and Papers Presented to the meetings of the
American Public Health Association in the Years 1327-1373
(Boston, l"330) ,
12Picayune, October 12, 1373; Democrat, October 12,
1373.

309
Health Association^ in Richmond, Virginia during the
latter part of November.

The Association extended invi

tations to all state and municipal Boards of Health and to
public-spirited citizens interested in seeking protective
measures against yellow fever and other dangers to the
public h e a l t h . ^

Dr. Choppin announced his intention to

be present at Richmond in order to show that yellow fever
was of foreign importation.

As early as August Choppin

was convinced that the epidemic had been caused from germs
imported by the steamship Emily B. Souder.

He now ex

pressed his determination to recommend to the American
Public Health Association that in the future absolute non
intercourse be imposed against the West Indies and other
yellow fever ports during the summer m o n t h s . ^
The response by the Mew Orleans press to Choppin*s
propostion was immediate and decidedly unfavorable.

The

newspapers stated that the general public was likewise
opposed to the extreme solution for the yellow fever prob
lem proposed by the President of the Board of Health.

The

editor of the Picayune asserted his conviction that New
Orleans could not afford so costly an experiment merely to

The American Public Health Association was an
organization which included in its membership most of the
nation’s public health leaders.
It had been organized in
1872, and held annual meetings beginning in 1873* Smillie,
Public Health, pp. 297-305*
-^ P i c a y u n e , October 16, November 10, 1878.
^^Democrat, August 30, November 16, 1878.
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settle the question of whether or not yellow fever was
always imported from tropical regions.

He suggested a

less energetic quarantine, similar to the one serving New
York City so successfully.

Neither the Picayune nor the

Democrat would concede that all yellow fever epidemics resuited strictly from outside causes.

16

Some New Orleanians, declared the Democrat, were
suggesting the termination of all efforts to quarantine
their city.

On November 21 a meeting of bankers, insurance

agents, and citizens interested in fostering trade with
tropical countries was held.

A committee was formed to

persuade the state Legislature to modify or repeal the
existing quarantine.

Editorial comment in the daily papers

was as much opposed to this action as it was to Choppin’s
non-intercourse proposal.

It seemed clear that the result

of easing the state quarantine would be a barrage of shot
gun quarantines which would ’’hermetically seal” New Or
leans from the interior.

Many localities had successfully

used these ’’lawless, unconstitutional” quarantines,

imposed

by force, to discontinue all contact with the Crescent City
during the summer of 1$78> and it was assumed that this
same device would be used in the future upon very little
provocation . ^

The Picayune presented the problem clearly:

-^Picayune, November 21, 137$; Democrat, November
2 2 , 1873.
^Democrat, November 22, 1878 , Picayune, November
23, 1878.

311
Whether justly, or unjustly, N e w Or
leans is held responsible for the epidemics
which has recently desolated so many cities,
towns and villages in the Southwest.
Wheth
er justly, or unjust!;'', Ne w Orleans is ac
cused of having transmitted to the country
a terrible and fatal disease against which
she might have guarded by rigorous quaran
tine, or by proper sanitary measures w i t h 
in her own limits.
Whether reasonably, or
unreasonably, those communities demand
that New Orleans shall prevent the recur
rence o f such a calamity, on penalty of
a total severance of relations with her,
such as, if repeated from year to year,
would compass her certain ruin.^°
Dr. Bemiss presented to the American Public Health
Association a detailed report of the investigations con
ducted by the Yellow Fever Commission in the Mississippi
Valley.

The committee to which this report was referred

expressed its approval with the work done by the Commis
sion.

Bemiss, writing in the Ne w Orleans liedical and

Surgi cal J o u r n a l , stated that the report he delivered at
the Richmond meeting was not complete, and that the Co m 
m i s s i o n ’s final report would be forthcoming later.

He

asserted that the Commission was in unanimous agreement
on several important points.

First, declared Bemiss,

yellow fever could not in a single instance be shown to
have been of indigenous origin;

second,

in most towns,

testimony of importation was direct and convincing; third,
transmission of yellow fever was wholly by human inter
course,

including fomites;

fourth, disinfectants had

■^Picayune, November 23, 187&*
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proven useless; and finally:

"Quarantines established

with such a degree of surveillance and.rigor, that absolute
non-intercourse is the result, have effectually and without
exception, protected those quarantined fro:;: attacks of
yellow fever."

19

The Commission evidently agreed with

Choppin with regard to the merits of non-intercourse.
Dr. Choppin, as he had promised,

told the American

Public Health Association that' the Emily B, Souder intro
duced the Cirst cases of yellow fever into New Orleans in
I'-'yB,

He

an exotic

asserted his conviction that yellow fever was
disease, always imported. The only certain

preventive, he maintained, was non-intercourse between
April and November with ports where the disease was in
digenous.

Conditional quarantines could not be effective,

concluded the Louisiana official, because of laxity in
enforcement and the cupidity of commercial men.

20

Not everyone agreed with Bemiss and Choppin.

Dr.

D. C. Holliday of New Orleans also presented a paper at
the Richmond meeting in which he implied that the Yellow
Fever Commission had distorted facts in a manner which
seemed to

indicate that yellow fever was invariably

result of

importation.

Yellow fever

was

the

indigenousto

■^Reports and Papers . . . of the American Public
Health Association . . . 1377-1873, IV7~J55-$6, 3 6 1 ^ 2 1
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s., VI (lS7$-79)>

W5-JUT.

20Reports and Papers . . . of the American Publ_ic
Health Association .
.1877-12?!, IV, 190-20F:
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New Orleans, thought Holliday, and quarantine was a useless
extravagance.

21

The Picayune, editorialising on the diver

sity of opinion supposedly found among doctors, assailed
the entire medical profession for stubbornly adhering to
preconceived opinions and failing to rely upon scientific
testimony.

Year after year, continued the editorial, the

public was bombarded with T,the same round of inconclusive
argument, and contradictory opinion; the same array of
evidence to show that yellow fever is indigenous and en
demic, and the same array of facts to prove that it is
importable and transmissible.11

The Democrat expressed

similar dissatisfaction witn physicians.

22

The movement for an effective national quarantine
was now making rapid headway.

A bulletin from Washington

dated November 25 indicated that Congress was ready to
establish a national quarantine against yellow fever.
Upon the convening of Congress a week later, President
Hayes commenced his annual message with a discussion of
public health.

Hayes spoke of the great loss of life

and wealth and the intense suffering caused by the recent
epidemic.

A general public sentiment had been awakened,

he said, in favor of a national sanitary administration to
control quarantine.

He urged Congress to give the subject

2lIbi d., pp. 237-39 .
^Picayune, November 28, 1878; Democrat, November
26, 1373.
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early and careful consideration.^3
Even before the devastating yellow fever outbreak of
1#7$, the possibility of establishing a central quarantine
authority was being discussed widely.

Earlier in the year

a convention held at Jacksonville, Florida considered this
matter at length.

The delegates, representing key cities

of the South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, presented a memorial
to Congress reciting the dire results of frequent epidemics.
Quarantines administered by state and municipal authorities
were ineffective, maintained the delegates.

Therefore,

concluded trie memorial:
we believe that the remedy for the
correction of these evils is within the
constitutional powers of the general
government, and we pray for the protec
tion of the public health, and for the
promotion of commerce, that your hon
orable bodies will replace the existing
methods by a uniform and effective sys
tem of quarantine on the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts.24
Congress responded very feebly by passing a law,
April 29, 137$, which provided feoeral assistance to local
quarantine officers.

United States consuls residing in

foreign ports having contagious or infectious diseases
were ordered to report to the Supervising Surgeon-General
of the Marine Hospital Service whenever a vessel left that

23p i cayune, November 29, 1^78; Congressional Record
• • • Forty-Fifth Congress, Third Session (Washington,' 1879),
Vol. 3, Part 1, p. 3.
^ ^Mjscel1aneous Documents of the Senate of the
United States, Forty-Fifth Congress, Second Session (Wash
ington, 1S73) Vol. 2, Document No. 42, pp. 1-3*
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port for the United S totes.

The Mari ne Hospital Service

was then to notify the proper state and municipal officers
at the port of destination.

"There shall be no interfer

ence in any manner with the quarantine laws or regulations
as they now exist or may hereafter be adopted under State
o5

laws," declared the act.

Despite this measure’s obvious

weakness, by granting authority to the Marine Hospital
Service it was within a few years to loom as very signifi
cant legislation.
When Congress convened the following December,

state

quarantine regulations were not nearly so sacrosanct.
Senator Isharn Harris of Tennessee, the foremost leader of
the formidable faction in Congress seeking a strong na
tional quarantine, successfully secured the adoption of
a resolution proposing the appointment of a Joint Committee
to investigate and report on the best means of preventing
the introduction and spread of epidemic diseases in the
United States.

The Committee was to be composed of four

senators and five representatives, according to Harris’
proposal, and would be given power to employ experts and
scientists to visit recently infected localities to obtain
full and accurate information.

^ Statutes at Large of the United States of America,
Forty-Fifth Congress, Second Session, I§7$-79 "(Washington,
w m >
XX,

^ Miscellaneous Documents of the Senate of the
United States', Forty-.Fifth Congress, Third Session (Wash
ington, "T^79T» Vol. 1, Document No. 2, no p.

As finally constituted, the Congressional Yellow
Fever Commission, as it was commonly called, was made up
of twelve members,

six from each house.

To aid the in

vestigation, this Committee, or Commission, appointed a
n3oard of Experts" comprised largely of physicians.

On

this Board were the eminent New Orleans doctors, Cnaille/
and Bemiss, and Colonel T. S. Hardee, also of New Orleans,
the lone non-medical man among tne appointees.2?

The

experts met in Memphis December 2c, and there they received
instructions to collect facts regarding the epidemic of
1&73 and to meet in Washington January 15.

Their cnief

objective was to determine to what extent importation had
been responsible for tne epidemic, and how future importa
tions of infectious and contagious diseases could be avert
ed.

In addition, a joint sub-committee of three senators

and three representatives was sent to New Orleans to take
testimony from leading medical and commercial men, and a
similar sub-committee v/as dispatched to Memphis.

These

sub-committees later submitted their findings to the Board
Of}

of Experts to assist that body in formulating conclusions.

2?0n D ecember 21 Congress adopted a joint resolu
tion appropriating fifty thousand dollars for the purpose
of investigating the origin and cause of epidemic diseases,
especially yellow fever and cholera, and the best method of
preventing their introduction and spread in the United
States.
Statutes at Large . . . , Forty-Fifth Congress,
Third Session (Washington, 1&79), p." 4>?7.
2^Report of the Committees of the Senate of the
United States, Forty-Fifth Congress, Third Session (Wash
ington ,~T^797) Vol. 2, Report No. 734> pp. 1-2.
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The Joint Congressional Committee reported February
7, 1379, a week after the Board, of Experts, had delivered
its official recommendation that a national board of health
be created to assist in preventing epidemics.

Nearly all

yellow fever invasions, the Committee report asserted,
could be traced with certainty or a high degree of proba
bility to a new importation.

Furti.ermore, no conclusive

proof could be found that yellow fever was indigenous to
any part of the country.

Non-intercourse with ports where

epidemic disease prevailed was the only certain means of
preventing importation,

continued the Report, but next

best was a national quarantine involving strict sanitary
measures to be observed by vessels at the port of depar
ture, with careful inspection and thorough disinfection of
those vessels before being allowed to enter the United
States.

With respect to the question of whether Congress

had authority to legislate on this matter, tne report de
clared that Congress1 constitutional power to regulate
commerce should not only include the promotion of commerce
but also the prevention of importable epidemic diseases.
To reassure the states, the Committee expressed its opinion
that Congress had no power whatever to supersede or interfere with their individual quarantine regulations.

29

A lav/ based upon the recommendations of the Joint

29jbid_., pp. 2-3.

Committee and the Board of Experts was passed by Congress
March 3j 1^79*

This new statute, r,An act to prevent the

introduction of infectious or contagious diseases into the
United States, and to establish a National Board of Health,11
provided a framework for the national quarantine many re
formers hoped would be adopted later.

A National Board of

Health consisting of seven regular members appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate
was created.

In addition, the National Board was to include

a medical officer from the army,

the navy, the Marine Hos

pital Service, and the Department of Justice, 'bringing the
Board’s total membership to eleven.

The seven appointive

members were to receive ten dollars each day when on duty;
the other four were entitled to no pay.

The new organiza

tion was empowered to frame all necessary rules and regula
tions authorized or required by the act, and to make special
investigations aimed at promoting its objects.

The National

Board of Health was to be primarily an information-gathering
agency with power to advise state and national officers on
questions which in the Board’s opinion might tend to pre
serve and improve the public health.

Fifty thousand dollars

was appropriated to pay the salaries of Board members and
to cover other expenses.

30

The Louisiana Board of Health, in the meantime, had

30iStatutes at Large . . . , Forty-Fifth Congress,
Third .Session, XX, 4o4-B5.
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produced its annual Report for 1C'7 3".

Dr. Chop pin asserted

as before that yellow fever made its appearance in New Or
leans as a result of two cases reaching the city aboard
the steamship Emily B. Souder.

The purser and one of the

engineers had passed inspection supposedly suffering from
neuralgia, but they later died of yellow fever after having
spent some time in New Orleans.

Choppin, noting that more

than four thousand had died in the Crescent City during
the epidemic, directed attention to the fact that Galveston,
Mobile,

Shreveport, Monroe, and Natchez had completely es

caped the disaster, presumably by their shotgun quarantines.
The lesson to be observed, thought Chop in, was that there
could be no mediocrity in a quarantine; it had to impose
ins urmount a ble barriers between healthy and infected com
munities.

The failure of moderate quarantine and of dis

infection to resist yellow fever in 1378 indicated to
Choppin that Louisiana must strengthen its quarantine sys
tem.

Choopin, representing the State Board, asserted that

the only solution appeared to be a six month ban on all
commerce between New Orleans and infected localities.

31

Governor Nicholls sympathized with Choppin’s position
on quarantine.

Nicholls told the General Assembly at the

beginning of the 1379 session that individual good must

3-IAnnual Report of the Board of Health of the State
Louisiana to the General Assembly for the Year 1378
"(New Orleans, 1879 )> pp. IT 13-1A*
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yield to public good.

Even if the quarantinists were

eventually proven wrong, declared the Governor,
better to injure the trade

of a few New Orleans business

men than to jeopardize thelives of
in the Mississipoi Valley.

it seemed

hundreds of thousands

Nicholls lauded trie Board of

Health, and asserted that the Board would not have recom
mended a quarantine at all if there ’were not sufficient
grounds for believing the quarantine was yielding some
benefit .3^
A bill was introduced

into the Legislature to repeal

the act of l#7o which had eased

the quarantine.

The pro

posed bill empowered the Board of Health to detain at its
discretion all vessels from "ports where yellow fever gen
erally prevails, and from ports where other contagious
diseases are reported to exist" for a period not exceeding
sixty days.

This modification would undoubtedly have tended

to produce a rigid quarantine, but the bill was

d e f e a t e d . 33

When the General Assembly adjourned without granting the
Board of Health any supplementary quarantine powers what
ever, the New Orleans Medical and Surgical J ournal was
indignant:
The truth might as well be recognized:
there is a groundless jealousy on the part
of the average legislator, as well as the

3^Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House
of Representatives, of the State of Louisiana . . . 1^79
TNew Orleans, I'S79) > p. 17.

33ibid., pp. 40, 122, 144.
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average citizen, towards the hoard of
Health and the medical profession in
general, because they are prominent ex
ponents of progress in science.
It is
only a
new chapter in the long history
of the
warfare of science against igno
rance and superstition, in which the
people resist at every point the civili
zation which science proffers.34
Popular resentment against the legislators for having
failed to strengthen the state quarantine system was great,
but business interests opposed to quarantine were influen
tial and well organised.

As in the past, this latter

faction was ably seconded by some of the local press and
physicians who were still convinced that epidemics resulted
primarily from

local causes.

The New Orleans Times,a

leading daily newspaper, declared

that the StateBoard of

Health knew very little about the yellow fever outbreak in
1#7'3, but had collected rumors and conjectures to bolster
its theory that the epidemic could have been averted by
a rigid quarantine.35

^ committee of the New Orleans M e d 

ical and Surgical Association, a new organization, asserted
that Choppin’s proposed plan to enforce absolute non-inter
course between New Orleans and the West Indies would create
a vicious system which existed only during the "barbarous
ages," and had been abolished by the good sense and prac
tical knowledge of civilised nations.

Quarantine "has

•^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
VI ( 13 73 - 7 W T £7o3

^ % e w Orleans Times , March 6, 1879.

322
nev er prevented
maintained,

. . . ye llow f e v e r , n the committee report

and even the existing system was said to in

terf er e un ju st if iab ly with the c i t y ’s commercial r e l a 
tions .xa
Despi te the failure of the Board o f Health to obtain
legislation putting teeth into the state quarantine,

Dr.

Choppin wa s roundly excoriated in some circles for having
the aud aci ty to advocate non-intercourse.
Board,
Dr.

in fact,

F. Loeber,

The entire

became the object of considerable abuse.
one of the Board members, was

Choppin's remarks in the 1S?3 Report
for non-intercourse.

led to protest

concerning the need

Loeber seemed satisfied w h e n informed

the Report was intended to repre sen t only the views of the
Board President.

This represented an innovation,

because

in the past the annual Reports were submitted to th e entire
Board before publication.
In March,
businessmen,

17

'

1379 some Crescent City civic leader's, m o s t l y ’

organized the Auxiliary Sanitary Association

of H e w Orleans.

The object of the Association was to aid

public officials in improving the

sanitary condition of the

city.

Charles A. Wh i tn ey became President and Dr. C. B,

White,

former State Health Officer, was

Director.

Dr.

chosen San ita ry

Choppin and a committee of three from the

■^N ew Orleans Med ic al and Su rgical Journal,
VI

(1373-7977
3 7 p e m o c r a t , Marc h 12, 1379.

n.s.,
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Board of He a l t h met wi t h the A u x i l i a r y Sa nit ar y
April 15 and we re r eas su red by the
new o r g a n i za ti on had no

A sso ci ati on

"Sa nitarians" that the

intention of finding fault w i t h

le gal ly -c on st it ut ed healt h authorities.
to ac k no wl ed ge this pro nouncement

The Times refused

and r em a i n e d of the o p i n 

ion that the A ss o c i a t i o n had been establ ish ed to emphasize
H e w O rl ea ns s a n i ta ti on as opposed
stinate qua ran ti ne craze."

to the

"fo ol ish and o b 

R e fe rr in g to th e Board and A s 

sociation as "essentially a nt ag on i s t i c , " the Times remarked:
If the Board of H e a l t h chooses to
d ev ote its time and its revenues to the .
m a i n te na nc e of a vicious and injurious
system of quarantine, the C i t i z e n s ’ A s 
sociation w i l l raise mo n ey and organize
end ea vor with a view to a c c o m p l i s h i n g the
more serious and n e c e s s a r y a nd sensible
ends whic h t h e Board ignores.
That there
could be h a r m o n y of aim or sympathy of
opin io n un d e r the ci rcu mst an ces is out
of the q u e s t i o n . 39
Th e Picayune and the De mo c ra t

claimed that the public d e 

m a n d e d h ar mon y b e tw ee n the twro or ga niz ati on s,

but Times

assa u lt s on the Board of H e a l t h were unrelenting.
O p p o s i t i o n In N e w Orleans to the
policy

B o a r d ’s qua rantine

■■.as p r ob ab ly grea ter in 1B79 than it had ever been

previously.

Dr.

Choppin,

the v i c t i m of much of t h e o p p r o 

brium, was in the m ea nt im e re- el ec t ed u n a n i m o u s l y by the
oth er Board me m b e r s to serve as Pr es i de nt
C h op pi n annou nce d that his

zeal and

fixity of p ur po se were

3&lbid., March 29j April 6, 1B7939Times, April 16, 1&79.

for a no the r year.
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und iminished, ana that he was determined to maintain a
strict quarantine.

Almost immediately after reorganisation

the Bo,rd of Health advised Governor Micholls to issue a
quarantine proclamation effective May 1.

The quarantine

was to be enforced against vessels from all West Indian
ports, ports south of Texas along the Gulf of Mexico

(in

cluding the Bay Islands), ports on the mainland bordering
the Caribbean Sea, and all ports along the Atlantic coast
of South America as far south as Buenos Aires.

The deten

tion period established for vessels included in the proc
lamation 'was twenty days,

indicating clearly that the Board

of Health had reversed its policy of depending largely upon
disinfection.

But the Board was soon to find that en

forcing a twenty day quarantine would not be e a s y . ^
At least three newspapers,

the German Gazette, the

Times, and the City I t e m , vigorously attacked, the Board of
Health and its quarantine policy, and suggested that the
Auxiliary Sanitary Association represented more faithfully
the interests of Mew Orleans.

The Times claimed that public

opinion was opposed to the rigid quarantine, the number of
persons supporting it being ’’literally insignificant.”
The Democrat and the Picayune denounced the Board's antag
onists,

emphasizing the need for promoting confidence in

Louisiana health authorities at home and throughout the

^ Picayune, April 5* 12, IE?79.
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Mississippi Valley.

If the Times were to continue its.

"vicious and dangerous policy," asserted the D e m o c r a t ,
surrounding states would invoke shotgun quarantines at the
slightest provocation, and New Orleans commerce would be
as effectually destroyed as if another epidemic a p p e a r e d . ^
The problem had to be faced:

if New Orleans did not mai n

tain a rigid quarantine against supposedly infected ports,
inland towns would quarantine New Orleans.
Seemingly the Board stood firm in its determination
to enforce the twenty day quarantine despite the generally
unfavorable reaction from the press.

The pressure mounted,

however, which evidently led the Board of Health to find a
scape-goat.

Dr. P. 3. Carrington,

the Quarantine Officer

at Mississippi Station, had been vilified frequently in
the newspapers and elsewhere since the epidemic of the
previous year because he had allowed the Emily B. Souder
to pass the quarantine.

Early in May,

1£>79 a resolution

was adopted by the Board asking Governor Nicholls to re
move Carrington, ostensibly because he had mistreated the
captain and crew of the bark Peter a few days before.
Nicholls directed Choppin to call a special meeting of the
Board o f Health to formulate a precise statement o f reasons
why Carrington should be removed.

The Governor coupled

this action with a mild rebuke to the state health officials

^Democrat, April 15, IB, 28, 1$79; Times, April
15, 1879.
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for having yielded to public clamor.
Nicholls,

Choppin agreed with

and declared that Carrington was in no measure

responsible for the epidemic of l6?6.

The fault,

said

Choppin, lay in the law of 1676 which permitted vessels to
be detained only for fumigation and disinfection.

A ma

jority of the Board members then concluded that the harried
quarantine official was competent.
How did the public feel about the ne w quarantine?
This question was hotly disputed.

The i-ica> une maintained

unqualifiedly that its views supporting the Board of Health
were also held by most Mew O r l e a n i a n s . ^

The T i m e s , on the

other hand, asserted that nine-tenths of the intelligent
citizens of the Crescent City agreed with its policy of
objecting to an embargo being placed upon commerce.
so-called embargo,

also referred

The

to as "C hoppinis m,n was

destroying the life o.f the city and injuring the prosperity
of the state,

claimed the T i m e s .^

Indicative of the resentment against Choppin,

he re 

ceived an anonymous letter signed by his f,best friend”
which contained a warning that some one was getting ready
to kill him if he refused to relent on the quarantine i s s u e . ^

^ D e m o c r a t , Kay 3>

1679*

^ p ic ay un e, April 30, 1679 /""afternoon ed._7.
^Times,

Hay 2, 1679.

^ P i c a y u n e , May 6, 16?9*
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Immediately the Times was accused of having: fomented the
threatening; letter by its daily diatribes against state
health officials.
reply:

As usual, the Times had a slashing

"The TIMES confines itself to argument and fact,

but it is hardly to be wondered at if the Dagos and long
shoremen and the hundreds of other laboring people should
have a different way of expressing their resentment."^*
Two days later Choppin countered by denouncing the Times
as a "communistic paper," and requesting the editor to send
a reporter to replace the insolent one previously given
in

the assignment of attending Board of Health meetings.
Dr. Choppin told a Board meeting May

8

that not a

single medical or sanitary organization from any state had
protested against. Louisiana quarantine restrictions or the
general policy of the Board of Health.
meeting, however,

At this very same

a resolution was adopted creating a com

mittee to consider whether modifications beneficial to New
Orleans commercial interests could be made in existing
quarantine regulations without impairing their effectiveness.
It Vv»as noted that a few modifications had already been made,
and Co'J.onel T. 3. Hardee asserted that the 3oard should be
ready to eliminate "any rigorous or unnecessary hardships
in our quarantine system, where they can be pointed out

^Times, May 7, 1379.
^Democrat, May 9> 1379

as existing without reasonable cause and to the detriment
of public interests.”

The Committee on Quarantine M o d i 

fications reported a few days later,

the only significant

recommendation being that quarantine restrictions against
vessels arriving from some of the Bay Islands be relaxed.
The Governor issued a proclamation effecting that change .^
This meager modification, goaded the T i m e s , which had
expected much more,
ently,

into a new round of vehemence.

Appar

complained the editor, the state government was

completely submissive to the ”iiare-brained experiments and
arrogant policy” of the state health authorities.

’’Unless

some check be put upon the violent and arbitrary tendency
of the Board of Health,” he continued,

"New Orleans will,

in the course of a very short while, be fit for nothing but
pastureland and might as well be abandoned to that u s e . ”
The Times spoke of an ” 1irrepressible conflict'

between the

scientific speculations of doctors and the monetary specu
lations of merchan ts,” and asserted that the United States
Supreme Court must determine the limitations of state police
powers. The Board of Health, maintained the Times, had not
only been quarantining but also interfering with commerce. 5®
Relief was rather quick in coming.

At a special m e e t 

ing June 3 the Board, after a heated discussion,

^ Picayune, May 9, l£79*

49Ibid., May 13, 15, 1379.
^ Times, May 16, 25, 1^79.

voted five
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to four in favor of reducing the quarantine to ten days. 5^T*le Times rejoiced in what it called "a signal triumph of
common sense, as expressed in public opinion, over the
tyrannical and arbitrary pretentions of authority as ex
pressed in a body of small officials.”

Reduction of the

detention period to ten days was by no means a complete
remedy, declared the editor, but it was encouraging as an
explicit confession that the Board of Health had erred.
The exasperating fact,
chievous folly” was

he continued, was that the Tfmis

ersisted in "until it crippled the

whole system of our foreign commerce."

The Times sug

gested the adoption by Louisiana of a "scientific quaran
tine” based upon the system employed by the state of 1\!ew
Yo r k . 52

No further change was made,

but states nearby

were of the opinion that modifications had already weakened
the Louisiana quarantine to a dangerous extent.
The great yellow fever epidemic of 13?S which deci
mated much of the Mississippi Valley brought with it an
almost immovable distrust of Louisiana health officials.
Whether justified or not, a strong feeling had arisen that
only through some agency other than the Louisiana Board of
Health could this vast area feel secure from epidemic dis
eases which might be transported up the river,

51peinocrat, June k, 1B79*
52Times, June 5, 6, 1$79.
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often questionable, were pointed out whe n numerous local
ities h :id been infected from New Orleans.

This fear was

made manifest by the man y shotgun quarantines imposed
against the Crescent City during the 1$7& outbreak.
fear did not subside;

The

now these localities wanted organ 

ized protection against imported disease to avert a future
disaster.
Growing, out of the experience of 1$7B the Sanitary
Council of the Mississippi Valley was organized the follow
ing spring.

This Council consisted o f delegates from state

and local boards of health and from sanitary associations
throughout the Valley.
also represented.

The National Board of Health was

The avowed object o f the Council was to

promote interstate sanitation and prevent the spread of
epidemics.

Dr. Choppin was present at the organizational

meeting in Memphis held April 30, but the Louisiana State
Board of Health did not continue active participation when
it became evident that the Coun cil’s views regarding quar
antine administration on the lower Mississippi were basi 
cally antipathetic to those of Louisiana health authorities.
At first,

relations were friendly, but the jurisdictional

conflict shaping up between the National Board of Health
and the Louisiana Board found the Sanitary Council of the
Mississippi Valley supporting federal health officials.

53

^ P i c a y u n e , May 5> 1$79> December 7 j 1&S0; Smillie,
Public H e a l t h , pp. 321-23*
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Soon after the establishment of the National Board
of Health in March,

1-379) President Hayes nominated as

members of this body seven eminent physicians including
Samuel M. Bemiss of New Orleans,

the Board ’s first Presi

dent , and James L. Cabell of the University of Virginia,
who succeeded Bemiss as chief executive a short time later.
At the organisational meeting held in Washington April 1,
the seven appointees were joined by medical officers from
the army, the navy,

the Marine Hospital Service, and the

Justice Department.

Bemiss was chosen President by the

other members,

and Dr. Thomas J. Turner, U. 3. N., was

elected Secretary.'’'^
Just what the functions of the National Board of
Health were to be was still very much open to conjecture.
The provisions of the organic act were disturbingly vague,
but apparently the Board had little real power.
speaking to the Louisiana Medical Society,

Bemiss,

explained that

his organisation intended to make sanitary surveys, to
collect information on public health matters, to appoint
scientific commissions to carry on investigations, and to
advise proper sanitary legislation for states and for the
federal government.

He said that the National Board would

cooperate with state and local associations and boards of

^Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the
Senate of the UnitecT States of America from MarcE 2l,
1'379)" to^Mar ch 3> 1 8 3 r ,~rh~clusive (Washington, 190 TT,
H I T , Tg; '"''Democrat, April 3, T379«
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health.

With regard to quarantine Bemiss asserted that

the National Board of Health had no powers beyond those
of an advisory and cooperative character.

55

Support for a national quarantine was growing ail the
while, and rather surprisingly,
was not averse.

even the New Orleans press

The Picayune favored a national quarantine

in the hope that the additional protection would reassure
inland communities and thereby prevent shotgun quarantines.
The Times also favored a national quarantine, apparently
believing that state boards would then automatically sur
render their powers in this matter.

Quarantine would

probably never prevent yellow fever, declared the T i m e s ,
but under a national system New Orleans would not be the
only port to suffer from this foolish policy.

This jour

nal disliked seeing ports with what were alleged to be
more intelligent quarantines winning over all the trade
previously going to the Crescent City.

56

The question of granting quarantine authority to the
National Board of Health was already being taken up by
Congress.

The bill under consideration was introduced by

Senator Isham Harris from Tennessee,

the state most dis

trustful of Louisiana health officials.

Harris held the

conviction that federal authority in this matter should be

55pjc ayune, April 10, 1579*
5^I_bid., April 12, 1$79; T i mes , April l£, 1^79•
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as complete as possible.

Foremost among the supporters of

Harris' bill were congressmen and senators from the Missis
sippi Valley whose views corresponded pretty closely with
those of the Tennesseean.
Opposition was by no means lacking.

The rights of

states and the rights of commerce, thought some, were being
sorely jeopardized.

Senator Hamlin of Maine believed the

bill's provisions unnecessarily harsh, insisting that it
was unwise to place the country's entire navigation in
the hands of a few men.

Senator V-hyte questioned the

constitutionality of the provision granting the federal
government power to go into states and interfere with
their quarantine regulations.

Representative Rice of

Massachusetts pointed out that court decisions had con
sistently regarded quarantine laws and regulations as
police matters reserved to the states. 57'
The Harris bill, when finally passed, bore a title
almost identical to the measure adopted in March:

"An

act to prevent the introduction of contagious and infec
tious diseases into the United States."

It now became

unlawful for a vessel from a foreign port where contagious
or infectious disease existed to enter the United States
except in accordance with the act's provisions, the rules

^Congressional Record . . . , Forty-Sixth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1$79)>""Vol. 9, Part 1,
p7 bHH;'^[bId., Vol. 9, Part 2, pp. 1540-41, 1642.
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and regulations of state boards of health, and rules and
regulations made in pursuance of the act.

The new law

went on to state that vessels from diseased ports would
thereafter be required to obtain from a United States con
sul or medical officer a certificate describing the sani
tary history of the vessel.
The National Board of Health, according to section
three, was to
/ might_7i

,Tco-operate with and,

ai dtr state and

municipal

so far asit lawfully
boards ofhealth in

the execution of their respective rules and regulations
to prevent the introduction of epidemic disease from for
eign countries and frovn one state to another.

At ports

and places in the United States where state quarantine
regulations did not exist,

the National Board of Health

was to report the facts to the President who could then
order the National Board to make necessary rules and reg
ulations which were to be enforced by state sanitary au
thorities.

If state authorities failed or refused to enforce

them, the President was empowered to detail an officer or
appoint a proper person for that purpose.
The National Board of Health was authorised by the
act to establish rules and regulations which vessels
sailing for a

port in the United States would be required

to observe at

the port of departure

fected)

and on its voyage.

(if the port were in

It was made the Board ’s dut}r

to obtain information on the sanitary condition of foreign
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ports from which disease might be imported into the United
States, and consular officers were to assist by providing
weekly reports.

State and local health authorities in

the United States were ordered to issue weekly sanitary
reports.

The National Board was to provide rules and reg

ulations to be observed at ports of destination in the
United States with regard to inspection and treatment of
vessels from foreign ports upon their arrival.

No vessel

was to be allowed to discharge cargo or land passengers
without a certificate from the health officer at a quar
antine station.
An appropriation of $500,000 was provided the National
Board of Health.

Disbursal of these funds was to be under

the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, based upon
estimates of expenditures made bv the Board and approved
by the Secretary of the Treasury.

The most important pro

visions of the 1S7S act which gave the Marine Hospital
Service certain limited powers over quarantine were re
pealed by this new law.

Finally, the tenth and last sec

tion of the act declared that the entire statute was to
remain in force no longer than four years. 53
The Louisiana State Board of Health was not especially
alarmed at first that the National Board with its new

^ Statutes at Large . . . , Forty-Sixth Congress,
First Session (Washington, 1330), XXI, 5-7*
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powers v.'ould encroach upon the "prerogatives" of state
officials.

However, Choppin did warn that the National

Board could not in any way interfere with existing state
regulations.

Louisiana had adopted a stringent quarantine,

he said, because yellow fever was regarded as a foreign
.foe, and the people of the state had a right to enact
measures for self-preservation.

59

In July, 1379 New Orleans again became involved in
quarantine difficulties with other communities.

Fortu

nately, 1-379 did not become another great epidemic year
in the Mississippi Valley, although yellow fever did gain
sufficient foothold to renew the panic of the previous year.
Memphis bore the brunt of the onslaught, but Mew Orleans,
though not seriously infected, again fell victim to the
shot-gun.

On June 10 the Louisiana Board of Health, hoping

to avert quarantines against New Orleans, adopted a quaran
tine of its own against Memphis which was on its way toward
another disaster.

The Board was attacked by the Times for

having acted with "indecent and foolhardy h a s t e , " ^ but if
it had held fixedly to its stand in this matter, possibly
New Orleans would have been saved grievous difficulty.
The first city to quarantine New Orleans was Galveston,
a nearly perennial trouble-maker.

59pjcayune, June 11, 1379.
^ T i m e s , July 13> 1379.

The quarantine was
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adopted by the Galveston Board of Health July 10 primarily
because the Louisiana Board had not adhered to a policy of
strict quarantine against the infected city of Memphis.

A

few days later the Galveston Board voted to continue the
restrictions because of "the reasonable probability of
yellow fever occurring in New Orleans."

The Louisiana

Board of Health protested the quarantine, and the Democrat
editorialized bitterly:

"It has been a question whether

the frivolous ami flimsy pretexts that have been advanced
for taking such steps in former years have been as much of
an incentive in the matter as has the furthering of a self
ish interest on the part of the city of Galveston to crip
ple the commerce of New Orleans and thereby to advance its
own.
Pensacola v>as next.

Only a short time after Galves

ton acted, the Florida port imposed a quarantine against
all points west of Mobile and south of Cairo, Illinois,
excepting only the Texas seaports.

The Mayor of Pensacola

wrote to Choppin telling hirn that if good conditions per
sisted in New Orleans, intercourse would be restored„

He

pointed out that it was logical at the time to treat New
Orleans as infected because an epidemic wras raging in
Memphis, and word had been received of suspected cases of

^ Picayune, July 22, 23, 1379*

6^1 bid ,} July 20, 1079; Democrat, July 19, 1079.

yellow fever in the Crescent City.

Shreveport, in the

meantime, quarantined boats, mail, and all conveyances
/^

from New Orleans.

Many other quarantines followed, but

the situation did not become as serious as it had been the
previous year.
A few cases of yellow fever did appear in New Orleans
toward the end of July, but the city suffered no important
outbreak during the entire season.

Memphis was not so

fortunate, and by the first of August was virtually iso
lated.

The Louisiana Board of Health and the New Orleans

press, fearing the extention of non-intercourse in the
Mississippi Valley, publicised vigorously the good health
prevailing in the city, asserting that no cause for alarm
existed.

Nonetheless, exaggerated reports of yellow fever

in the Crescent City were published elsewhere, causing the
Democrat to remark that a systematic plan appeared to be
afoot to ruin the city's b u s i n e s s , ^
During August many of the places quarantining New Or
leans removed their restrictions.

Acting Governor Louis

A. V/iltz, who succeeded Francis P. Nicholls as Chief Exec
utive of Louisiana, encouraged this action by issuing a
proclamation to the state and the country declaring New
Orleans to be in excellent sanitary condition and free from

63p icayune, July 24> 29» 1379.
^^Democrat, A.ugust 7j 1G79.
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yellow fever.

65

Before the proclamation was made public

the Times printed another diatribe against the state quar
antine.

The editor, mindful of the localities maintaining

restrictions on intercourse with New Orleans, reminded his
readers that the Louisiana Board of Health had imposed a
rigid quarantine against supposedly infected vessels in
order to prevent isolation of the city from behind.

This

16
policy failed to achieve its g o a l ,J he continued, and
nineteen-twentieths of the intelligent people of the region
involved were against quarantine.
dramatic, asserted:

The Times, now becoming

"Civilization itself is threatened

in this frantic reaction toward the practices of barbarism*
Manhood,

simple humanity, brotherly love--all go down alike

before the brutal onset of the superstition which stalks
abroad in the guise of quarantine.
A committee of about fifteen businessmen called upon
Acting Governor Wiltz August 20 to get relief from alleged
quarantine evils.
list of signatures.

They presented a petition with a lengthy
The petitioners said they favored "a

rational system of quarantine,” and implied the quarantine

^5jbia., August 17, 1379*
^ T h e Times seemingly forgot that the quarantine had
been substantially modified early in the summer.
This policy
of easing restrictions against incoming vessels unquestion
ably contributed to the distrust of Louisiana health offi
cials felt throughout much of the Mississippi Valley and
Gulf Coast, thereby provoking shotgun quarantines.

^ T i m e s , August 11, 1379*
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maintained by the Btate Board of Health was the opposite.
New Orleans trade was paralyzed and its commerce lost to
other portSj

claimed the petitioners, and consequently

property holders, ship owners, merchants,
so on were losing money.

shopkeepers, and

The Board of Health was said not

to enjoy the confidence of New Orleans or of other communi
ties.

The petition concluded with a request that the Board

be reorganized, and the lav; of 1376 requiring only brief
detention for incoming ships be enforced by a new group of
health off i c e r s . ^
Governor hiltz was very tactful in handling the peti
tioners, agr eing to a rational system of quarantine, but
informing them that he could, not remove state officials
appointed by ex-Governor Nicholls,

He said, that he would

meet with the Board of Health in order to consider a modi
fication of the quarantine proclamation.

At a special Board

meeting held the following day, Board members defended tneir
quarantine policy, reminding the Governor that New Orleans
in 1379 was one of the healthiest cities in the nation.
petitioners'

The

elusive concept of a "rational quarantine" was

treated sarcastically.

At a later meeting one of the me m

bers remarked that a petition with five times as many sig
natures could have been gotten in support of the Board.
Within a week some merchants,

steamboatmen, and railroad

^ Picayune, August 21, 1379*
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companies drew up a petition defending the Board of Health
and its quarantine policy.

Surrounding areas, they recog

nized, demanded that a rigid quarantine against the impor
tation of epidemic diseases be maintained, ana failure to
do so would result in New Orleans becoming ’’hermetically
sealed” from the interior.

Inland commerce, said the

Board’s defenders, was much more vital than foreign trade.

69

At the Board of Health meeting September 11 a letter
was read from Dr. Bemiss, representing the National Board.
The letter suggested that a request be made to the Governor
for the relaxation of the quarantine on October 1, a month
earlier than usual.

After that date, according to Bemiss,

vessels should be given permission to proceed up the river
immediately unless they recently left an infected port or
had sickness of an infectious nature on board.

Even in

those cases detention should be only long enough for the
State Board to determine whether it was dangerous to re
lease the vessel.

Five days later the Board adopted a

resolution asking the Governor to modify the quarantine
, 70
substantially as Berniss had recommendea.
During September the Board’s chief problem was at
tempting to secure removal of remaining local quarantines
against New Orleans.

Repeatedly, resolutions were adopted

declaring that excellent health conditions existed in the

69ibid., August 22, 23, 1879; D emocrat, August 31,
1879.

^Democrat, September 12, 1879; Picayune, September
17, 1879.
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city and imploring other cities to remove all restrictions
on free intercourse.

The National Board of Health, and the

Auxiliary Sanitary Association of New Orleans joined in
the appeal.

Some localities relented, but the Crescent

City was not entirely unfettered until winter.
The National Board of Health had been quite active
during the summer of 1B79 j although a great deal remained
to be done before it could plav a major role in quarantine
matters.

One important accomplishment was the formulating

of rules and regulations to be observed by railroad and
steamship companies to prevent transfer of disease from
one state to another.
this reform.

Little objection could be found to

However, in July Choppin received a letter

from Dr. Turner, Secretary of the National Board, informing
him that funds were being made available to the Louisiana
Board with the understanding that rules and regulations
approved by federal health officials would be adopted for
the quarantine of New Orleans.

Choppin, hoping to clarify

any misunderstanding, asserted that adoption of recommenda
tions made by the National Board of Health did not interfere
with the rights of state and local authorities, because the
National Board was simply a cooperative body without juris
diction over other boards.

In no way, he said, could the

National Board undermine the sovereignty of states under
the quarantine law or any other law.

According to an

editorial appearing in the Picayune early in September,
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nearly twenty thousand dollars had been appropriated by
the National Board of Health for sanitary improvements in
Louisiana alone.

The editor appeared satisfied with serv

ices rendered by federal health officers and agents during
the summer.

71

Nothing could conceal the undercurrent of apprehension
felt in Louisiana regarding future federal interference with
the state quarantine.

The Democrat, commenting on the

indiscriminate use of quarantine by Galveston and Mobile,
asked what benefit the National Board of Health had been.
The National Board confined itself to spying out sporadic
cases of yellow fever, claimed the editorial, instead of
preventing embargoes.

The Democrat was especially dis

gruntled because reports of suspected cases of Yellow Jack
in Louisiana had been telegraphed all over the country.
The editor continued with a bitter blast:

’'Perhaps no

official body, with, so pompous and ostentatious a name and
such huge pretentions, has ever made itself so ridiculous
and accomplished such injurious results.1’
editorial concluded:

The vitriolic

"We have had enough of the National

Board of Health.

^ Picayune, July 17> August 1, September 9> 1^79*
^Democrat, October 3> 1879*

CHAPTER XI
DR. JONES AND STATES1 RIGHTS
The Rational Board of Health anticipated important
results from its efforts to improve quarantine procedures
on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts.

Of vital interest to

Louisiana health authorities was the National BoardTs
proposal to establish a quarantine station on Ship Island,
located just off the Mississippi coast in the Gulf of Mex
ico.

Dr. Bemiss, New Orleans member of the National Board

of Health, let it be known in September, 1&79 that this
project was in the offing, although details were not made
public.

Dr. A. N. Bell of New York, representing the

National Board, visited the Crescent City a short time
later and reported that the Mississippi Quarantine Station
operated by the Louisiana Board of Health was located in
the worst possible site which could have been found.

At

Mississippi Station, said Bell, communications with New
Orleans could not be prevented, infected ships could not
be separated from healthy ones, mosquitoes were ferocious,
and accommodations for the sick were crude and unsatisfacto
ry.

Consequently he recommended that the proposed Ship Is

land Quarantine supersede Mississippi Station in caring for
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infected vessels#

x

The Ship Island project evidently met with considerable
approbation in New Orleans.

The Democrat reminded its

readers that only infected vessels were to be sent to the
new quarantine station, whereas those presenting a clean
bill of health^ would be permitted to proceed up the river
at once.

3

At a November meeting of the Auxiliary Sanitary

Association, optimism was expressed that government as
sistance in providing an adequate quarantine would not
only tend to prevent the introduction of disease but also
to protect inland commerce by allaying apprehensions in
rural areas.^
The Louisiana State Board of Health remained unim
pressed by the enthusiasm for the National Board exhibited
in some quarters.

At an October meeting Dr. Choppin, the

,

State Health Officer, charged the National Board with being
derelict in its duty under the law by withholding necessary
funds from state and local boards of health.

It was the

legal duty of the National Board to cooperate with and aid
other public health organizations, Choppin averred, but

^-Democrat, October 10, 1879*
2A certificate of good health granted by a medical
officer#
•^Democrat, October 13 > 1879*
^Proceedings of the New Orleans Auxiliary Sanitary
Association Meeting oT-November &, 1879 (n.p., n T d .), in
Jones Papers^ Gummed"S"tub File Book"J Business Papers, op.
c it .
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these latter agencies alone had the authority to determine
how the money was to be spent.

Mention was made of ten

thousand dollars denied the Louisiana Board of Health during
the past summer because of a technicality.

5

Support for the National Board of Health was clearly
manifest at the seventh annual meeting of the American
Public Health Association held in Nashville, November 13-21,
1$79.

Dr. Gustavus Devron of New Orleans expressed his

view that maritime quarantine should be left exclusively
to the National Board, and state boards should only gather
statistics and enforce rules and regulations of federal
officers.

Dr. E. A. James of Chattanooga stated that the

work of controlling disease should be left to ’’that govern
ment having the greatest power and the longest purse.”

The

Association adopted resolutions commending the National
Board for its service to the country, and recommending
additional investigations into a number of diseases.

Con

gress was requested to appropriate sufficient funds to
provide the best talent and apparatus for these investiga
tions.

The existing quarantine law and the rules and regu

lations of the National Board of Health were declared to
have accomplished ’’great good," and no change in the law

^Picayune, October 10, 1379*
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was recommended
The Times, seldom found lacking in abusive criticism,
stated that the resolutions adopted by the Nashville
Convention could not have been less satisfactory to the
people of the South.

The National Board of Health had

been ”a disastrous failure,” continued the editorial, and
if not improved, should be abolished.

Evidently because

it adopted the undesirable resolutions, the American Public
Health Association was described by the Times as being
”narr’ow-minded, unprogressive, professionally prejudiced
and exhibiting poverty of resource in sanitary science to
7
a remarkable degree.”
The first annual Report of the National Board of
Health, written by its President, James L. Cabell, listed
the Board’s principal operations during the year l£79.
First, declared Cabell, the National Board had sought to
determine the proper relationship which should exist be
tween a national quarantine system and those maintained
by states and municipalities.

A second undertaking men

tioned in the Report was the collection by the Board of
information regarding sanitary conditions in some of the
most important cities and towns in the United States.

^Public Health Reports and Papers Presented at the
Meetings of the American Public~H'ealth Association in the
Year l879~TBoston, 1 8 8 0 ) , V, 22&, 23l; frjew Qrleans Medical
and Surgical Journal, n.s., VII (l&79-&Of7 652.

?Times, November 23, lo79*
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Another of the Board’s important operations was the sending
of a commission to investigate yellow fever in Cuba, and a
fourth was the collecting and collating of the sanitary
laws of the United States and the states.

Cabell went on

to enumerate fourteen services performed by the National
Board of Health in promoting public' health.
Under provisions of the act of June 2 the National
Board issued to state and local authorities a set of rules
and regulations for securing the best sanitary conditions
on vessels arriving in the United States from infected
ports, and another set of rules and regulations aimed at
securing the best sanitary conditions on railroads and
river boats.

The Report mentioned also that a total of

seventeen inspectors had been appointed to visit quaran
tine stations and report on their condition.

The inspec

tors were instructed that yellow fever was the disease
presenting the gravest danger, and special attention should
be given measures to prevent its spread.

Physicians and

communities were to be impressed with the importance of
recognizing promptly the first cases of yellow fever, the
inspectors v;ere told, and all suspicious cases were to be
watched carefully.

Detailed reports of these cases were

to be preserved and forwarded to the National Board by
state and local authorities.
The great majority of existing quarantine establish
ments,

contended the Report, did not possess facilities
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adequate for properly dealing with infected ships.

Only

nine fully-equipped quarantine stations were necessary to
protect the country from disease, continued Cabell, and
these stations would free most American ports from the
burdensome expense of purchasing costly apparatus.

The

Report stated that the proposed quarantine station on
Ship Island would treat infected vessels destined for
Gulf ports between Pensacola and New Orleans (including
those two ports), and would be one of three stations to
be equipped and maintained entirely by the federal govern
ment.
Quarantine stations were also to be established on
the Mississippi River at New Orleans, Vicksburg, Memphis,
and Cairo, declared the Report.

Competent inspectors

would examine all boats traversing the river, Cabell stat
ed, and would grant certificates as to the sanitary condi
tion aboard the vessels.
Cabell mentioned the yellow fever epidemic which pre
vailed in Memphis during the summer.

More than two thousand

cases and nearly six hundred deaths were recorded.

The

figures for the state of Louisiana in 1$79 were 745 cases
and 162 deaths.

Cabell noted the many local quarantines

employed to prevent communication with Memphis, and as
serted that those quarantines had been obstructive to
commerce and unnecessary.

The difficulty, he thought, was

that people had to rely on them because none of the state
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boards of health was prepared for the emergency.

The Lou

isiana Board of Health was said to be merely the New Or
leans Board of Health with power for quarantine purposes.
However, Cabell’s Report asserted with gratification "that
the operations of the State and local boards aided by it
£~the National Board of Health_7 were harmonious and sat

isfactory, and that all the officers of these boards showed
great interest in the work, furnishing information and
d

rendering services of great value to the board.

. . .”

The National Board’s annual Report for 1&79 also
contained a ’'Report on Quarantine at New Orleans,” by Dr.
J. H. Rauch.

Rauch had visited the Crescent City in June

with instructions to ascertain general sanitary conditions
existing in the city and to investigate quarantine pro
cedures used by Louisiana health officials,

municipal

sanitation, Rauch reported, left little to be desired,
but he was very critical of the state quarantine.

He

noted the Louisiana Board’s action in reducing from twenty
days to ten days the detention period required of vessels
arriving from infected ports.

Moreover, Rauch remarked,

even at the time the twenty day quarantine was in force,
vessels proceeded to New Orleans after a detention ranging
from twenty-four hours to eighteen days— as a rule, from

Board of Health,
°Annual Report of the National
Nat
1&79 (Washington’7 1879) » PP* 5-22
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three to five d a y s . 9
The Louisiana Board of Health was placed on the defen
sive by the criticism of its quarantine policy from influ
ential New Orleans sources who thought the restrictions
too rigid, and from national health authorities and others
outside Louisiana who maintained they were not rigid enough.
Surprisingly, Choppin did not strike back at these critics
in the State Board's annual Report for 1&79.

He admitted

that during May so much pressure was applied to Board mem
bers that a majority, acting individually,

consented to

the release of vessels from quarantine before the expira
tion of the twenty day detention period.

He noted the

liberalization of restrictions in the fall as soon as this
action could safel_y be taken.

Choppin felt called upon to

reiterate his conviction that "conditional” quarantines
could never be made effective, and "the only absolutely
safe policy /~was_7 non-intercourse for certain months,
enforced by positive lav/."

Choppin’s Report credited

rules and regulations established by the National Board
of Health for the regulation of inland quarantine with
having served to remove the apprehensions of interior
communities, thereby averting a rash of e m b a r g oe s, ^

9ibid., pp. 45&-61.
IQAnnual Report of the Board of Health of the State
°* Louisiana to the General Assembly for the Year 1879
TNew Orleans, 1880j, pp. 17-23.
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The Louisiana State Board of Health started off the
year IB30 on a sour note.

Governor Louis A. Wiltz, in his

message to the state Legislature, manifested antagonism
toward the quarantine adopted by the Board the previous
year.

The Board’s primary duty, he said, should be to

warn the people of the state concerning dangers to the
public health and to advise all necessary precautions
and preventive measures.

Wiltz maintained that no reason

existed why New Orleans should be walled up against the
outside world.

"Thorough cleanliness and rigid sanitary

regulations at home, seconded by rigid exclusion of in
fection and contagion, must be the chief reliance of the
public for safety,” the Governor’s message asserted, "but
these may be secured effectually without putting an embargo
upon all commerce and all intercourse with the outside
world.”

Speaking for. the state’s industrial and commercial

interests, Wiltz implored the lawmakers to find a means
of adequate protection which would not paralyze business.^
Despite this appeal, no legislation was forthcoming.
The Ship Island project of the National Board of
Health remained very much in the news.

Dr. John S. Bill

ings, Vice-President of the National Board, addressed a
meeting of the New Orleans Auxiliary Sanitary Association

•^Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House
of Representatives of the ‘State of Louisiana, at the Reg-"
uTar Session . . • T 3 3(3 (New""'Q’rleans~| 1880), p. 17J!7~*
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in December, explaining that Ship Island appeared to be
the best location between Key West and New Orleans for a
quarantine station.

The idea, explained Billings, was to

secure all possible safeguards against infection with as
little restriction upon commerce as was compatible with
this protection.

The Sanitary Association resolved to

recommend that a national quarantine station be established
on Ship Island, and stated that its Influence would be
utilized to obtain legislation for Louisiana and the fed
eral government making state and national quarantines
harmonious and effective.

12

A month later the Democrat

came out strongly in favor of the Ship Island Quarantine,
Some advantages \'iere mentioned which Ship Island presumably
would have:

good accomodations for vessels, facilities

for rapid discharge and disinfection, and pure salt breezes
from the Gulf of Mexico.

It was suggested that persons

forced to stay there during detention might indulge in
surf bathing, fishing, and boating.

Ship Island, asserted

the Democrat, would be of "incalculable benefit to New
Orleans."^
Dr. Choppin at no time displayed outright opposition
to the establishment of a federally-controlled quarantine
station on Ship Island.

But Choppin’s three-year presidency

^•2Picayune, December 2, 1$79*
^ Democrat, January 20, lSBO.
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of the State Board, terminated early in lSSO.
appointed by the Governor,
Board took office,

New men were

and on April & the reorganized

Dr. Joseph Jones, upon being chosen

President by the other members, announced his intention
to work in harmony with the National Board of Health and
the Auxiliary Sanitary Association.

Jones, however, soon

became an implacable foe of the National Board,

and did

more than any other individual to bring about its demise.
A former Confederate officer, Jones refused to yield state
authority to an encroaching federal agency.
The

National Board of Health did not wait long in

testing Jones1 spirit of cooperation.
days after Jones became President,

On April 10, two

he received a letter

from Bemiss stating five propositions with regard to the
Ship Island Quarantine and asking him three questions about
the Louisiana Board’s official attitude toward the project.
Bemiss stated as reasons for establishing the Ship Island
Quarantine that danger from importation of epidemic diseases
would be diminished by detaining infected vessels at a dis
tance from the coast; passengers and crews would receive
good accommodations; and prompt, thorough disinfection would
be provided.

The second proposition asserted that vessels

required to stop at Ship Island would be those with in
fectious diseases, those sailing from infected ports, and
those compelled to do so by quarantine regulations of Lou
isiana, Mississippi, or Alabama,

The last proposition
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reassured the Louisiana Board that the Ship Island Quaran
tine was to be entirely cooperative with sanitary organiza
tions engaged in the same work of protecting United States
citizens from pestilence.^
The questions put to Jones involved the willingness
of the Louisiana Board to help enforce the rules embodied
in the second proposition, its willingness to order back
to Ship Island vessels attempting to proceed to New Orleans
in contravention of the rules, and its willingness to ac
cept bills of health and certificates of disinfection from
the chief medical officer at Ship Island without subjecting
vessels bearing them to further restrictions.

The ques

tions were submitted by Jones to the state Attorney-General,
J. C. Egan, whose reply was dispatched to Bemiss April 22.
Egan stated that in his opinion the State Board had power
to order vessels back to Ship Island— Jones believed the
Board did not have this power--when by doing so the secu
rity of the state would be enhanced.

But, said Egan, the

lav/ confided largely in the discretion of the State Board
of Health regarding quarantine matters, and this trust
could not in any manner be delegated.

Egan stated further

that the law contemplated the personal service of state
health officials, and therefore bills of health and

•^Annual Report of the National Board of Health,
1SS0 (Washington, 1881J, p. 603.
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certificates of disinfection from an officer of the Nation
al Board could not be conclusively satisfactory.^
Several days before Egan’s opinion was known, Jones
expressed disapproval of the Ship Island project.

The new

State Health Officer asserted that even if he had power
to send vessels back to Ship Island, he had no disposition
to do so because it might criople the commerce of the Mis
sissippi Valley.

Jones steadfastly maintained that the

quarantine stations operated by the Louisiana Board of
Health provided the Valley adequate protection from imported
diseases.

The National Board, he insisted,

should according

to the law grant financial aid to Louisiana authorities so
that existing quarantine establishments could be repaired
and re-equipped.

Early in July Jone3 submitted to the

National Board a request that ten thousand dollars be
appropriated for this purpose, and a like amount be placed
at the disposal of the Louisiana Board in the event of an
epidemic.

The National Board's outright refusal to provide

this kind of aid Jones attributed to the animosity excited
among federal officers by his refusal to agree that all
infected ships should go to Ship Island.
An important achievement of the National Board of

•^Ibid., pp. 603-604.
■^Report of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana, for the Year l^^Q /"lixtracts 7~(New Orleans,
n .d l
.), p p . 5O", 5 4 - 5 ^

Health in l&BO was the establishment of the Mississippi
River Inspection Service.

This new service was aimed at

preventing the spread of epidemic diseases along the river,
at the same time avoiding unnecessary obstruction to trav
el and traffic during the prevalence-of disease.

The

Board’s annual Report noted its success in having made
possible continuous sanitary supervision of vessels in
transit between New Orleans and Cairo, Illinois during
the summer months.

Intermediate quarantine stations were

set up near Vicksburg, near Memphis, ana near Cairo; all
vessels traversing the river in either direction were re
quired to stop.

The Report maintained that improved sani

tary conditions on steamboats, barges, and other vessels
had been secured, and confidence in threatened communities
had been created, thereby averting the shotgun quarantine.

17

The rules and regulations adopted by the National

Board of Health for the Inspection Service, and also the
rules and regulations pertaining to railroad travel were
presented to the Louisiana Board in May.

Two weeks later

the committee appointed by Jones to consider the rules
reported unanimously in favor of granting support to these
new undertakings.

However, the Louisiana Board was some-

what provoked because it had not been consulted earlier.

1S

-^Report of the National Board of Health, 13&0, p.

2g.
-^Democrat, May 21, lBSO; Picayune, June 4, 18&0.

Early in May a quarantine proclamation was issued by
Governor Wiltz; it was to go into effect May 10.

Vessels

from Havana, Vera Cruz, and Rio de Janeiro were made sub
ject to the quarantine.

Vessels with clean bills of

health and no sickness on board during the passage were
to be allowed to proceed up the river after thorough dis
infection.

Those with sickness on board or known to be

dangerously infected were to be detained at the discretion
of the Louisiana Board of Health,

The Democrat declared

the quarantine fair and just, and asserted that all reasonable men would support it.
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Unfortunately, incidents

involving the Louisiana quarantine were soon to widen the
breach between state and national health officials.
Seeking to promote friendly relations with the Loui
siana Board, Dr. Cabell, President of the National Board
of Health, wrote an unofficial letter to Jones May 27.
Cabell said it was the desire of his organization to co
operate with Louisiana health authorities "without in the
slightest degree usurping any of their rights or desiring
to supersede them in respect to any of their powers.”
told Jones that originally the National Board had not
wanted any quarantine power and desired only to grant
financial aid to state boards, but Congress would not
permit dispersal of government funds without government

■^ D e m o c r a t , May 5, lSBO.
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control.

Congressmen from the Mississippi Valley, he

wrote, insisted that the National Board be given general
authority over a system of quarantine which would be out
side state jurisdiction.
Cabell informed Jones that after the previous summer
several municipalities had made urgent applications to the
National Board of Health for quarantine stations to protect
their own and neighboring ports.

According to Cabell, the

applicants, all of whom were ports on the South Atlantic
and Gulf Coasts, alleged the want of necessary funds to
maintain a proper establishment.

Cabell explained that a

few fully-equipped stations were being set up by the Na
tional Board so that ports unable to acquire adequate
equipment and facilities to handle infected vessels could
avail themselves of assistance.

Cabell’s friendly tone

prevailed until the last paragraph of the letter.

Then

Jones was reminded of the legal duty imposed upon the
National Board to report to the President of the United
States the failure or refusal by a state to use proper
measures to keep out infectious disease.

Cabell assured

Jones that should the necessity to take this action arise,
his organiztion would not shirk its responsibility.

20

The National Board persisted in its stand that Missis
sippi Station was no place for infected vessels.

The point

^ J . L. Cabell to Joseph Jones, Charlottesville,
Virginia, May 27> l&SO, in Joseph Jones Papers, Gummed
Stub File Book, Business Papers, o j d . cit.
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was made many times that vessels proceeding to the Missis
sippi Quarantine, nearly forty miles upstream, had ample
opportunity for contact with the nearby shore.

Ship Is

land, it was argued, not only was a healthier spot, but
it was located several miles from the mainland.

Dr. Jones

investigated Mississippi Station in June and remarked at
a Board meeting a few days later that the site was well
chosen, remarkably healthy, and commanded the mouth of
the river.

It could not be superseded, he declared, by

another quarantine station removed from the banks of the
Mississippi.

Jones hurled defiance at the National Board

of Health by asserting:
and quarantined,

"However and whenever detained

ships must again undergo thorough in

spection and be submitted to rigid quarantine regulations
whenever they enter the gateway of the Valley of the Mississippx•

„
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Several times during the spring and summer of 1&S0
the National Board of Health was accused by the State
Board and the New Orleans press of intentionally or u n 
intentionally exciting needless yellow fever alarms
throughout the country.

In April the Associated Press

reported that eleven deaths from "malignant yellow fever"
had been recorded in New Orleans during the four-week
period ending March 27.

The National Board was said to

^ Picayune, June 16, 1BS0.
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be the source of information.

Dr. Thomas J. Turner,

the Board Secretary, wrote to Governor Wiltz, informing
him that the erroneous report resulted from a mistake by
the telegraph operator.

Jones was not satisfied because,

as he pointed out in a letter to Turner, the mistake had
caused great excitement in hew Orleans, in Louisiana, and
in neighboring states.

22

Dr. Turner later became the vic

tim of bitter epithets when he untactfully predicted that
New Orleans would be visited by violent yellow fever within
a month.

Turner, declared an editorial in the States, was

the chief among the medical charlatans and scientific
jackasses spawned by the National Board of Health.^3
The worst was yet to come.

A serious incident in

volving the state quarantine occurred in July, and reper
cussions from it produced widespread ill feeling during
the remainder of the year.

This incident v/as the belated

appearance of yellov/ fever aboard the Swedish bark Excel
sior after its release from Mississippi Station.

Accord

ing to Jones, the Excelsior had been at Rio de Janeiro,
an infected port, from April 13 to May 10, and arrived
at Mississippi Station June 24.

No yellow fever had

occurred on the vessel either at Rio or during the voyage.
The Excelsior was detained twelve days in quarantine, and

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana . . . ll%0, pp. 65-67 .
23New Orleans States, July 16, lBBO.
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the entire cargo of thirty-six hundred sacks of coffee
was thoroughly aired and fumigated with sulphurous acid
gas.

The ship itself was said to have been cleaned care

fully.
Jones related that on July 5 the Excelsior reached
New Orleans.

Five days later he visited one of its crew

members at Touro Infirmary and found symptoms of yellow
fever.

Immediately the Civil Sheriff of Orleans Parish

was ordered to seize the apparently infected vessel and
have it towed back to the quarantine station.

The Excel

sior was returned to quarantine July 11 and this time was
not released until August 1$.

A few additional cases of

yellow fever were noted aboard the Excelsior between July
11 and July 14.

Jones declared that every effort had been

made to protect Louisiana and the Mississippi Valley from
disease, and these efforts were crowned with success be
cause no case of yellow fever was propagated from the Ex
celsior.
In other states this incident brought condemnation
of the Louisiana Board of Health and its President.

One

case of yellow fever in New Orleans was enough to excite

^ R e p o r t of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana . . . l M O , pp. 34-42. Jones also pointed proudly
to his resolute handling of the Vanguard case.
In may the
Vanguard, a British vessel, refused to stop at Mississippi
Station, and proceeded to New Orleans without a permit.
The Civil Sheriff was promptly alerted, and the Vanguard
was removed from the Crescent City and placed in quaran
tine, ibid., pp. 25-2$.

363
general anxiety in some places.

Almost immediately upon

hearing about this case, health authorities in Mississippi
and Tennessee imposed quarantines against the ’’infected1'
city.

On July 16 the Mississippi State Board of Health

issued a proclamation noting that coffee from the Excelsior
was stored in a New Orleans warehouse, and therefore trains
and water craft departing from New Orleans would not be
allowed to enter Mississippi unless inspected by an officer
of the National Board of Health.

Persons from New Orleans

could not enter Mississippi without a certificate from an
officer of the National Board stating they had not been
25
exposed to infection. J
The Tennessee State Board of Health issued an order
restricting certain vessels leaving New Orleans from land
ing in Tennessee unless they presented a certificate of
inspection from an officer or agent of the National Board
of Health.

A month later the two Memphis members of the

Tennessee Board wrote the Acting Governor of Louisiana,
Samuel D. McEnery, explaining the reason for the quaran
tine.

They pointed out that when New Orleans neglected

proper precautions and allowed infected vessels to enter
the city, the law of self-preservation demanded that the

^ Quarantine Proclamation of the Mississippi State
Board of Health, July'l'6, 1 & 8 0 ] fn.p., n.d. J", in Notebook
and Scrapbook of Dr. Joseph Jones (1&80), Louisiana State
Board of Health Library Historical Collection, Louisiana
State Office Building, New Orleans, Louisiana.
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rest of the Mississippi Valley, so often scourged from
New Orleans, take steps to confine the infection to the
community which permitted it to enter through negligence
or indifference.

The Tennessee quarantine order, McEnery

was told, prevented panic and shotgun quarantine.

The

Tennessee health officials explained that restrictions
on intercourse between their state and New Orleans would
have been even more stringent if it had not been for the
general confidence placed in the River Inspection Service
of the National Board of H e a l t h . ^
New Orleanians were outraged at the action taken by
Mississippi and Tennessee.

The Times denounced the boards

of health of those states for their precipitate orders,
and suggested they send competent men to the Crescent City
to discover the truth about its salubrity.
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The Democrat

blamed the National Board of Health for not publicizing
the healthfulness of New Orleans.

Jones wrote Governor

McEnery, delivering an official protest.

The quarantines,

he said, were "unnecessary, unwise, ungenerous and uncon
stitutional .

Jones remarked to Dr. C. P. Wilkinson, a

quarantine physician at Mississippi Station, that it seemed

^ R e p o r t of the National Board of Health, 1830,
pp. 5&-60.
27Tj.mes, July 22, 1880.
^ D e m o c r a t , July IS, 1380.
29lbid. , July 23, 1830.
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impossible to satisfy the fears and avarice of surrounding
states and cities because of their prejudice against the
Louisiana quarantine.*^
. Most of the restrictions imposed by Tennessee and
Mississippi against New Orleans were removed after two
weeks.

However, Mississippi and the city of Mobile con

tinued to ban coffee from New Orleans, fearing that it
might be part of the Excelsior1s cargo, and therefore
infected.

The National Board of Health became involved

when its Supervisor of Inspectors in New Orleans, Dr. C.
A. Rice, publicized the Mississippi and Mobile coffee or
ders,

At a. meeting of the Louisiana Board of Health July

29 Rice was roundly denounced for allegedly having exceeded
his authority by prohibiting shipments to places in Missis
sippi and Alabama.

The next day Jones wrote Governor M c 

Enery protesting Rice’s action.

He described it as ’’ille

gal, unconstitutional and destructive of the commercial
relations of the individual States.
A few days later Dr. Rice wrote the Governor explain
ing that the coffee order issue was a tempest in a teapot.
Rice conceded that the National Board of Health had no
powrer to forbid the shipment of coffee or any other article

30jones to Wilkinson, New Orleans, July 17> 1&3C,
in Notebook and Scrapbook of Dr. Joseph Jones (1BB0),
o p . cit.

^ Picayune, July 30) August 1, l££0.
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from a port not declared to be infected.

The publication

of the Mississippi and Mobile orders, he said, was simply
to notify shippers and public curriers that these orders
existed.

The National Boars of Health, McEnery was told,

had performed a valuable service by warning shippers that
coffee had been declared contraband of quarantine and
would be returned.^2
New- Orleans also had trouble with Galveston again.
Early in July it was reported that Galveston was considering
the adoption of a quarantine against the Crescent City.

No

action was taken, but a month later, after the Excelsior
affair, two members of the Galveston Board of Health vis
ited New Orleans to get the truth regarding the Louisiana
quarantine.

The cm' ef concern of the two Galveston health

officials was the seventy-two hour detention which was
»

being required of vessels having arrived from the infected
ports of Havana and Vera Cruz.

They let it be known that

unless the detention period was extended, the Galveston
Board would almost surely quarantine New Orleans.

Jones

received a letter from Dr. R. Rutherford, Texas State
Health Officer, which contained an almost identical warnm g . 33

Galveston health authorities, including Rutherford,

^ 2xbid., August 6, 1830.
33pemocrat, August 5, 6, 1.330.

seemed convinced that the seventy-two hour detention would
permit a vessel from Havana or Vera Cruz to complete its
voyage to New Orleans in five days.

Members of the Loui

siana Board of Health protested this conclusion, but agreed
to humor the Galvestonians by modifying the quarantine.
At a special meeting held August 9 a resolution was adopted
requiring that ten days elapse before vessels sailing from
infected ports would be allowed to dock in New Orleans.
Seventy-two hours of that period were to be spent at the
Mississippi Quarantine for disinfection, fumigation, and
observation.

The visitors from Galveston were satisfied,

and no further difficulties were recorded from this quarter
during the remainder of the year.
While the controversy with Galveston was raging, the
New Orleans press, as in other years,

suggested that the

motives of the Texas City were anything but pure,

Galves

ton was said to be promoting its own business interests at
New OrleansT expense.

The Times stated that Galveston’s

quarantines were aimed at keeping New Orleans merchants
out of Texas at the beginning of the business s e a s o n . ^
The following are the last two stanzas of a six stanza
verse appearing in the Democrat (Governor 0. M. Roberts
of Texas is speaking to Rutherford):

-^ I b i d ., August 6, 10, 1&$0.
^^Times, August 9> 1$$0.

We must not stop at any means
Our seaport's trade to save, sir:
So telegraph from New Orleans,
And I will do what best it seems—
Give them the benefit of the doubt
By— keeping all the people out.
Go find the "germ"— at least pretend
That you have found it there;
Then quickly me a message send
(And please prepay it at your end),
Galveston then will feel serene,
.
V/hen Wet-Nursed by our Quarantine.3°
Fortunately,

in 1880 the expected Galveston quarantine did

not materialize.
During September and October another serious clash
occurred between the Louisiana Board of Health and the
National Board.

On September 3 Jones was advised that a

fatal form of fever had appeared in Plaquemines Parish,
below New Orleans.

The exact location of this minor out

break was at Point'd la Hache and Point Ilichel, in the
vicinity of Mississippi Station.

The question immediately

arising was whether-the malignant disease which had at
tacked the region bordering the lower extremity of tr.e
Mississippi River was yellow f ever.^7
Dr. Jones telegraphed several doctors in the general
area of the outbreak to get all the facts about the cases,
and to inform him at once as to their conclusions.

The

general, although not unanimous, consensus among the

3^Democrat, August 8, 1880.
3?Report of the National Board of Health, 1880,
p . 57; Report of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana . . . 1880, pp. 127-28.

examining ohysicians was that the disease in question was
an unusually severe form of malarial fever.

The accumula

ted facts were laid before the Louisiana Board of Health
September 9.
and press,

The Board meetings were open to the public

stated Jones, because the Board wanted the

public to know the truth, hoping that confidence would
be engendered and panic thereby avoided.

But by this

time the National Board of Health had also acted.

Dr.

George M. Sternberg, U. S. A., a prominent public health
official, had been dispatched to Point sa la Hache and Point
Michel to investigate, and on September 10 he submitted a
very controversial report.

Sternberg concluded that the

twenty cases he visited were not severe malarial fever,
but were mild yellow fever.

3A

Dr. Bemiss, calling attention to Sternberg’s report,
notified Jones that the National Board of Health was availing the Louisiana Board of funds necessary to procure
disinfectants, to pay sanitary police and inspectors, and
to meet other expenses incurred in preventing the spread
of fever.

Jones refused the offer, and commented later

that if it had been accepted, rigid quarantines would have
been established against New Orleans, inflicting panic
and incalculable damage.

As it was, he said, the National

3 ^Report of the National Board of H e a l t h , l & g Q ,
p p . 6 Q 7-609; Report of the BoalFH 'of liealt h of tEe State
of Louisiana . . . I'EEO, pp. 127-T5*
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Board of Health had nearly provoked a panic by telegraph
ing the country's leading business centers stating that
seventy-five cases of yellow fever had appeared around
Quarantine Station.

On September 23 the State Board

adopted resolutions bearing a preamble which stated that
the National Board of Health had "deliberately attempted
. . . to create a Yellow Fever panic."

A resolution re

quested officers of the National Board to instruct their
representatives in Louisiana to conform tneir conduct with
the law by merely extending aid whenever asked to do so by
Louisiana health authorities.

The Louisiana Board of Health

pledged itself to alert the entire c untry promptly should
an epidemic disease be detected, and to keep the public
truthfully informed about trie health of Mew Orleans and
the surrounding area.

39

In the meantime a neutral commission had been created
to investigate the fever in Plaquemines Parish.

Dr. Stern

berg, representing the National Board of Health, was a
member of the commission along with Dr. J. P. Davidson of
the State Board of Health and Dr. J. D. Bruns of Mew Or
leans.

All three were presumably authorities on yellow

fever, but their conclusions regarding the fever they
investigated differed greatly.

Sternberg reiterated his

earlier findings that the disease in question was yellow
fever, possibly resulting from cases on the Excelsior.

39figport of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana . , . 1 ^ 0 , pp. 133-35.
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Davidson and Bruns maintained with equal resolve that the
disease was malarial fever which appeared in an especially
dangerous form because of increased acreage planted to rice
in the area.

i+0

Rice, thought some, was an unhealthy mode

of agriculture, being a prolific source of severe malarial
fevers.

New Orleans newspapers, eager to dispel fear,

publicised the conclusions of Davidson and Bruns, but
scarcely mentioned Sternberg’s minority report at all,
Jones steadfastly held to his position that no yellow
fever had been present.
Dr. Bemiss and. Dr. R. V/. Mitchell of Memphis, members
of the National Board of Health, did not hesitate to sup
port Sternberg's findings.

Sternberg's reputation as an

authority on yellow fever was imnressive, but in New Or
leans it was said that his knowledge of the disease was
"tenth rate."

Two Memphis newspapers, always extremely

critical of the Louisiana Board of Health, printed the
Sternberg report together with some acid comments of their
own.

The Memphis Appeal declared the report would probably

convince doubters that Louisiana health authorities were
insincere, and would strengthen the general conviction
that except through the National Board of Health people
upstream had no guarantee that quarantines in Mew Orleans
would be faithfully enforced.

The Memphis Avalanche

^QReport of the National Board of Health, 1&&0,
pp. 57, 607-1$.
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asserted that Jones was an uncompromising opponent of
quarantine, and that the Louisiana Board of Health had
made war upon many of the nation’s public health organ
izations as well as upon ’'every individual who has ventured
to express an opinion not in consonance 'with its methods
of suppression, misrepresentation and total neglect of
ordinary sanitary measures;”^
This controversy stirred the New Orleans press to
denounce the National Board as mischievous and worthless,
and Sternberg as an ignorant charlatan, unfitted for his
p os i t i o n . ^

The Ship Island Quarantine,

completed during

the summer, was also subjected to another barrage ■f crit
icism.

The States, among others, complained that the new

quarantine was vexatious to commerce because ships had to
J

O

sail nearly 150 miles out of toe way. 1

'

The National

Board of Health was accused by the Picayune of having
ruined New Orleans’ coffee trade.

The editor noted that

the entire country had been warned about purchasing coffee
from New Orleans, but no mention at all was made when
infected vessels brought the same commodity to New York
or Baltimore.

The National Board, he said, lacked a truly

national policy.

"It is simply a great Government incubus

^ Report of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana . . .
0 , p p . 140-42.
^2Times, September 21, 1BB0; Democrat, November 6,

1SB0.
^ States, August 27, 1$£0.
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that has cast its entire might upon the commerce of New
Orleans,” continued the editorial, "It is a monstrous
humbug and should be abolished at o n c e . " ^
Jones vas at all times anxious to continue his verbal
assaults on the National Board of Health, with or without
justification.

Late in 1SB0 Bemiss was assailed with

particular bitterness for having had the audacity to
criticize the Louisiana Board in the New Orleans Medical
and Surgical Journal.

Jones set out to showr the "inate

rottenness" of the entire editorial.

In the first place,

he said, Bemiss had from the beginning assumed an attitude
of decided enmity toward him.

The Ship Island Quarantine

Jones described as a "preposterous scheme" which, if it
had been enforced, would have destroyed Crescent City
com::,eree without protecting the Mississippi Valley.

Jones

declared 3emir;st statement that he, Jones, was opposed to
quarantine to be absolutely false.

Finally, Jones accused

Bemiss of having originally accepted the majority report
on "Rice Fever," but later of having reported one hundred
tC
cases of yelloxv fever in Louisiana during lBBO.
On November 19 Governor Wiltz and three Louisiana
Congressmen met with Jones and three other members of the
State Board of Health. - The purpose of the meeting, said

^ P i c a y u n e , October 10, lBBO.
4-5Ibid., November 5) 1#$0.

the Governor, was to discuss the health and commerce of the
state.

Wiltz expressed his desire that the Congressmen

should be well informed on questions involving Louisiana's
commercial interests and quarantine regulations when those
subjects came up in Congress.
inent Board member,

Mr. I. N. Marks, a prom

spoke of the persistent hostility

manifested by the National Board of Health toward Louisiana
health officials.

The National Board, asserted Marks,

endeavored to excite suspicion and distrust of the Loui
siana Board, and gave birth to sensational reports which
interfered with New Orleans commerce.

Jones declared that

state quarantines had in all instances been rigidly en
forced, and the Ship Island quarantine would make a very
weak substitute.

The National Board's quarantine powers

were calculated to produce continued collisions with
state boards, Jones averred.

Jones and Dr. Felix Formento

suggested repeal of the act of June 2, 1$79 which granted
the National Board of Health its authority in quarantine
matters.^
New Orleans was host to three important public health
conventions held simultaneously during the last month of
lGGO. The American Public Health Association scheduled its
annual meeting in the Crescent City, so the Sanitary Council
of the Mississippi Valley did likewise, and the Louisiana

^ Ibid. , November 20, lBBO,
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Board of Health, envisioning the presence of many prominent
public health leaders, planned a special Quarantine Confer
ence,

On August 26 the Louisiana Board adopted a resolu

tion requesting Jones to invite state and municipal boards
of health to send delegates to New Orleans where subjects
’’vital to sanitary and commercial welfare” were to be
discussed.

The National Board of Health was also asked

to take part in the meetings.

In October Jones wrote to

the governors of Southern states and to the mayors of

prominent cities concerning the upcoming Quarantine ConL.1
ference, hoping in this way to stimulate action.
The three conventions met from December 7 through
December 10,

It was well known that in all of them the

major topic of discussion was to be the status and effi
cacy of the National Board of Health.

At the meeting of

the American Public Health Association Dr. Sternberg
presented a paper,

’'Yellow Fever and Quarantine,” highly

critical of the Louisiana quarantine.

Sternberg empha

sized disinfection as opposed to detention as the best
means of forestalling importation of infectious diseases.
The disinfection procedures employed by the Louisiana
Board of Health he believed to be inadequate.

The quaran

tine at New Orleans was virtually worthless, Sternberg
declared, because of unique problems encountered in the

^ D e m o c r a t , August 27> October 22, 1$B0; New Or
leans Medical and Surgical Journal , n.s., VIII (1S^0-'§T),
2^9-90.
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Crescent City:

the numerous waterways providing several

approaches, the extended commerce, the strong opposition
to quarantine from some businessmen and physicians, and
the difficulty in obtaining an efficient administration
of the state quarantine system.

Mississippi Station was

located very poorly, Sternberg asserted, because of the
ease with which contact between infected vessels and the
area bordering the river was p o s s ib le .^
The American Public Health Association was told by
its President, Dr. J. 3. Billings, who wa.; also VicePresident of the National Board of Health, about the
general sentiment in the country supporting the National
Board.

The Association’s Advisory Committee on Sanitary

Legislation urged Congress to make suitable appropriations
for the National Board of Health so that it could continue
its work; the Committee noted that the National Board did
not desire to have its powers increased.

Dr.- J. D. Bruns

of New Orleans was somewhat critical of the National Board
of Health, particularly because two of its members, Bemiss
and Mitchell, accepted Sternberg’s minority report on the
fever in Plaquemines Parish rather than the majority re
port which denied the presence of yellow fever.

Sternberg,

according to Bruns, knew very little about fevers in the

^ P u b l i c Health Papers and Reports Presented at
the Eighth Annual Meeting o£" the American Public Health
Association, 1880 ( B o s t o n , Vi, J51-57.
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lower Mississippi Valley.

Bruns’ position was not sup

ported by the Association, the outcome being the adoption
of a resolution declaring that whenever there was doubt
respecting the nature of an outbreak of disease, national,
state, and local health officials should give the benefit
of the doubt on the side of safety . ^
Far more important than anything done by the American
Public Health Association was the adoption of two provoca
tive resolutions by the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi
Valley.

The first resolution, offered by Drs. Pinckney

Thompson and J. V/. Holland of Kentucky, stated:
Whereas, experience has shown that
measures of quarantine under the sole
direction of local and State Boards of
Health have not succeeded in protecting
this valley from invasion from yellow
fever; and,
Whereas, our people habitually view
with distrust all announcements and sani
tary acts of local boards, when those acts
and announcements are of a character to
affect the commercial interests of the
locality directly concerned;
Resolved, that in our* opinion the
General Government alone, acting through
its constituted sanitary agents, should
have the direction and control of na
tional and maritime quarantine.
After the adoption of this resolution Dr. J. H. Rauch of
Illinois presented another of equal significance:
Whereas, There is unfortunately a
want of confidence with regard to the
prompt furnishing of information by the
health authorities of New Orleans with

^ I b i d ., 385- 86 ; Picayune, December 9> 11, 1880,
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reference to infectious and contagious
diseases; Therefore,
Resolved, That in the opinion of
this Council it would undoubtedly tend to
the restoration of confidence if the State
Board of Health would request the National
Board of Health to place an inspector
at the Quarantine Station and one in New
Orleans, who shall have access to the
records of the /~Louisiana__7 Board of
Health, and be furnished every facility
for obtaining reliable information with
regard to all cases deemed suspicious,
and especially with regard to yellow
fever.50
By adopting these resolutions the Sanitary Council of the
Mississippi Valley aligned itself squarely on the side of
the National Board of Health in the battle being waged be
tween federal and state health officials over the question
of quarantine jurisdiction.
The Quarantine Convention called by the Louisiana
State Board of Health produced nothing of significance.
The Louisiana Board1s Committee on Arrangements prepared
a program with the avowed aim of securing the adoption
of "a regular and uniform system of quarantine and of such
sanitary measures and precautions as y f would_7 best facil
itate the interests of the public health and those of
commerce and Inter-State relations.'1

This elaborate pro

gram was almost totally disregarded because there was too

50

New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
viii ( l S S o ^ I ) , 6 9 1 - 9 3 .
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little harmony and too little t i m e . ^

It is not at all

surprising that there should have been resistance to the
scheduled plans, because the obvious intention of Loui
siana health authorities was to frame a quarantine agree
ment among state and local boards of health which would
have reduced the National Board of Health’s dominion.
Dr. Jerome Cochran of Alabama introduced to the Quar
antine Conference some resolutions defending the National
Board and its actions.

Edward Fenner, representing the

Auxiliary Sanitary Association of New Orleans,

supported

Cochran by reading resolutions adopted only two days
earlier by the Crescent City Chamber of Commerce.

No

local board of health, said these latter resolutions,
could carry into effect sanitary measures necessary to
avert the spread of disease and to protect commerce.

The

National Board of Health was said to be beneficial to New
Orleans because of the widespread confidence it held.
Jumping to the defense of the Louisiana Board, I. N. Marks,
one of its members, pointed out that the Chamber of Com
merce comprised only a small fraction of New Orleans busi
nessmen.

Jones accused federal health officers of having

spread false reports that yellow fever prevailed in

51lbid., pp. 688-89; Quarantine Convention called
at the request of the Board of Health of the State of Lou
isiana, to 8e~~held in the city of New Orleans, PecemBer
7-l0, ltfgU . . . [New Orleans, T B 8 0 ) , pp. 4-1?•

Plaquemines Parish.

Cochran*s proposals were defeated,

and eventually a compromise was found.

A resolution was

adopted directing the appointment of two committees, one
representing the Atlantic and Gulf states, and the other
the states of the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys.

Each

committee was to formulate a schedule of rules and regula
tions dealing with quarantine and sanitary matters.

The

schedules were to be submitted to the individual states
for ratification and adoption.
little importance,
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This resolution was of

end all concerned seemed to regard the

Quarantine Conference as a failure.
The results of the three conventions influenced the
opinion of at least one Crescent City newspaper.

The

Democrat, although never an enthusiastic adherent of the
National Board of Health, printed a long series of edi
torials advising a conciliatory policy toward this organ
isation because of the respect with wnich it was regarded
by health officials and the general public in other places.
The Louisiana Board of Health, asserted the editor, did
not have the confidence of a single hamlet or community
outside the state.

The Democrat declared its confidence

in the Louisiana Board, but stated that shotgun quarantines
were more to be feared than yellow fever.
remarked thoughtfully:

The editor

T,If, by making timely and reasonable

5^Picayune, December B, 10, 1$S0; New Orleans Med
ical and Surgical Journal, n.s., VIII (loBO-^lT, 690.

3 Si
concessions to the fears and the desires of our neighbors,
we can secure a fair and temperate and friendly treatment,
should, we not be foolish as well as wicked to

r e f u s e ? " ^

The State Board of Health found similar sentiments
expressed elsewhere in the Crescent City.

The New Orleans

Medical and Surgical Association adopted a report by its
Committee on Quarantine stating that the responsibility
for keeping infectious and contagious diseases out of the
Mississippi Valley should belong to the federal govern
ment because it alone was capable of exercising super
vision satisfactory to all interested communities.

The

report contained three specific recommendations which
would enhance federal control of the Louisiana quarantine.
A health inspector of the National Board of Health, de
clared the report, should be stationed at Eadsport to
rj

keep dangerously infected vessels out of the Mississippi.
It was recommended that a representative of the National
Board be present at all meetings of the State Board of
Health, and have access to all the State Board’s documents
and reports.

The report advised that a Board of Experts

consisting of Bemiss, Jones,

and a neutral member be or

ganized to examine suspicious cases of yellow fever and

53pemocrat , December 12, 22, 1330.
^ D r . Jones appointed an inspector for Eadsport
and the surrounding area in August, 1330.
Of course, this
inspector
was
an
official
of
the
State
Board
of Health.
X

*
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to telegraph its decision to the National Board of Health.
These recommendations, approved in January, lBSl by the
Mew Orleans Medical and Surgical Association, were agreed
to early the following month by the Auxiliary Sanitary
Association.

55

The Louisiana Board of Health was finding

sovereignty.increasingly difficult to maintain.

emocrat, January 23 > February 10, 1331.

CHAPTER XII
THE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH VICTORIOUS
At a meeting held In February, 1331, the attention
of the Louisiana Board of Health was directed to a letter
from the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley.

The

Board was reminded of the resolution adopted at the Sani
tary Council’s recent meeting expressing want of confidence
in New Orleans health authorities, and advising the Loui
siana Board to request the National Board of Health to
place an inspector at Mississippi Station, and another
inspector in New Orleans who would have access to the
records of the State Board of Health.

Six Board members

were hostile to this proposal, the others wishing to
propitiate the Sanitary Council.

The Board President,

Dr. Joseph Jones, declared that a majority of communities
and boards of health outside New Orleans did have confi
dence in the statement of Louisiana health authorities;
Jones asserted further that he would rather resign than
submit to a spy.

Mr. I. N. Marks stated that the entire

scheme was an insult to the Board and the integrity of
its members.

1

The Democrat expressed disappointment in the Board’s

1
Picayune, February 11, 1331.
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3S4
attitude.

Neighboring states clearly did not place trust

in pronouncements of the Louisiana Board of Health, d e 
clared the editorial, and although the distrust was un
justified, it could not be ignored, or New Orleans would
again be threatened by local quarantines.
position was made very clear:

The Democrat1s

"Popular excitement on the

subject of yellow fever has become so formidable and so
widespread, so intense and so unmanageable,

that we per

ceive the wisdom of conciliating rather than opposing
it."^

The T i m e s , even more concerned, asked its readers:

"Shall.we insist that its /"the Sanitary Council* s_7 very
reasonable request shall be granted, or shall we support
our State Board of Health in its effort to preserve what
it is pleased to consider its dignity and prerogative,
3

and run the risk of having our commerce ruined?
The Auxiliary Sanitary Association of New Orleans
came to the forefront in defense of the National Board
of Health.

Its President,

Charles A, Whitney, asserted

that only by acceptance of the Sanitary Council's prop
ositions could premature and unnecessary restrictions on
commercial and personal intercourse with the Crescent City
be averted.

Early in April the Association urged the

Governor to exercise his authority to grant the two

^Democrat, February 12, lBSl.
^Times, March 10, lSSl.
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requests of the Sanitary Council.^Dr. James L. Cabell, President of the National Board
of Health, asked Jones to make public the State Board’s
official stand on these propositions.
meeting Mr. Edward Booth,

At the March 10

speaking for the rest of the

Louisiana Board, asserted that the proposition involving
the inspector to be stationed by the National Board at
the Mississippi Quarantine involved legal difficulties,
and had been referred to the B o a r d ’s counsel and the state
Attorney-General.

Cabell was informed that agents of the

National Board might have access to mortality reports,
since this was a public right.
cases of infectious disease,

In doubtful and suspicious

a representative or agent of

the National Board of Health could be included when the
State Board called consultations with experienced physi
cians.

Booth stated that Louisiana health authorities

approved the resumption in 1331 of the sanitary inspection
of railroad and river craft at New Orleans.**
On one issue the Louisiana State Board was adamant
in its refusal to cooperate with federal health officials.
Cabell and others repeatedly pressed the matter of re
quiring all infected ships arriving at the mouth of the

^Report of the National Board of H e a l t h , 1330
(Washington, 183T7 , pp. 233-89.
5Annual Report of the Board of Health of the State
of Louisiana to the & eneraT"Assembly~Tor the~Year~T53T
jN e w Orleans,"TT332J, p p . 333*1 336-37.
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Mississippi River to go to Ship Island for detention and
treatment.

Local medical organizations and the New Or

leans press urged compliance, but the State Board of
Health steadfastly refused.

A member of the State Board

had declared, said Cabell, that if this plan were adopted:
’’Louisiana would no longer need protection.

It would be

entirely r u i n e d , and would soon disappear from the family
of S t a t e s .

Dr. Jones stated several times that New O r 

leans commerce was threatened by the Ship Island Quaran
tine.

In the 1330 Board of Health Report Jones pointed

out that sending vessels to Ship Island would necessitate
their traveling considerable distances out of the way:
95 miles from Eadsport,
211 from New Orleans.

130 from Mississippi Station,

and

However, his conclusion that com

merce would be driven from the Mississippi River was very
questionable, because only infected vessels, a small pe r 
centage of the total number, would have been subject to
this requirement.^
Opinion in the local press was far from unanimous
in support or condemnation of the State Board of Hea l t h 1s
position.

The Picayune and the States were among the

Bo a r d ’s leading defenders.

The latter journal declared:

^Report of the National Board of H e a l t h , 1333
(Washington, l33vT» P* 51^Report of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana . . . TF3D',~pp. 6U-5I.

3 #7
"The direct control of our quarantine should be left to
our local authorities who, from their personal experience
and close contact and familiarity w i t h the disease /""yellow
fever_7> are best qualified to enforce such measures as
may be adopted for its prevention."

The Democrat and the

Times were convinced that the State Board was pursuing a
dangerous policy.

The antagonism it displayed toward

the National Board of Health, the Democrat noted, had
resulted in the resignation of one of its members who
desired a more conciliatory policy.

The Democrat d e 

scribed the State Board's stand as one of "jealousy,
churlishness and general folly."

The editor said he

envisioned no remedy from Jones and the others directing
the sta t e ’s quarantine system.
was not remediable.

Jones' mind, he averred,

"We see nothing for the people save

to ask them to resign," continued the editorial,

"and to

put this request in such a shape as to prove beyond all
cavil that it represents the patriotism and intelligent
sentiment of the entire community."

The Times suggested

that the existing Board make room for one which would
adopt a policy acceptable to the people of N e w Orleans
and the Mississippi Valley.

9

The Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley

^States, March 31> lddl.

lddl.

9pemocrat, March 17> 29* 1SB1; Times, March Id,
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continued to grant strong support to the National Board
of Health.

At a meeting held in April, 1331 the Council

reaffirmed its stand.

The Louisiana Board of Health was

requested to invite the National Board to appoint and
maintain inspectors at Ne w Orleans, Mississippi Station,
and Eadsport.

Louisiana health officials were warned that

if they failed to act in good faith the boards of health
represented in the Council would be compelled to take into
their own hands the matter of providing quarantine pro
tection.

Emphasized especially was the need of excluding

infected ships from the Mississippi River.
Shortly thereafter, Governor Wiltz granted the N a 
tional Board of Health permission to station an inspector
at the Mississippi Quarantine.

The State Board had earlier

taken the position that it was without power to decide this
question; the Governor had been asked to assume responsi
bility.

Dr. G. F. Patton, a former state quarantine offi

cial, was appointed to the new post.

Patton resided at

Mississippi Station during the summers of 1331 and 1332,
but as might have been expected, he quickly wore out his
welcome.
The National Board of Health also created another
new office, that of Supervising Inspector.

Appointed to

this office was Dr. Stanford E. Chaille', one of the

^Democrat, April 25, 1331.
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Crescent C i t y ’s most prominent and most respected physi
cians.

According to his instructions, C h a i H e ' was re

quired, as the National B o a r d ’s "representative and chief
executive agent in Ne w Orleans," to obtain the earliest
possible information of the existence of yellow fever;
to secure, as nearly as practicable, uninterrupted
commerce between New Orleans and other places;

and,

if

yellow fever should break out, to cooperate in averting
its spread.

11

of doubtful,

In attempting to obtain early information

suspicious,

and unquestionable cases of

yellow fever, Chaille'issued a circular to physicians in
New Orleans and farther downstream.

Physicians were urged

to report immediately all cases of yellow fever so that
protective measures could be taken and neighboring states
notified of the whole truth, thereby forestalling panic
and shotgun quarantines.

12

Chaille'said later he was not

satisfied with the response to this circular.

Further

more, after attending three State Board o f Health meetings,
Chaille''concluded that very little could be learned t h e r e . ^
On May 12 Dr. Chaille'presented the Louisiana Board
of Health with five propositions which were answered a week

•^Report of the National Board of H e a l t h , 1331
(Washington, 188277 P* 291.
•^circular No. 1 in Scrapbook, ChaiHe''(Stanford E.)
Manuscripts, Rudolph Matas Medical Library, Tulane Uni v e r 
sity, N e w Orleans, Louisiana.
^ Report of the National Board of H e a l t h , 1 3 3 1 .
p . 293.

i
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later.

The proposition stating that all doubtful and

suspicious cases of yellow fever should be reported to
Chaille^ and that he be allowed to investigate in the
company of a person appointed by the State Board was un 
hesitatingly accepted.

The second proposition called for

a modification of the State Board’s resolution requiring
a unanimous opinion from its recently created Investigating
Committee on yellow fever cases.

Chaille^’s position was

that both the National Board member and the State Board
member of the Committee should be permitted to issue a
minority report on any case which had been investigated.
In reply the Louisiana Board of Health asserted that two
reports might tend to confuse the public mind and create
panic.

Chaille^ in proposition three, asked permission to

appeal to physicians, medical and sanitary organizations,
and so forth to get information regarding the earliest
yellow fever cases.

No objection was expressed,

previously noted, he made this appeal.

so as

Proposition four

stated that the National Board of Health should cooperate
with local health authorities in restricting the spread
of yellow fever.

The State Board agreed, and suggested

that aid not be limited only to times when epidemics were
already prevailing.
The fifth proposition presented the key point.

Ves

sels from infected ports should be examined at Eadsport,
declared Chaille' and if infected, or if there was reasonable
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ground for suspecting infection, those vessels should not
be allowed to proceed without a certificate from the In
spector of the National Board of Health at Ship Island.
This proposition, as expected, was turned down by the
Louisiana Board of Health.

Mississippi Station was said

to be better located~and better equipped to protect the
Mississippi Valley than was the nearby federal quarantine
station.

To stop ships at Eadsport,

and send them to

Ship Island, continued the State Boa r d ’s reply, would be
to abandon the power and authority conferred upon state
health officials by law.

The Board also claimed it had

no power to order vessels out of Louisiana waters to a
"j I

quarantine station over which it had no jurisdiction.
Chaille/protested the position taken by the State
Board of Health on the fifth proposition by stating that
the number of ships which would be sent to Ship Island
would be so small that it could have little effect on
New Orleans commerce.

Furthermore, he declared, no place

in the United States had proven itself as liable to yellow
fever as Mississippi Station; infected vessels should
therefore be kept away,

ChaTlle''maintained that there

was no valid legal obstruction to prevent sending them to
the Ship Island Quarantine.

15

After carefully inspecting

14-New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
IX (1381-8277 126-31.
1$I b i d ., pp. 134-37.
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the state quarantine grounds Chaille^ remarked in his DailyRecord and Reports that no accomodations were provided
healthy people subject to detention.

They had to remain

aboard their ship during the entire quarantine period.
ChaiHe** felt too that cleaning and disinfection procedures
at Mississippi Station were not thorough e n o u g h . ^

The

S t a t e s , totally unconvinced by these assertions, declared:
"The arguments of Dr. Chaille/ in favor of compelling ships
bound for this port to proceed, under certain circumstances,
to Ship Island, and there remain for a certain period, are
unsatisfactory, and the Board of H e a l t h ’s position on the
subject is impregnable on both the law and the facts.
There is no occasion, no reason, no shadow of justifica
tion for any such interference with the commerce of this
city
The Louisiana Board of H e a l t h ’s annual quarantine
against supposedly infected ports went into effect M a y 1.
According to the quarantine proclamation issued by Gov
ernor Wiltz,

ships arriving from Rio de Janeiro,' Vera

Cruz, Havana, and Aspinwall

(Colon) were to be detained

seventy-two hours at Mississippi Station.

As in previous

years, Galveston denounced the Louisiana quarantine on

^ S t a n f o r d E. Chaille/', Daily Record and Reports,
Apl. 26th, lSBl, in Chaille'Manuscripts, l o c . c i t .
^States,

June 20, lBBl.
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the grounds it afforded inadequate protection.

Conse

quently on June 9 the Board requested the Governor to amend
the quarantine proclamation to provide a detention period
of ten days instead of only three.

IB

A few days later a committee of ship agents approached
Jones,

protesting the quarantine modification.

They said

they represented a large number of ship agents and commer
cial men.

On June 15 Dr. F. Loeber resigned from the Board

in protest against the lengthening o f the detention period.
He said the amended proclamation was "not suggested by
experience or sanctioned by science and sound judgment,
but by fear and caprice."

Loeber predicted the ten day

quarantine would paralyze New O r l e a n s 1 export trade, at
the same time increasing the danger of epidemics by
keeping clean, healthy vessels in an infected atmosphere.
Trouble developed later in the summer between Dr.
Patton, the National B o a r d ’s inspector at Mississippi
Station,

and state health authorities.

Jones became irate

when in August Patton mistakenly notified the National
Board of Health of a suspicious case of yellow fever at
the quarantine ground.

A month later Dr. J. F. Finney,

the Resident Physician at Mississippi Sta'tion, called the

•^ R e p o r t of the Board o f Health o f the State of
Louisiana . , . iffgl, p. 426; U T N. John to’TJr. JosepTT”
Jones, Galveston, Texas, Ma y 7, lBBl, in Notebook and
Scrapbook of Dr. Joseph Jones (lBBl), Louisiana State
Board of Health Library Historical Collection, l o c . c i t .
^ p i c a y u n e , June 14, 17> 1B&1.
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State Board’s attention to aspects o f Patt o n ’s conduct
which he felt were improper.

The United States Consul

General in Rio de Janeiro also protested the "very im
proper course" pursued by Patton in publicizing false
statements made by a ship captain that a physician in
the Brazilian capital sold certificates of inspection
and disinfection without actually performing those services.

20

/•

At the end of l88l C h a i H e ' replied to charges

made by Jones against Patton and the National Board of
Health.

Chaille/ remarked that with reference to Patton,

Jones’ accusations had "committed great injustice by inference, omissions and forgetfulness."

21

In December Dr. Jones sent to each m ember of the
state Legislature a copy of the Board o f Health Report
for 1831 and a letter directing attention to Louisiana’s
total freedom from infectious and contagious diseases
during 1880 and 1881.

Because of this exemption, Jones

averred, the commercial and material prosperity of New
Orleans and the entire state had been greatly increased,
and friendly relations had been maintained with surround
ing states.

These happy conditions were said to have

resulted from "the efficient and rigid quarantine and

^ R e p o r t of the Board o f Health of the State of
Louisiana . , . ltH?l, pp. 4
1
Pica~yune, September 30,
October 2$, 1881. ^ S t a n f o r d E. Chaille/ The La. State Board of
Health in its Annual Report for 1881 versus the National
Board of H e a l t h , Reply in Behalf of the Latter (New Or 
leans, 1382), p. 3.
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enlightened execution of the sanitary laws of the State."
Jones declared the State Board had accomplished this w i t h 
out "one farthing" from the National Board of Health— a
statement which was denied by Berniss— or from any other
organization.

22

Governor McEnery seems to have been greatly impressed
by Jones'

assertions.

In his message to the General

As

sembly the following May, McEnery mentioned the "unprec
edented health" enjoyed by Louisianians during the past
two years,

and said it had been "in a large measure due

to the untiring energy,
of duty,

careful

and intelligent discharge

firmness and courage in combating prejudices,

the members of the State Board of Health.

..."

of

The

state quarantine had proven a success, the Governor con
tinued, and the Board's recommendations for its improve
ment should be carried out „ 2^
Antagonism between state and national health author
ities did not ease in 1882.
as in the past,

Issues were much the same

although before the summer had ended the

eventual victor in the struggle had been quite clearly
determined.

In April Governor McEnery,

at Chaille^’s

request, again extended to the National Board of Health

^ P i c a y u n e , December 10, 1881; N ew Orleans Medical
and Surgical J o u r n a l , n.s., IX (1881-82J , 617-13.
23p f f jcial Journal of the Proceedings of the House
of Representatives of the State of L o u i s i a n a , at the R e g 
u l a r Session . . . 1882 (Baton Rouge"J 1882), p* 15*
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the privilege of stationing an inspector at the Mississippi
Quarantine.

However, McEnery insisted that this inspector

subject himself to the regulations of the Louisiana Board
of Health, and provide aid and assistance to the state
Quarantine Officer.

He declared that the National Board’s

inspector should not supervise, control, or direct the
actions of the Quarantine Officer, or in any way inter
fere with his performance of duties imposed upon him by
the laws of L o u i s i a n a . ^
The New Orleans Times-Democrat loyally backed the
National Board of Health during the spring and summer of
1882, even though the writing on the wall was becoming
increasingly distinct.

Health authorities in New York,

Baltimore, and other cities were joining the Louisiana
Board of Health in calling for an end to federal inter
ference in local sanitary matters.

The Mississippi Valley

was strongly behind the National Board, but elsewhere its
support was not formidable.

The Ship Island project had

never been accepted by the Louisiana Board despite its
approval by some New Orleans newspapers and most of the
local medical organizations.

The Times-Democrat. reminding

its readers of the shotgun quarantines of 1878 and 1379>
called upon the public to manifest clearly its sentiment

^ P r o c eedings of the Board of Health, Vol. 2
(April-August, 1832], Manuscript in the Louisiana State
Board of Health Library Historical Collection, loc. cit.
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in favor of the National Board of Health.

"The only

course for us," stated the editor, "is a frank and hearty
acceptance of the overtures of the National Board, and a
grateful recognition of the benefits involved in their
presence and cooperation."25
The Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley stated
its position during its annual meeting held at Cairo in
April.

The work of the National Board of Health was

granted official approval, and Congress was urged to make
necessary appropriations to enable it to continue its
functions.

The National Board was asked by the Council

to re-establish its Inspection Service on the Mississippi
River and on railroads, and to place on duty in New Or
leans and other Southern ports an inspector to supervise
the shipment of all goods by river and rail.

The Sani

tary Council resolved also that the National Board should
maintain an inspector at Eadsport who would act conjointly
with an officer of the Louisiana Board in excluding infected
vessels from the river.

Another very important resolution

endorsed the immediate passage by Congress of the contro
versial Harris Bill which would have extended the quarantine
powers of the National Board of Health beyond I 8B3 .
Congress, however, was not very favorably disposed

25k ew Orleans Times-Democrat, April 9, 29> May
14, 1SS2.
2^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
IX (1381-3577 870- 71 .
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toward federal health officials, especially with regard
to quarantine jurisdiction, and before long the National
Board had its authority materially reduced.

In order to

operate effectively the National Board of Health required
a substantial annual appropriation, but in 1332 the amount
it received was scarcely enough to keep it alive.

Envi

sioning the termination of the national quarantine, the
Mississippi Valley fought tenaciously to preserve un
diminished the power held by the organization it consid
ered its greatest benefactor.
Opposition to the National Board was stronger in
the House than in the Senate,

The total appropriation

provided by the House to sustain the Board was only
$17,500.

The Senate voted an amendment to raise this

figure to nearly eighty thousand dollars, but the House
would not agree.

In discussing the question of the Sen

ate amendment Representative Simonton of Tennessee argued
that efficient quarantine on the Mississippi River was
essential.

Boards of health, cotton exchanges, and cit

izens throughout the Mississippi Valley, he declared, had
sent telegrams imploring Congress to increase appropria
tions for the National Board of Health.. Representative
Reagen of Texas asserted that four vessels had been sent
to Ship Island during the summer of 13S1, any one of which
could have introduced a yellow fever epidemic.

Congress

man Butterworth of Ohio agreed that disease had to be
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kept from the country, but maintained that the Marine
Hospital Service was adequately organized and equipped
to perform this function.

He regarded the National Board

of Health as a needless bureau.
Congressman Dunn of Arkansas said that either the
National Board should be abolished outright, or Congress
should grant it enough money to perform its services
effectively.

The Mississippi River Inspection Service

was particularly important, stated Dunn, because without
it people living in the Mississippi Valley were at the
mercy of the Louisiana Board of Health.

Local boards,

he continued, did not satisfy public demands; the pro
tection they provided was not adequate.

Dunn believed

the Marine Hospital Service incapable of handling the
momentous task of preventing importation of epidemic
diseases.

He urged that a strong National Board of Health

be retained.

Representative Cox of New York, a leading

opponent of the National Board, made it clear he would
not vote for the Senate amendment.

f,Not one dollar is

for the preservation of health," he declared, Mit is
simply to pay salaries to men around Washington who are
doing no good, but only starting rumors about the prev
alence of disease here and there, for the purpose of
being enabled to draw their salaries.

^Congressional Record . . . , Forty-Seventh
Congress, First Session (Washington, 1&$2), Vol. 13>
Part 7* p p T 6$9l-902.
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With the refusal of the House to concur in the Senate
amendment, the appropriation bill was sent to a conference
committee.

There the House had its way; the National
- -

Board was to get only a fraction of the money it requested.
Senator Isham Harris of Tennessee, the Board’s firmest
adherent, said he would vote against the report of the
conference committee.

The National Board of Health,

according to Harris, had spent an average of $153,000 a
year during the first three years of its existence and
needed a minimum of $121,000 to continue its functions
properly.

If other senators had witnessed scenes of death

in Memphis, he averred, they would not be so anxious to
agree to a niggardly appropriation for the organization
which protected the entire Mississippi Valley.

Harris

stated he did not know of a board of health (aside from
that of Louisiana) or a sanitary organization anywhere
that did not desire the maintenance of the National Board
of Health.2g
The Times-Democrat, seeing the National Board in
imminent danger, protested the crippling of an institution
which it maintained was needed desperately.

It reminded

readers of the shotgun quarantines in 1373 and 1379.

An

editorial appearing July 27 remarked that on the surface
the primary cause of trouble between the Louisiana State

2gIbid., pp. 6949-50.
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Board of Health and federal health officials was the
extreme states’ rights views of Dr. Jones.

The Times-

Democrat implied, however, that perhaps the battle Jones
was waging against the National Board was more of a personal fight than one based upon principle.

29

Upon careful

appraisal of evidence in this controversy, the author is
convinced the Times-Democrat was on the right track.
Dr. William G. Austin, a member of the Louisiana
Board of Health in 1879> came to the defense of the Na
tional Board by asserting that the hostility manifested
by Congress toward it was regretted by every sanitarian
in the

country.

localboard can,

Austin declared further:

,TNo State or

in the exercise of their limited police

powers, effectually prevent the importation of contagious
and infectious diseases without the cooperation of the
National Board of Health.

. . .’’^0

The Memphis Appeal

remarked that the discontinuance of the Mississippi River
Inspection Service would be ’’most unfortunate, if not a
national calamity.”^**- The Memphis Avalanche stated that
local and state boards had proven utterly incompetent to
deal with national public health problems.

Residents of

the Mississippi Valley were urged by the Avalanche to wage

29Times-Democrat, June 22, July 9, 21, 27» 1882.
3°Ibid., July 11, 1882; Picayune, July 15> 1882.
^ M e m p h i s Appeal, July 12, 1882, in scrapbook,
Chaille^ M a n u s c r i p t s T ioc. cit.
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vigorous protests against the proposed action of Congress
to destroy the usefulness of the National Board of H e a l t h . ^
Editorial comment in N ew Orleans newspapers was as
divided as ever regarding the merits of the National Board
of Health.

The States thought Congress would be acting

wisely if only a meager appropriation for the "National
Board of Sensationalists" was voted.

The editor said he

had held from the beginning that the National Board was
an "utterly useless body."

His chief complaint was that

anxieties had been needlessly stirred in the past by sen
sational reports emanating from national health officers,
and these same officials,

he said, were presently trying

to inflame the country with apprehensions o f the spread
of pestilence if the Board's authority should be undermined.
The National Board's river and rail inspection services
were beneficial, asserted the S t a t e s , but they could be
operated equally as well by the marine and army medical
corps.

Dr. John Hamilton,

Surgeon General of t he United

States Marine Hospital Service, declared that the river
inspection service could be performed without charge.
Jones was enthusiastic concerning Hamilton's proposition
to have the Marine Hospital Service take over this duty.
Both Jones and the States believed Hamilton's agency to

^^Memphis A v a l a n c h e , June 23» 1S&2;
Chaille^Manuscripts, l o c . c i t .

in scrapbook,
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be inoffensive.33
On August 7 the appropriations bill finally passed,
with the National Board of Health receiving a substantially
smaller grant than had been requested, although its fate
was not immediately clear.

The total appropriation for

public health was $16$,000, but $100,000 of this amount
was to go to the President of the United States to aid
state and local boards of health prevent the spread of
disease in the event of a threatened or actual epidemic.
The disposition to be made of this "epidemic fund" was
left open to' speculation.

Fifty thousand dollars was

earmarked to state and local boards of health to aid
them in carrying out their rules and regulations aimed
at preventing the introduction and spread of contagious
and infectious diseases.

Only eighteen thousand dollars

was to go directly to the National Board, and this entire
amount was for salaries, rent, light, fuel, stationery,
and so on.

Mention of inspection services and quarantine

stations was conspicuously absent.3^
The question arising upon passage of this measure
involved the ultimate dispensation to be made of the
$150,000 appropriated for aid to state and local boards
of health.

1$$2

.

The National Board promptly put in its claim

33states , July 14, 27, 1$$2; Picayune, July 2$,

3^Statutes at Large, Forty-Seventh Congress,
Session I (Washington, 1$83), XXII, 315*
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to the entire amount,

but this once proud agency was about

to go down to utter defeat.

President Chester A. Arthur

temporarily turned over to the Secretary of the Treasury
the $100,000 epidemic fund which could be expended only
in the face of an epidemic.

Dr. Hamilton of the Marine

Hospital Service as well as the National Board of Health
asked to be given possession of the money.

The S e c r e t a r y ’s

decision was in favor of the former, and shortly thereafter
word was received from Washington that the National Board
had virtually lost all hope that it could still acquire
the fund.^^
The government's decision on the fifty thousand
dollar appropriation was more definite.

The Comptroller

of the Treasury ruled that the National Board of Health
might select the local boards of health and quarantine
stations to receive aid from this fund,

but he also de 

clared that no part of the money could be used for in
spection stations existing solely under the National
Board's authority.

Unquestionably this blow ended the

effectiveness on the National Board of Health; the Board
was left with practically no capital with which to contin
ue operations.

Dr. Chaille''commented that this decision

would result in "grave misfortune" for New Orleans because
residents of the Mississippi Valley relied upon reports

35picayune, August 15, 21, l£$2.
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issued by federal health officers regarding health in the
Crescent City.

The Louisiana State Board of Health,

viewing the Comptroller1s decision very differently, was
overjoyed.

At a Board meeting held August 17 the Presi

dent of the United States and the Secretary of the Treas
ury were commended for their wisdom in giving the epidemic
fund to Dr. Hamilton’s agency, and the Board members re
solved they would cooperate with the Marine Hospital
Service in all measures to preserve the public health.
Simultaneously they asked for half of the fifty thousand
dollars in the care of the National Board in order to
^A
improve the s t a t e ’s three quarantine stations.
Even though the National Board of Health was severely
crippled,

it was not entirely dead.

During October the

Times-Democrat printed a series of editorials in its d e 
fense.

The state quarantine was said to be ruining New

O r l e a n s ’ coffee trade by detaining for te n days all ves
sels from infected ports.

N e w York, asserted the editor,

had won the coffee trade by adopting a more practical
quarantine.

The solution to this problem, he continued,

was to allow the National Board of Health to devise a
uniform quarantine system for the entire country.

The

National Board was lauded for the aid it granted Pensa
cola during the yellow fever epidemic which had been

3^Ibid., August IB, l£$2.
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raging there.

The National Boa r d ’s effective response

to the emergency was compared to the ’’dilatory red-tape
system” of the Marine Hospital Service.

Pensacola was

said to have appealed for aid to the latter organization
for two months, but it had failed to act.

The editor of

the Times-Democrat found it easy to understand why two
days earlier the American Public Health Association had
’’unanimously and enthusiastically” endorsed the National
Board of Health instead of the Marine Hospital Service.

37

At this annual meeting of the American Public Health
Association Dr. James L. Cabell, President of the National
Board of Health,

spoke of the embarrassing position in

which his organization had been placed in being charged
with important duties and yet deprived of the means of
executing them.

Cabell directed attention to the report

of a senate committee which had investigated the best
means of preventing the introduction and spread of epi
demic diseases.

The committee credited the National Board

with having accomplished highly important results which
could not have been accomplished by any other agency.

The

President of the American Public Health Association, Dr.
R. C. Kedzie of Michigan, denounced ’’the hostile indif
ference of Congress and the Executive to the National
Board of Health.”

’’The painful conviction abides with

37Times-Democrat, October 1, 7» 20, 1B82.
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us," asserted Kedzie, "that a fearful blunder has been
made in . . . crippling the National Board of Health, and
that we have been guilty of the folly of changing front
in the presence of the f oe.r|3&
Dr. P. H. Bailhache of the Marine Hospital Service,
and also a member of the National Board of Health, stated
that the Marine Hospital Service, under the Treasury De
partment, had in the past conducted quarantine without an
appropriation, and at present had at least one medical
officer in every port in the United States.

Bailhache

felt that the National Board should never have been given
control over the quarantine.

Colonel Haddin of Memphis,

a leader of the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Val
ley, disagreed with Bailhache.

He did not believe the

Marine Hospital Service to be as effective, and noted
that its certificates of inspection were not valued as
highly as those of the National Board of Health.

Most

others at the convention agreed with Haddin; the Marine
Hospital Service, they believed, could not be trusted to
perform requisite t a s k s . ^
A Picayune editorial discussed the possibility that
the National Board of Health might yet be revived.

The

3^Public Health Papers and Reports Presented at the
Tenth Annual M eeting of the AmericanPublic Health Associ
ation,~1882 (Boston, T 3 8 3 )» VIII, 12, 72-74*
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proper place for quarantine powers, declared the Picayune,
was in the Treasury Department, because only it could
control commerce.

The Treasury Department, continued the

editorial, had in the Marine Hospital Service and the
revenue cutter service as organized machinery for in
spection, and should therefore be entrusted with all
national health and quarantine matters.

The editor could

see no reason for setting up a special body of men in
spired by local interests, with private and personal
jealousies, and pay those men to find disease where it did
not e x i s t . ^

Opponents of the National Board of Health

pointed out that prior to June, 1$79 the Marine Hospital
Service had controlled the national quarantine, and it
would automatically regain control if the National Board’s
quarantine powers were allowed to l a p s e . ^
Senator Harris and some of his colleagues continued
the fight to save the National Board of Health.

Harris

reported in January, 1SS3 that his committee on the pre
vention of epidemic diseases recommended the repeal of
section ten of the quarantine act of June 2, 1&79.

This

section made the law operative for only four y e a r s . ^

If

4-Qpjcayune, November 6, 1BS2.
^■The quarantine law passed April 29, 1$7# would
then be in effect again.
^ Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United
States, Forty-Seventh Congress, Second Session~TWashington,
lU83), Vol. 1, Report No. 942, p. 1. This was the report
to which Dr. Cabell referred during his address to the
American Public Health Association.
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Harris had been successful in securing that legislation,
the National Board's quarantine powers would have been
extended indefinitely.
The Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley* which
had worked closely with the National Board of Health, man
aged to keep up agitation for retaining the Board and for
restoring its past authority.

A very important meeting

of this body was held at Jackson, Mississippi April 3-4,
1$&3.

The Council’s Executive Committee in issuing its

call for the meeting directed attention to the diminished
powers of the National Board, and also to the Louisiana
Board’s attitude toward the New Orleans Auxiliary Sanitary
Association and other state boards of health in the Mis
sissippi Valley.

Several days before the meeting convened,

the Louisiana State Medical Society, the Orleans Parish
Medical Society,

„nd the New Orleans Medical and Surgical

Association urged the Louisiana State Board of Health to
cooperate with the Sanitary Council to maintain unob
structed commerce and travel in the Valley during the
coming summer.

On March 27 the State Board appointed a

committee to confer with the three local medical organ43
izations.
The conference was held March 31; its object, as
stated by the Chairman, was to establish a basis of

^•3Picayune > March 23, 2$, lSo3 ; Times-Democrat,
March 2$, 18$3•
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cooperation and harmony among the bodies concerning action
to be taken at the Sanitary Council’s Jackson meeting, due
to convene a few days later.

The State Board was asked

whether it would be represented at Jackson, and what as
surances it could give that all cases of yellow fever and
suspicious fevers would be reported promptly to health
associations in the Mississippi Valley.

Mr. I. N. Marks

replied that it was neither desirable nor expedient for
the Board to be represented at Jackson.

A few members,

he pointed out, could not bind the rest of the Board to
any course of action.

It was the Louisiana Board’s duty

to protect the city of New Orleans, the state of Louisi
ana, and the entire Mississippi Valley, Marks declared.
Marks later refused to endorse resolutions lauding the
Sanitary C o u n c i l . ^
At a meeting of the Louisiana Board April 2 a res
olution stating that the Board "would maintain a rigid
quarantine during the summer months, give boards of health
in surrounding states prompt information on the appearance
of yellow fever in New Orleans, and keep its health records
open was passed unanimously.

The resolution declared

further that the Board’s resources for quarantine pur
poses were adequate to guarantee no interruption in the
service.

Regarding the Jackson meeting, mention was made

^Picayune, April 2, l£&3
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by Dr. Edward Booth that legally constituted authorities
(the Louisiana State Board of Health) could not properly
send delegates in an official capacity to an irrespon
sible, though respectable, volunteer assemblage of citizens
(the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley).^
Board’s stand made good sense to the Picayune.

The

The Sani

tary Council assumed the Louisiana Board would neglect
and ignore its duties, remarked the editor, and still had
the effrontery to ask the Board to participate in a move
ment to place itself under surveillance.^
The meeting of the Sanitary Council at Jackson was
conducted in an atmosphere of emergency.

Dr. Bemiss, a

member of the National Board of Health, had announced
recently that his organization had only enough money to
continue inspections until June 2.

Bemiss noted, however,

that the Treasury Department had ordered the Marine Hos
pital Service to carry on inspections without charge.^7
Among the resolutions adopted by the Council were first,
the President of the United States should be petitioned
to place the $100,000 epidemic fund in the hands of the
National Board of Health;

second, if the National Board

were deprived of its inspection powers, the Sanitary

^ Ibid., April 3, 1S33.
^6Ibid.
47ibid., April 2, 1332.
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Council was to commence issuing certificates of inspection
to be accepted as valid by boards of health in the Valley,
provided the inspections were carried on under rules and
regulations prescribed by the National Board; and third,
states were recommended to make voluntary contributions
to continue the river and rail inspections.

A fourth res

olution recommended to health organizations in the Valley
was the adoption of the system of inspection,

isolation,

disinfection, and quarantine advocated by the National
Boara of Health.

Finally, the Louisiana Board of H e a l t h ’s

promise to cooperate with the Sanitary Council was cor)d
dially approved and acknowledged.
The editor, of the
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal was sorry the
Louisiana Board did not choose to be represented at Jack
son; he believed its presence at the meeting would have
engendered a more general feeling of confidence in health
reports emanating from New Orleans.

49

Seemingly, the greatest immediate concern was over
the Sanitary Council’s first resolution,

i. _e., that the

$100,000 epidemic fund be placed at the disposal of the
National Board of Health.

The Secretary of the Treasury

decided several months before that the fund would go to
the Marine Hospital Service, but the money had not yet

^ N e w Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
X (Igd2-S3T7“352.

^Ibid., p. 851.

been transferred.

The Sanitary Council, shortly after the

meeting’s adjournment, sent a petition to President Arthur
requesting that the $100,000 be channeled to the National
Board.

This petition, according to the Times-Democrat,

represented the desires of nine-tenths of the people of
the Mississippi Valley.

SO

Memphis threatened a rigid

quarantine against New Orleans if the money were not
granted to the National Board of Health . ^

The Louisiana

Board, as adamant as ever, adopted a resolution urging
the President to turn the fund over to the Marine Hospital
Service, and another resolution endorsing the Marine Hos
pital Service "unequivocally."

The State Board’s efforts

were rewarded; in May Dr. Hamilton wrote to Jones thanking
hi m for his help, and informing him that the Marine Hos
pital Service hacl finally received the money.
The State Board of Health n e x t .became involved in an
embroglio with the Auxiliary Sanitary Association of New
Orleans.

Editorial comment was unfavorable to the Board,

but its stand was' unwavering.

The Board refused to accept

any financial assistance from the local Sanitary Associa
tion, contending the aid was illegal.

The States, a

journal ordinarily defending the Louisiana Board, suggested
that the Board had become too pugnacious and sensitive, and

^ T i m e s -Democrat, April 6, 1SS3.
^ Picayune, April 12, 1SS3.
52ibid., April 20, May 29,

•
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urged it to cooperate with the Association.53

The Times-

Democrat denounced the Board’s policy of hostility and
warfare.

Dr. Formento, a Board member was quoted as

having said that differences between the two public
health organizations were ’’strictly personal and alto
gether unnecessary.”

Formento blamed the Board of Health

for the conflict and repudiated its action. The TimesDemocrat asserted that the Board preferred to see the
health of New Orleans residents suffer rather than accept
54
aid "so generously and courteously proferred .1ty
On June 2 the quarantine powers held by the National
Board of Health four years terminated abruptly.

The Sani

tary Council of the Mississippi Valley, still manifesting
no faith in Louisiana health officials, assumed control
of the river and railroad inspection services July 1.
The Memphis Avalanche reported July 7 that the Council
had established inspection stations at New Orleans, Fort
Adams (Mississippi), and President’s Island (near Memphis).
The Avalanche noted a remark by Colonel Haddin, the Council
President, asserting that although his organization had
no money it was backed by the moral influence of thirteen
states.

The Marine Hospital Service, still not in full

possession of the quarantine stations, was said to be

53states, May 30, 1BB3*

54Times-Democrat, May 30, 31> 1 8 3 3 .
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nervously awaiting d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h e Memphis Public
hedger stated that local health authorities preferred to
follow the dictates of the Sanitary Council rather than
the Marine Hospital Service.^
The Louisiana Board of Health, seconded by the Pic
ayune , remained strongly in favor of the Marine Hospital
Service.

Dr. Jones referred to Hamilton, its number one

officer, as custodian of the government's quarantine
authority and its highest agent in the work of public
hygiene.

The Picayune maintained that steamboat inspec

tions should be performed by the Marine Hospital Service
instead of the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley.
The Sanitary Council was said to be a voluntary organiza
tion proposing to subsist its agents on involuntary con
tributions from river commerce.

Without a shadow of legal

status, declared the Picayune, the Council was undertaking
to tax transportation and to prescribe conditions of travel
and traffic between states.

The editor regarded the Coun

cil's refusal to recognize inspection certificates issued
by the Marine Hospital Service to be absurd.

The Sanitary

Council was also assailed for attempting to "resuscitate"
the National Board of Health, which according to the

55picayune, July 9, 1$$3.
56oiipping from Memphis Public Ledger in the Board
of Health Notebook and Scrapbook (1883)> Louisiana State
Board of Health Library Historical Collection, loc. cit.
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Picayune, had fallen dead under the weight of its own
unsavory record.

57
'

Meanwhile, on May 1 Louisiana’s seasonal quarantine
went into effect in compliance with the provisions of Gov
ernor McEnery’s quarantine proclamation.

Vessels arriving

from several West Indian, Mexican, and Brazilian ports
were made subject to a ten day detention during which the
vessels and their cargoes were to undergo cleansing and
disinfection.

Vessels arriving from other West Indian

ports and from ports on the Isthmus of Panama and the
northern coast of South America were to be inspected, and
then cleansed, disinfected, and detained as directed by
the Louisiana State Board of Health.

McEnery ordered

quarantine officers to enforce the regulations energeti
cally, and requested the Board of Health to prosecute
violators vigorously.^
By the end of May complaints were being registered
in New Orleans newspapers that the quarantine endangered
the city’s commerce.

The fault lay, declared the Times-

Democrat, with ’’the arbitrary rendering of its provisions
by the State Board of Health.”

The quarantine against

Jamaica and Colon was described by the same journal as

57picayune, July 10, 13> 1333*
^Quarantine Proclamation of Governor Samuel
Douglas McEnery in the Board of Health Notebook and Scrap
book (1333), Louisiana State Board of Health Library His
torical Collection, lac. cit.

’’illogical, unreasonable and unjust.”

Speaking of the

danger to commerce, the Times-Democrat *s editor asserted:
’’Capital and enterprises are employing every energy to
promote it during half the year, while during the other
half there is a perpetual clamor for more rigorous measures
to restrict and destroy it.”-^
Later during the summer this criticism was greatly
modified.

Noting the danger of having large numbers of

infected vessels quarantined at Mississippi Station, the
Times-Democrat once again advocated the use of Ship Is
land as a protective measure.

Ship Island had been aban

doned early in July by the National Board of Health, but
its quarantine facilities were taken over before long by
the Marine Hospital Service.

The State Board and the

Governor were very much aware that New Orleans, the en
tire state of Louisiana, and the Mississippi Valley were
in imminent danger from the infected ships undergoing
detention at this very time at the quarantine g r o u n d . ^
This perilous situation called for immediate action.
At a special meeting of the State Board of Health held
July 23, attention was focused on a letter from Governor
McEnery which declared Mississippi Station to be virtually
an infected port.

The safety of the city and the state,

59t imes-Democrat, May JO, June &, July 13, 18S3.
^ P i c a y u n e , July 6,
July 23, 24, 1333.
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and the highest public interests, said the Governor, de
manded a rigid quarantine.

The response to McEnery's

appeal was quick and decisive.

With only one dissenting

vote the Board adopted a resolution requesting the Gover
nor to proclaim non-intercourse with yellow fever ports,
and to order all infected vessels out of state waters.
Feeling in the Crescent City toward the Board's non
intercourse policy seems to have been generally favorable.
The Picayune declared that the city had never been as
unanimous before in demanding a perfectly rigid quarantine.
Among others, the Cotton, Stock, and Produce Exchanges
were said to favor non-intercourse.^

The Times-Democrat

remarked that New Orleans could no longer be charged with
carelessness and recklessness in health matters.

''No city

has become more active and energetic than this in sani
tary matters," declared the editor, "none give .more time
and consideration to them."
This widespread approval of the new, rigid quaran
tine was short-lived.

The Chamber of Commerce, meeting

August 16, passed a resolution commending the Board of
Health for its vigilant and effective execution of state
sanitary laws, but recommending that the proclamation of

^ P i c a y u n e , July 24 > 1$$3«

62I b i d . , July 24, 1$$3.
63Times-Democrat, July 2$, 1$$3 .
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non-intercourse be modified immediately. ^

A week later

the Picayune noted that non-intercourse had been combatted
from a sanitary, a commercial, and a legal point of view.
Non-intercourse was staunchly upheld by the Picayune be
cause it was said to provide certain protection, whereas
a less absolute system did not.

On legal grounds non-in

tercourse was justifiable, asserted the Picayune, because
it was based on the right of self-protection.

Apparently,

concluded the editorial, the majority of New Orleanians
and other residents of the Mississippi Valley warmly ap6*5
proved this rigid policy. '
Agitation against non-intercourse continued.

Upon

request of the Chamber of Commerce and various New Orleans
commercial exchanges, the Board of Health relented early
in September and abolished non-intercourse.

The ten day

quarantine was then re-established, remaining effective
until November 1.

The Times-Democrat believed the adop

tion of non-intercourse saved New Orleans and the area
downstream from a visitation of Yellow Jack.

The Missis

sippi Valley, asserted the journal, certainly had no cause
for complaint with regard to protective measures employed
to avert epidemics in l £ $ 3 . ^

^ P i c a y u n e , August 17, 1$&3.
^ I b i d . , .August 25, l£$3•
^ I b i d . j September 7* October 5> 1$$3> TimesDemocrat, September 7> 1$33 •
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The National Board of Health was still in existence,
however, and its adherents were evidently as vociferous as
ever in proclaiming the need of having its quarantine
powers restored.

The American Public Health Association

resolved in November,

1883 that the act of June 2, 1879»

from which the National Board had derived its quarantine
authority, was ”a wise and judicious measure,” and Con
gress was advised to re-enact this m e a s u r e , ^

The annual

report of the National Board of Health for 1883, the last
yearly report issued by the Board, printed resolutions
adopted by many leading sanitary organizations throughout
the United States.

These resolutions wrere in support of

the National Board,

lauding its past accomplishments, and

urging that it be revivified at once.
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Early the following year the Picayune remarked on the
attempt being made to ’’resurrect” the National Board of
Health.

This move was unwise, thought the editor, be

cause the Marine Hospital Service met all requirements
for supervision of national sanitary matters including
quarantine.

The Marine Hospital Service was said to have

nothing to gain by concealing the truth or by manufac
turing falsehoods.

According to the editorial, the

^ C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record . . . , Forty-Eighth Con
gress, First Session (Washington, 1884), Vol. 15, Part 1, p.
47ST"
^ R e p o r t of the National Board of H e a l t h , 1883 »
pp. 215- 26.
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National Board of Health had sometimes carelessly re
ported fever or the suspicion of fever, and had not
adhered to the facts.

The country had been unnecessarily

alarmed, and commerce injured.

New Orleans had been free

from epidemics for several years, continued the Picayune,
which indicated that existing precautions were the most
efficacious.
These comments by the Picayune were superfluous;
the battle had already been won.

Congress had decided

to allovf the National Board to continue its existence
as

avirtual nonentity.

vided

Meager appropriations were pro

the Board until 1833, and after that, none at all.

In 1393 the National Board of Health was officially abolished by act of Congress.
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Dr. Joseph Jones, after serving Louisiana as State
Health Officer during four eventful years, found it
necessary to relinquish his post early in 1334.

Governor

McEnery, paying tribute to Jones, told the state Legisla
ture:

"Courage, energy, vigilance and sagacity have

distinguished his administration, in which he has won
new honors and the gratitude of our p e o p l e S u c c e e d i n g

^^Picayune, January

17, 1334.

^ S t a t u t e s at Large
. .. , Forty-Seventh Congress,
Session II (Washington" 1893), XXVII, 452.
7-*-0fficial Journal of the Proceedings of the House
of Representatives of the State of Louisiana at the Reg
ular Session . . . H?34 (Baton Rouge, 1834 ), pp. 13-144
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Jones as President of the State Board of Health was Dr.
Joseph Holt, who was appointed to the Board only a week
before its annual organizational meeting in April.

At

this meeting Holt was elected President over Dr. Felix
Formento by a vote of six to two.

To reassure the public,

the Board then adopted resolutions stating first, that it
was the fixed and irrevocable policy of the Board of Health
to apply quarantine restrictions against all ports where
contagious or infectious disease existed, and to suspend
all communication with those ports if necessary;

second,

that it would exercise sleepless vigilance against the
outward threat of epidemic disease,
Mississippi,

Alabama, and Florida to do likewise; and

third, that sanitary organizations
health)

and called upon Texas,

(including boards of

from other states xvere to be granted unrestricted

access to all records and health reports of the Louisiana
Board of Health, both at the quarantine stations and at
its central office in New Orleans.
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The choice of Dr. Holt, a former Sanitary Inspector,
as President of the Board was a popular o n e ,

The Times-

Democrat referred to Holt as a man of "indefatigable en
ergy . . . , highly esteemed, and well known throughout
the country and in every way admirably suited to the

^ P i c a y u n e , April 13» 18&4.
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position to which he has been e l e v a t e d . " ^

However, Dr.

Formento, piqued at having been denied the post, resigned
with the statement that evidently his services had not
been appreciated.

Formento was senior medical member on

the Board of Health, and had for years tried to create
a spirit of conciliation and cooperation with sanitary
organizations in Louisiana and adjoining states.

He felt

he had earned the presidency, but the other Board members
had elected the newcomer, Joseph Holt.
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On April 14 the Board of Health held a special meet
ing and resolved to request the Governor to proclaim a
quarantine effective May 1.
ports were provided;

As in 1S83, two lists of

vessels from some ports were to be

detained ten days, and vessels from the others were to be
detained

for a period which the Board might direct.

75

This quarantine proved inadequate according to H o l t ’s
standards.

Holt recommended June 9 that vessels arriving

from ports in the West Indies, Mexico, Central America,
and Brazil, which under the Governor’s April proclamation
would have been quarantined ten days,
for a period of forty days.

should be detained

The Board agreed, with only

one dissenting vote, the result being that Louisiana had

73Times-Democrat, April 14, 1$&4.
74pj.cayune, April 15, 1&&4*

75ibid.
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a forty day quarantine (a quarantine in the literal sense)
for the first time since General Butler’s occupation of
New Orleans during the Civil War.

*7f \

i

Not satisfied with this extremely rigid quarantine,
Holt told a meeting of New Orleans businessmen that he
was trying to get a twenty-five thousand dollar appropri
ation from the Legislature in order to install an efficient disinfection apparatus at Quarantine Station.
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Holt was determined to provide the entire Mississippi
Valley with optimum protection.

The State Board of Health,

with the threat to its sovereignty seemingly erased, was
ready to pursue its vitally important task with renewed
vigor.

?6Ibid., June 10, lBG4o
77joseph Holt, Quarantine and Commerce . . .
(New Orleans, n.d.}, pp. 11-14#

CHAPTER XIII
SUMMARY

The public health movement was among the count ry ’s
major reforms of the nineteenth century.

One hundred years

ago Americans were questioning the right of the state to
interfere with the liberty of the individual to secure
the health of the next generation.

Could the community

compel a person to undergo isolation or inoculation or
other preventive measures for the purpose of protecting
society?

Victory over conservatism in public health

matters did not come at once, but was achieved only
through t h e determined efforts of dedicated reformers
over long periods of time.

A generally favorable climate

of social responsibility has been one of the great advance
ments of recent decades.
Within the medical profession a similar transformation
was taking place.

To t h e traditional obligation of caring

for the sick, many nineteenth century physicians were em
phasizing an additional one:
prevent epidemics.

that of seeking a means to

Although preventive medicine was cer

tainly not unheard of prior to 1&Q0, organized public
health programs were uncommon.

Recognition that medicine

is partially a social science could not be grasped overnight.
The state of Louisiana earned for itself an enviable

425
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place of distinction in public health advancement.

Chiefly

because New Orleans was notoriously susceptible to epidem
ics, Louisiana established a Board of Health nearly a
decade and a half before similar action was taken by any
other state.

The Board had a tenuous existence at first,

but it attained permanent status within a few years
through public appreciation of its accomplishments.

State

control of the Board of Health was maintained except dur
ing the four years following the occupation of New Orleans
during the Civil War.
Prior to the creation of the State Board of Health
the Crescent City’s reputation for filth was all too well
known.

Early attempts to promote sanitary reform had not

been noticeably successful,

even though in some cases an

organized program was employed.

Unfortunately, the work

done by the State Board in furthering sanitation in the
Crescent City was often forgotten.

The Board found it

necessary to remind the public quite frequently that it
was charged with the task of improving sanitary conditions
in New Orleans and was endeavoring to do so.
The issue of the state quarantine captured the center
of attention.

The quarantine, along with the Board of

Health, was instituted by legislative action in 1&55 1 an<i
remained an extremely controversial matter during ensuing
decades.

When the quarantine failed to avert the out

break of an epidemic disease, the Board’s future was in
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jeopardy; when the quarantine seemed to be succeeding,
sentiment in the Board’s favor was formidable.

Despite

determined opposition to the Board of Health from some
sources, public opinion tended more and more to regard
highly the work being performed by state health authori
ties.

Although yellow fever was not conquered until the

twentieth century, some success was being achieved in the
prevention of other maladies.
The appearance of the National Board of Health in
1$79 created a new problem.

The State Board was faced

immediately with the question of whether to cooperate
with this organization.

Residents of the Mississippi

Valley, believing health officials in New Orleans and at
Mississippi Quarantine Station incapable of preventing
the spread of yellow fever, urged Louisiana to accept
offers of assistance coming from Washington,

Primarily,

the objective was to keep vessels thought to be carrying
Yellow Jack and other presumably contagious diseases
from entering the Mississippi River.

Louisiana health

authorities refused this aid and continued to go it alone.
Had state health officials been willing to work hand
in hand with the National Board, important results might
have been attained.

Nevertheless, the State Board of

Health, having taken the measure of the interloping fed
eral agency, proceeded with its excellent program for the
betterment of health conditions in Louisiana.

Services
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performed by the Board have been increased steadily ever
since.

Louisiana*s nineteenth century public health

leaders prepared well for the future.
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